Legitimacy of the Maltese Financial Services Regulator by Muscat, Matthew
 
 
 
Legitimacy of the Maltese  
Financial Services Regulator 
 
 
 
Institute of Criminology 
University of Cambridge 
 
 
 
Matthew Muscat 
 
 
 
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Justice Tankebe 
 
 
 
 
St. Catharine’s College 
September 2019 
 
 
i		
 
Declaration 
 
 
This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work 
done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. 
 
It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently 
submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or 
any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in 
the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, 
or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the 
University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in 
the Preface and specified in the text. 
 
It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee.   
ii		
 
Abstract 
Legitimacy of the Maltese  
Financial Services Regulator 
 
This dissertation sought to investigate two interrelated issues: first, to explore the ‘basic 
legitimation demands’ of operators in the Maltese financial services sector; second, and 
arising from the first, to explore the influence of legitimacy perceptions on the behaviour of 
operators. Legitimacy – the recognition of power as morally valid – is an important topic to 
researchers across many disciplines and to policy makers. Unlike other disciplines, 
criminology has been a latecomer to legitimacy research, with Tom Tyler’s Why People Obey 
the Law being the watershed moment. Evidence in criminology shows legitimacy perceptions 
correlate with actual or intended compliance with laws and cooperation with legal authorities.  
However, a number of criticisms have arisen including how best to conceptualise and 
operationalise legitimacy. Some have argued that while criminologists theorise legitimacy as 
a social-scientific concept, their empirical analysis has not reflected this theorisation. 
Legitimacy scales are developed in ways that do not fully reflect the socially constitutive 
nature of legitimacy. Drawing on methodological insights from prisons research, this 
dissertation attempts to address this gap in the wider criminology literature. It does so in the 
context of the Maltese financial services regulator. In focusing on the Maltese financial 
services regulator, the dissertation also promises contributions to fields beyond criminology – 
for example, in sociology, management and organisational studies, and political science.  
How do operators in the Maltese financial services sector construct the legitimacy of the 
regulator? What basic legitimation demands do they make of the regulator? How do their 
views about the legitimacy of the regulator influence their self-reported behaviour and 
intentions toward the regulations? A mixed-methods research design was used to answer 
these questions. A qualitative component involved interviews with 49 Maltese financial 
services participants to discover what mattered to operators licensed by the Malta Financial 
Services Authority (MFSA) and why. Based on the interview data, a regulatory legitimacy 
scale was developed and tested among a sample of 226 Maltese financial services operators.  
Confirmatory factor analysis identified a three-factor legitimacy model comprising rule of 
law, distributive fairness and responsiveness. Further analysis showed that perceived 
legitimacy of MFSA was strongly correlated with positive attitudes to compliance. 
 
Matthew Muscat 
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Introduction  
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 resulted in the collapse of major financial institutions, 
leading to untold damage worldwide and deleterious effects that still reverberate today, 
particularly in Europe (“Ten years on; international banking”, 2017). Globally, more than 
US$20 trillion in wealth was lost and approximately 20 million workers lost their jobs 
(Barak, 2013). In the United States of America (USA) alone, more than four million 
homeowners faced legal foreclosures, with retail investors bearing the brunt of the losses 
(amounting to approximately US$9.8 trillion) and costing taxpayers US$700 billion in TARP 
bailout funds (Barak, 2013 Kaissar, 2018; Lybeck, 2011; Merle, 2018). Similar effects were 
felt on the other side of the Atlantic. In Europe, several financial institutions reported billions 
of euros in losses, prompting the European Union (EU) to agree to a range of financial 
remedies and bailouts aimed at strengthening economic growth and a number of European 
governments introducing strict austerity measures (Ryder, 2014; Tooze, 2018).  
The regulatory and enforcement response to the crisis emphasised deterrence 
strategies. Regulators imposed cumulative fines on banks worldwide to the tune of US$321 
billion (Grasshoff et al., 2017). Forty-seven bankers in seven countries (Iceland, Spain, 
Ireland, Cyprus, Germany, Italy and the USA) were also imprisoned for their role in the crisis 
and for engaging in a range of offences including fraud, insider trading, market manipulation, 
misappropriation, falsification of accounts and conspiracy to commit fraud, dispelling 
commonly held notions that no natural person would be found responsible for the crisis 
(Noonan et al., 2018). Regulations imposed on financial entities skyrocketed (with Grasshoff 
et al., (2017) estimating an average of 200 revisions per day). Moreover, close supervision of 
financial institutions replaced light-touch-regulation (“Ten years on; international banking”, 
2017). Despite the dominant role played by avaricious bankers in precipitating the crisis, 
regulators could have done more to prevent the damage and thus they too share responsibility 
(“Crash course: the origins of the financial crisis”, 2013). For instance, regulators allowed 
Lehman Brothers to become insolvent, fuelling panic and leading to a loss of trust in the 
market further stifling lending as a result (“Crash course: the origins of the financial crisis”, 
2013).  In an internal report, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Financial Services Authority 
admitted that regulatory errors existed in the supervision of Northern Rock (Clayton, 2010). 
This report identified poor internal communication and inconsistent enforcement of rules as 
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regulatory failings that contributed to red flags going undetected, leading to this bank’s 
decline (Armour et al., 2016).  
Apart from the contemptible conduct of bankers during the financial crisis, a raft of 
other scandals shook the financial services sector. These scandals have also been met with 
regulatory responses that emphasised deterrence as a strategy to control corporate 
wrongdoing. The Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) scandal, which had its roots in the 
1990s and was described by Megaw (2019:6) as “the UK’s largest consumer mis-selling 
scandal”, has cost UK banks more than £36 billion since January 2011. London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) manipulation led to a combined fine of £680m being imposed on 
Barclays and the Royal Bank of Scotland. Breaches of money laundering regulations by 
HSBC Bank resulted in a fine of US$2 billion (Tombs and Whyte, 2015). In these cases, a 
lack of effective supervision and wilful blindness on the side of UK and United States (US) 
regulators were also cited as factors that contributed to the egregious misconduct committed 
by regulated financial entities and individuals involved therein (Doane, 2012; Huang, 2015; 
National Audit Office, 2016; Stewart, 2018). The unlawful conduct of regulated companies 
and their employees, the contributory regulatory failings, the complexity of financial services 
regulation and the reliance on deterrence all underscore the importance of regulatory 
legitimacy as a mechanism for engendering voluntary compliance and cooperation with 
regulatory authorities (Bottoms, 2019). To the extent that authority is acknowledged as 
rightful, individuals (and companies) will feel a need to comply with the regulation and 
cooperate with the financial authority without being coerced to do so (Beetham, 1991). 
Legitimacy is an important consideration for regulatory compliance and cooperation because 
regulation involves the imposition of rules by governments or regulatory authorities backed 
by the use of sanctions that are intended to modify the behaviour of regulatees and the 
individuals therein (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
2002). If regulatees do not recognize the legitimacy of regulatory authorities, the deterrent 
effect of those sanctions might have little effect or result in defiance (Simpson, 2002). This 
argument takes on added importance in the European regulatory context. Arguments have 
been raised in competition cases that the imposition of substantial administrative fines on 
regulatees without recourse to a court hearing infringes article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the right to a fair hearing) because the fine is criminal in 
nature (A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy; Schindler Holding v. European Commission). 
Criminology has been a relative latecomer to legitimacy research, with Tom Tyler’s Why 
3 	
People Obey the Law representing the watershed moment. Evidence in criminology shows 
that perceptions of legitimacy correlate with actual or intended compliance with laws and 
cooperation with legal authorities. However, this link has been questioned on a number of 
grounds, including the conceptualization and operationalization of legitimacy. In criminology 
the failure to adequately conceptualize legitimacy has given rise to measurement errors due to 
a failure to differentiate between normative and empirical concepts of legitimacy (Tankebe, 
2014). Moral philosophers adopt a normative concept of legitimacy by utilising a set of 
“objective” criteria to examine legitimacy (Hinsch, 2010). In terms of a normative concept of 
legitimacy, the philosopher uses his or her own criteria to assess the legitimacy of a particular 
legal authority. In contrast, social scientists adopt the empirical concept of legitimacy in 
which they consider an institutional arrangement to be legitimate if, as a matter of fact, it 
gains the approval of those who are subject to the arrangement (Hinsch, 2010). In effect, 
social scientists consider a legal authority legitimate if its audience or audiences deem the 
legal authority legitimate even if it does not meet their own criteria as to what makes a legal 
authority legitimate. Drawing on Tankebe (2014), I argue that all empirical studies in 
criminology – apart from Liebling’s (2004) study on the quality of prison life – fail to 
adequately measure legitimacy as they adopt a normative approach by determining a priori 
and imposing legitimacy criteria in particular contexts. Tankebe (2014) has reasoned that in 
order to develop valid measures, criminologists ought to employ the two-stage social 
scientific approach that Liebling (2004) used in her research on the quality of prison life. The 
first stage is inductive and involves interviews or focus groups with audiences to discover 
what legitimacy means to them and why. The second stage is deductive and involves 
constructing and distributing a survey to the group under study that is grounded in the 
interviews and the focus groups and with a view to developing scales through exploratory 
and confirmatory factor analysis.  
This dissertation explores Tankebe’s proposition in the financial regulatory context, 
specifically focusing on the legitimacy of the Maltese financial regulator – the Malta 
Financial Services Authority (MFSA). The legitimacy of the MFSA as perceived by one of 
its main audiences – licensed operators – was selected for general and specific reasons. First, 
MFSA licensed operators are in Beetham’s (2013:19) terms the “relevant agents … subject to 
the power” of the MFSA. In their quest to build legitimacy, regulators may sometimes need 
to address multiple audiences or agents simultaneously with each audience having potentially 
different and conflicting expectations or demands (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Liebling, 
2002). For the MFSA, licensed operators and consumers of financial services (or the general 
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public) are the main audiences. The former are those “subject to the power” while the latter 
are, in Beetham’s (2013:19) language, “third parties whose support or recognition may help 
to confirm [MFSA’s claim to legitimate power]”. This is because in terms of article 4(1)(a) 
the MFSA Act, the regulator’s main objective is to regulate, monitor and supervise financial 
services in Malta. Although the MFSA is bound to act in the interests of other external 
stakeholders (such as consumers of financial services), this appears incidental to, or arising 
from, its main duty to regulating licensed operators. This argument is reinforced by 
examining structural changes within the MFSA. Before 2017, the MFSA housed the 
Consumer Complaints Unit which was charged with investigating complaints from private 
individuals relating to any financial services transaction, a function which has now been 
subsumed by the Arbiter for Financial Services. Second, Loader and Sparks (2013:109) argue 
that the term “audiences” refers “to those who have had direct experience” with 
powerholders. If that is correct, it is licensed operators, and not consumers of financial 
services, who have direct interactions with the MFSA. My third reason for choosing to focus 
on licensed operators is that financial crimes (such as insider trading and market 
manipulation) cause untold damage and are generally difficult to detect unless there is a 
smoking gun. Given the large number of regulated entities, it is impossible for the MFSA, to 
inspect and supervise the conduct of every single regulated entity (approximately 2000) as 
this would require costly expenditures of material and human resources which would be 
unsustainable and impractical (Wrong, 2004). Would it not be better if operators were to 
acknowledge the MFSA’s authority as legitimate? Indeed, instead of being coerced, they 
would then be willing to provide information to the financial regulator that may help to 
prevent the commission of financial crimes.  The research evidence suggests that this can be 
achieved if operators regard the Authority as legitimate. This is an important consideration 
because in criminology, research on regulatory legitimacy and the crimes of the powerful is 
limited.  
More specifically, recent cases have called into question the ability of the MFSA to 
effectively exercise its authority to prevent financial crimes. One such case was that of 
Maltese Cross Financial Services Limited (MCFSL), a Maltese company licensed by the 
MFSA to provide investment services in or from Malta. On 7 August 2014, the MFSA 
published an announcement that it had suspended the licence of MCFSL and revoked its 
approval for one of its directors, Mr Jean Claud Bugeja, to act as a director, compliance 
officer and money laundering reporting officer of the company. The MFSA also directed Mr 
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Bugeja to resign as a director of MCFSL, to desist from providing any financial services and 
not to access MCFSL’s records, IT systems and offices. These regulatory actions were taken 
due to allegations of misuse and manipulation of clients’ funds, resulting a loss of between 
€6 and €7 million. On 14 October 2014, it was reported that Mr Bugeja was to be indicted 
for misappropriation and fraud. Then on 28 October 2014, it was reported that MCFSL 
clients filed a judicial protest against the MFSA, holding the regulator responsible for the 
losses they had suffered. In particular, investors alleged that the MFSA was “grossly 
negligent, particularly in the period prior to August 2014” because the MFSA supervision of 
MCFSL appeared “to have been virtually inexistent” (Vella, 2014).  
Other specific reasons for selecting the Maltese context as an example to address 
measurement issues in legitimacy revolve around access. The researcher is a Maltese national 
and a non-practicing lawyer who worked in the Maltese financial services sector for three 
years and interned with the MFSA in its Enforcement Unit for nine months. Accessing elites, 
including individuals in the top managerial and supervisory roles of financial services 
operators (comprising chairmen, managing directors and chief executive officers of banks, 
insurance and investment entities as well as senior partners of law firms and accounting or 
auditing firms that provide professional services to licensed operators) can be a cumbersome 
and frustrating process (Delaney, 2007). Although as corporate elites they are highly visible, 
they are not easily accessible (Thomas, 1995). Accessing corporate elites can be problematic 
for several reasons. They can, for example, be hard-to-reach because their gatekeepers 
(secretaries or security guards) deny researchers access; moreover, the researcher may be an 
outsider who lacks familiarity with the research context and the necessary network contacts 
to obtain access (Harvey, 2010; Jones, 2016, Lofland and Lofland, 1995; Nir, 2018; Neuman 
and Wiegand, 2004). From the researcher’s own experience of working both in the Maltese 
financial services sector and with the regulator, it was clear that access to financial elites is 
privileged and reserved to those who have forged contacts in the industry. Owing to the 
researcher’s familiarity with the Maltese financial services industry, it was believed that 
access to financial services elites would be easier if conducted in the Maltese context.  
In order to comprehensively examine the relationship between legitimacy and rule-
following behaviour, it was first necessary to conceptualize and measure legitimacy in a valid 
manner. To this end, the research sought to: (i) investigate the basic legitimation demands of, 
or what mattered to, licensed operators within the Maltese financial services sector and why; 
(ii) explore the scope for developing a regulatory legitimacy survey to measure scales of 
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licensed operators’ legitimacy perceptions; and (iii) examine the relationship between the 
perceived regulatory legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. In order to accomplish 
these goals, a social scientific approach was employed in two stages. The first stage involved 
an inductive approach through the use of Appreciative Inquiry (AI) interviews. AI was 
employed to discover the Basic Legitimation Demands (BLDs) of financial market 
participants. The second stage of the research comprised a deductive approach, entailing the 
development and administration of a regulatory legitimacy survey informed by AI. The 
research design was therefore a two-stage process, beginning with a qualitative approach and 
followed by a quantitative approach. It must be emphasised that in seeking to address the first 
two research questions, the objective was not to corroborate any existing theoretical 
framework conceptualizing and measuring legitimacy but to use a grounded approach, 
similar to that employed by Liebling (2004), through which themes were distilled through the 
data.  
 This PhD is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter reviews criminological, 
organisational and regulatory studies that define, conceptualize and measure legitimacy. This 
chapter also defines legitimacy in the Maltese context and explains how legitimacy is 
conceptualized and measured in this dissertation. The second chapter reviews the literature on 
normative compliance and on instrumental compliance. Specifically, this chapters examines 
legitimacy and audience behaviours and the corporate crime deterrence literature. The third 
chapter describes the Maltese regulatory context and the regulatory challenges faced during 
fieldwork. The fourth chapter describes the research methods employed in this PhD. The fifth 
chapter reports the results of the qualitative phase and provides a theoretical grounding to 
developing the questionnaire measuring the perceived legitimacy of the financial regulator. 
The sixth chapter builds on the fifth chapter by using the results obtained from the interviews 
to construct and distribute a survey to licensed operators. In this chapter, the survey data are 
analysed using exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses to develop a three-dimensional 
model of MFSA legitimacy. This Chapter also subjects the three-dimensional model to 
reliability and validity tests in preparation for exploring its relationship with order. The 
seventh chapter builds on the sixth chapter and explores whether it is the perceived 
legitimacy of the MFSA (conceptualized and measured as a three-factor model) or deterrence 
that has the greatest impact on attitudes to compliance. This chapter also explores whether 
obligation to obey mediates the relationship between perceived MFSA legitimacy and 
attitudes to compliance. The eighth chapter offers an overall conclusion, discusses the study’s 
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conclusions and limitations, provides some policy recommendations and puts forward future 
avenues for research.  
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1 
 
Defining, Conceptualizing and Measuring Regulatory Legitimacy 
 
“Since in empirical science everything depends on how fruitfully and faithfully thinking 
intertwines with the empirical world of study, and as concepts are the gateway to that world, 
the effective functioning of concepts is a matter of decisive importance.” (Blumer, 1954:5)  
 
1.0 Preliminary note  
In this Chapter I attempt to review the existing literature in criminology, organisational 
studies and regulatory studies that defines, conceptualizes and measures legitimacy. This is 
required to arrive at a definition of legitimacy to use in the Maltese financial regulatory 
context, to conceptualize and measure the legitimacy of the MFSA from the perspective of 
one of its main audiences (licensed operators).  
 
1.1 Legitimacy in criminology 
The concept of legitimacy has been described as “slippery”, “mushy” and “elusive” (Novick, 
1968:192; Huntington, 1991:46; Zartman, 1985:134). In criminology, this ambiguity is 
palpable when considering the various ways in which legitimacy has been defined 
conceptualized and measured. Within criminology there are two broad ways of defining 
legitimacy. The first follows Tyler (2006a:376), who defined legitimacy as “the belief that 
authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just”. In this 
definition, based on Weber’s (1968) and Easton’s (1975) “belief in legitimacy”, Tyler 
emphasised that the legitimacy of legal authorities is important because “it leads [civilians] to 
feel personally obligated to defer to those authorities, institutions, and social arrangements”. 
Accordingly, studies following the broad Tylerian definition of legitimacy generally tend to 
define legitimacy in terms of an “obligation to obey”. The second broad way of defining 
legitimacy follows Beetham (1991:x) and Coicaud (2002:10) who respectively defined 
legitimacy as “power which is acknowledged as rightful” and as “the recognition of the right 
to govern”. Beetham (1991:20) viewed legitimacy as providing “moral grounds” for 
compliance and cooperation. Similarly, as Bottoms and Tankebe (2012:125) observed in 
relation to Coicaud’s definition, “legitimacy is seen as the ‘recognition of the right to govern’ 
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within a structured bilateral (or multilateral) relationship, and if successfully established it 
simultaneously justifies the actions of both the power-holder and the obedient subject”. 
Unlike the Tylerian definition of legitimacy, which integrates notions of obligation to obey, 
Beetham’s and Coicaud’s definitions do not incorporate aspects of obligation to obey or 
compliance or cooperation, even though these are incidental to or follow from legitimacy.  
These definitions have been instrumental in conceptualizing and measuring 
legitimacy in criminology. In criminology, there are three broad ways of measuring and 
operationalizing the concept of legitimacy. These are: (i) the Tylerian inspired 
conceptualizations of legitimacy; (ii) Jackson and colleagues’ (2011; see also Hough, Jackson 
and Bradford’s (2013)) three-dimensional conceptualizations of legitimacy and Jackson et. 
al.’s (2012) two-dimensional conceptualization of legitimacy; and (iii) the Bottoms and 
Tankebe (2012) four-dimensional conceptualization of legitimacy. Appendix 1 presents the 
studies inspired by the Tylerian conceptualizations (see Table 1), the studies inspired by the 
Jackson et al. (2011; 2012) and the Hough et al. (2013) frameworks (see Table 2) and the 
studies inspired by the Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) framework (see Table 3). All three 
conceptualizations of legitimacy seek to explain rule-following, albeit through different 
routes or pathways, as highlighted in Chapter 2.  I shall return to these different 
conceptualizations shortly. For now, I wish to provide a brief review of the works of Weber, 
Easton, Beetham and Coicaud, as these are relevant to how criminologists have 
conceptualized and measured legitimacy.   
A significant theme of Weber’s social and political thought is the “inevitable and eternal 
struggle” of “the rule of man over man” (Weber, 1978:269; Lassman, 2000:83). Weber 
defined “rule” as “the chance of having an order with a specific content obeyed by specifiable 
people” (Lassman, 2000:89). He argued that in order for the state to remain in existence (and 
for order to prevail) the ruled must obey the ruler (Lassman and Spiers, 2010). For Weber 
(1968:213) this necessitated cultivating the belief in its legitimacy. Weber, adapting 
Jellinek’s “empirical types”, proffered three grounds for legitimating any rule (Lassman, 
2000:90). The first is “traditional-rule” characterized by custom and habit. The second is 
“charismatic-rule” emphasizing the importance of a ruler’s personal qualities. The third is 
“legal-rational rule” which underscores the belief in the validity of a legal statute and the 
appropriate juridical competence based on rationally devised rules (Lassman and Spiers, 
2010).  
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  Easton (1975:451) also wrote about a “belief in legitimacy” through the notion of 
diffuse support. For Easton, diffuse support had two separate dimensions: a belief in 
legitimacy, and trust. Similarly to Weber, Easton (1975:451) defined legitimacy in terms of 
an obligation to obey: “legitimacy is defined as the conviction ‘that it is right and proper … 
to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime’”. This 
belief in legitimacy, in turn, had three different sources: (i) ideological legitimacy based on 
moral convictions; (ii) structural legitimacy which rests upon the belief in the validity of 
structure and norms; and (iii) personal legitimacy which lies in the personal qualities of the 
individual power-holder. To these sources of legitimacy, Easton (1975:451) added 
“commitment”, defined as “a willingness to maintain and defend the structures or norms of a 
regime even if they produce unfavourable consequences”. 
 Beetham (1991:x) and Coicaud (2002:10) defined legitimacy respectively as “power 
which is acknowledged as rightful by relevant agents” and as “the recognition of the right to 
govern.” Rather than emphasising a “belief in legitimacy” in a manner akin to Weber and 
Easton, Beetham and Coicaud considered a power-holder to have legitimacy if those subject 
to the power arrangement acknowledged the power relationship to be justified in terms of 
their beliefs. For Beetham (1991/2013) and Coicaud (2002) authority is legitimate if: (i) it 
conforms to established rules – lawfulness or legality; (ii) those rules can be justified by 
reference to shared values; and (iii) there is evidence of consent (or actions expressive of 
consent) by the audiences to the power-holder.1  
In his seminal study in Chicago, Tyler (1990:25) defined legitimacy as “an acceptance 
by people of the need to bring their behavior into line with the dictates of an external 
authority”. He then drew on Weber and Easton to conceptualize and measure legitimacy in 
terms of an obligation to obey and support. In another study conducted ten years later, Tyler 
and Huo (2002:101) adopted a definition similar to Tyler (1990): “legitimacy reflects 
people’s views about the degrees to which they feel a responsibility to support legal 
authorities and defer to their decisions”. They expanded Tyler’s (1990) original 
conceptualization of legitimacy to conceptualize and measure legitimacy not only in terms of 
an obligation to obey but by applying the conceptual frameworks of Easton and Ewick and 
 
1 The relationship between legitimacy and consent is complex. Among some political scientists and police 
researchers, consent is regarded as a sine qua non criterion for legitimate authority; hence, regarding the latter, 
‘policing by consent’ is viewed as the moral foundation of British policing. However, some have expressed 
scepticism, arguing that consent presupposes the existence of a full-fledged legitimate structure able to define 
what actions qualify as consent and who might be qualified or not qualified to consent (see Buchanan 2002). 
What is clear from these discussions is that consent is strongly connected to the issue of legitimacy.  
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Silbey as institutional trust, affect and cynicism towards the law. As is evident from Table 1 
in Appendix 1, several studies, mostly conducted in the policing context and carried out in a 
range of jurisdictions, have been inspired by Tyler’s (1990) as well as Tyler and Huo’s 
(2002) conceptualizations to measure legitimacy in a similar manner. Some of these studies 
tested full versions of Tyler’s (2003; see also Sunshine and Tyler, 2003) process-based model 
of regulation in which legitimacy was treated as a mediating variable between procedural 
fairness and rule-following behaviour. Other studies, while adopting a Tylerian-inspired 
conceptualizations and measurements of legitimacy, treat legitimacy as an independent 
variable affecting rule-following behaviour, or a dependent variable affected by inter alia 
procedural justice considerations (see Table 1 in Appendix 1).  
Despite the empirical status of the Tylerian conceptualization of legitimacy, 
limitations exist as to how Tyler and other researchers have measured it. In their dialogic 
approach to legitimacy, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) disagreed with Tyler’s 
conceptualization and operationalization of legitimacy as obligation to obey and trust. 
Regarding trust, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) observed that although legitimacy and trust are 
empirically similar they are conceptually different and should not be confused with one 
another because while legitimacy concentrates on the present – that is, it is concerned with 
what makes authority rightful here and now – trust is focused on the future. Bottoms and 
Tankebe (2012; see also Tankebe (2013) also cited Barbalet (2009) and Kaina (2008) 
respectively who argued that if trust is confused with legitimacy, it obstructs a proper account 
of trust. Regarding the perceived obligation to obey, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) argued that 
legitimacy should not be equated with an obligation to obey because individuals may feel an 
obligation to obey the law for reasons other than legitimacy, such as instrumental reasons or 
dull compulsion. Empirical research supports these philosophical arguments. Using a sample 
of 210 students at a large university in Southern California, Gau (2011) conducted a 
confirmatory factor analysis on items measuring obligation to obey and trust, finding that the 
sub-scale of obligation to obey displayed low factor loadings and did not converge with trust 
to form the latent construct of legitimacy. In a subsequent study using a sample of 284 
residents in a mid-sized city in Florida, Gau (2014) also found that the statements measuring 
an obligation to obey presented low factor loadings and did not converge with trust to form 
the dimension of legitimacy. This study buttressed the results of the first study and 
corroborated earlier research that implied that the items measuring obligation to obey 
negatively affected the latent construct of legitimacy (Reisig, Bratton and Gertz, 2007; Tyler, 
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2006b; Tyler and Huo, 2002). Research conducted by Johnson et al. (2014) reinforced these 
earlier findings by demonstrating that obligation to obey is empirically distinct from other 
components of legitimacy, namely trust and cynicism towards the law. Furthermore, some 
studies that include trust as a sub-dimension of legitimacy also comprise questions that tap 
into trust when measuring procedural fairness (Elliott, Thomas and Ogloff, 2011; 
Muratbegović, Vujović and Fazlić, 2014; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2009; Tyler 
and Huo, 2002; Tyler and Wakslak, 2004). These issues of measurement validity have the 
potential to distort the relationship between the concept of legitimacy and rule-following 
behaviour (Eisner and Nivette, 2013). 
Jackson et al. (2011; 2013) and Hough et al. (2013) sought to remedy these 
measurement issues by drawing on Tyler’s conceptualization of legitimacy as an obligation 
to obey and on Beetham’s (1991) three criteria for legitimacy (lawfulness, shared values and 
consent). They developed a legitimacy scale comprising three dimensions: obligation to obey, 
moral alignment (or shared values) and legality (see Table 2 in Appendix 1). Similarly, 
Jackson et al. (2012; see also Akinlabi and Murphy, 2018; Bradford, Hohl, Jackson and 
MacQueen, 2015; Van Damme and Pauwels, 2016) drew on Tyler’s conceptualization of 
legitimacy as an obligation to obey as well as on Beetham’s three-fold criteria to 
operationalize legitimacy using two sub-scales: obligation to obey and normative alignment 
(see Table 2 in Appendix 1). Other researchers have included trust (or confidence) along with 
the dimensions of normative alignment and obligation to obey (see Reisig and Bain, 2015; 
Tyler, Geller and Fagan, 2014; Tyler and Jackson, 2013).  
Both Hough et al. (2013) and Jackson et al. (2012) tested their conceptualizations of 
legitimacy vis-à-vis the outcomes of offending behaviour and compliance with the law by 
extending Tyler’s procedural justice theory. In these studies, legitimacy was modelled as a 
mediating variable between inter alia procedural justice elements and rule-following or rule-
breaking behaviour. Similarly to the Tylerian inspired studies, legitimacy was also treated in 
some studies as an independent variable affecting rule-following behaviour and as a 
dependent variable impacted by inter alia procedural justice elements (see Table 2 in 
Appendix 1). Despite Jackson et al.’s and Hough et al.’s efforts to resolve the measurement 
issues relating to legitimacy, the problem remains. Their approach does not offer any 
sustained argument for measuring legitimacy in terms of an obligation to obey.  
 Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) addressed these shortcomings in their dialogic approach 
to legitimacy. First, rather than defining legitimacy in terms of an obligation to obey and 
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trust, Bottoms and Tankebe view legitimacy in terms of Coicaud’s definition: legitimacy is 
the right to rule. Second, by drawing on the works of Weber (1978) and Raz (2009), Bottoms 
and Tankebe (2012) argued that legitimacy is best conceptualized as a continuous dialogue 
between a power-holder and its various audiences2 with the former making claims and the 
latter responding to them with power-holders then adjusting those claims and so on. Through 
this recursive claim-response, power-holders and their audiences come to a shared 
understanding concerning the meaning of legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012).  Tankebe 
(2013) noted that because dialogues can take different forms in different contexts, the 
meaning of legitimacy may differ according to societies. However, and as can be seen in 
Table 3 in Appendix 1, by drawing on Beetham’s (1991) and Coicaud’s (2002) same three-
fold conceptualization of audience legitimacy (incorporating the concepts of lawfulness, 
shared values and consent) and Williams’ (2005) BLDs, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, 2017) 
hypothesised that police audience legitimacy in liberal democracies comprises four BLDs: 
lawfulness, procedural justice, distributive justice and effectiveness.3 Lawfulness embodies 
the extent to which police authorities obtained power in accordance with the law and exercise 
that power in terms of the rule of law (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Procedural fairness 
reflects the degree to which police authorities abide by the Tylerian concepts of the quality of 
decision making (that is, whether police act neutrally, consistently, transparently and 
impartially) and the quality of treatment (that is, whether police treat their audiences with 
dignity, respect and courtesy) (Paternoster et al., 1997; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 
2003). Distributive fairness captures the extent to which police allocation of resources and 
outcomes is seen as fair (Tankebe, 2013). Effectiveness is a normative rather than an 
instrumental notion and reflects the capability of the police to act competently and effectively 
in the performance of their roles or functions (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013). 
Unlike the Tylerian process-based model (see Sunshine and Tyler, 2003) and the Jackson et 
al.’s (2012) and Hough et al.’s (2013) legitimacy model in which judgments of procedural 
justice, distributive justice and effectiveness are considered as antecedents of legitimacy, the 
Bottoms-Tankebe four-dimensional model of police legitimacy treats the components of 
lawfulness, procedural fairness, distributive fairness and effectiveness as constitutive 
elements of legitimacy rather than antecedents thereof (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012) with 
 
2 A power-holder in its journey towards legitimacy may sometimes need to address two or more audiences 
simultaneously with each audience potentially having different claims (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Liebling, 
2002).  
3 The component of distributive fairness was considered implicitly by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) when 
discussing the dimension of lawfulness before being explicitly added by Tankebe (2013). 
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obligation to obey functioning as a mediating variable between the four components of 
legitimacy and rule-following behaviour.4 As can be seen in Table 3 in Appendix 1, Tankebe 
(2013; see also Tankebe et al., 2015) has generally found that obligation to obey mediated the 
relationship between legitimacy and rule-following behaviour.  
To summarise, all three conceptualizations of legitimacy seek to explain compliance 
with the law and cooperation with legal authorities, although the route towards the dependent 
variable of behaviour is different. The Bottoms-Tankebe conceptualization of legitimacy only 
operates as an independent variable that may affect the dependent variable of behaviour 
(whether directly or indirectly through the mediating variable of obligation to obey), but in 
the Tylerian conceptualizations and in Hough et al.’s model (see also Jackson et al., 2012), 
legitimacy generally operates as a mediating variable that affects rule-following behaviour.  
Having examined the three broad forms of conceptualizing and measuring legitimacy, 
I now turn to studies that conceptualize and measure legitimacy in workplace, taxation and 
organizational contexts. These studies are presented in Table 4 in Appendix 1. It is clear from 
Table 4 that most studies in workplace, taxation and organizational contexts have adopted 
Tyler’s (1990) original definition of legitimacy to conceptualize and measure legitimacy as 
an obligation to obey, resulting in the same validity concerns explained above. In these 
studies, and as can be seen in Table 4 in Appendix 1, legitimacy akin to the Tylerian vein of 
studies is treated as an independent variable that affects rule-following behaviour, as a 
dependent variable affected by inter alia procedural justice, as a mediating variable and as a 
moderating variable. To date, no study in workplace, taxation or organizational contexts in 
criminology has employed Jackson et al.’s (2011; 2012) two-dimensional and three-
dimensional conceptualizations of legitimacy or the Bottoms and Tankebe (2012; 2017) four-
component model to measure legitimacy in workplace, organization or regulatory contexts. 
Nevertheless, Beetham and Lord (1998) employed Beetham’s (1991; 2013) three-
dimensional framework (the underlying foundation of the Bottoms-Tankebe 
multidimensional model of audience legitimacy) to examine the legitimacy of EU institutions 
while Lord (2016) has proposed applying Beetham’s three-dimensional framework to 
examine the legitimacy of enforcement responses to transnational corporate bribery. In 
addition, Tankebe (2019b) made a convincing argument to utilize the four dimensions of 
police audience legitimacy to understand rule-following behaviour in organizational contexts.  
 
4 Other researchers have acknowledged Bottoms and Tankebe’s (2012) criticism of the Tylerian inspired 
conceptualizations of legitimacy when operationalizing perceived obligation to obey, and accordingly did not 
label the concept as legitimacy but as an obligation to obey (Baker et al., 2015; Pryce, Johnson and Maguire, 
2017).  
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Having examined the three main ways in which legitimacy has been conceptualized 
and measured in criminology, including studies that measure legitimacy in workplace, 
taxation and regulatory contexts, I turn to the literature on organisational legitimacy. In 
contrast with criminology, in which legitimacy is an important variable that seeks to explain 
rule-following behaviour and attitudes to compliance and cooperation, in organisational 
literature legitimacy is crucial for organisational survival (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
 
1.2 Legitimacy in organizational studies 
In a widely cited paper, Suchman (1995:574) defined legitimacy as “a generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”.5 Suchman proposed a 
broad threefold typology of organizational legitimacy: pragmatic legitimacy; moral 
legitimacy; and cognitive legitimacy. Similar to Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), Suchman 
(1995) recognizes that an organization may need to face multiple audiences. Pragmatic 
legitimacy is based on self-interested calculations of an organization’s most immediate 
audiences and can take one of three forms: exchange, influence and dispositions (Suchman, 
1995). In contrast to pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy rests not on self-interested 
judgements but on a normative assessment/evaluation of whether an organization is acting in 
accordance with social norms in a manner that promotes societal welfare and can take one of 
four forms: assessments of consequences, assessments of procedures, assessments of 
structures and assessments of character (Suchman, 1995). Moral legitimacy as an umbrella 
concept is similar to the criterion of share values in the Coicaud-Beetham framework. 
Further, the sub-types of consequential and procedural legitimacy are similar to dimensions 
of effectiveness and procedural fairness respectively in the Bottoms-Tankebe (2012) 
multidimensional model. Cognitive legitimacy, in contrast to pragmatic and moral 
legitimacy, involves a passive assessment rather an active evaluation (either self-interested or 
normative) that an organization is necessary and taken-for-granted (Suchman, 1995:582). The 
sub-type of taken-for-grantedness is similar to the notion of dull compulsion,6 which does not 
feature as a criterion of legitimacy in the Bottoms-Tankebe framework. Other organizational 
scholars have developed typologies similar to Suchman. For instance, Aldrich and Fiol 
(1994) differentiated between cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy (similar to the concept 
 
5 Few studies in criminology expressly cite Suchman’s (1995) definition (Jackson, 2015; Tyler, et al., 2007; 
Tyler and Blader, 2005) 
6 Dull compulsion refers to feelings of powerlessness and resignation.  
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of moral legitimacy). Scott (1995) distinguished between three forms of legitimacy: 
regulative, normative and cognitive. While normative and cognitive legitimacy are similar to 
Suchman’s types of moral and cognitive legitimacy, regulative legitimacy, which stresses 
conformity with rules, is similar to the concepts of legality or lawfulness in the Coicaud-
Beetham and Bottoms-Tankebe frameworks.  
 Measures of organisational legitimacy vary; some studies employed objective, proxy 
or secondary indicators to measure it (Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Ruef 
and Scott, 1998; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) but few have used subjective or perceptual 
measures. This review has identified six such studies that will be examined in chronological 
order below. None of these studies seek to measure the legitimacy of regulatory authorities. 
 The first study was conducted by Elsbach (1994) prior to the three-fold 
conceptualization advanced by Suchman (1995) and measured the legitimacy of the 
California Cattle industry. Elsbach (1994) developed a 12-item legitimacy scale that 
measured, on a seven-point Likert scale, two dimensions of organizational legitimacy: 
organizational endorsement (internal (support by employees) and external (support by the 
general public)) and organizational normativity (attributes that a legitimate organization 
ought to possess).7 Four of the items in this scale appeared to measure the dimension of 
lawfulness: “the organization follows government regulations for operating procedures in the 
cattle industry”, “the organization is committed to meeting the cattle industry standards in its 
production operations”, “the organization is concerned with meeting acceptable standards for 
environmental protection, food safety and animal welfare” and “the organization’s leaders 
believe in ‘playing by the rules’ and following operating guidelines” (Elsbach, 1994:51). 
Foreman and Whetten (2002) later developed a six-item scale to measure the cognitive 
legitimacy and a seven-item scale to measure the pragmatic legitimacy of rural cooperatives. 
Some of the items measuring pragmatic legitimacy also seemed to measure certain properties 
of the quality of treatment: “compared with similar businesses, co-ops, in general are more 
supportive when members and patrons have financial problems” and “compared with similar 
businesses, co-ops, in general have a friendlier and more helpful atmosphere” (Foreman and 
Whetten, 2002:632-633). One item also appeared to measure an aspect of the quality of 
decision-making: “compared with similar businesses, co-ops, in general offer greater 
opportunity for customers and members to influence the ways things are done” (Foreman and 
Whetten, 2002:632-633). Pollack, Rutherford and Nagy (2012) constructed a three-item scale 
 
7 Although Elsbach (1994) distinguished between two dimensions of organisational legitimacy, she measured 
the concept in a unidimensional manner by creating an additive scale.  
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that measured stakeholder perceptions of entrepreneurs’ cognitive legitimacy. Moreover, 
Diez-Martin, Prado-Roman and Blanco-Gonzalez (2013) developed a 21-item scale that 
measured both the internal and external legitimacy of Spanish mutual guarantee societies in 
terms of Suchman’s typology of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. Humphreys and 
Latour (2013) adapted the scale developed by Elsbach (1994) to measure perceptions of 
users’ and nonusers’ normative legitimacy of the online gambling industry. In addition, the 
study measured cognitive legitimacy not by employing a scale but by utilizing response 
latency measures that calculated the response time between legitimating and delegitimating 
stories.  
More recently, Alexiou and Wiggins (2018) developed a three-factor scale that 
measured Suchman’s tripartite model of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. Unlike 
the context-specific nature of previous measures of organization legitimacy, Alexiou and 
Wiggins’ (2018) three-dimensional scale was developed to be applied across contexts. No 
studies in the organizational context have sought to measure the legitimacy of regulatory 
authorities, including financial regulators. Admittedly, this is not within the remit of 
organisational scholars. Indeed, they are more concerned with business, entrepreneurial or 
profit-making firms. Regulators are generally regarded as an audience of commercial 
organisations (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse and Carter, 2005; 
Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Oliver, 1997). Having examined legitimacy in organisational 
studies, I turn to legitimacy in regulatory studies. In regulatory studies, as in criminology, 
legitimacy is important not only because it makes compliance and cooperation with 
regulators more likely (Black, 2008) but also for other reasons as described below. 
 
1.3 Legitimacy in regulatory studies 
Baldwin (1996) did not explicitly define legitimacy in the regulatory context. At the 
beginning of his chapter, Baldwin (1996:83) argued that regulators face issues in “securing 
support or legitimation” from their multiple audiences (regulatees, politicians and the general 
public). Later, Baldwin (1996:90) argued that in attempting to secure support, a regulator 
“may invoke five types of argument to invoke legitimacy”.8  In line with Weber but in 
 
8 In an earlier text Baldwin (1995:39) seemed to offer a different implicit definition when he arguesd that 
“values do play a role in justifying and legitimating particular government procedures. The legitimacy of an 
administrative process can thus be seen in terms of the persuasive arguments made in its favour”. This argument 
resonates with the criticism that Beetham (1991:11) advances of Weber’s definition of legitimacy: “a given 
power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in 
terms of their beliefs”. Indeed, one of the central tenets of Beetham’s tripartite conceptualization of legitimacy is 
that power must be justified according to shared values.  
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contrast to Beetham, Baldwin (1996) approached legitimacy from the standpoint of the 
power-holder when he argued that a regulator may seek to secure legitimacy by making the 
following five claims:  
(i) a legislative claim – the regulator claims legitimacy on the basis of delegated power from 
a parliament that is democratically elected;  
(ii) an accountability claim – the regulator secures legitimacy through measures of 
accountability;  
(iii) a due process claim – the regulator claims legitimacy on the basis of using fair 
procedures;  
(iv) an expertise claim – the regulator claims legitimacy on the grounds that it is staffed by 
experts who are taking expert judgments and acting in the public interest; and 
(v) an efficiency claim – the regulator claims legitimacy on the grounds that it is performing 
its functions effectively and efficiently.  
Although Baldwin approached legitimacy from the perspective of the power-holder, 
his claims are similar to demands made by audiences in criminological and organisational 
studies. The legislative claim is similar to the dimension of lawfulness in the Bottoms-
Tankebe framework and to the pillar of regulative legitimacy in Scott’s typology. The due 
process claim is similar to the dimensions of procedural fairness and procedural legitimacy in 
the Bottoms-Tankebe model and in the Suchman typology respectively. Finally, the expertise 
and efficiency claims are similar to the component of effectiveness in the Bottoms-Tankebe 
four-dimensional model and to the sub-type of consequential legitimacy in Suchman’s three-
fold typology.  Similar to the Bottoms-Tankebe (2012, 2017) dialogic approach to legitimacy, 
Baldwin (1995:41-42) argued that legitimacy claims involve a “discourse of justification” 
and that it is their “cumulative force” which justifies authority. Moreover, both Bottoms and 
Tankebe (2012, 2017) and Baldwin (1995) argue that tensions could exist between the 
different BLDs and legitimacy claims.  
 Majone (1996, 1998) approached regulatory legitimacy from a different perspective 
than Baldwin (1996) but proposed concepts that are broadly similar to those put forward by 
Baldwin. Majone (1996) argued that independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), as non-
majoritarian institutions (public bodies that are not directly accountable to the public or to 
elected officials), suffer from an inherent democratic legitimacy deficit. According to Majone 
(1998) this is because democratically elected governments may delegate policy-making 
powers to IRAs but cannot transfer their own legitimacy. He proposed that procedural and 
19 	
substantive legitimacy principles offer a promising way to address that deficit. Procedural 
legitimacy involves improving accountability and transparency by giving reasons for 
decisions, by ensuring public participation and by allowing avenues for judicial review. It is 
therefore similar to some aspects of Tyler’s (2003) quality of decision-making and to 
Baldwin’s (1996) accountability and due process claims. Substantive legitimacy refers to the 
extent to which the purposes and functions of IRAs are clearly defined. Majone (1997:161) 
stated that clarity of goals is fundamental because “accountability by results cannot be 
enforced when the objectives of an organization are too vague or too broad”.9 Two points 
should be noted here. First, substantive legitimacy echoes aspects of lawfulness, which as 
noted above, incorporates the notion of the rule of law. According to Bingham (2010:37) an 
integral criterion of the rule of law is that rules “as far as possible must be clear, intelligible 
and precise”. Second, substantive legitimacy is also similar to the dimension of effectiveness 
in the Bottoms-Tankebe model, to the sub-type of consequential legitimacy in organizational 
legitimacy and to Baldwin’s efficiency claim.  
 Prosser (2010) adopted a different starting point from Baldwin and Majone. He 
maintained that claiming the legislative, expertise, efficiency and accountability mandates as 
“sources of legitimation” is far too simplistic. According to Prosser (2010:8) regulation 
should not be thought of in terms of a principal-agent relationship but as “regulatory 
enterprise” involving collaboration between different sections of government and the 
regulator. In this collaborative approach, Prosser (2010) advocated the application of 
procedural values (in particular, increasing transparency, similar to the Tylerian aspect of the 
quality of decision-making – that is, giving reasons for decisions) in order to achieve 
“regulatory deliberation” which can be instrumental in obtaining a mutual agreement. This 
notion of “regulatory deliberation” appears to be very similar to Bottoms and Tankebe’s 
argument that legitimacy is best conceptualized as dialogic. However, while Bottoms and 
Tankebe conceptualize legitimacy as a dialogue within which procedural justice is a 
dimension of legitimacy, Prosser seems to argue that procedural values lead to deliberation.  
 These approaches have been applied in relation to various regulators, but not financial 
regulators. Boulding (1969) was one of the first to analyze the legitimacy of financial 
regulators. He identified six sources of legitimacy: (i) payoffs – similar to effectiveness in the 
Bottoms-Tankebe framework, consequential legitimacy in Suchman’s typology and 
Baldwin’s efficiency claim; (ii) sacrifices; (iii) age; (iv) mystery; (v) ritual or artificial order; 
 
9 See also Majone (1996:294). 
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and (vi) alliance with an already legitimate organization or the “legitimacy syndrome”. He 
first applies these six sources of legitimacy to the banking system and then to central banks.  
 Tucker’s (2018) Unelected Power offers a more recent analytical framework to 
examine central banks and regulators. Tucker draws on Beetham’s three-fold conceptual 
scheme and argues that because not all people in a liberal democracy hold exactly the same 
values and beliefs about politics then Beetham’s second condition (justification according to 
shared values) must be revised in terms of William’s (2005) Basic Legitimation Demand to 
take every citizen into account. That is to say, a power-holder must justify his or her power to 
every citizen. Consequently, Tucker (2018:162) argues that “a regime for delegating power to 
unelected, independent and officials needs … to enjoy legitimacy under different conceptions 
of democratic governance that prevail among reasonable people living in representative 
democracies”. He then attempts to develop a robustness test to assess the legitimacy of 
regulators. In developing his test, Tucker (2018) assumes that different strands of liberal 
political and democratic theories are reflected to varying degrees in the values of audiences 
that assess the legitimacy of regulators but acknowledges that people may not express their 
thoughts in the same manner as explicated by political theorists. Tucker’s robustness test is 
divided into five precepts each with their own sub-precepts, which may be summarized as 
follows:  
(i) Purposes and powers precept – lawmakers ought to clearly set out the goals and functions 
of a regulator and restrict those powers; 
(ii) Procedures precept – lawmakers ought to clearly set out who will exercise the delegated 
powers and the procedures used to delegate those powers and how they will be exercised; 
(iii) Operating principles precept – the regulator ought to be publish guidelines on how it 
plans to exercise its discretion; 
(iv) Transparency and accountability precept – the regulatory regime should be open and 
capable of being monitored and checked by elected representatives; and   
(v) Emergencies – there ought to be rules in place for when a regime experiences a crisis, 
including how democratic accountability should operate in such scenarios.  
The precepts of “purposes or powers” and “procedures” are similar to the dimensions 
of lawfulness (Beetham, 1991; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Coicaud, 2002) in criminology 
and to regulative legitimacy (Scott, 1995) in organizational legitimacy, which emphasize that 
powers must be exercised in accordance with the law, as well as to Majone’s (1998) notion of  
substantive legitimacy, which underscores the importance of legal certainty. Furthermore, the 
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“transparency and accountability” precept is similar to the concepts of: (i) procedural fairness 
in the Bottoms-Tankebe (2012) model; (ii) procedural legitimacy in Suchman’s (1995) 
framework; (iii) Baldwin’s accountability and due process claims; (iv) Majone’s (1996; 
1998) procedural principles; and (v) Prosser’s (2010) procedural values.  
The foregoing approaches are theoretical and analytical in nature and to my 
knowledge none of these concepts have been operationalized when measuring regulatory 
legitimacy.10  Indeed, few studies in the regulatory context seek to measure regulatory 
legitimacy. An exception is Amirkhanyan, Meier and O’Toole’s (2017:381) study in which 
the authors developed a measure for “perceived regulation legitimacy” in the nursing context. 
For Amirkhayan et al. (2017) regulation legitimacy refers to: (i) perceptions of regulation 
fairness; (ii) perceptions of regulators’ effectiveness; and (iii) internal adoption/use of 
externally mandated performance standards. They combined three items (one for each 
dimension of regulation legitimacy) from the Texas A&M University Nursing Home 
Administrator survey to create a regulation legitimacy scale. Using a sample of 717 
organisations, they found that perceptions of regulation legitimacy increase the quality of 
nursing homes.  
So far I have reviewed criminological, organisational and regulatory studies that seek 
to conceptualize and measure legitimacy. Despite the various standpoints involved, these 
perspectives agree that legitimacy is a multi-dimensional concept. What appears to differ is 
the nature of the dimensions. Nonetheless, it is clear that the dimensions of lawfulness, 
effectiveness, and procedural fairness resonate throughout the criminological, organisational 
and regulatory literature. This suggests that legitimacy incorporates (as alluded to briefly 
above) many aspects of the rule of law as explicated by Dicey (2013), Bingham (2010) and 
Tamanaha (2004). The dimension of lawfulness (exercising power in accordance with the 
law) is congruent with Dicey’s (2013) first principle of the rule of law which stresses the 
need to eschew arbitrariness; Bingham’s (2010) fourth principle requires that power-holders 
must not abuse their powers, which is similar to Tamanaha’s (2004) first theme – power-
 
10 Most of the foregoing concepts are operationalized when measuring regulatory governance and not regulatory 
legitimacy. Marques and Pinto (2018:73) argue that sound regulatory governance (which refers to the regulatory 
framework within which decisions are made) is essential to inter alia “increasing credibility and legitimacy (and 
therefore acceptability)”. They propose a multidimensional scorecard to measure regulatory governance 
incorporating many of the concepts examined by Baldwin, Majone and Tucker in their analysis of regulatory 
legitimacy. Their measure consists of three dimensions: (i) the inner dimension, incorporating the criteria of 
transparency, predictability, consistency, proportionality and integrity; (ii) the outer dimension, composed of the 
criteria of clarity of rules, regulatory coordination (role clarity) and authority to perform its functions; and (iii) 
the relational dimension, comprising the criteria of autonomy, public participation and accountability. 
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holders limited by law. The aspect of lawfulness (emphasising legal certainty) as already 
noted resonates the principles articulated by Bingham (2010) and Tamanaha’s (2004) 
emphasis on formal legality which includes the quality of certainty. The dimension of 
procedural justice (emphasising aspects of independence, impartiality, fairness, 
accountability, and transparency) resonates with Dicey’s (2013) second and third principles 
of the rule of law which concern equality before the law and human rights respectively. We 
find similar themes in Bingham’s (2010) third and seventh principles on equality before the 
law and the right to a fair trial, and Tamanaha’s (2004) insistence on the quality of equal 
application of the law. However, the procedural justice literature, as spearheaded by Tom 
Tyler, places emphasis on how individuals experience the exercise of power. It is possible for 
power-holders to be legally correct in their procedures and yet be viewed as unjust (see 
Scarman 1981).  Do one or more of these dimensions reflect the BLDs of operators in the 
Maltese financial services sector? This question will be addressed in the next two sections.  
 
1.4 Defining legitimacy in the Maltese regulatory context 
Having reviewed three major strands of literature on legitimacy, I now turn to the questions 
of how regulatory legitimacy should be defined and how it should be conceptualized and 
measured in the Maltese regulatory context. In this study and similar to Bottoms and Tankebe 
(2012), I employ Coicaud’s (2002:10) definition of legitimacy: “the recognition of the right 
to govern”. I do so for several reasons. First, and as previously noted, legitimacy ought not to 
be defined in terms of “an obligation or duty to obey”, because as observed by Tankebe 
(2013), a perceived obligation to obey should not be equated with legitimacy since obligation 
is a broader concept than legitimacy. People may feel obliged to obey not only out of 
considerations of legitimacy, but for instrumental reasons, out of habit or “dull compulsion” 
(Beetham, 2013; Carrabine, 2005; Marx, 1887; Raz, 2009). A similar argument can be made 
in respect of how Baldwin (1996) implicitly defined legitimacy in terms of “support”. As 
Von Haldenwang (2016) explained, audiences may support a power-holder for instrumental 
or for normative reasons or even out of habit. Moreover, even if Baldwin (1996) did not 
equate legitimacy with support, his “legitimacy claims” refer to legitimation, that is, when “a 
ruler seeks to make, enhance or cultivate his/her claim to have the right to rule” and not to 
legitimacy “which is an attribution conferred on a power-holder by his/her audience(s), 
acknowledging that he/she [has] … the right to rule” (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012:64). 
Second, by explaining legitimacy in terms of citizens’ positive recognition of power-holders’ 
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moral right to power, Coicaud’s definition highlights the normative aspect of legitimacy 
(Bottoms and Tankebe 2012:125). This is the reason why Suchman’s definition is not utilized 
in this paper. As noted, Suchman (1995:574) deemed an organization legitimate if there is an 
“assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. Drawing on 
Beetham’s (1991) criticism of Weber’s “belief in legitimacy”, I contend that an organization 
is not legitimate if people assume its actions to be desirable, proper or appropriate. Beetham 
(1991:11) maintained inter alia that Weber “misrepresents the relationship between beliefs 
and legitimacy”. According to Beetham (1991:11), “a given power relationship is not 
legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of 
their beliefs”. Assumptions are similar to beliefs and therefore an organization is not 
legitimate because people assume its actions to be desirable, proper or appropriate but 
because its actions can be justified in terms of their assumptions or beliefs. Further, the 
assumption that a power-holder is legitimate is a form of passive recognition or taken-for-
grantedness and is therefore similar to dull-compulsion or habit. Conflating legitimacy with 
these passive concepts obscures a proper measurement of legitimacy. Third, Coicaud’s 
definition, captures the view that discussions on legitimacy must take into account power-
holders and their audiences (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Fourth, and flowing from the 
previous point, in terms of this definition legitimacy is regarded as necessarily conditional or 
defeasible (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012).  
 
1.5 Conceptualizing and measuring regulatory legitimacy  
Having defined legitimacy, I now turn to the question of how the legitimacy of the MFSA as 
perceived by one its main audiences (operators) should be conceptualized and measured. 
Given that legitimacy should not be conceptualized and measured as an obligation to obey or 
trust, how should the legitimacy of the MFSA be conceptualized and measured, in a way that 
is valid?  All three strands of the literature explored above acknowledge that legitimacy is 
multidimensional in nature or is dependent on a number of claims. This conclusion is 
supported by Tankebe’s (2013:106) assertion that the “multidimensionality [of legitimacy] is 
perhaps not a contested issue”. However, Beetham (1991:22) contended that despite different 
empirical variations in legitimacy across countries it is possible to hypothesize that there is an 
“underlying structure of [audience] legitimacy common to all societies, however much of its 
content will vary from one to the other”. Given the similarities between criminological, 
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organisational and regulatory frameworks, I could hypothesize that operators’ perceptions of 
MFSA legitimacy can be measured in terms of the dimensions of lawfulness, procedural 
fairness, distributive fairness and effectiveness. That is, given that similar dimensions appear 
under different names in three different strands of literature each writing from a different 
standpoint it can be argued that these concepts could reflect the dimensions of MFSA 
legitimacy as perceived by regulatees. Were I to adopt such strategy, however, this research 
would suffer from the defect acknowledged by Tankebe (2014) when operationalizing 
policing legitimacy: that is, adopting a normative approach to conceptualizing and measuring 
legitimacy (Tankebe, 2014).  
To understand this methodological limitation, it is necessary to visit the distinction set 
out by Hinsch. Legitimacy has two different concepts: a normative concept and an empirical 
concept (Hinsch, 2008). Although both concepts share a critical element – in that they both 
emphasize the normative aspect of legitimacy – a crucial difference distinguishes them 
(Hinsch, 2010). While the normative concept of legitimacy, adopted by moral philosophers, 
employs a set of “objective” criteria to assess legitimacy and expresses moral approval as to 
the legitimacy of a particular legal system, the empirical concept of legitimacy, employed by 
social scientists following in the tradition of Weber, considers an institutional arrangement to 
be legitimate if, as a matter of fact, it meets with the approval of those who are subject to this 
arrangement (Hinsch, 2010:40). Unlike the normative concept of legitimacy, this does not 
involve passing any normative judgment as to whether the evaluator considers such system 
legitimate (Hinsch, 2008).  
The distinction between normative and empirical legitimacy may also be seen through 
the lens of Blumer’s (1954:7) “definitive” and “sensitising” concepts. Blumer (1954) 
explained that whereas definitive concepts are defined in terms of precise attitudes or fixed 
benchmarks, sensitising concepts lack such attitudes or benchmarks. Blumer (1954) further 
noted that definitive concepts afford the researcher strict definitions of what to search for 
when conducting research and that sensitising concepts serve as a heuristic device that 
provides the researcher with a guide in this respect. Looking at Hinsch’s concepts through 
Blumer’s lens it is arguable that while normative legitimacy is associated with definitive 
concepts, empirical legitimacy is linked with sensitizing concepts. Applied to financial 
regulatory legitimacy, sensitizing concepts discourage researchers from a priori prescriptions 
of the criteria or dimensions that constitute legitimacy in that particular context.  
Adopting a normative approach when measuring legitimacy has two defects. The first, 
25 	
a philosophical one, may be seen through the lens of Williams’ (2005) BLDs, an approach 
similar to Bottoms and Tankebe’s dialogic conception of legitimacy.11 Williams (2005) 
argued that when power-holder A claims authority over audience B, A must justify or explain 
its claim to power (the legitimation story) by meeting the BLD. Therefore, the BLD 
represents a demand by audiences that the power-holder provide an adequate justification of 
his/her claim to rule. Williams suggests that B will then assess the legitimation story and if 
the BLD makes sense (MS) to B then A’s claim to power will be accorded legitimacy. In 
exploring what MS to audiences, Williams (2005:186-187) maintained that we “need 
concepts which are rooted in more local practices, our culture, and our history” and thus his 
analysis of legitimacy rejects political moralism (normative theories of legitimacy that stress 
the priority of the moral over the political by setting out universal moral principles to assess 
the state’s right to rule) and instead pursues political realism. He contends that by examining 
legitimacy with antecedent moral views, political moralism “mistakes the contextual 
judgments about what makes sense with the basic conditions of satisfying the BLD.” (Hall, 
2015:4). This implies that what MS in a financial regulatory context reflects a range of 
variables that cannot be adequately captured by adopting or adapting scales from previous 
studies.  
Second, and flowing from the first point, given that legitimacy dialogues, the meaning 
of legitimacy and what MS to audiences can differ according to the particular context, 
employing a normative approach to conceptualize and measure regulatory legitimacy by 
drawing on scales from previous studies may not adequately capture the meaning of 
legitimacy in the financial regulatory context (Beetham, 1991; Tankebe, 2013). How can 
these epistemological limitations be addressed?  
Tankebe (2014) proposed that researchers who seek to develop scales to measure 
legitimacy ought to adopt the social-scientific two-stage approach employed by Liebling and 
colleagues (2004) to develop the Measuring Quality of Prison Life (MQPL) survey, which 
can be regarded as a measure of a prison’s “interior legitimacy” (Sparks, 1994 and Sparks 
and Bottoms, 2008 cited in Liebling, Hulley and Crewe, 2012a:361). Liebling (2004:128) 
reviewed measures of prison environments (such as Key Performance Indicators and Targets, 
Moos’ Correctional Institutions Environment Scale, Toch’s Prison Preference Inventory, the 
 
11 Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) argued that legitimacy should be conceptualized as a continuous dialogue 
between a power-holder and its various audiences with the former making claims and the latter responding to 
those claims with power-holders then adjusting those claims and so on. Through this recursive claim-response, 
power-holders and their audience(s) come to a shared understanding concerning the meaning of legitimacy 
(Tankebe et al. 2016). 
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Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Prison Social Climate survey) and observed that “there is no 
accepted consensus in the literature (or in practice) of what is meant by quality or how it 
should be measured” and that “part of the difficulty” is a reliance on “quantifiable measures 
of what are basically qualitative dimensions”. Liebling and colleagues sought to address these 
measurement issues by seeking to discover “what matters most” in prison “to whom” and 
“why” (Liebling, et al, 2012:358-359; Ross, Diamond, Liebling and Saylor, 2007). To 
accomplish this goal, they used a triangulated research design incorporating an inductive 
approach (appreciative inquiry (AI)) and a deductive approach (the design and administration 
of a detailed quality of life survey). AI helped to identify a broad range of moral and 
relational factors that matter most in prison: respect, humanity, staff-prisoner relationships, 
support, trust, fairness, order, well-being, personal development, family contact, power, 
meaning and decency (Liebling, 2004; Liebling et al., 2012a). These factors were then 
operationalized to create the MQPL (Liebling et al., 2012a). In 2007, the MQPL was 
systematically revised as part of an ESRC-funded study culminating in the development of 
five dimensions reflective of the moral performance of prisons: harmony, professionalism, 
security, conditions and family contact, and well-being and development (Liebling et al., 
2012a).12/13 
This research adopts Liebling’s social-scientific two-pronged approach as suggested 
by Tankebe (2014) to conceptualize and measure MFSA audience legitimacy. This social 
scientific approach involved a mixed-methods design incorporating an inductive and a 
deductive stage. The inductive stage involved interviews with MFSA licensed operators. The 
objective of this stage was to identify what legitimacy means to Maltese operators (that is, 
what operators expect from the MFSA, what their BLDs are, or in Liebling’s (2004) language 
what matters to operators licensed by the MFSA and why. The deductive stage entailed the 
development and administration of a regulatory legitimacy survey informed by the 
interviews. Through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (as well as tests to assess 
the convergent and discriminant validity of the legitimacy measures) the deductive stage 
identified a three-factor multidimensional model that reflects the BLDs of MFSA licensed 
 
12 To evaluate staff quality of life, Liebling and colleagues, using the same methods described above, developed 
a Staff Quality of Life (SQL) survey (Harding, 2014). The SQL was also revised following research conducted 
by the Prisons Research Centre (PRC) on features of prison officers’ work and prisoners’ quality of life 
(Liebling et al., 2012a; Liebling, Price and Shefer, 2012b). The current version of the SQL contains four 
dimensions: management, job satisfaction, authority and prisoner orientation (Liebling et al., 2012b).  
13 In 2011 the PRC coined the term MQPL+. This refers to a deep and thick descriptive analysis of a prison’s 
social environment for prisoners and staff (‘MQPL +’: Analyses of quality, culture, and values in individual 
prisons, n.d.). 
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operators. Beetham (1991) cited Winch (1958) who argued that the task of a social scientist is 
to understand why individuals comply with law. For Beetham (1991), legitimacy provides 
normative or moral grounds for obedience to authority. He also recognises that people 
comply with the law for self-interested reasons, hence the quest to understand people’s 
behaviour needs to explore both normative and utilitarian factors. However, as Beetham 
(1991:27) maintains, there is often a challenge in determining “the precise balance of reasons 
in any one situation; but is important to distinguish them analytically, since each makes a 
very different kind of contribution to obedience”.  Consequently, this dissertation explores 
the relative influence of legitimacy and deterrence in explaining the behaviour of licenced 
operators. In the next Chapter, I will review the literature on these factors. 
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2 
 
 
Normative Compliance versus Instrumental Compliance  
 
It is truly enough said, that a corporation has no conscience; but a corporation of 
conscientious men is a corporation with a conscience. (Thoreau, 2016:262)  
 
Corporate crimes should be among the most deterrable offenses because corporations 
are designed as quintessentially rational organizations built to pursue the highest gains 
(profits and market share) and to minimize their costs in the pursuit. (Yeager, 
2016:439) 
 
2.0 Preliminary 
These quotations capture two contrasting reasons why corporations or their employees should 
comply with the law or cooperate with legal authorities, which can be termed normative and 
instrumental motivations (Bottoms, 2019). Bottoms (2019) subdivides normative motivations 
for compliance into four types: acceptance of or belief in social norms; normative attachment; 
response to normative cues; and legitimacy. While I recognise that other forms of normative 
compliance are important, since the focus of this dissertation is legitimacy, this Chapter only 
focuses on legitimacy as form of normative compliance. According to the normative 
legitimacy perspective, humans are ontologically perceived, in MacCormick’s (2007:20) 
words, to be “norm-users, whose interactions with each other depend on mutually 
recognizable patterns that can be articulated in terms of right versus wrong conduct, or of 
what one ought to do in a certain setting”. In contrast, in terms of the instrumental 
perspective, humans are ontologically viewed as rational beings14 who are sensitive to pain 
and pleasure and are therefore deterred by the increased certainty, severity and swiftness of 
punishment (Paternoster and Simpson, 1993; Brown, Esbensen and Geis, 2010).  
 
14 Drawing on Simon’s (1990) concept of “limited or bounded rationality”, Cornish and Clarke (2008:25) 
recognise that: (i) in the real world action generally has to be taken on the basis of decisions made under less 
than perfect circumstances; (ii) offending is risky and the possible advantages and disadvantages are difficult to 
estimate in advance; and (iii) other uncertainties, in particular time pressures and differences in experiences and 
skill must be taken into account. Therefore, even though deterrence is an instrumental form of legal compliance, 
it does not necessarily require individuals to be completely rational in weighing up the costs and benefits (Von 
Hirsch, Bottoms, Burney and Wikström (1999).  
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As guardians of the financial services industry, financial regulators such as the MFSA 
are charged with regulating, monitoring and supervising the financial services sector. To this 
end, financial regulators seek to ensure compliance with financial services regulation and to 
ensure that operators cooperate with the regulator.  Moving from the specific to the general, 
regulators like the MFSA strive to assure compliance and cooperation through a range of 
strategies. Regulatory compliance and cooperative strategies fall along a continuum (Lord 
and Levi, 2015; May and Wood, 2003; Murphy, 2008). At one end of the spectrum lies the 
punishment model characterised by deterrence strategies involving tough legislation, 
prosecution and severe punishment (Croall, 2004). At the other end of the spectrum is the 
compliance model characterised by persuasive strategies involving cooperation, education, 
self-regulation and a reluctance to employ legal sanctions (Gray, 2006b). 15 These regulatory 
strategies are grounded in the two aforementioned dominant motivations for regulatory 
compliance. Whereas the punishment model is based on self-interested reasons and is 
associated with the deterrence and rational choice theories, the compliance model is founded 
on normative or (principled reasons) and is linked to legitimacy theories (Bottoms, 2002).  
Even though financial regulators use a range of strategies to engender compliance and 
cooperation by regulatees, deterrence remains a key approach to maintaining order (Henning, 
2015). For example, following the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) Financial Services Authority moved from a light-touch approach to a 
“credible deterrence policy” that sought to impose fines not only on regulated entities but on 
individuals, too (Ryder, 2014:201). Deterrence is considered an appropriate response to 
financial crimes because, as Braithwaite and Geis (1982:302) observed, “[c]orporate crimes 
are almost never crimes of passion; they are not spontaneous or emotional, but calculated risk 
taken by rational actors”. However, Schell-Busey et al. (2016) concluded that they did not 
have enough evidence to support the contention that punitive sanctions deter individual- or 
company-level offending. 
Despite being rooted in opposing assumptions, deterrence and legitimacy are 
intrinsically linked and should not always be viewed in opposition.16 This is for several 
reasons. As Beetham (1991:27) explained in almost all power relations there is a system 
 
15 In the middle of the spectrum lies the responsive regulation strategy (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), a strategy 
that seeks to promote compliance and cooperation by “hopping off the seesaw” between deterrence and 
persuasion through a careful combination of both tactics (Braithwaite, 2005:177). 
16 Although legitimacy and deterrence should not be viewed in opposition, as Beetham (2013:27) explained it is 
“important to distinguish them analytically, since each makes a very different kind of contribution to 
obedience”.  
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backed by “a framework of incentives and sanctions”. If audiences do not regard a power-
holder as legitimate, then the deterrent effect of sanctions would diminish and defiance may 
occur (Simpson, 2002; Sherman, 1993). Literature indicates that the overzealous use of the 
“big guns” can be counterproductive and create friction between the regulator and the 
regulated (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Hawkins, 1984:115; Kagan and Scholz, 1984). 
Preliminary evidence regarding corporations17 has also shown that deterrence strategies, 
especially if perceived as being too severe or unfair, may lead to non-compliance (Simpson et 
al., 2014), creative compliance (McBarnet, 2001) and defiance (Rorie et al., 2018; Schell-
Busey et al., 2016; see however Ariel, 2012).18 Although it is assumed that legitimacy 
improves regulatory outcomes, it should be acknowledged that relationships founded on 
normative considerations can lead to improper conduct by power-holders. For instance, in the 
prison context, Liebling (2011; see also Liebling et al., 2012b) showed that good 
relationships between prison staff and prisoners characterised by informality and closeness 
can result in unethical conduct by prison officers. Tankebe (2019a) has also observed that 
deterrence studies on conventional crime have marginalised the normative and that 
legitimacy literature has neglected instrumental factors. As shall be seen in the literature 
review, the same point applies in relation to deterrence studies in corporate crime and 
legitimacy studies in regulatory, workplace or organisational contexts. 
At the outset it is necessary to explain that several limitations have been raised that 
temper the association between legitimacy and behaviour: inconsistent instruments, 
heterogeneous definitions of key outcomes, limited experimental studies, lack of integration 
of macro and micro perspectives and a lack of cross-cultural evidence (Demir et al., 2018; 
Eisner and Nivette, 2013; Johnson, Maguire and Kuhns, 2014; Mazerolle et al., 2013; 
Tankebe, 2014). Another limitation concerns the valid measurement the concept of 
 
17 More conclusive evidence that deterrence strategies can be counterproductive exists when the unit of analysis 
is individuals rather that corporations (Braithwaite and Reinhart, 2013; Murphy, 2008; Murphy and Harris, 
2007).  
18 Philosophical arguments underpin these empirical findings. First, it is axiomatic that a financial regulator 
cannot justify its authority by using force or coercion (Williams, 2005). Second, the use of force by a financial 
regulator to justify its power and to secure both compliance with the law and cooperation from regulatees would 
be akin to the gunman scenario described by Hart (2012), in which a victim feels coerced to comply and to 
cooperate rather than feeling a duty to obey, reflecting an argument originally captured by Rousseau 
(1762/1997:3): “force is a physical power [and] giving way to force is something you have to do, not something 
you choose to do”. Third, in the short-term, force can be an effective tool in securing compliance and 
cooperation (Wrong, 2004). However, in the long-term, compliance and cooperation derived solely by force will 
be unsustainable and impractical because in order to be effective, coercion must be extensive and omnipresent, 
requiring considerable expenditure of regulatory resources (Beetham, 1991; Wrong, 2004). And if threats of 
punishment are not occasionally enforced, their credibility will diminish over time (Boulding, 1969). Indeed, 
force operates only fleetingly. As Rousseau (1762/1997:2) also remarked: “the strongest is never strong enough 
to be master unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty”. 
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legitimacy (Reisig, Bratton and Gertz, 2007; Maguire and Johnson, 2010, Gau, 2011, 2014; 
Johnson et al., 2014; Tankebe, 2014). In Chapter 1 I drew on Tankebe (2014) to argue that 
previous studies in criminology have conceptualized and measured legitimacy incorrectly, for 
two reasons. First, many studies have measured legitimacy in terms of an obligation to obey, 
which as explained by Tankebe (2013), is a broader concept than legitimacy. Second, many 
studies have measured legitimacy by adapting scales from other studies to use in the 
particular context and therefore adopted a normative approach to operationalising legitimacy 
by determining a priori the dimensions that constitute legitimacy (Hinsch, 2008). This has 
resulted in a lack of measurement validity because, as Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) 
explained, legitimacy is a concept whose meaning differs according to context. In order to 
address this methodological limitation, I build on Tankebe’s (2014) proposition to employ 
Liebling’s (2004) two-stage social scientific approach to operationalize regulatory legitimacy 
in the Maltese regulatory context. The first stage involved an inductive approach through the 
use of Appreciative Inquiry (AI) interviews to discover the BLDs of financial market 
participants (see Chapter  5). The second stage of the research involved a deductive approach, 
entailing the development and administration of a regulatory legitimacy survey informed by 
AI (see Chapter 6). Using this two-stage process and statistical techniques (exploratory factor 
analysis and confirmatory factor analysis), in Chapter 6 I developed a multi-dimensional 
legitimacy scale, comprising sub-three scales: (i) rule of law encompassing the dimensions of 
lawfulness, procedural justice, trust and competence; (ii)  distributive fairness; (iii) and 
responsiveness.  
In the light of the above, this dissertation seeks to achieve two additional objectives. 
First, it attempts to address the current gap in the corporate crime deterrence literature and in 
the regulatory legitimacy literature (specifically the limited amount of research in corporate 
crime deterrence and regulatory legitimacy comparing the effects of legitimacy and 
deterrence factors on behaviour) by exploring whether deterrence variables or the newly 
developed legitimacy scales have the greatest impact on Maltese operators’ attitudes to 
compliance with financial services regulation. Second, this dissertation seeks to explore 
whether obligation to obey mediates the relationship between deterrence, legitimacy and 
positive compliance attitudes.  
This Chapter is divided into 3 sections. The first section provides a concise review of 
the corporate crime deterrence literature and shows that many studies do not include 
legitimacy variables. The second section explores three models in criminology that seek to 
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explain compliance through legitimacy, concluding that most regulatory studies fail to 
compare instrumental and normative perspective and that the scales used to operationalize 
legitimacy suffer from a lack of measurement validity.  
 
2.1 Deterrence and corporate crime  
Corporations (including regulated companies) and their employees are driven by profit and 
monetary gain and are likely to make cost-benefit calculations (Sutherland, 1983; Braithwaite 
and Geis, 1982). It may therefore be assumed that corporations and their employees are 
sensitive to perceptions of the severity, certainty and celerity of punishment and would 
therefore be deterred from engaging in offences that have the possibility of jeopardizing the 
future of the company, their own position and other valued possessions such as reputation, 
social status, comfortable living and family life (Braithwaite and Fisse, 1983; Braithwaite and 
Geis, 1992; Schlegel, 1990).  
Perceptual studies on deterrence have provided mixed results.19 Klepper and Nagin 
(1989) conducted a survey among 163 university students to examine the impact of the 
likelihood of detection and likelihood of punishment on tax non-compliance and found that 
the perceived risk of detection and criminal prosecution acted as a deterrent to non-
compliance. Braithwaite and Makkai (1991) tested a model of organizational compliance 
among 410 Australian nursing home executives using a cross-sectional design that 
incorporated the likelihood that non-compliance would be discovered, the probability of 
punishment following apprehension and the cost of punishment. These researchers obtained 
some evidence that the certainty of apprehension deters offending but failed to find support 
for the certainty and severity of punishment, concluding that deterrence is a “stark failure” 
(Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991:8). Three years later, Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) 
conducted a more robust study by employing panel data, finding partial support for the view 
that chief executive officers (CEOs) with high perceptions of the certainty of apprehension 
had better regulatory compliance in their organization, a finding which is consistent with the 
researchers’ original study. Moreover, as with the earlier study, Makkai and Braithwaite 
(1994) found no evidence that the perceived severity of punishment increases compliance; 
rather, they discovered a negative relationship between sanction severity and compliance.  
In a different vein, Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan (2005) conducted a survey 
among 233 companies across a range of industries in the United States of America (USA) to 
 
19 Owing to space considerations, this review only focuses on perceptual-based studies. For objective-based 
deterrence studies see Del Guercio, Odders-White, and Ready, 2013; Simpson, Garner and Gibbs, 2007; 
Simpson and Koper, 1992; Stotland et, al., 1980; Weisburd, Waring and Chayet, 1995.  
33 	
determine inter alia whether the general deterrent effect of severe legal penalties imposed on 
organisations – known as “signal cases” – alters the compliance behaviour of other firms. 
They found that many organisations that were already compliant with the law when severe 
legal penalties were imposed on other organisations did not generally perceive an increased 
risk of legal punishment; rather, such knowledge acted as a reassurance that compliance was 
not a fool’s errand and that compliance mechanisms were working well. 
A systematic review conducted by Simpson et al. (2014) sought to identify and 
summarise published and unpublished studies examining the impact of formal legal and 
administrative prevention and control strategies taken by law enforcement agencies, 
legislators and regulatory authorities on individual and corporate offending. Their review also 
provided mixed results. Law had a modest deterrent effect on corporate offending at the firm 
and geographic level of analysis, but this result was limited to cross-sectional studies. 
Punitive sanctions had a deterrent effect, yet this was generally non-significant in both cross-
sectional and longitudinal studies. Regulatory policy had a deterrent effect for individuals, 
not for companies. A more recent corporate crime deterrence meta-analysis was performed 
by Schell-Busey et al. (2016), the results of which were broadly consistent with the meta-
analysis conducted by Simpson et al. (2014) in finding that neither law nor punitive sanctions 
had an effect on deterring corporate offending and that regulatory policy produced a deterrent 
effect only for companies.  
None of these studies considered legitimacy variables in their analysis.20 Simpson’s 
(1992) interview-based studies was one of the first to implicitly examine the impact of a 
hypothesized component of legitimacy (fairness) (see Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012, 2017) in a 
corporate crime context. Simpson found that perceptions of impartiality varied between top-
level and mid-level management; whereas the top-level executives perceived that everyone 
was treated equally, mid-level managers thought that inconsistencies existed in internal 
compliance proceedings. This led Simpson to conclude that if internal compliance systems 
are perceived as unfair, the likely impact of deterrence withers away because it is difficult for 
employees to measure sanction probabilities.   
One of the first models to expressly consider legitimacy variables was Paternoster and 
Simpson’s (1993:41) rational choice model of corporate crime which they referred to as a 
 
20 Kuperan and Sutiten (1998) compared the effects of deterrence and legitimacy on the compliance behaviour 
of Malaysian fishermen. This study is not being examined here because the sample consisted of fisherman rather 
than companies or their employees. Other corporate crime deterrence studies have included other normative 
considerations, such as moral persuasion, moral rules and personal morality (see for example Ariel, 2012; 
Piquero, 2012).  
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“subjective utility theory” of corporate crime. Paternoster and Simpson (1993) proposed a 
rational choice model of corporate crime that included the following explanatory variables: 
(i) perceived certainty/severity of formal legal sanctions, of informal sanctions, and of loss of 
self-respect; (ii) perceived cost of rule compliance; (iii) perceived benefits of noncompliance; 
(iv) moral inhibitions; (v) perceived sense of legitimacy/fairness; (vi) characteristics of the 
criminal event; and (vii) prior offending. Moreover, Paternoster and Simpson (1996) tested a 
partial version of this model among MBA students and business executives by examining the 
association between the dependent variable of self-reported intention to commit price fixing, 
bribery, manipulation of data and violating environmental standards, but did not include 
legitimacy variables in the study.  
Simpson (2002) conducted two studies in which she tested Paternoster and Simpson’s 
subjective utility model of corporate crime, in which legitimacy was explicitly considered as 
a variable that might affect decisions to offend. The first study was conducted among first-
year MBA students and a group of managers attending an executive education programme. 
Using vignettes, Simpson (2002) found that criminal, civil or regulatory sanctions did not 
have a significant impact on offending. However, when the vignette portrayed managers as 
questioning “how the law was applied” or “the substance of the law” (which Simpson 
(2002:127) referred to as “the perceived legitimacy of the law”), participants’ criminal 
intentions increased. In the second study, Simpson (2002) administered a revised version of 
the original survey (see full details in Simpson, 2002:139-141) to managers in work settings, 
along with MBA students. Similarly to the first study, criminal, civil or regulatory sanctions 
had no significant effect on intentions to offend, but unlike the first study, perceptions that 
the law was unfair (Simpson’s measure of legitimacy) were unrelated to offending intentions. 
This brief review has demonstrated that evidence of the impact of deterrence on 
corporate crime is mixed and that a limited number of deterrence studies include legitimacy 
variables in their analyses. The latter point precludes comparisons between deterrence and 
legitimacy variables. Moreover, in the studies considered above, legitimacy is associated with 
fairness and, as shall be seen below, legitimacy is a broader concept than fairness.  
 
2.2 Legitimacy and audience behaviours 
Legitimacy, or the right to rule, involves two different concepts: a normative concept and an 
empirical concept (Hinsch, 2008). Although both concepts share a critical element in that 
they both emphasize the normative, a crucial difference distinguishes them (Hinsch, 2010). 
While the normative concept of legitimacy adopted by moral philosophers applies a set of 
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“objective” criteria to examine legitimacy and expresses moral approval of the legitimacy of 
a particular legal system if these are criteria are satisfied, social scientists following in the 
tradition of Weber consider an institutional arrangement to be legitimate if, as a matter of 
fact, it meets with the approval of those who are subject to this power arrangement (Hinsch, 
2010:40). Unlike the normative concept of legitimacy, the empirical concept does not involve 
passing any value judgment on whether the evaluator considers such system to be legitimate 
(Hinsch, 2008). This review concentrates on the empirical concept of legitimacy as an 
explanation for order.  
Within the social scientific approach, Weber was one of the first to connect 
legitimacy to order. Weber argued that for order to prevail, the ruled must submit to the 
authority of the ruler (Lassman and Spiers, 2010). Writing from the perspective of power-
holders and adapting Jellinek’s “empirical types”, Weber proffered three grounds for 
legitimating any rule (Lassman, 2000:90). The first is “traditional-rule” characterized by 
custom and habit. The second is “charismatic-rule” that emphasizes the importance of a 
ruler’s personal qualities. The third is “legal-rational rule” which underscores the belief in the 
validity of a legal statute and the appropriate juridical competence based on rationally 
devised rules (Lassman and Spiers, 2010). 
In criminology, the starting point for any review on normative compliance would 
undoubtedly be Tom Tyler. Tyler (1990, 2003; see also Tyler and Huo, 2002) departed from 
Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) instrumental model of procedural justice to propose a process-
based model of procedural justice. In this relational model, Tyler (2003) postulated that the 
antecedent concept of procedural justice (i) fosters legitimacy, which in turn encourages 
compliance with the law, cooperation with legal authorities and support for the empowerment 
of the law; and (ii) may also promote immediate and long-term decision acceptance. Tyler 
(2003:308) defined legitimacy as “a quality possessed by an authority, a law or an institution 
that leads others to feel obligated to obey its decisions and directives”. In the process-based 
model, the concept of procedural justice comprises two distinct qualities: the quality of 
decision-making and the quality of interpersonal treatment (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). The 
quality of decision-making incorporates notions of neutrality, consistency, transparency and 
impartiality (Paternoster et al., 1997), while the quality of interpersonal treatment 
encompasses concepts of dignity, respect and participation (Tyler, 2003:289-301). Unlike 
Hough et al.,’s (2013) and Bottoms and Tankebe’s (2012) legitimacy models, Tyler’s 
procedural justice and legitimacy theory did not incorporate the dimensions of distributive 
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fairness and effectiveness, only including these antecedents in empirical studies to control for 
their effects on legitimacy and compliance and cooperation.  
A number of perceptual studies conducted in a range of countries (USA, Australia, 
Jamaica, the Netherlands and Slovenia) and in a variety of criminal justice contexts, in 
particular police (Murphy, Hinds and Fleming, 2008; Reisig, Tankebe and Mesko, 2012, 
Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, Callahan and Frost, 2007), courts (Caldeira and Gibson, 
1995; Tyler, Casper and Fisher, 1989), prisons21 (Beijersberge et al., 2015; Reisig and Meško, 
2009) and taxation or regulatory contexts (Murphy, 2005; Murphy, Tyler and Curtis, 2009), 
have provided full or partial support for the Tylerian process-based model of regulation by 
showing that (i) procedural justice is the main driver of legitimacy rather than distributive 
fairness or effectiveness, (ii) legitimacy affects compliance and cooperation more than 
distributive fairness or effectiveness and (iii) procedural justice has a greater impact on 
compliance and cooperation than distributive fairness or effectiveness.22 As can be seen in 
Table 1 in Appendix 1 most studies testing Tyler’s procedural justice and legitimacy model 
do not examine whether it is perceived legitimacy or perceived deterrence that has the 
greatest impact on compliant or cooperative behaviour; those that do are mostly confined to 
the policing context (Hertogh, 2015; Muratbegović, Vujović, & Fazlić, 2014; Sunshine and 
Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2009a; Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Fagan, 2008).23 These studies have 
generally found that legitimacy has a greater impact on compliance and cooperation than 
perceptions of deterrence. In comparison to the policing literature, few studies have tested 
Tyler’s model in regulatory, workplace or organisational contexts to examine whether it is 
legitimacy or deterrence considerations that have the greatest impact on compliance and 
cooperation. I will review these studies further below.  
In Tyler’s research and in studies inspired by his theoretical framework, legitimacy 
has primarily been conceptualized and measured solely as an obligation to obey (Hinds and 
Murphy, 2007; Reisig and Lloyd, 2009), as a combination of an obligation to obey and 
support (Tyler, 1990) or as an obligation to obey and trust (Gau, 2011; Reisig, Bratton and 
Gertz, 2007; Tyler, Schulhofer and Huq, 2010). In some studies, cynicism about the law 
(Tyler and Huo, 2002), affective feelings towards authorities (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003), 
 
21 In the prisons context (and separately from Tyler) Sparks, Bottoms and Hay (1996) and Liebling (2004) have 
demonstrated the importance of procedural justice in achieving order.   
22 Although empirical research in various countries and a range of criminal justice contexts have found that 
procedural justice is the main driver of legitimacy and of compliant and cooperative behaviour some studies 
have cast doubt on that association (see Kim, Ra and McLean, 2019; Tankebe, 2009a; Sun et al., 2017). 
23 Some studies include measures of number of prior convictions (Beijersberge et al., 2015) and previous 
punishments (Kim, Ra and McLean, 2018). 
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identification with the police (Tyler and Fagan, 2008) and normative values (Reisig and Bain, 
2016; Tyler, Fagan and Geller, 2014; Tyler and Jackson, 2014) have been included as 
components of legitimacy, along with the central concepts of obligation to obey and trust.  
Hough et al. (2013; see also Jackson et al., 2011) expanded Tyler’s conceptualization 
of legitimacy by drawing on Beetham’s (1991) three criteria of legitimacy (lawfulness, 
shared values and consent) to conceptualize and measure legitimacy as having three sub-
dimensions: obligation to obey, legality and moral alignment. Similarly, Jackson et al. (2012) 
drew on Tyler and Beetham to conceptualize and measure legitimacy in terms of an 
obligation to obey and moral alignment. Both Hough et al. (2013) and Jackson et.al. (2012) 
tested their conceptualizations of legitimacy vis-à-vis the outcome of self-reported offending 
behaviour by extending Tyler’s procedural justice theory to the policing context (see Table 2 
in Appendix 1). In so doing and in contrast to most studies within Tyler’s procedural justice 
framework, both Hough et al. (2013) and Jackson et al. (2012) expressly included perceived 
risk of sanctions in their analytical models (see Table 1 Appendix 1).   
Hough et al. (2013) hypothesised that trust in justice institutions (conceptualized as 
trust in procedural fairness, trust in effectiveness and trust in distributive fairness) would 
foster legitimacy (measured as moral alignment, obligation to obey and lawfulness), in turn 
resulting in an increase in compliance with the law. Hough et al. (2012) also hypothesized 
that trust in police effectiveness affects perceived risk of sanction (assessed by asking 
participants their perceptions of the likelihood of their being caught and punished), in turn 
leading to compliance. Using the European Social Survey (ESS) to test their extended 
procedural justice model among a sample of 52,041 individuals, Hough et al. (2013:341) 
found that in all 26 countries included in the study, “trust in procedural justice was the 
strongest and/or most consistent predictor” of the obligation to obey component of 
legitimacy. Similarly, trust in procedural justice was the most significant predictor of moral 
alignment. However, in contrast to the other dimensions of legitimacy, the ESS data indicated 
that trust in distributive justice was a significant predictor of the legality dimension of 
legitimacy. Focusing on compliance with the law as an outcome of their conceptualization of 
police legitimacy, Hough et al. (2013) found that while the sub-dimension of legitimacy 
(perceived obligation to obey) had no effect on offending behaviour, the sub-dimensions of 
police legitimacy (perceived lawfulness (b = -0.12; p < 0.001) and moral alignment b = -0.11; 
p < 0.001)) and perceived risk of sanction (b = -0.12; p < 0.001) were all associated with 
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reductions in offending behaviour, with perceived lawfulness and perceived risk of sanctions 
having the same effect.  
 Jackson et al. (2012) tested a model similar to that of Hough et al. (2013) also in the 
policing context. Jackson et al. (2012) hypothesised that trust in effectiveness and trust in 
procedural justice leads to legitimacy (measured as an obligation to obey and moral 
alignment), in turn fostering compliance with the law either directly or indirectly through the 
mediating variable of obligation to obey the law. Similar to Hough et al. (2013), Jackson et 
al. (2012) hypothesised that trust in effectiveness fosters perceived risk of sanction (also 
measured by asking participants how likely they thought they would be caught and 
punished), in turn leading to compliance with the law. Using data from the National Policing 
Improvement Agency (NPIA) survey with a sample of 937 adults in England and Wales, 
Jackson et al. discovered, akin to Hough et al. (2013), that the sub-dimension of legitimacy 
(moral alignment) had a statistically significant effect on the reduction of offending 
behaviour (b = -0.23; p < 0.001). In contrast to Hough et al.’s (2013) results, Jackson et al. 
found that the sub-dimension of legitimacy (obligation to obey the police) and the perceived 
risk of sanction did not have a statistically significant effect on compliance with the law.  
 Although Hough et al.’s (2013) and Jackson et al.’s (2012) (see also Bradford, Hohl, 
Jackson and MacQueen, 2015) legitimacy models included deterrence variables, no study has 
tested their conceptualizations of legitimacy in organisational, workplace or regulatory 
contexts in this way.  
Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, 2017) drew on Beetham’s (1991) and Coicaud’s (2002) 
same tripartite conceptualization of audience legitimacy and Williams’ (2005) basic 
legitimation demand to propose a revised multidimensional model of legitimacy that went 
beyond Tyler’s process-based model. In terms of this model, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, 
2017; see also Tankebe, 2013) hypothesized that the concept of legitimacy (comprising the 
dimensions of lawfulness, procedural justice, distributive fairness, effectiveness) may directly 
affect behaviour or indirectly lead to compliance or cooperation through the mediating 
variable of obligation. As can be seen in Table 3 in Appendix 1, two studies (one using 
survey data from London residents and the other with data collected from the USA and 
Ghana) have provided support for the Bottoms-Tankebe (2012) framework in the policing 
context (Tankebe, 2013; Tankebe, Reisig and Wang, 2016),24 but neither of these studies 
included deterrence variables. In a very recent study, Tankebe (2019) acknowledged the 
 
24 The Ghana data, however, showed that while legitimacy was significantly related to compliance with the law, 
obligation to obey did not mediate the relationship between legitimacy and compliance (Tankebe et al., 2016). 
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failure of policing legitimacy literature to take deterrence variables into account when 
analysing the effect of legitimacy on compliance and cooperation. Seeking to fill this gap, 
Tankebe (2019a) simultaneously regressed three sub-components of the Bottoms-Tankebe 
model (effectiveness, procedural justice and lawfulness) and perceptions of deterrence (risk 
of punishment and perceptions of severity of punishment) on intentions to cooperate. Using a 
sample of 530 young adults at a Ghanaian university, Tankebe found that experiences of 
police unlawfulness displayed significant and negative effects on cooperative intentions, 
perceptions of certainty of punishment exhibited positive and significant impact on 
cooperative intentions (b = -0.090; p < 0.01 vs. b = 0.321; p <0.001) and perceptions of the 
severity of punishment had no effect. 
 To summarise, all three models have sought to explain compliance with the law and 
cooperation with legal authorities, yet the route towards the dependent variable of behaviour 
differs. In the Bottoms-Tankebe model legitimacy is an independent variable that may impact 
the dependent variable of behaviour (whether directly or indirectly through the mediating 
variable of obligation to obey), but in the Tylerian process-based model and in Hough et al.’s 
model legitimacy is the mediating variable which affects compliance and cooperation. 
Whereas in the Bottoms-Tankebe beyond procedural justice model the dimensions of 
procedural justice, effectiveness and distributive justice and lawfulness are components of 
legitimacy, in the Tylerian process-based model and in Hough et al.’s model procedural 
justice, effectiveness and distributive fairness are antecedents of legitimacy. To reiterate, 
most studies that test Tyler’s, Hough et al.’s (2013) and Jackson et al.’s (2012) legitimacy 
models incorporating deterrence variables have been tested in the policing context. 
Furthermore, the Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, 2017) model (which did not include 
deterrence variables) was only tested in the policing context and only one study (Tankebe, 
2019a) included deterrence variables (also in the policing context). 
Having briefly described three legitimacy models in criminology that seek to explain 
compliance with the law and cooperation with legal authorities and which compare 
legitimacy and deterrence factors, I wish to focus on some studies that operationalize 
legitimacy and deterrence in organisational, regulatory and taxation contexts in order to 
explain compliant and cooperative behaviours.25 Table 1 presents a list of these studies, 
divided according to context, sample size, legitimacy index dimensions, deterrence variables, 
 
25 Kastlunger et al. (2013), Hofmann et al. (2014), Gobena and Van Dijke (2016), and Hofmann et al. (2017) 
distinguish between legitimate and coercive power. Coercive power, however, is not the same as deterrence as it 
does not measure perceptions of severity and of certainty of punishment but rather perceptions of whether 
authorities use coercive measures.  
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rule-following behaviour and findings comparing legitimacy and deterrence on behaviour. 
Table 1 shows that while in a few cases deterrence factors had a more significant effect on 
rule-following behaviour than legitimacy, in general legitimacy had a stronger effect on rule-
following behaviour than did deterrence. From Table 1 it is evident that although the 
measurement of the concept of legitimacy varies somewhat across studies, most measure 
legitimacy in terms of obligation to obey.  
 
Table 1. Legitimacy and rule following actions  
Author 
(s) 
Context Sample Legitimacy scale 
dimensions 
Deterrence 
variables 
Rule 
following 
actions 
Findings comparing 
legitimacy and deterrence 
Tyler and 
Blader 
(2000) 
Workplace N = 404 
employees 
Obligation to 
obey 
Unclear how 
perceptions 
of sanction 
risk were 
measured. 
Compliance 
In-role 
behaviour 
Deference  
Extra-role 
Sanction risk had a greater 
impact on compliance than 
legitimacy (b = .22; p < .001 
vs. b = .19; p <.001). 
However, legitimacy was a 
more significant predictor 
than sanction risk for 
deference (b = .43; p < .001 
vs. b = .14; p <.01). While 
legitimacy had a significant 
effect on extra-role 
behaviour (b = .10; p < .05), 
sanction risk had no 
significant effect. Neither 
risk of sanction nor 
legitimacy had any 
significant effects on in-role 
behaviour 
Tyler and 
Blader 
(2005) 
Workplace Sample 1 N = 
1,350 
employees 
with a U.S. 
division of a 
large 
multinational 
financial 
services 
company 
 
 
 
Sample 2 N = 
4,430 
employees of 
various 
companies 
 
Obligation to 
obey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obligation to 
obey 
Perceived 
likelihood 
and 
perceived 
severity of 
punishments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceived 
likelihood 
and 
perceived 
severity of 
punishments 
Compliance  
Deference  
Rule-breaking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliance  
Deference  
Rule-breaking 
Legitimacy has a significant 
impact on compliance with 
organisational policies (b = 
.29; p < .001), deference to 
organisational policies (b = 
.29; p < .001) and on rule-
breaking (b = -.10; p < .05). 
Deterrence variables had no 
significant impact.  
 
 
 
 
Legitimacy and likelihood of 
punishment had the same 
has a significant impact on 
compliance with 
organisational policies (b = 
.32; p < .001). Perceptions of 
severity of punishment also 
had a significant effect on 
compliance but this was less 
than legitimacy and certainty 
(b = .03; p < .001) 
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Legitimacy had a greater 
impact that likelihood of 
punishment on deference to 
organisational policies (b = 
.46; p < .001 vs. b = .15; p < 
.001) with severity having 
no significant effect. And for 
rule-breaking, legitimacy 
had a more significant 
impact than certainty and 
severity of punishment (b = -
.26; p < .001 vs. b = -.11; p 
< .001 vs. b = -.02; p < .05). 
Murphy, 
Bradford 
and 
Jackson 
(2016) 
Taxation n = 359 tax 
offenders  
Obligation to 
obey  
Risk of 
sanction was 
measured 
with a single 
item which 
asked 
participants 
about the 
likelihood of 
getting 
caught. 
Compliance While perceptions of 
legitimacy increased tax 
compliance, perceptions of 
the risk of sanction reduced 
tax compliance (b = .16; p < 
.01 vs. b = -.13; p <.05) with 
legitimacy demonstrating a 
more statistically significant 
effect than deterrence 
Rorie et 
al. 
(2018) 
Regulatory Offending 
scenarios n = 
879 
professionals 
and managers 
knowledgeabl
e about 
environmental 
regulation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adequacy of law 
Obligation to 
obey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a control 
variable. 
Contained 
measures for 
formal and 
informal 
deterrence. 
Formal 
deterrence 
was 
measured 
with two 
scales. The 
first 
measured 
perceived 
certain/chan
ce of formal 
sanctions. 
The second 
measured 
the 
perceived 
severity of 
formal 
sanctions.  
Offending 
intentions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adequacy of the law did not 
predict offending intentions. 
Participants who felt that 
they should comply with a 
law even if went against 
their personal morality then 
they were less likely to 
ignore a compliance order (β 
= -.1184; p < .01) but this 
had no effect on discharge of 
toxins or mislabelling waste. 
Those who felt that they 
should comply with the law 
so long as the law go against 
their personal morality were 
also less likely to disobey a 
compliance order (β = -.911; 
p < .01) but this item had no 
effect on other forms of 
offending. The statement 
measuring the extent to 
which an individual should 
act as others do had no effect 
on offending intentions 
For the formal deterrence 
variables likelihood of 
formal sanctions had no 
effect on offending 
scenarios, and perceptions of 
severity only had a 
significant negative effect on 
discharging toxins. 
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Although legitimacy has been found to predict compliance and intention to offend, the 
association is tempered by two methodological limitations. First, a perceived obligation to 
obey should not be equated with legitimacy, because obligation is a broader concept 
(Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013). Individuals, as noted by Bottoms (2002), may 
feel duty-bound to obey owing to instrumental or normative reasons or even out of habit or 
dull compulsion. Conflating obligation with legitimacy obscures a proper measurement of 
legitimacy and distorts the relationship between legitimacy, deterrence and compliance and 
cooperation. Accordingly, and as noted by Tankebe (2013), an obligation to obey should be 
treated as a dependent variable, which may occasionally be explained by legitimacy and not 
as a component of legitimacy. Research conducted by Johnson et al. (2014) has confirmed 
this assertion.  How should the legitimacy of financial regulators be measured in order to 
adequately explain rule-following behaviour while comparing it to deterrence factors? As 
explained in Chapter 1, the multidimensional character of legitimacy is uncontested in the 
literature (Suchman, 1995; Tankebe, 2013). Moreover, a convincing argument can be made 
to measure financial regulatory legitimacy in terms of procedural justice, distributive justice, 
effectiveness and lawfulness (which were identified as antecedents or components of 
legitimacy in the models above) by using scales derived from the aforementioned studies, 
especially given that the theoretical regulatory and organisational literature (Baldwin, 1996; 
Dowling and Preffer, 1975; Majone, 1996, 1997, 1998; Prosser, 2010; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 
1995) recognizes similar concepts. However, such an approach would suffer from the second 
methodological limitation acknowledged by Tankebe (2014) in the policing context. The 
abovementioned studies adopt a normative approach to measuring legitimacy by determining 
a priori the dimensions that constitute legitimacy and subsequently by adapting scales from 
other studies for use in the particular context (Hinsch, 2008). Williams (2005) argued that 
when a power-holder A claims authority over audience B, A must justify or explain its claim 
to power (the legitimation story) by meeting the BLD. Therefore, the BLD is a demand by 
audiences that the power-holder should provide an adequate justification of its claim to rule. 
Williams suggests that B will then assess the legitimation story and if the BLD makes sense 
(MS) to B then A’s claim to power will be accorded legitimacy. In exploring what MS to 
audiences, Williams (2005:186-187) maintained that we “need concepts which are rooted in 
more local practices, our culture, and our history” and thus his analysis of legitimacy rejects 
political moralism (normative theories of legitimacy which stress the priority of the moral 
over the political by setting out universal moral principles to assess the state's right to rule) 
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and pursues political realism. He contends that by examining legitimacy with antecedent 
moral views, political moralism “mistakes the contextual judgments about what makes sense 
with the basic conditions of satisfying the BLD”. (Hall, 2015:4). This implies that what MS 
in a financial regulatory context reflects a range of variables that cannot be adequately 
captured by adopting or adapting scales from previous studies. Moreover, given that 
legitimacy dialogues may differ according to the particular context, the use of a normative 
approach to measuring regulatory legitimacy by drawing on scales from previous studies 
might not adequately capture the meaning of legitimacy in the financial regulatory context 
(Beetham, 1991; Tankebe, 2013).  As previously noted, to resolve these methodological 
limitations, I employed the social scientific approach proposed by Tankebe (2014) in the 
policing context which had been previously utilized by Liebling (2004) to develop the 
Measuring Quality of Prison Life survey to assess a prison’s “internal legitimacy”. The aim 
was to develop scales to measure operators’ perceptions of MFSA legitimacy. This social 
scientific approach involved a mixed-methods research design that incorporated an inductive 
and a deductive stage. The inductive stage involved interviews with operators licensed by the 
MFSA. The objective of this stage was to identify what legitimacy means to Maltese 
regulatees, that is, what operators expect from the MFSA, what their BLDs are, or in 
Liebling’s (2004) language, what matters to operators licensed by the MFSA and why. The 
deductive stage entailed the development and administration of a regulatory legitimacy 
survey informed by the interviews. Through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis the 
deductive stage identified a multi-dimensional legitimacy scale comprising the following 
three sub-scales that reflect the BLDs of operators within the Maltese financial services 
context: rule of law, distributive fairness and responsiveness. The three-factor 
multidimensional model was then employed to explore the association between legitimacy 
and positives attitudes to compliance while comparing legitimacy to deterrence and to 
explore whether obligation to obey mediates the relationship between perceptions of MFSA 
legitimacy and positive attitudes to compliance. More will be said about the research methods 
used in this study in Chapter 4, but for now I wish to provide a description of the research 
context. Legitimacy considerations do not occur in a vacuum and are affected by national and 
international events as highlighted in Chapter 3 below.  
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3 
 
 
Research Context 
 
 
 
3.1 Description of context  
The fieldwork conducted for this PhD was carried out on the island of Malta. While the 
qualitative phase of the research (conducting the interviews) took place between April 2017 
and August 2017, the quantitative phase (distributing the regulatory legitimacy survey) was 
undertaken between July 2018 and September 2018. Malta is part of the Maltese archipelago, 
which also comprises the smaller islands of Gozo and Comino and the even smaller islands of 
Cominotto, Filfa, St. Paul’s Islands and Manoel Island. Malta is situated in the central 
Mediterranean, south of Sicily and north of Libya. Malta has been inhabited since 
approximately 5200 B.C. and has been occupied or colonised by various groups including the 
Phoenicians (800 B.C.), the Carthaginians (480 B.C.), the Romans (218 B.C.), the Byzantines 
(395 A.D.), the Arabs (870 A.D.), the Normans (1090 A.D.), the Knights of St. John (1530 
A.D.), the French (1798 A.D.) and the British (1800 A.D.). Malta gained its independence 
from Britain in 1964, became a republic in 1974, acceded to the EU in 2004 and became a 
member of the Eurozone in 2008.  
In terms of surface area, Malta is the smallest country in the EU (“Europe in the EU”, 
n.d.) and with a population of 475,501 at the end of 2017 it also has the EU’s smallest 
population (National Statistics Office Malta, 2018). With a population of approximately 
1,562 individuals per square kilometre, it is the seventh most densely populated country in 
the world (“Malta Population 2019”, n.d.). Malta has two official languages: Maltese and 
English. Malta’s political system is a single-chamber parliamentary democracy whose 
members are elected on the principle of proportional representation by means of a single 
transferable vote. The head of government is the Prime Minister, while the head of state is the 
President.   
In 2016, the year when this PhD research commenced, the top contributors to the 
Maltese economy were first, wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food 
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services (21% of GDP), second, public administration, defence, education, human health, and 
social work activities (18% of GDP) and third, administrative and support services (13%) 
(“Malta Overview”, n.d.). The fourth most important sector was financial services. This 
sector employs around 10,000 individuals and contributes approximately 11% to GDP 
(MFSA Annual Report, 2017). According to a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
report, the Maltese financial services sector is large relative to the rest of its economy (IMF 
Country Report No. 19/69). The most significant players in the Maltese financial services 
sector are the Maltese banks: as of 2019 there are 25 banks, six of which account for half of 
system assets, 95% of resident deposits and 98% of loans to residents (IMF Country Report 
No. 19/69). 
 
3.2 The Malta Financial Services Authority  
The MFSA regulates financial services in Malta.26 It is a fully independent public body 
established by Act of Parliament: the Malta Financial Services Authority Act (Chapter 330 of 
the Laws of Malta). In 2002, the MFSA became the single regulator of financial services in 
Malta by subsuming the supervisory powers of the Central Bank of Malta, the Malta Stock 
Exchange and the Malta Financial Services Centre. It licenses, regulates, monitors and 
supervises the following financial services operators: (i) investment services entities and 
collective investment schemes; (ii) insurance and pensions undertakings; (iii) credit and 
financial institutions; (iv) trusts; and (v) company service providers. From 1 November 2018 
(following the completion of the research) the MFSA also began regulating virtual financial 
assets (“MFSA Virtual Financial Assets”, n.d.; Virtual Financial Assets Act (Chapter 590 of 
the Laws of Malta)).  Until 2018, the MFSA additionally housed the Registry of Companies 
and the Listing Authority. To fulfil its regulatory goals, the MFSA is legally empowered to 
 
26 Another institution of particular importance in Malta’s financial sphere is the Financial Intelligence Analysis 
Unit (FIAU). In terms of article 16 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (Chapter 373 of the Laws of 
Malta) the FIAU is responsible for collecting, collating, processing, analyzing and disseminating information 
with the aim of countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Significantly the FIAU, by article 
16 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, is responsible among other things for: (a) receiving and 
analyzing suspicious transaction reports (STRs) from subject persons; (b) forwarding the SRT report to the 
Commissioner of Police if there is a reasonable suspicion of money laundering; (c) monitoring compliance of 
money laundering legislation and regulation by subject persons; (d) instructing subject persons to take such 
steps that the FIAU considers appropriate to facilitate money laundering analysis; (e) gathering data on Malta’s 
financial and commercial sectors with the aim of detecting areas that are at risk of money laundering; (f) 
compiling and disseminating such data and issuing guidelines on the prevention, detection, analysis, 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of money laundering; (g) promoting and providing anti-money 
laundering training to employees of subject persons; (h) advising and assisting individuals and companies to set 
up anti-money laundering mechanism; and (i) reporting to the Commissioner of Police any activities that it 
suspects involves money laundering or criminal activity. Although the FIAU is a critical player in the Maltese 
financial services regulatory environment, this research focuses only on the MFSA.  
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issue, refuse and revoke licences, to establish rules setting out the duties of licence-holders 
and the persons involved in the management thereof, to conduct investigations into alleged 
breaches of financial services legislation and to impose penalties for infringements of 
financial services legislation without recourse to a court hearing.  
During the process of writing up this PhD thesis, the structure of the MFSA changed. 
Up to 2018, one of the main organs of the MFSA was the Co-ordination Committee which 
was responsible for overseeing policy implementation within the Authority. The Co-
ordination Committee functioned as the bridge between the MFSA’s Board of Governors 
(headed by the Chairman) and the Supervisory Council, the Enforcement Unit, the Legal and 
International Relations Unit, the Board of Management and Resources and the Registry of 
Companies. I wish to focus on the functions of the Board of Governors, Supervisory Council 
and the Enforcement Unit, because these are the sub-organs of the MFSA that carry out its 
main functions. The Board of Governors is appointed by the Prime Minister and is 
responsible for setting out the objectives, strategies and policies of the Authority (Annual 
Report, 2016, 2018). Until April 2018 it was headed by a Chairman who took an executive 
role. In April 2018 the Chairman’s role was split into two: a non-executive Chairman 
(appointed by the Prime Minister) and a Chief Executive Officer (appointed by the Board of 
Governors) (“MFSA appoints new Chairman and CEO”, 2018).  
The Supervisory Council was responsible for overseeing the MFSA’s main functions 
and was composed of the following units: (i) Authorisations; (ii) Conduct Supervision; (iii) 
Banking Supervision; (iv) Insurance and Pensions Supervision; (v) Securities and Markets 
Supervision; and (vi) Regulatory Development. The Authorisations Unit was responsible for 
processing all licensing applications submitted by individuals and companies that required 
authorisation by the MFSA to provide financial services in or from Malta, applications for 
changes in control and appointment of approved persons, waivers and exemptions, and 
passporting applications. The Conduct Supervision Unit was responsible for supervising the 
business conduct of licensees. This Unit supervised how licensees designed their products 
and services and how operators interacted with consumers, seeking to ensure that operators 
provided fair, honest, transparent and professional services to consumers of financial 
services. The remaining supervisory units were responsible for the prudential supervision of 
licenced firms through on-site and off-site inspections to ensure that the firms abided by their 
statutory duties, regulatory responsibilities and licensing conditions.  
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The Banking Supervision Unit was responsible for supervising all local banks and 
financial institutions. Since the Single Supervisory Mechanism was implemented in 2014, 
banks that are designated as Significant Institutions (systemically important for the economy 
of Malta) are supervised by a Joint Supervision Team (JST) composed of European Central 
Bank (ECB) officials and MFSA staff. Banks that are designated as Less Significant 
Institutions are directly supervised by the MFSA, “with additional reporting obligations to 
DG Micro-Prudential Supervision III (DG MS III) of the ECB under the SSM” (MFSA 
Annual Report 2016:41). The Banking Supervision Unit was also responsible for transposing 
EU legislation and guidelines issued by the ECB (MFSA Annual Report, 2018).  
The Insurance and Pensions Supervision Unit supervised insurance undertakings, re-
insurance undertakings, insurance intermediaries, retirement schemes, retirement funds and 
retirement plan service providers, including business carried out in an EU Member State or 
European Economic Area (EEA) State, either through establishment or under the freedom to 
provide services. The Securities and Markets Supervision Unit was charged with overseeing 
the supervision of investment services entities, collective investment schemes, fund 
management and related fund services operations, admissibility to listing on recognised 
investment exchanges, trustees and oversight of financial markets. The Regulatory 
Development Unit’s function was to carry out research and implement cross-sectoral policies 
as well as being responsible for financial stability and macro-prudential supervisory issues. 
The Enforcement Unit investigated operators who were suspected of having committed 
egregious compliance failures and misconduct, market abuse, breach of listing rules or any 
other serious breaches of the financial services legislation and regulation. The Unit also 
investigated whether persons were carrying out licensable financial services activities without 
possessing the necessary licence or authorisation (MFSA Annual Report, 2018).  
In 2019, owing to the events further described below, the Maltese Parliament 
approved amendments to the MFSA Act and to the Financial Markets Act which, according 
to the MFSA’s latest Annual Report (2018:22), “will strengthen and streamline the MFSA’s 
decision-making processes, and boost the supervision of compliance to prevent money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism”. In implementing these changes, the MFSA 
established: (i) an Executive Committee; (ii) an Enforcement Decisions Committee; (iii) an 
Enforcement Directorate; (iv) a Financial Crime Compliance Team; (v) an Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Committee (AML/CFT); (vi) a Risk 
Committee; and (vii) a Financial Services Stakeholder Panel (MFSA Annual Report, 2018). 
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The Executive Committee has now absorbed the functions previously assumed by the Co-
ordination Committee, the Supervisory Council and the Board of Management and 
Resources. The Enforcement Decisions Committee seeks to separate the supervisory and 
enforcement functions, is composed of individuals from outside the MFSA and is obliged to 
act independently from the MFSA’s Executive Committee. The Enforcement Directorate is 
charged with carrying out investigations, enforcing those decisions and making 
recommendations for the Enforcement Decisions Committee to take into account when 
makings its decisions. The AML/CFT is intended to function as a forum for harmonising and 
coordinating anti-money laundering investigations and processes and advises the Executive 
Committee on process improvements pertaining to AML/CFT procedures. The primary 
function of the new Risk Committee is to aid the Executive Committee and the Board of 
Governors with establishing the extent of the MFSA’s risk appetite and risk management 
policy. The MFSA’s new Regulatory Committee is responsible for co-ordinating regulatory, 
authorisation and supervisory matters. Finally, the Financial Services Stakeholder Panel 
seeks to provide a forum that engages in dialogue with the industry.  
 
3.3 Political and regulatory challenges  
The Maltese financial regulatory climate was fraught with challenges throughout the 
interview and the survey stages. I will begin with the challenges during the qualitative stage.  
 
3.3.1 Political and regulatory challenges in the qualitative stage 
Between 15 and 21 April 2017, the investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia (DCG) 
published a series of articles on her “Running Commentary” blog and made some very 
serious allegations: that documents contained in a safe in Pilatus Bank (an MFSA-licensed 
credit institution) showed that the Maltese Prime Minister’s wife (Michelle Muscat) was the 
ultimate beneficial owner of the mysterious Panamanian company Egrant Inc; that Pilatus 
Bank was employed as a money-laundering vehicle by Azerbaijani and Maltese Politically 
Exposed Persons (PEPs) (presenting a heightened risk of being involved in criminal 
activities, in particular corruption and money laundering and its predicate offences); and that 
the MFSA failed to take any action following an on-site inspection conducted at Pilatus Bank 
in 2015 that found that Maltese and Azerbaijani PEPs held accounts there. In her articles, 
DCG also raised questions about the Bank’s Chairman, Seyed Ali Sadr Hasheminejad, an 
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Iranian national with multiple passports who applied for a banking licence in his early thirties 
without having had any banking experience or expertise.  
A few hours after the Egrant allegations were published, the Bank’s Chairman and 
risk manager were filmed by NET NEWS leaving via the Bank’s emergency exit carrying 
two suitcases – raising suspicions that the bags contained documents relating to accounts held 
by Maltese and Azerbaijani PEPs. While these events were unfolding, the Police 
Commissioner was filmed enjoying a meal with friends at a restaurant and refused to 
comment on the Egrant allegations. The following day, Pilatus Bank’s offices were raided by 
the police and a magisterial inquiry into the Egrant allegations was requested by the Prime 
Minister. These events prompted members of the general public to express their anger and 
frustration on social media. In particular, members of the public were outraged at the failure 
of the police authorities to promptly act on DCG’s allegations.   
In response, the MFSA released a statement that the process issuing Pilatus Bank’s 
licence had been carried out in accordance with the applicable legislation, that the Bank had 
been and continued to be subject to prudential and supervisory measures and that as an 
independent authority the MFSA had cooperated and would continue to work with the 
competent authorities. On the same day, the Institute of Financial Services Practitioners 
(IFSP, 2017) also issued a statement in which it argued that these events would blight Malta’s 
reputation and render the country an unattractive choice for international investors. 
Significantly, the IFSP was “particularly concerned that the ethical fibre of the entire 
financial services industry in Malta was being called in question in such a facetious manner” 
(IFSP, 2017). Further allegations surfaced: that the son of an Angolan dictator held an 
account at Pilatus Bank and that the Prime Minister’s chief of staff received kickbacks from a 
partner of Nexia BT, an audit and accounting firm, on the sale of Maltese passports. On 1 
May 2017, as a direct response to the allegations made by DCG, the Maltese Prime Minister 
called a snap election for 3 June. More will be said about how these events affected the 
research strategy, especially the sampling process, in Section 4.1.3.1 below.  
 
3.3.2 Political and regulatory challenges in the quantitative stage 
The events described in this section occurred following the completion of the interviews, 
during the interview data analysis phase, while developing the survey and prior to 
distributing the survey. On 16 October 2017, while facing a defamation suit in a US court 
filed by Pilatus Bank’s Chairman, Ali Sadr Hasheminejad, DCG was assassinated by a car 
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bomb. On 23 October 2017, the European Commission (EC) requested the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) to investigate allegations that the MFSA and the Malta Financial 
Intelligence Analysis Unit had breached EU law by failing to effectively supervise Pilatus 
Bank in relation to its anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism 
obligations (an issue to which I will return soon). Moreover, on 20 March 2018 the 
Department of Justice (2018) reported that Mr Hasheminejad had been arrested on 19 March 
2018 in the U.S. for “his alleged involvement in a scheme to evade U.S. economic sanctions 
against Iran, to defraud the United States, and to commit money laundering and bank fraud”. 
In terms of the bill of indictment, Mr Hasheminejad was charged with participating in a 
scheme in which more than $115m in payments for a Venezuelan housing complex were 
illegally funnelled through the U.S. financial system for the benefit of Iranian individuals and 
entities. Specifically, Mr Hasheminejad was charged with six counts as follows: conspiracy 
to defraud the USA; conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act; bank fraud; conspiracy to commit bank fraud; money laundering and conspiracy to 
commit money laundering. These charges carry a maximum prison term of 125 years. The 
following day in Malta, washing machines were placed in front of the offices of the MFSA 
and of Pilatus Bank. As symbols of money laundering, the washing machines suggested that 
the MFSA failed in its supervisory duty to prevent those crimes.  
In response to these allegations, on 21 March 2018 the MFSA removed Mr 
Hasheminejad as Director of the Bank, ordered the Bank to cease its operations and 
appointed Mr Lawrence Connell as the “competent person” to take charge of the Bank. Then, 
on 30 June 2018, the MFSA announced that it had filed a formal recommendation with the 
ECB to withdraw the Bank’s licence. On 11 July 2018, the EBA, following the request by the 
EC (mentioned above) to investigate the MFSA and the FIAU, found “that the FIAU failed to 
conduct an effective supervision of Pilatus Bank due to a number of failures, including 
procedural deficiencies and lack of supervisory actions by the FIAU after its decision to close 
the case without imposing any sanctions on the bank” (EBA, 2018). Once the survey stage 
had been concluded at the end of September 2018, more significant regulatory events took 
place. On 5 November 2018, the MFSA published a notice informing the public that the ECB 
had withdrawn the licence of Pilatus Bank. In February 2019, the IMF published a report 
containing a series of recommendations aimed at the MFSA that seek to strengthen the 
Authority’s risk analysis framework, render the MFSA more independent, bolster its 
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supervision in the banking and insurance sectors with a focus on money laundering and 
improve the MFSA’s crisis management capabilities (IMF Country Report No. 16/69). 
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4 
 
Research Methods 
 
The social-scientific approach to developing a regulatory legitimacy scale involved two 
stages. The first stage involved an inductive approach through the use of Appreciative 
Inquiry (AI) interviews. AI was employed to discover the BLDs of financial market 
participants. The second stage of the research comprised a deductive approach entailing the 
development and administration of a regulatory legitimacy survey informed by AI. The 
research design was therefore a two-stage process, which began with a qualitative approach 
followed by a quantitative approach. The quantitative stage of the research also explored 
whether legitimacy or deterrence factors have the greater impact on positive attitudes to 
compliance. I will begin with the qualitative stage.  
 
4.1 Qualitative stage  
4.1.1 Appreciative Inquiry interviews 
Liebling (2004) utilized Appreciative Inquiry (AI) to identify what mattered to prisoners and 
why. AI was then used as a basis to develop the Measuring Quality of Prison Life Survey. 
This method starts with exercises aimed at imaginative conversations and develops into 
loosely structured interviews (Liebling, 2004). AI is somewhat similar to symbolic 
interactionism and grounded theory in that it is: (a) mainly qualitative and creative; (b) 
concerned with theory generation and the creation of sensitizing concepts; and (c) concerned 
with lived experience, narrative and meaning (Liebling, et al. 2012). This method was 
deemed appropriate to identify the BLDs of, or what mattered to, financial services 
participants for seven epistemological reasons (see Appendix 2 for Appreciate Inquiry 
Interview Schedule).  
First, AI is a research strategy predominately aimed at examining organizations 
(including regulators) (Liebling, 2004). It has been used as a method of achieving 
constructive organizational change in governmental bodies such as the UK’s National Health 
Service (NHS) (Liebling, Price and Elliot, 1999) and international non-governmental 
organizations (Johnson and Cooperrider, 1991).  
53 	
Second, AI is grounded in social constructionism – a theory that addresses the 
question of what meaning individuals give to concepts (Watkins, Mohr and Kelly, 2011). 
Since this study seeks to understand what legitimacy means to operators AI is considered an 
appropriate research strategy.  
Third, operators (as licensed entities) are involved in a constant dialogue with the 
MFSA. Given that AI employs generative questions based exclusively on narrative and on 
memories of specific experience, it was considered an appropriate method within the 
financial services context (Liebling, 2004).  
Fourth, rather than solely focusing on inadequacies, this method also concentrates on 
best experiences and practices, strengths, accomplishments and peak moments and is, 
therefore, an appropriate tactic for encouraging participants to imagine the MFSA at its best, 
that is, at the pinnacle of its legitimacy (Bushe, 1999; Liebling, 2004).  
Fifth, the term “appreciative” underscores the notion that when something increases 
in value, it “appreciates” (Watkins et al. 2011:22). As Liebling (2004:141) has remarked, the 
verb “to appreciate” can be interpreted as “to estimate the value of”, “to recognize as 
valuable”, “to estimate rightly”, “to esteem adequately” or “to form an estimate of worth or 
quality”. AI, therefore, plays a significant role in the measurement and cultivation of values – 
it is a useful method to identify the BLDs of regulatees, as well as their expectations and 
what matters to them (Bushe, 1999; Hulley, Liebling and Crewe, 2011). 
Sixth, given that certain operators may have had negative experiences with the 
MFSA, by asking participants to focus on their “peak experiences” or “what is best,” AI 
transcends negative emotions, permits emotional space, builds trust and makes research 
participants more comfortable (Liebling et al., 1999).  
Seventh, and flowing from the sixth point, AI can help unearth “the darker side of 
social reality”, negative experiences and problems and can lead to a nuanced understanding 
of those negativities (Liebling, et al., 1999:76; see also Bushe, 2007; Liebling, Arnold and 
Straub, 2011). This Aristotelean approach is critical because by appreciating the negative, it 
is possible to identify the positive (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Johnston, 2011; Liebling, et 
al., 1999). One can understand this epistemological reasoning through the ideas of C. Wright 
Mills. Although writing in a different context,27 Mills (2000:213) contended that “[o]ften you 
get the best insights by considering extremes by thinking of the opposite of that with which 
you are directly concerned”. Ontological reasons lie behind incorporating positive and 
 
27 Here Mills was actually talking about distilling the positive from the negative.  
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negative experiences in AI interviews. As Robert Louis Stevenson (1886/2007:61) observed 
in The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, “[i]t was on the moral side, and in my own 
person, that I learned to recognise the thorough and primitive duality of man; I saw that of the 
two natures that contended in the field of my consciousness, even if I could rightly be said to 
be either, it was only because I was radically both”. The ontological implication is that the 
threads that compose our human nature are two-ended: there is no capacity for good without 
an equal capacity for evil and one cannot feel joy unless one can also feel despair (Wise, 
2011).28 
 
4.1.2 Piloting the interview schedule  
The AI interview schedule was piloted among a small sample (n = 10) of financial services 
participants (more is said about sampling in Section 4.1.3.1 below). The purpose of the pilot 
stage was to determine whether the interview schedule was clear and easily understood. 
Interviews with these participants showed that the question “What in your view justifies the 
powers of the regulator?” was ambiguous. It was therefore replaced with the question: “Why 
do you believe it is right or proper for the regulator to have the powers that it has?”. Two 
participants (Caesar and Romeo) complained about the length of the interview schedule. 
When I originally sent the interview schedule to participants I included the follow-up 
questions. The follow-up questions were excluded from the interview schedule sent to 
participants prior to the interview and were only included in the researcher’s version. The 
pilot stage also serendipitously revealed: (a) the power dynamics that were embedded in the 
interviews (such as arriving late); (b) the need to be flexible (rescheduling meetings either 
because the participant wished to postpone the meeting or for personal reasons); (c) that 
interviewees may ask about what other interviewees have said (more will be said about this 
below); (d) the need to keep in mind public holidays and feasts; (e) that interviewees like to 
read the questions beforehand to avoid being caught off-guard; (f) that interviewees may be 
reluctant to answer questions when politics is involved; (g) the need not to show offence 
where a participant says something offensive. More will be said about aspects (a), (c) and (g) 
below.   
Having discussed the raison d’être in employing AI interviews to determine the 
BLDs of or what matters to MFSA-licensed operators, in the ensuing section I shall discuss 
 
28 These notions are derived from Lao Tzu’s (2006) Tao te Ching. Tzu wrote that once we recognise beauty, we 
must also recognise ugliness and vice versa.  
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the process of getting in (that is, identifying potential participants), getting on (with 
participants) and getting out (of the fieldwork setting). 
 
 
4.1.3 Getting in  
Gaining access to a research setting and to research participants or material to collect data is 
an essential part of the research process. As Cochrane (1998:2124) aptly remarked: “without 
gaining access, there can be no research.” For some researchers, whether novice or 
experienced, this process may be fraught with difficulties, while for others it is smooth 
sailing (Buchanan, Boddy, and McCalman, 1988; Delaney, 2007; Leblanc and Schwartz, 
2007; Ostrander, 1993). Gaining access can be divided into three broad stages, each requiring 
careful planning considerations and each of which may be affected by external events. These 
steps are as follows: (i) identifying potential participants; (ii) contacting participants; and (iii) 
securing commitment to participate (Goldman and Swayze, 2012). For this paper, I will 
merge stages two and three, because in most cases they occurred simultaneously.  
 
4.1.3.1 Sampling  
As previously noted, I was interested in identifying the BLDs of, or what mattered to, 
organisations licensed by the MFSA. Although companies have a distinct legal personality 
separate from their members and are therefore capable of acting on their own, they are still 
metaphysical persons. It was therefore essential to identify individuals within the entity who 
would be in the best position to voice the BLDs of the company. From a legal perspective, 
according to the Maltese Companies Act (Chapter 386 of the Laws of Malta) and the various 
Codes of Good Corporate Governance, these individuals would be the members of the board 
of directors. These persons are legally responsible for: (a) managing the business of the 
company; (b) its governance; (c) its proper administration; and (d) the general supervision of 
its affairs (Companies Act). The board also sets the company’s aims, values, and strategies 
(Code of Good Corporate Governance for Listed Entities and Code of Good Corporate 
Governance for Investment Companies and Collective Investment Schemes). Primarily, the 
board of directors acts as the agent of the company and is the principal organ that speaks for 
it (Davies, 2008). Prima facie the board is thus in the best position to voice the BLDs of the 
entity. However, from informal conversations I had with experienced financial market 
participants, the board of directors rarely engages in a dialogue with the MFSA. Conducting 
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interviews with these individuals may not have yielded sufficient data to discover the 
meaning of legitimacy in the Maltese financial services context, the company’s BLDs, what 
the company expects from the regulator or what matters to it and why. My experience as an 
associate working in the Corporate and Commercial Department of one of Malta’s most 
prestigious law firms between 2009 and 2012 also revealed that it would have been 
challenging and time-consuming to speak to the board of directors as this organ typically 
meets only once or twice per year. It was therefore considered appropriate to identify other 
individuals within the licensed entity who had been delegated powers by the boards of 
directors (hence one could say that they are also agents of the company) and who are in 
regular direct contact with the regulator. These individuals would be persons who occupy 
critical supervisory and managerial roles, namely chief executive officers (CEOs), chief 
financial officers (CFOs), chief operations officers (COOs), chief compliance officers 
(CCOs) and money laundering reporting officers (MLROs). Following informal 
conversations with an influential, highly qualified and experienced senior partner at one of 
Malta’s top-tier law firms and who is also a non-executive director on the board of one of 
Malta's largest credit institutions (whom I shall call Caius), I also thought it prudent to speak 
to lower level employees such as compliance officers and individuals in the legal department 
of licensed entities, as these individuals have regulator contact with the MFSA. For a number 
of reasons, Caius additionally recommended that I speak to lawyers who specialize in 
financial services. First, lawyers are usually the first port of call when licensed operators 
encounter problems with the MFSA. Second, operators often communicate with the MFSA 
through or accompanied by their lawyers. Third, prospective licensees often engage lawyers 
to help in the licensing process (which involves ongoing discussions with and the submission 
of documents to the MFSA). Fourth, when representing licensed operators, some lawyers 
tend to identify and associate themselves with their clients. Fifth, many lawyers also serve as 
directors or managing directors of, or act as external compliance officers for, licensed 
operators. Sixth, many financial services lawyers work in firms that are licensed to provide 
trust and trustee services and are also registered with the MFSA to provide corporate 
services. Caius further recommended speaking to individuals within auditing or accounting 
firms (for much the same reasons that he recommended speaking to lawyers who specialise in 
financial services). In particular, these firms are regularly engaged by potential licensees to 
represent them in discussions with the MFSA during the application stage for a licence, and 
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where applicants are granted a licence the firms would typically continue to provide auditing 
or accounting services to them.  
The literature on accessing organisational elites suggests a range of ways in which 
researchers can identify organisations – including trade or business directories, company 
databases, trade associations, news media, personal contacts, cultivating contacts, 
conferences, snowball sampling and internet searches (Jones, 2016; Odendahl and Shaw, 
2002). In the case of entities licensed by the MFSA, the best starting point was the Financial 
Services Register (FSR) on the MFSA’s website.  The FSR contains a list of all licensed 
organisations (including individuals) divided into nine categories as follows: (i) company 
service providers; (ii) credit institutions; (iii) financial institutions; (iv) insurance 
undertakings; (v) notified alternative investment funds; (vi) pensions; (vii) securities and 
markets; (viii) securitization vehicles; and (ix) trustees and fiduciaries. The FSR suffers from 
some limitations. It does not always provide the email address of a contact person(s) for 
licensed operators and in cases where a contact person(s) is listed, the FSR does not usually 
indicate the individual’s role or position in the entity. It may however be possible to identify 
the individual’s role within the operator by conducting an internet search. To identify 
individuals in supervisory and managerial positions (but not junior level employees/lower 
ranking employees) it is also possible to access the Registry of Companies (ROC) website by 
requesting an account. The ROC website contains the details of every licensed entity’s 
shareholders, the composition of the board of directors, its legal and judicial representatives 
and its company secretary. The ROC website also serves as an online repository for 
documents submitted to the ROC by the licensed entity. Every year all companies registered 
in Malta (including operators authorised by the MFSA) must submit an annual report. From 
this report, it is sometimes possible to identify individuals in supervisory and managerial 
roles. However, in some cases, the annual report may be out of date because the last version 
would not have yet been submitted or may have been submitted but not uploaded to the 
website. In the case of some companies, the annual report is also available through the 
company’s website. Additionally, the company’s website may also provide support in 
identifying potential participants. The corporate directory maintained by Finance Malta is 
also a useful source for identifying not only licensed entities and individuals in supervisory 
and managerial roles but also law firms that specialise in financial services as well as entities 
that provide auditing and accounting services and the critical spokespersons within those 
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legal, auditing and accounting firms. Similar information in respect of the last three groups 
can be found on the Institute of Financial Services Practitioners (IFSP) website.  
In preparation for the qualitative stage, I obtained a copy of the FSR. For every 
company on the FSR, I accessed the ROC website and obtained a copy of its annual report. 
This not only served to identify relevant individuals therein, but also to divide the licensed 
entities according to their size: small, medium or large. Concomitantly, I drew up, with 
considerable help from Caius, a list of individuals who met the following criteria: (i) 
occupied or occupy managerial positions in the Maltese financial services industry, including 
individuals who provide professional legal, auditing or accounting services to licensed 
operators; (ii) were known to Caius on a personal or professional level or both; (iii) are 
considered by Caius to be experienced and knowledgeable in their respective fields; and (iv) 
are deemed to be honest and trustworthy. On this list I also included some of my own 
contacts whom I knew on a personal and professional level. During the pilot phase of the 
qualitative stage, I selected 10 potential participants from the list mentioned above to be 
interviewed. Once the pilot stage was concluded the plan was to draw a random sample of 
licensed entities from the FSR as this would enable generalizations to be made from the 
sample to the populations of interest (Tankebe, 2008) and to enter the field as soon as 
possible. The aim was to conduct around 40 interviews. The rationale for this number was 
two-fold. First, this amount should be sufficient to reach saturation (Francis et al., 2010; 
Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 2006). Second, given that there are six categories of licence-
holders (banking, insurance, pensions, securities, trusts and corporate services), with some 
groups having sub-categories, selecting two entities from each category (and sub-category) 
would amount to a total of 20 entities and I would then seek to obtain interviews with two 
individuals from each entity.  
This plan had to be revised entirely following the allegations made by DCG during 
the pilot phase of the qualitative stage (see Section 3.3.1 above). By then, I had already 
conducted seven pilot interviews. When the allegations surfaced, I became concerned that the 
temporal closeness (Desmond, 2004) to these events might skew the results of the study and 
that potential participants might be reluctant to speak to me owing to the intense media 
coverage. I continued the pilot interviews as planned, only having four left to complete the 
pilot stage. On 26 April 2017, I conducted two interviews. The first interviewee took place 
early in the morning with Mercutio, a former non-executive director of a large bank in Malta. 
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At the end of the interview, I asked whether there was anything he wished to discuss. He 
replied: 
The only thing I can say is obviously the incidents that have been happening in this 
country recently worry me tremendously. I am speaking more as a citizen here rather 
than as a person who was involved in the banking [sector]. Because again the mind 
boggles how a banking licence was given when one sees the type of scrutiny and 
rigour that was applied to the larger significant banks, at least the one [I was involved 
in] … how a banking licence was given to an Iranian national in Malta to sustain 100 
clients, some of which are mostly PEPs. Some of which are effectively extremely 
dubious characters. How that was allowed to happen in this same country with the 
same regulator which has been so rigorous and correct with the larger bank that I have 
experience [with]. I cannot reconcile the two. 
 
Later that day I conducted another meeting with Caesar, an ex-member of the senior 
management of a large bank. We decided to meet outside his place of work. As he walked 
towards me, I noticed that he was stressed – his cheek muscles were twitching and his eyes 
had a piercing look. We immediately started talking about the recent allegations surrounding 
Pilatus Bank. He was visibly irritated and angry about the whole affair and was worried that 
the claims would cost the MFSA and Malta their reputation, negatively impacting the 
Maltese economy. His face was contorting with displeasure throughout the interview and he 
refused to answer some questions about the allegations surrounding Pilatus Bank.  
I remember walking out of this interview feeling shocked. This was the second 
interview I had conducted that day, and this participant was much more vociferous about the 
events surrounding Pilatus Bank.  
Two days after this interview a former employee of Pilatus Bank (the source of most 
of the previous allegations) testified before the Magistrate leading the inquiry into Egrant. As 
noted in Section 3.3.1 above and as a direct consequence of the allegations made by DCG, on 
1 May 2017 Prime Minister Joseph Muscat called a snap election for 3 June 2017. 
At this stage, I felt that a tipping point had been reached. The Pilatus Bank affair 
(roping in the MFSA) was exponentially politicised with Maltese tribal and partisan politics 
emerging in full swing (Cini, 2002) – akin to a feud between the Capulets and the 
Montagues.  Media coverage surrounding Pilatus Bank, and by implication the MFSA, was 
frenzied. It was a period of time where I feared voicing my opinions on the allegations 
surrounding Pilatus Bank out of fear of being branded either a Nationalist or a Labourite. 
Owing to these events and feelings, I deemed it prudent to delay the interview stage until 
about a month after the election and I started the interview stage proper on 5 July 2017. 
Efforts were made to complete the pilot interviews as early in May as possible. Only two 
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pilot interviews were conducted in May. The pilot stage would have been concluded on 12 
May had I not come down with gastric flu, compelling me to ask Vincentio, the final pilot 
interviewee, to postpone the interview to 18 May. The reasons behind this stage in strategy 
were as follows. Had I commenced the interviews in the period before and after the election, 
I feared that the Pilatus Bank affair would overshadow the purpose of the meetings. I had a 
feeling that participants would only interpret the questions related to the MFSA in the light of 
the Pilatus Bank scandal.  
Desmond (2004) reported that access was facilitated despite temporal closeness to 
politically sensitive events. However, I determined that it would be more difficult to access 
participants both in the period before and after the election. I also felt that even if I had to 
avoid the election period, it would still be nearly impossible to access participants unless they 
were known on a personal and/or professional level by Caius and/or myself. The decision 
was therefore taken to switch from random sampling to non-probability sampling methods: a 
blend of availability sampling, purposive and snowball sampling. Towards the end of June 
2017, I debated whether the decision should be taken to revert to random sampling. However, 
two events casting the MFSA in the spotlight occurred, solidifying my decision to use non-
probability sampling methods. On 14 June 2017, DCG reported that the Chairman of the 
MFSA and the Chairman of Pilatus Bank were travelling together on a flight to Malta from 
Frankfurt. And on 22 June 2017, DCG stated that inspectors from the Banking Supervision 
Unit had refused to conduct an on-site inspection of Pilatus Bank.   
The sample in the substantive stage of the interviews comprised 39 Maltese financial 
services participants. These individuals were selected using a combination of availability 
sampling, purposive and snowball sampling and meeting the criteria set out at pp. 36-37 
above.  
The final sample, including the participants from the pilot stage, comprised 49 
Maltese financial services participants in or representing operators licensed by the MFSA 
(see Appendix 3 for list of interviewees). The 49 research participants were distributed across 
the financial sectors as follows: 18 banking sector; 10 insurance sector; 9 investment services 
and funds sector; 8 Company Service Providers (CSPs) and trusts; and 4 auditing and 
accounting firms. Of these participants, 24 were directors or partners, 9 were CEOs or 
managing directors, 4 were Chairmen, 6 were compliance officers, 5 were lawyers and 1 was 
a money laundering reporting officer. 29  
 
29 Some participants occupied roles in different sectors.  
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4.1.3.2  Contacting participants and gaining commitment to participate 
Researchers have identified a range of factors that influence access to elites. These include 
luck, insider status, previous relationships, making the right contacts, personal contacts, help 
from an influential individual with an extensive network who is enthusiastic about the 
research and willing to assist in gaining access (as an intermediary) as well as knowledge of 
the local context (Gamson, 1995; Healey and Rawlinson, 1993; Hunt, 1998; Leblanc and 
Schwartz, 2007; Mikecz, 2012; Ostrander, 1993; Van Maanen and Kolb, 1985; Zaloom, 
2006). My experience in recruiting research participants from the Maltese financial services 
sector was consistent with these findings.  
Three referral sources or intermediaries (Caius, Iago and Portia, the latter two also 
being interviewees) at a prestigious Maltese law firm where I had previously worked for 
three years between 2009 and 2012 and who were enthusiastic about my research put me in 
touch with 46 potential interviewees. Caius was the main referral source, putting me in 
contact with 41 participants (including Iago and Portia). Iago introduced me to another four 
potential participants and Portia to two potential interviewees. Another referral source 
(Caliban), another interviewee referred to me by Caius, helped put me in touch with the 
compliance officer of the company of which he was CEO. The referral sources contacted 
potential participants either by telephone or email and with their consent provided me with 
their contact details, including personal telephone numbers and email addresses (both 
personal and corporate). All of these potential interviewees, in turn, knew the referral sources 
on a personal and/or professional level, enabling me to bypass their secretaries and personal 
assistants and contact them directly via telephone or email.30 Seven potential interviewees 
were contacted via telephone. I mentioned to each potential interviewee who I approached 
via a phone call that the referral source had said that I would be contacting him/her and 
speaking to him/her about my project. I then provided an explanation of the project citing the 
research questions and requested a meeting in order to ask some questions that would assist 
me in the qualitative stage of my research. While providing this information over the phone, I 
asked the potential interviewees whether they understood what I was saying and requested 
their email addresses to enable me to send them three documents: (a) a brief explanation 
about my PhD research; (b) a participation information sheet and an informed consent form; 
and (c) the interview schedule (see Appendix 2 for copies of these documents). I asked for a 
 
30 In the cases of two participants, initial contact was established with the potential interviewee, but I then 
continued corresponding with their personal assistants.  
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“meeting” rather an “interview” because asking for the latter sounds more formal and I did 
not wish to disconcert the potential participant. All potential participants who were contacted 
via telephone agreed to meet within a few days.   
Forty-two potential participants were directly contacted via email (see Appendix 2 for 
copy of email sent to participants). Following local custom, which dictates respect, I 
addressed each participant using their proper designation (more will be said about this 
below). In the email, I first mentioned the referral source who had spoken to the potential 
participant about my PhD and then added that “it would be great if we could meet up so that I 
could ask you some questions for the interview stage of my PhD project. This would be of 
tremendous help”. I employed the word “tremendous” because I wanted to make the potential 
participant feel that his/her possible contribution to the project would be precious (Delaney, 
2007). Given that researchers who study elites find that these groups are extremely busy (or 
at least present an image of themselves as such), I declared my flexibility with timing over 
the following two weeks (Goldman and Swayze, 2012; Welch et al., 2002). This also 
afforded me time to space out the interviews. I concluded each email with the line “I look 
forward to hearing from you.” In the emails, I also provided each potential interviewee with 
the three documents mentioned above. Unlike the experience of Conti and O’Neil (2007), 
whose emails were simply ignored, 39 of the potential participants promptly replied to my 
emails either on the same day, the day after or within a few days. Only three responded after 
a week, all offering their apologies. In two cases, they explained that the delay was due to 
restricted email access. All interviewees contacted via email agreed to be interviewed. 
Meetings were set within a few days. Only in 13 instances were meetings set after a week.  
Delaney (2007) argues that the key to gaining access is to write a robust introductory 
letter using non-academic nomenclature that emphasises the valuable contribution that the 
potential participant would make to the research. Although I adhered to Delaney’s advice, I 
attribute gaining potential participants’ commitment to participate to the fact that all of them 
knew the intermediaries on a personal and/or professional level. It would have been very 
awkward indeed had the referral sources passed on the potential participants’ contact details 
to me with their consent, only for them to refuse a meeting when I contacted them. In most 
(41) of the cases, Caius was the main referral source. It would appear that his involvement 
was effective in obtaining access to the high-level interviewees because he knew them on a 
personal and/or professional level and had a reputation for integrity forged over several years 
as a trustworthy, hardworking and honest individual. In fact, Claudius specifically remarked 
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that one of the reasons he agreed to meet me was due to the “great respect” he had for Caius. 
Moreover, all of Caius’s referrals asked me to pass on their regards to him, demonstrating, at 
least to me, that they held Caius in high esteem. The implications of Caius as a referral source 
in relation to building rapport and trust, power dynamics and confidentiality will be discussed 
in a later section of this paper. The importance of having a trustworthy source for securing 
access can be demonstrated by what may happen when an unreliable source is used. During 
the course of my fieldwork, I discussed the research project with a young lawyer whom I 
shall call Shylock. Shylock proudly told me that he had an extensive network of connections 
that he had forged while working at one of Malta’s most reputable law firms and that he 
would be more than willing to contact them on my behalf. I knew from previous 
conversations I had with other experienced lawyers that Shylock is considered to be a shady 
and untrustworthy individual. Using Shylock as a referral source would undoubtedly have 
impeded access. I therefore politely declined his offer by saying “OK, thank you very much 
for the offer, I have already managed to secure access to a number of participants and will let 
you know if I need your assistance.” I never contacted Shylock, and I believe this was a good 
decision on my part. During an interview with Benvolio, Shylock’s name came up, and the 
interviewee issued a stark warning: “avoid him like the plague”.   
Two potential participants, Puck and Macduff, were my childhood friends and so 
contacting them and receiving their consent to be interviewed was very straightforward. The 
interview with Puck was conducted only a few hours after I telephoned him asking for a 
meeting. He said “For you, anytime”. In the case of Macduff, I had mentioned in informal 
conversation about a year earlier the possibility that I might ask him for an interview. When I 
formally contacted him via email requesting an interview, he replied the following day to ask 
if we could meet in two weeks’ time, to which I agreed. Even though both of these 
participants were childhood friends, I still felt it was important not to skirt around the issues 
of informed consent. Accordingly, I thoroughly explained the purposes of the research over 
the phone and sent them a participant information sheet and informed consent form via email.  
Employing referral sources (in particular Caius) and personal contacts to access 
participants was not only necessary given the political scenario described above but also 
because of the local context. Malta is a small country with an area of 316km2 and a 
population of just over 400,000. Due to its size, degrees of separation between individuals are 
few. It is a country where everyone knows everyone. Brabantio even went as far as to call 
Malta an “incestuous community”. Despite the few links separating individuals, it is a local 
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custom for a referral source to make an introduction. While it would not be taboo to cold-call 
potential participants, a referral would undoubtedly significantly increase the likelihood that 
the individual would agree to meet the researcher. A murky side to this local custom exists. 
Caius explained that Malta has two types of freemasonry: the formal form, with members 
engaging in obscure and arcane rituals; and the informal kind, involving the use of networks 
and contacts. He also remarked that the latter form of freemasonry is used for both illicit and 
licit purposes. Caius, drawing on his practical experience as a professional in the Maltese 
legal sphere, was convinced that using networks of contacts would be critical to gaining 
access. 
 
4.1.4 Getting the data 
Having discussed the process used to identify potential participants, the impacts of particular 
political events on the research process and the process of contacting participants and gaining 
their commitment to participate, I wish to focus on the challenges experienced in attaining the 
data. Indeed, this process was affected by a complex interaction of factors acknowledged in 
the literature on interviewing elites (in particular, location of the interview, seating 
arrangements, rapport and trust, power dynamics and positionality of the interviewer). I shall 
begin with the place of interview and seating arrangements. The positionality of the 
interviewer is discussed within the sections describing rapport and trust and power dynamics.  
 
4.1.4.1 Location of the interview and seating arrangements  
Researchers studying elites agree that the location of the interview affects the types of data 
that participants are willing to share (Harvey, 2010; Mikecz, 2012), but disagree on the 
specific location where the interview ought to be conducted. Ostrander (1995:20) claimed 
that meeting in a public place familiar to the interviewee (such as an elegant restaurant) and 
arriving before the interviewee tips the power balance in favour of the interviewer enabling 
one to conduct a “frank and substantive” interview. Dexter (2006), however, cautions against 
meeting in a public place as this can lead to general chitchat. Mikecz (2012) acknowledged 
certain disadvantages of meeting in public places (the noise level makes it harder to 
concentrate, compromising the quality of the audio-recording and rendering transcription 
more difficult than when recording in office settings), but discovered that these locations 
yield “high-quality” and “invaluable” data. In contrast, few participants in McDowell’s 
(1998) research wished to be interviewed in a public place (like a bar or restaurant) and felt 
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more comfortable being interviewed in a neutral space in the work environment such as a 
boardroom. Essentially, the appropriate location to interview elites depends, as Harvey 
(2010:10) notes, “on a number of factors, including the research context, the type of 
respondent being interviewed as well as the predicted power relationship between the 
interviewer and respondent”. 
In the case of my research, in line with other social scientists who have conducted 
research on elites, I sought to primarily ensure the comfort of the participant (Pierce, 2011). 
At the same time, I did not want the interview to be conducted in a public place (such as a 
restaurant or bar), not for the reasons cited by the above researchers, but because of the 
sensitive nature of the research. Given that the study revolved around the MFSA, which was 
in the political and media spotlight at the time, I did not want our conversation to be 
overheard by anyone. To satisfy these two goals, I allowed participants to select the venue; 
and in all but two cases I deferred to their preference. Forty-one interviewees opted to be 
interviewed at their workplace to which I immediately agreed. Of these, 21 took place in the 
interviewee’s office and 20 were held within boardrooms. Six interviewees suggested their 
private residence, to which I also agreed. One interviewee, Macduff, a close childhood friend, 
asked if he could be interviewed at my house, which I naturally accepted. Two participants, 
Prospero and Lear, requested the interview to be held at lunchtime in a restaurant. While I 
would have preferred the meeting not to be conducted at this location, I did not want to 
bluntly decline as this would have been impolite and would have blunted rapport-building in 
the early stages of the research. I therefore explained that due to the sensitive nature of our 
discussion it would be more appropriate to find a quiet location within the restaurant. Lear 
remarked that this would be difficult because the restaurant becomes rather busy at 
lunchtime. He additionally explained that he was reluctant to conduct the interview at his 
private residence because his wife would be there. I suggested that as he lived just a short 
distance from my house by car we could meet at my home. I also explained that to protect his 
identity I would ensure that nobody would be at home at the time of the interview. Upon 
learning these details, Lear promptly agreed. Prospero assured me that “there is no 
eavesdropping where we will meet” and stated, “as you are sensitive to this, whilst we will 
still meet at this place we will then proceed to our apartment and meet and discuss on our 
terrace.” 
Whether at the participants’ workplaces (offices or boardrooms) or private residences 
or at my home, the interviews proceeded relatively smoothly. The interviewees appeared 
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comfortable and at ease, aside from some participants feeling uneasy about the presence of 
the audio-recording device. For instance, while I was interviewing Brutus in the boardroom, 
he adopted a sombre tone, speaking carefully in English, stammering all the while. Once the 
recorder was switched off, he began talking in Maltese in a more frank and free-flowing 
manner. I had a similar experience with Portia. During the interview in her office, Portia 
appeared tense and adopted a cautious tone. However, once the recorder was turned off, she 
became much more talkative. Reagan continuously looked at the device throughout the 
interview but still mentioned sensitive information while it was switched on. In contrast, 
seven interviewees divulged more sensitive and “juicy” information or were more critical 
about the MFSA once the recording device was switched off. Two participants specifically 
signalled to me to switch the recorder off to tell me confidential information. 
There were some minor interruptions in both the workplace and private settings. For 
instance, while I was interviewing Brutus in his firm’s boardroom, one of my friends who 
worked at the same firm unexpectedly walked into the room because he heard that I was 
there. I immediately switched off the recorder, and we spoke briefly for a few minutes before 
returning to the interview. And while I was interviewing Banquo, his office phone rang on 
three occasions. He answered the phone every time, getting increasingly irritated and huffed 
and puffed.  The final time the phone rang I heard him tell the receptionist “I told you I am in 
a meeting; I will call when I am ready”. As Banquo returned to the table, he apologised. I 
explained that I was used to this as whenever I try to speak to my father he is constantly 
interrupted by telephone calls. This explanation seemed to put him at ease. While I was 
conducting a meeting with Claudius, he had to attend an urgent conference call with some 
members of his team and asked me to leave his office for a few minutes. When I conducted 
the meeting with Prospero at his private residence we originally started talking in the living 
room area but there was a problem with the room’s air-conditioning and so it was getting 
unbearably hot. He therefore suggested that the interview be held in the kitchen where his 
wife was preparing lunch. As we were entering the kitchen area, his wife protested but he 
stood his ground, saying “We will not disturb you; it is too hot inside the [other] room.” She 
scowled at me and I felt awkward for intruding into her kitchen space.  
The location of an interview also affects the power dynamics between the researcher 
and the participant (Elwood and Martin, 2000). I will discuss power dynamics and their 
impacts on attaining the data in a further section of this chapter. However, for the purposes of 
this part, I wish to make a few points. First, in cases where the interview was being 
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conducted at an interviewee’s workplace or private residence, the interviewee was generally 
able to exert more control over the interview. I believe that this was due to two reasons: the 
interview was being conducted in the interviewee’s own domain; and I generally feel less 
comfortable conducting interviews in unfamiliar settings. Admittedly, when I conducted the 
interview with Lear at my own residence, his domineering character overshadowed any 
attempt of mine to control the flow of the interview. Second, the interview venues 
symbolised and heightened the power distance between the participant and me. Many 
interviews were conducted on the top floor of office buildings with fantastic views of the 
island, large boardrooms with even larger desks, or old Maltese townhouses that were 
lavishly decorated. The grandiosity of the locations, reflecting the top positions the 
interviewees held in the organisations under study (an observation also made by Hunter, 
1995) as well as their evidently high salaries made me feel slightly subordinate, leading to a 
passive stance throughout the interviews. Nevertheless, seating arrangements served to 
reduce the power distance between me and the interviewees. In the workplace scenario, many 
participants possessed not only a large desk on which to work but also had a smaller table to 
conduct meetings. All participants with this set-up in their offices asked me to sit down by 
this smaller table. This helped to slightly reduce the power distance, enabling me to conduct 
an informal conversation rather than a strict formalised interview (Empson, 2017). Sitting by 
this smaller table or, as suggested by Pierce (2011), at a right angle to the interviewee rather 
than opposite to him or her (where the meeting was conducted at a large table), made me feel 
more comfortable in trying to coax the interviewee to answer my questions, steering them 
back on track whenever the interview proceeded at a tangent and asking follow-up questions 
to probe further. In the private residence scenario when interviewing Prospero, I achieved the 
same comfortable effect when we sat side-by-side on a small sofa. 
 
4.1.4.2 Developing rapport and gaining trust 
Building rapport and gaining trust are essential to obtaining candid and honest information 
from participants (Doody and Noonan, 2013; Harvey, 2010). In the case of my research on 
Maltese financial services participants, I utilized a range of techniques with different 
participants. I will illustrate and discuss the process of how I sought to do so primarily 
through the lens of Goffman’s (1956) rituals of deference and demeanour.  
Goffman (1956:473) explained that all segments of society are imbued with rules of 
conduct which serve as a guide for action and which ought to be followed not only because 
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they are “pleasant, cheap or effective” but also because they are “suitable or just”. In his 
analysis, Goffman distinguished between the following rules of conduct: (i) symmetrical and 
asymmetrical; and (ii) substantive and ceremonial rules. While symmetrical rules are those 
that create mutual/bilateral obligations and expectations, asymmetrical rules are those that 
produce unilateral duties and expectations. On the one hand, substantive rules are those that 
guide conduct concerning matters that by their own nature are fundamentally important. On 
the other hand, ceremonial rules are those that guide conduct regarding issues that by their 
very nature are insignificant or of secondary importance, but through which an individual 
communicates his or her character or expresses his or her appreciation of other individuals. 
Goffman noted that these ceremonial messages can be linguistic, gestural, spatial, task-
embedded or part of the communication structure. He goes on to explain that these 
ceremonial messages can be divided into two forms of ceremonial activities or rituals, termed 
deference and demeanour. Deference is the part of the ceremonial activity through which an 
actor symbolically conveys appreciation to a recipient. Goffman subdivides deference into 
two forms: avoidance rituals and presentational rituals. While avoidance rituals are negative 
ethics that prescribe what ought not to be done, presentational rituals are positive ethics that 
set out what ought to be done. Goffman describes four common forms of presentational 
deference: salutations, invitations, compliments and minor services. For Goffman, demeanour 
is the part of the ceremonial activity generally conveyed via deportment, dress and bearing 
through which the actor demonstrates to the recipient that he or she is an individual of 
desirable or undesirable qualities.  
Ostrander (1993) and Harvey (2010) sought to build rapport and develop trust with 
elite participants in the initial stages of their research by ensuring their interviewees’ 
anonymity and confidentiality and by disclosing to interviewees in an open and transparent 
manner their own identities, the goals of the research and how the results would be utilised. I 
followed that advice. As a PhD student conducting research at the Institute of Criminology at 
the University of Cambridge, I am bound by the British Society of Criminology Statement of 
Ethics to obtain a participant's voluntary informed consent before starting the interview. This 
is an asymmetrical substantive rule. The duty to obtain informed consent is asymmetrical 
because the participant owes no such obligation to me. Obtaining voluntary informed consent 
is of substantive importance because otherwise I would be coercing and deceiving the 
participant. Consent obtained through coercion or deception would have numerous effects. 
First, any initial attempt at building trust would be shattered because, as Onora O’Neill 
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(2002:37) argued, “trust is destroyed by deception”. Second, and from a general legal 
perspective, consent is vitiated by coercion. Third, and from a Kantian perspective, I would 
be breaching the categorical imperative of respect for persons (Levine, 1991). To prevent 
these negative effects, prior to the interviews, I sent to participants via email a brief 
explanation of the PhD project, a participation information sheet and informed consent form 
as well as the interview schedule. 
At the beginning of most of the interviews, I explained the purposes of the research 
by citing the research questions and the methods I was using to address them. I emphasised 
that the research was being conducted under the precepts of confidentiality and anonymity. I 
then asked for permission to record the interview. In this regard and similar to Goldman and 
Swayze (2012), I explained that recording was necessary to enable me to listen instead of 
taking notes. I would further explain that since the participant’s actual words were essential 
to the research and given that the data analysis would be based on those words, it would be 
better to audio-record the interview to capture the participant’s thoughts rather than writing 
them down and thereby potentially distorting them. To further guarantee each interviewee’s 
anonymity and confidentiality, I explained that the voice recordings would be stored securely 
and that having been transcribed they would be deleted.  
Following these assurances, I then asked each participant whether we could proceed 
to the interview. In all cases the participant answered affirmatively, demonstrating prima 
facie that abiding by this asymmetrical substantive rule contributed to their agreement to 
begin the interview and to be recorded. Some participants explicitly referred to these 
assurances before consenting to be recorded. For instance, Lear remarked that he normally 
refuses to be recorded, but because of these assurances, as well as others mentioned below, 
he agreed. Similarly, Demetrius stressed that deleting the recording would be crucial. Even 
one of my close friends, Macduff, was particularly concerned that he might be identified 
through his responses. It was only after I emphasised my substantive obligations was he 
comfortable proceeding with the interview. These examples confirm Ostrander’s (1993:16) 
observations that “getting in was not the same as gaining real access and establishing the 
kinds of relationships essential to getting useful information”. Other participants were more 
relaxed about my adhering to the substantive obligations. For example, Othello stated in a 
very cool manner that he did not mind being recorded. Similarly, Caesar claimed “It is not a 
problem, I give many interviews”. Claudius was more vocal and with extreme candour 
repeatedly stated that I could divulge his identity. In a few cases, participants casually handed 
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me the informed consent sheet filled in and signed at the start of the interview. In these cases, 
I refrained from explaining the purposes of the research, as I assumed that my substantive 
obligation had been fulfilled, but I asked if they had any questions they wished to pose 
regarding the research. In some cases, and as I became more confident throughout the 
research process, I asked the participant if he or she had examined the relevant documents. If 
the participant’s response was negative, I would spend some time going over the relevant 
documents. If the participant had read the documents, I would ask the participant whether we 
could proceed to the interview. In all cases, I emphasised the principles of anonymity and 
confidentiality.  
Similar to Hunter (1995) and Lancaster (2017), I discovered that many Maltese 
financial services participants, either at the beginning or at the end of the interview, were 
interested in knowing “who else I spoke to”. Unlike Hunter, I did not reveal or divulge 
specific names, as doing so would have breached the substantive obligations of 
confidentiality and anonymity, risking not only criminal and civil prosecution but also 
resulting in a breach of trust endangering both this and future research. In addition, and 
similar to Ostrander’s (1993) suspicions, this may have been a test to determine whether I 
could be trusted to keep the interviewee’s identity secret. Whenever these situations occurred, 
I would say something along the following lines: “Please appreciate that I cannot divulge the 
identity of the participants because this would violate the ethical agreement, but I can 
mention that I have spoken to lawyers and to individuals in the big four and in credit 
institutions, financial institutions, insurance institutions, investment services, trusts and 
trustee services and corporate service providers”. Unlike the participants in Hunter’s (1995) 
research, my interviewees seemed to be dissuaded from probing any further, but similar to 
Lancaster’s (2017) research, they suggested that I speak to certain individuals. For instance, 
both Iago and Benvolio advised me to speak to Tybalt, who unbeknownst to them I had 
already interviewed. I allowed these participants to put forward their suggestions because 
doing so would provide not only information on who to interview and who not to interview 
(Hunter (1995) but, as occurred in this case, confirmation that the individual can provide 
useful information.  
Aside from abiding by the substantive obligation to build rapport and trust, I also 
engaged in presentational deference rituals with specific etiquette. Many of the participants 
occupied the highest positions in the organisations under study, were at least 20 years older 
than me and/or were lawyers or accountants. Owing to these status differences, I was 
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compelled to abide by the informal asymmetrical ceremonial rule to defer to them by 
addressing them as Mr ____, Mr Chairman, Ms ____, Professor ______ or Dr _____. In 
addition, and similar to Mikecz (2012) and Liu (2018), I paid attention to local practices. For 
instance, it is a Maltese custom to address financial services professionals by their proper 
designation unless instructed otherwise by the participant. When I addressed participants 
using the preceding salutations, all bar one participant requested that I call them by their first 
name. In the case of Macbeth, however, it was only after meeting him a second time that he 
asked me to call him by his first name. Addressing participants by their proper designation 
and subsequently being asked to address them on a first-name basis suggests that a show of 
deference contributed to achieving rapport.  
Some researchers seek to develop a rapport with their participants by creating the 
right impression by dressing the part (see, for example, Froschauer and Wong, 2012; 
Richards, 1996; Ryan and Lewer, 2012; Spence, 2015). I also engaged in this form of 
ceremonial behaviour to appear as a “properly demeaned individual” (Goffman, 1956:489). 
My left and right arms are both tattooed. I have an image of Lady Justice on my left forearm, 
Millais’ Ophelia on my left inner arm, a quotation on my right forearm and an etching of St 
Catherine of Alexandria by Martin Schongauer on my right arm. As Farrington (1994) 
remarked, tattoos may be considered the criminal’s barcode and it was therefore crucial that I 
cover my arms by wearing a long-sleeved shirt, which was quite uncomfortable in the 
summer months. Apart from engaging in this form of ceremonial behaviour, which according 
to Smith (2006) can be considered as a manipulative tactic, I also sought to demonstrate my 
sartorial sense by arriving at the interview dressed in a smart casual manner, such as by 
wearing trousers not jeans, and shoes not sandals. For the interviews conducted in spring 
(April and May) I wore a full suit with jacket and tie, while in interviews carried out in the 
summer months (June, July and August) I did not wear a jacket or tie as during these months 
Maltese financial market participants rarely dress in such manner unless they have a board 
meeting or need to appear in court. It would therefore have been excessive for me to wear a 
full suit, especially in the summer months in blistering heat. More will be said about the 
demeanour of participants when discussing power displays.   
Kezar (2003), citing Dexter (1970), argued that showing empathy can help build 
rapport and trust. I also sought to display the positive character trait of empathy via reflective 
listening. For example, I would regularly employ the phrase “just to make sure I am 
understanding correctly” or would attempt to interpret the meaning of what the participant 
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was saying. Similarly to Gilding (2010), appearing empathetic helped to facilitate further 
discussion or clarify points made by the participant, yielding richer data (Karnieli-Miller, 
Strier and Pessach, 2009). 
Goffman (1956:479) argued that “deference comes to be conceived as something a 
subordinate owe to his superordinate” but goes on to explain that “this is an extremely 
limiting view of deference”. Throughout the research, I always aimed to be punctual. 
Arriving late for an interview would have been considered extremely rude and would 
certainly have jeopardised my chances of building rapport. Moreover, the interviewees 
generally had busy schedules, so it was critical to meet at the specified time in order not to 
lose the opportunity for a meeting. In only one instance did I fear that I was going to arrive 
late for a meeting – with Brutus. I have been a friend of this individual for many years and so 
I felt comfortable enough to text him, while I was stuck in traffic, to inform him that I would 
be late. He immediately texted me back saying “No worries”, although ultimately I did arrive 
on time. While I offered all interviewees presentational deference by arriving punctually, 
Claudius and Reagan did not immediately reciprocate such behaviour. I had scheduled a 
meeting with Claudius’ personal assistant for 3pm and arrived at his offices a few minutes 
early. However, Claudius did not turn up until 3.30pm. A similar situation occurred with 
Reagan. I arrived at the interview location a few minutes before the scheduled time. As I was 
walking towards her offices, I received a phone call asking me to go to another location. It 
only took ten minutes to drive there by car. When I arrived at the second location, Reagan 
took approximately half an hour to call me to her office. In both these cases, I was initially 
rather annoyed. I felt tempted to say “Really, half an hour late? I gave you the common 
courtesy for arriving on time for the scheduled meeting, the least you could do is be there on 
time”. I bit my tongue for three reasons. First, I knew from previous experiences as a lawyer 
(and confirmed during this fieldwork) that financial services practitioners are extremely busy 
and I therefore had to allow some latitude when meeting interviewees. Second, calling out 
participants for arriving late, particularly when I needed to interview them to collect the data 
would have demonstrated a lack of self-control, aggression and rudeness all of which reflect a 
lack of proper demeanour. Displaying such an inconsiderate attitude would undoubtedly have 
ruined my chances of building the necessary rapport to obtain the data. Third, both 
participants apologised profusely, thereby reciprocating proper comportment. A simple 
apology had three effects. Accepting their apology helped to build a stronger rapport. By 
showing proper demeanour, the participant made me less angry, enabling me to ask questions 
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in a relatively calm manner. By apologizing, participants also indirectly admitted that they 
had breached the presentational deference rule of punctuality. In addition to restoring their 
reputation by offering multiple apologies, I believe that participants took more time out of 
their schedule than they had initially intended, allowing me to ask important questions. I also 
knew that Claudius had another appointment but cancelled it to continue talking to me. 
Other techniques were employed to forge rapport and trust with participants. As 
Pierce (2011) has suggested and as noted by Mikecz (2012), maintaining eye contact proved 
helpful.  Similarly to Goldman and Swayze (2012), rapport and trust were developed by 
utilizing a referral source. Many participants who had been referred to me by Caius would, at 
the beginning of the interview, inquire about how Caius was doing. I would generally tell 
them that he was fine but very busy with work. I believe that conversing about this common 
connection made the interviewee feel comfortable with me, as occurred with Oakley (1982) 
and Puwar (1997), contributing to the interviewee sharing his or her own personal 
experiences (Kezar, 2003). Some interviewees associated me with Caius, helping to create 
rapport. For example, Caesar remarked how my voice is identical to Caius’ while Theseus 
even called me “Caius”. Both Edgar and Laertes also observed my resemblance to Caius. 
Lear projected his trust in Caius (the main intermediary) to me, creating what Petkov and 
Kaoullas (2015:9) describe as an “aura on trust”.  This was essential to obtaining his consent 
to audio-record the conversation: “Caius is a person of integrity and trust, then you are a 
person of integrity and trust”.  
 As with other researchers (Anthony and Danaher, 2015), having a shared interest or 
establishing common ground with participants helped to forge rapport and trust. Romeo was 
also a PhD student, and after guaranteeing confidentiality he told me that “he understands all 
the issues I am facing regarding recording”. At the beginning of the meeting, Gloucester 
mentioned that he knew my grandfather and my grandfather’s brother. He reminisced that 
while my grandfather was the “business type of man”, dealing for example with banks, his 
brother was the “enforcer”, dealing with stevedores. Bringing up this family connection at the 
start of the interview brought us closer together, yielding a smooth interview.  
Rapport was also easily built with those individuals who were friends of mine, either 
from childhood or through work. For instance, a close rapport was developed with Antony 
(the former CEO of an insurance company). After Antony asked to conclude the interview 
because he had another meeting, I mentioned that I remembered him from annual general 
meetings (AGMs) of a publicly listed company I used to attend while working as an associate 
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in a major law firm in Malta. (I did not bring this up at the beginning of the interview because 
the introduction had been made by Caius, the primary referral source.) Upon hearing that I 
remembered him from the AGMs, he postponed his other meeting and we spoke for a few 
minutes about my PhD. He also gave me a book as a gift and offered to provide assistance as 
and when necessary.  
Having examined how rapport and trust were developed throughout the research 
project and how they contributed to attaining the data, the discussion now turns to how power 
dynamics affected data collection, in some cases doing so through the lens of Goffman’s 
rituals of deference and demeanour.  In specific instances, power dynamics were intricately 
linked to rapport building. These examples will be discussed below also through the lens of 
Goffman’s ceremonial rituals.  
 
4.1.4.3 Power dynamics 
Hunter (1995) advises researchers studying elites not to ignore the elites’ power as well as 
their own power in the research relationship. Akin to other academics studying elites, and as 
can be seen in Appendix 3, 29 Maltese financial services participants tended to dominate the 
interviews in a range of ways. Many interviewees (27) gave lengthy answers to many of the 
questions rendering it difficult to ask other questions and follow-up questions.31 Furthermore, 
some of these interviewees did not answer the questions posed to them. For instance, 
Polonius went off at a tangent when I asked him a question about the role of the MFSA: 
 
MM  So what do you understand the role or the function of the MFSA to be?  
 
Polonius  I respect regulators in the sense, I know that there is need for a 
regulator, in everywhere and in everything. What is important is 
obviously that the regulator knows what he is doing and treats 
everyone with the same scale.  
 
Gloucester also failed to specifically answer the question pertaining to the function of the 
MFSA: 
MM So my first question is what do you understand the role of the MFSA 
to be?  
 
Gloucester  First of all just as some background I had been seconded after the 1987 
elections when there was a change in government. I had been seconded 
to the Malta International Business Authority, which was the authority 
 
31 While exceptions did arise, giving long answers was characteristically displayed by interviewees who were at 
least 20 years older than me.  
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that was set up to launch the offshore business concept that then 
morphed into the MFSA. The offshore label was dropped; it became 
the MFSA and again whereas previously supervision of banks was by 
the Central Bank and insurance was by the Ministry of Finance and 
funds almost didn’t exist. Then it all came under one roof under the 
one-stop concept of the MFSA.  
 
Escalus displayed dominance by suggesting that one question on the interview schedule 
should have been asked before another: 
 
MM This is quite a broad follow-up question, but how effective do you 
think the MFSA is in performing these functions? 
 
Escalus   I would like ... because when I saw the sequence of your questions, 
there was a question which I thought at least in my position should 
have been before because I think one of the questions was: What 
experiences do I have with the MFSA? 
 
 On some occasions, interviewees would immediately take charge of the interview. For 
instance, Romeo started answering the questions without me prompting him: 
 
Shall we start with the first question? Let me give you a brief introduction about 
myself. I am an accountant and an auditor, I graduated from the University of Malta 
with a BA(Hons) degree and subsequent to that I completed my ACCA studies. 
 
In a similar vein, Albany began the interview himself by mentioning numerous preliminary 
points: 
 
Naturally, the way I am going to reply to your various questions is in the context of 
Bank ABC, which is not DEF bank nor XYZ bank, and my experience is what it is. I 
thought of mentioning that initially and perhaps this is something you are already 
aware of: that the MFSA was staffed by people coming from the Central Bank 
initially. Now some time has gone by in the meantime, so naturally, there are new 
entrants who come from various areas and newcomers who joined just out of 
university, polytechnic or whatever it is. So initially you had these people who moved 
or were, in inverted commas, forced to move from the Central Bank of Malta to the 
MFSA because there was resistance then.  
 
I believe these interviewees displayed these dominant characteristics because they occupied 
high-level positions in the organisations under study (chairmen, CEOs, directors and 
partners) and are therefore “used to being in charge” (Ostrander, 1993:19).32 In these 
instances (interviewees giving long answers, not answering the questions posed to them and 
 
32 Caius would occasionally forewarn me about a participant’s dominant character traits (as he did with Prospero 
and Lear, the two most dominant interviewees). Most times he would remain silent not to influence my 
judgement.   
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taking charge of the interview), rather than interrupting, I adopted a deferential attitude and 
doxastic interview style (Brinkmann, 2007) by allowing them to talk while I listened 
carefully, as Mayo (1949) suggested, before asking them the question again in a polite 
manner, as Thomas (1993) advised. Alternatively, I would try to organise another meeting, 
which occurred in three cases. These were forms of avoidance and presentational rituals that I 
employed for four interconnected reasons.  
First, the interviewees who displayed this level of dominance were all at least 20 
years my senior, and an expectation existed that I would respect my elders by allowing them 
to speak freely, without interruption. Second, these interviewees were, in Hunter’s terms 
(1993:50), “knowledgeable informants”. I fulfilled the role of a student by listening in 
accordance with the maxim a bove majori discit arare minor (a young ox learns to plough 
from an older one) (Gray, 2006a:21). Admittedly, to establish some level of dominance on 
my part and to prevent interviewees from giving long responses, I considered telling 
interviewees at the beginning of the interview “I am interested in everything you have to say, 
and I wish to go over all the questions so please be concise and brief in your responses”. 
When I mentioned this to Caius, the primary referral source, he advised that if the participant 
had agreed to give me his or her time, it would be rude to ask them to be concise. Third, 
interrupting the interviewee would have been considered rude behaviour that would have 
blunted rapport. Fourth, this behaviour would have caused reputational damage to both the 
referral source and me. Malta is a small country and news of disrepute travels fast. This 
would have impeded my chances of collecting further data. Nevertheless, as the research 
progressed, I became more confident in asserting my own position throughout the interviews. 
This confidence was admittedly contingent on the relationship of the interviewee with the 
referral source. In those cases where I knew that the referral source had a personal, rather 
than a professional, relationship with the participant I was more confident in steering the 
interviewee back on track. I also discovered that a useful way to encourage the interviewee to 
answer a question was to wait for him or her to pause and quickly ask a question.  
Four participants (Lysander, Caesar, Cornwall and Prospero) displayed power by 
questioning the project’s link with criminology. In these situations, I would calmly explain 
that police studies have shown that if the general public perceives that the police lack 
legitimacy (for example, if they feel that they are being mistreated) it is more likely that they 
will fail to comply with the law or to cooperate with the police. Remaining unruffled while 
expressing my views was a form of ceremonial behaviour that was adopted to portray myself 
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as a well-demeaned individual.  Instrumental reasons explained my attempt at displaying a 
well-demeaned image – that is, to avoid reputational damage and to continue to build rapport 
(essential for collecting the data). I also adopted a calm attitude (and did so for the same 
reasons) when Caesar and Macbeth advised me to include the Financial Intelligence Analysis 
Unit (FIAU) in my study. I explained to both Caesar and Macbeth that while researching the 
FIAU was important, my project concerned the legitimacy of the MFSA and not that of the 
FIAU.  
Two interviewees displayed dominance by postponing the meeting as I arrived at the 
interview location. Indeed, Caesar asked if we could adjourn the meeting for half an hour 
because he had to go for lunch with the chairman of his company. I naturally agreed and took 
the opportunity to have lunch too. When I arrived for the meeting with Tybalt, his secretary 
asked me to sit down while she went to inform him that I had arrived. I immediately realised 
that he was in another meeting and that he had forgotten that he had a scheduled a meeting 
with me at 12pm. He asked if I could come back at 1pm to which I agreed. As I exited the 
office, I wanted to make doubly sure that I was not the cause of this confusion, so I checked 
my emails. I was correct: the meeting with Tybalt had been scheduled for 12pm. In both 
these cases, I felt slightly displeased because I had an expectation that individuals of this 
standing would display presentational deference by committing to the agreed time and not 
forgetting that a meeting had been scheduled. When I returned for the meetings, both Caesar 
and Tybalt apologised for having had to postpone at short-notice. I adopted an empathetic 
attitude (combined with self-control) and explained that I understood how busy they were  
and how things can crop up at any instant. Empathy was employed as a strategy. This 
demeanour was adopted for the instrumental reasons cited above: to avoid reputational 
damage and to build rapport.  
Tensions did rise on two occasions. Prospero first asked whether I was a lawyer. 
When I replied in the affirmative, he quizzed me, remarking “but criminology is not law”. 
This display of power (presuming that he understood the wide-ranging discipline of 
criminology) annoyed me. I responded curtly, “Yes, but it is multidisciplinary, including not 
only law and psychology but other disciplines such as geography”. He then asked whether it 
includes subjects like sociology and anthropology and I replied “Yes exactly” in a firm tone. 
I quickly realised that this lack of self-control on my part may have compromised our rapport 
because Prospero was taken aback.  
 
Malvolio displayed dominance by questioning the rationale behind the question:  
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MM:  Have you ever thought about stopping to work in the industry? 
 
Malvolio: I mean, as you know, I’m the managing partner of the organisation, so, 
I mean, stopping, I don't understand what that means; because, 
obviously, it’s an integral part of what the organisation does. 
 
The arrogant tone in which he questioned the meaning behind the question annoyed me. I 
tried to remain relaxed and explained that one of the reasons I asked that question was 
because some respondents had told me that the MFSA had bothered them so much that they 
were seriously considering leaving the sector. A few minutes later he questioned the raison 
d’être behind another question, perceiving the answer too obvious, again in an arrogant 
manner. Owing to this dominant attitude, I became quite irate, using a firm tone to make my 
arguments. I believe that by asserting my own position firmly, Malvolio was more inclined to 
respond in a succinct manner: 
 
MM: What do you think justifies the powers of the MFSA, or why do you 
think it is right or proper for the MFSA to have the powers that it has? 
 
Malvolio: Because you need a regulator, otherwise, I mean, in every serious 
financial services centre there is a regulator, so without a regulator 
how can you protect the consumer? For example, that’s the main 
function, right? So a service to ensure that enough information is made 
available to the consumer, so, I mean, I don’t really get the thrust of 
your question here either. Tell me why you’re asking that question like 
that? Why? 
 
MM: Why? Because that question directly concerns the legitimacy of the 
MFSA. 
 
Malvolio: Yeah, but how could you have a financial services centre without it? 
 
MM:  I don’t know that that’s up to the respondents to tell me, not for me to 
tell you. 
 
Malvolio: Yeah, OK, I mean, that’s - yeah, I think that you must … 
 
MM: Because I could have somebody who tells me that they don’t believe in 
regulation, so I’m leaving that up to the respondent, and it’s not for me 
to say. 
 
Malvolio: Okay, I think without a regulator, history has proven that the ignorant 
and the innocent get taken advantage of, and, therefore, you must have 
somebody taking care of their interests. 
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According to Kvale (1996) the power balance in an interview is tipped in favour of the 
interviewer. Despite the displays of dominance described above and only after listening to 
audio-recorded interviews and reading through the interview transcripts did I acknowledge 
what Brinkmann and Kvale (2005:164) have described as the “asymmetrical power relation 
of the interview”. Consistent with these authors’ powerful researcher perspective, my 
research project set the agenda; I initiated and terminated the interviews (at least in most 
cases), determined the interview topic and posed questions including follow-up questions. 
Moreover, in certain instances some interviewees (including those who displayed the 
dominant characteristics elucidated above) seemed unsure whether their responses were 
correct. For example, Macbeth asked: “I don't know if this is what you wanted”. Echoing 
Macbeth’s question, Romeo stated: “I am not sure whether I have answered your questions”. 
In these situations, as suggested by Rivera et al. (2002) I assured the participant that there are 
“no right or wrong answers”. Cornwall specifically asked for my approval: “But does it make 
sense?” Similarly to my responses to Macbeth and Romeo, I assured this respondent that 
there are no right or wrong answers: “Yes of course. It does make sense, but I am not here to 
judge”.  
Some interviewees, even after I had thoroughly explained the principles of anonymity 
and confidentiality, asked me at the end of the interview not to reveal their identity, revealing 
a fear that their identity might be disclosed. In these cases, I reassured the participant of my 
ethical obligations. Two participants also engaged in presentational deference by 
complimenting me about my qualifications. Macbeth remarked: “I been interviewed by some 
university students in the past but none had qualifications like you have”. Similarly, 
Montague flattered me by commenting “I am impressed with your qualifications”. While I 
felt proud, I displayed the positive trait of humility by saying “Thank you, I worked hard for 
that”. Despite being praised for my qualifications I still felt subordinate to these interviewees 
owing to our age difference and their position and expert knowledge. This subordinate 
position translated, especially with Macbeth (because he was a far more imposing figure than 
Montague), into a lack of self-confidence that at times prevented me from steering the 
interviewees back on track. 
While I perceived that most interviewees exhibited some degree of dominance over 
the interview, there was one interviewee who seemed to display extreme submissiveness. As 
Cordelia and I entered the boardroom, she stated “I feel nervous, and under pressure, I feel as 
if I am going to be interrogated. This reminds me of my viva at university”. At the end of the 
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interview, she asked as a student would at the end of a test: “How did it go?” It was not clear 
why she adopted a submissive stance. (I do not believe that gender was a factor here, because 
although the financial services sector is traditionally male-dominated (Zafar, 2017), she had 
been working in it for many years.) I believe that the main factor contributing to her 
submissive stance was my relationship with the referral source, Caius. I suspect that owing to 
my close relationship with Caius she felt anxious that she might have said something that 
would be construed as incorrect or inappropriate. Indeed, throughout the interviewee, she was 
cautious with her choice of words. To try and minimize this submissive stance and to 
encourage her to provide more information I repeatedly explained that “there are no right or 
wrong answers”.  
The demeanour of one participant (Messala) had an unexpected effect on me.  
Messala attended the interview wearing a shirt unbuttoned till just above his solar plexus. 
Although, I did not wear a full suit during the summer months due to the blistering heat, I 
still dressed in a smart-casual manner as did all of the other participants, and I expected them 
all to display proper demeanour.33 Messala’s lack of proper demeanour made me feel more 
dominant and increased my confidence throughout the interview. 
 
 
4.1.5 Getting out – analysing the data  
All interviews (including those in the pilot stage) were transcribed verbatim to aid data 
analysis (Hennick, Hutter and Bailey, 2011). The pilot interviews were included in the data 
analysis for two reasons: the interview schedule did not change; and even though six out of 
ten interviewees were former members of licensed operators, they had only recently resigned 
from their positions or moved out of the sector. After transcribing the interviews, I listened to 
the audio-recordings again in order to make sure that I had been accurate. Following this, I 
deleted the audio-recorded interviews in order to protect the identities of the respondents. In 
the analysis, I was guided by the research question “What do operators expect from the 
MFSA or what matters to regulatees?” I divided the analysis into three phases all aided by 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (QSR NVivo) (Bachman and Schutt, 
2011).  
The first stage of data analysis, called the open coding phase, created a lens through 
which to analyse the data by asking a specific and consistent set of questions (Strauss, 1987). 
 
33 In all fairness, it was a Friday (to many in Malta, the start of the weekend) and it was a very hot day. 
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This framework was based on the interview schedule and especially the following questions:  
 
(i) “What do operators expect or demand from the MFSA?” I coded responses for this 
question under the category “Expectation or demands”.  
 
(ii) “Can you tell me what the roles or functions of the MFSA are?” I coded responses for this 
question under the category “Functions of the MFSA”. 
 
(iii) “Can you tell me about an experience you had with the MFSA that was particularly 
good?” I coded responses for this question under the category “Positive experiences”. 
 
(iv) “Can you tell about an experience you had with the MFSA that did not go well?” I coded 
responses for this question under the category “Negative experiences”. 
 
(v) “What do you think constitutes a good (or right) relationship between companies and the 
MFSA?” I coded responses for this question under the category “Good relationships”.  
 
The purpose of this phase was to identify preliminary concepts reflecting the basic 
legitimation demands of, or what matters to, licensed market participants (Neuman and 
Wiegand, 2000). I cast a wide net to try to capture as many concepts and themes as possible. 
While adopting this broad approach, I nonetheless sought to be specific. That is, I did not 
seek to cluster preliminary concepts in broader conceptual themes.  This process resulted in 
356 codes: (i) 108 codes for the category “Expectations or demands”; (ii) 70 codes for 
“Functions of the MFSA” (iii); 56 codes for “Positive experience”; (iv) 71 codes for 
“Negative experiences”; and (v) 51 codes for “Good relationships”.   
In the second stage of data analysis, the above categories were examined in order to 
determine whether linkages and similarities could be made within and between categories 
(Noaks and Wincup, 2004). This stage was important for two reasons. First, it helped to 
consolidate, cluster and narrow the categories into broad conceptual themes reflecting the 
BLDs of operators. In the analysis, it became increasingly evident that many concepts were 
of a multidimensional nature. Through this process the following dimensions, each 
comprising sub-dimensions, were revealed: (i) competence; (ii) empathy; (iii) guidance; (iv) 
lawfulness; (v) independence; (vi) leadership; (vii) legal certainty; (viii) equality before the 
law; (ix) access and approachability; (x) effectiveness; (xi) quality of decision-making; (xii) 
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quality of treatment; (xiii) equilibrium or proportionality; (xiv) maintaining boundaries; (xv) 
spirit and the heart of laws; (xvi) separation of powers; (xvii) virtues; (xviii) responsiveness; 
(xix) resources; (xx) regulatory craft; (xxi) trust in regulator; (xxii) trust in operator; and 
(xxiii) voice. Second, it stimulated thinking about the associations between themes, raised 
new questions, and helped to reinforce connections between the data and thematic concepts. 
The theme of separation of powers was discarded because it only appeared a few times in the 
interviews (Neuman and Wiegand, 2000). The theme of virtues merged with the other themes 
of empathy, quality of decision-making and quality of treatment and was therefore also 
discarded.  
In the third stage of the data analysis, I re-examined the data and themes. I selectively 
searched for examples that reflected these concepts. This helped confirm the previously 
established concepts while elaborating on others.  Through this process I developed four 
broad themes, each with sub-themes as follows: (i) lawfulness, comprising the sub-themes of 
adhering to the objectives of the MFSA, acting intra vires and legal certainty; (ii) procedural 
fairness, comprising the quality of decision-making, the quality of treatment and trust; (iii) 
distributive fairness, comprising a lack of a one-size-fits all approach and balanced 
supervision; and (iv) effectiveness, comprising the themes of competence, performance of 
functions, substance over form, responsiveness, empathy, leadership and resources. These 
themes provided the basis to construct the items administered during the quantitative stage of 
the fieldwork.   
In developing these themes, I paid attention to whether participants were expressing 
views, expectations or demands in their capacity as representatives of the licensed operators 
or in their capacity as members of the general public (or consumers of financial services). 
This was critical not only because the objective of the qualitative stage of the research was to 
identify the BLDs of, or what mattered to, operators licensed; it was also, as explained in 
Chapter 3, because the research was conducted in a challenging regulatory and political 
environment which had the potential to introduce bias into the themes. I was conscious of this 
risk, especially the risk of “going native”.  
In order to mitigate against the risk of introducing bias into the themes, in particular 
the risk of “going native”, I kept my own personal views and opinions in the background and 
participant’s views in the foreground especially when these conflicted with participant’s point 
of view. For instance, I am of the view that the regulator should not be approachable or 
accessible with regulatees in order to maintain a very strict boundary with operators. 
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However, as can be seen in Chapter 5, the themes approachability and accessibility emerged 
as major expectations. I am also of the view that regulators should take their time when 
issuing licenses in order to perform all the necessary due diligence checks yet as can be seen 
in Chapter 5, participants also expected the MFSA to be fast acting when issuing licenses.  
An analysis of all 49 interviews revealed that participants were in fact expressing 
views as representatives of operators or of the financial services industry. 34  Participants 
expressed their position explicitly by specifically mentioning the company or implicitly by 
using the terms “we” or “our”. I wish to give some examples of these instances below. I will 
begin with explicit statements. For example, Albany expressly stated: 
Naturally the way I am going reply to your various questions is in the context of the 
bank  which is not ABC bank nor XYZ bank right and my experience is what it is. 
 
Similarly, when I asked Coriolanus what he expected from the MFSA he asked whether he 
should respond in his capacity as operator: 
 
MM What are some of the things you expect from the MFSA? And why are 
they important?  
 
Corolianus   What I would expect as an operator?   
 
MM  Yes, as an operator.  
 
Corolianus  Okay, I would expect more ... how would I say? The approachability is 
good but if possible, you know what I mean, being more approachable 
and being more receptive to various ideas coming from the industry. 
 
 Other participants used words such as “we”, “our”, “the operator”, “my business” or 
“the industry”. For example, Othello explained that in his role as Chairman of the Bank: 
We then faced a difficult post financial crisis period of regulatory issues arising from  
the closure of one of the funds which the bank had promoted 
 
 
 Similarly, Bassio spoke in his position as the compliance officer of the bank: 
 
MM   And what are some of the things you expect from the JST?  
 
Bassanio The JST request a lot of information, a lot of detailed information, they 
carry out their own analysis and we would expect that if there is 
 
34 In the email sent to participants requesting a meeting I explained that this study seeks to address the following 
questions: (i) what are operators’ experiences with the MFSA?; (ii) what do operators expect from the MFSA?; 
(iii) how do operators respond to a failure to meet those expectations? In that sense participants already knew 
that they should answer questions in their capacity as representatives of operators.  
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something in our operation or in the bank’s data or in the bank’s 
financial information, they would flag out the areas that are of concern 
and the areas that the bank need to look into with more focus so we 
would expect the JST to identify those areas that in their view need to 
changed or need to be looked into further detail and also suggest areas 
of improvement and areas of good practice from their experience in 
dealing with other banks. 
 
 
Escalus also implied that he was expressing his views as chief executive officer of a bank: 
MM  What do you expect from the regulator?  
 
Escalus  Definitely, at least in my business which is a specialised business, I 
would expect that they would understand more they would truly 
understand the financial markets that they are operating.  
 
Like Escalus, Caliban (the CEO of an insurance company) spoke in his role as a member of 
the insurance company: 
 
MM   What are some of the things that you expect from the MFSA?  
 
Caliban In the same way that we are expected to treat our customers fairly, I'm 
expecting them to treat their licensees fairly. 
 
 
Reagan (a partner in one of the big four) spoke in a capacity as a representative of the 
industry: 
 
MM   What would make a good MFSA?  
 
Reagan  I think the role - as operators - I think I can safely say we are all 
looking for a breath of fresh air. It needs somebody who is more 
energetic, perhaps not so rooted in the past. 
 
And Edgar (a lawyer and director in a CSP) like Reagan, spoke in his position as a member 
of the financial services industry: 
MM  How well-effective do you think the MFSA is in performing these 
functions?  
 
R   It's a very topical question that you're asking. At the moment, 
the MFSA is, in part, of the IFSP, so the financial services 
practitioners, and, again, we were always watching how the financial 
services industry can be improved.  
 
The displays of dominance described in the previous section also affected the data 
analysis. Some manifestations of dominance that also occurred during the interviews (but not 
explored above) did not affect the data collection per se but impacted the data analysis due to 
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the emotional aspects of the research (Liebling, 1999). For instance, Macbeth likened 
banking inspectors to children, having only theoretical knowledge, and subsequently 
compared me to them: 
 
“Children come to me, like you all right … who have read books and studied books”.  
 
I did not let this association bother me during the interview. I needed to display appropriate 
demeanour; showing offence was not an option as this would have interrupted the flow of the 
discussion. As the interviews progressed, I ruminated about this association. At the end of 
their interviews Macbeth and Caesar inquired about my post-PhD plans. I explained that 
while I was keeping my options open, I envisaged two possibilities: continuing my research 
to postdoctoral level or returning to work as a lawyer in the financial services sector. Both 
Macbeth and Caesar adopted a paternalistic attitude and advised that I should return to the 
financial services sector. This “caring” attitude annoyed me as I felt patronised. I retained my 
composure; otherwise, as noted previously, rapport and reputation would have suffered. How 
did the power displays affect the data analysis? Essentially and at the end of the research, the 
cumulative effect of dominant attitudes and character traits reached a tipping point. I felt a 
deep annoyance and a degree of animosity towards many of the participants. To overcome 
this, I distanced myself from the data for about a month. I also began by transcribing and 
analysing those interviews in which participants did not display dominance. When 
transcribing the dominant interviews, I realised that the more annoyed I was becoming, the 
more I was hammering down on the keyboard. Hence, I would stop for regular breaks and 
listen to loud music. When analysing the data, I would sometimes hear the dominant 
participant’s voice ringing in my head even though I anonymised the interview transcripts. In 
these instances, I would take a break to distance myself from the participants and would only 
re-approach the data once I had calmed down.  
Emotions continued to pervade the data analysis stage owing to the political context 
in which the research took place (Liebling, 2001). During the data analysis, certain 
allegations were made in the Maltese national press concerning the political scandal 
discussed in the “Getting in” stage. These allegations were corroborated by information 
divulged by one of the participants during the interview stage. Being in possession of this 
politically sensitive information, I was faced with a dilemma. Should I divulge the 
information to the press, leading to the identification of the operator (although not the 
participant) and risking, like Woliver (2002), future access being hampered? Or should I keep 
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the sensitive information confidential and risk supporting an allegedly corrupt government? 
Although this information pertained to the professional role of the respondent and was 
socially damaging and therefore could have been divulged in the public interest (Alvesalo-
Kuusi and Whyte, 2018), for various reasons I decided against this. From a legal perspective 
I had entered into an agreement with the participant not to divulge any data that was to be 
kept confidential and in accordance with the maxim pacta sunt servanda I had to adhere to 
that agreement. To do otherwise would have risked causing harm not only to myself but also 
to the participant, contravening Kant’s second categorical imperative of respect for all 
persons. Continuing from a deontological perspective I cannot rationally act on the maxim “I 
ought to always divulge politically sensitive information” as that maxim will become a 
universal law. Were criminologists to divulge every piece of politically sensitive information 
they come across during the course of the research process, they would transform themselves 
into journalists. As Bottoms (2008:76) notes, the “object of any kind of empirically-based 
science is to generate knowledge” and I would be doing a disservice to the discipline of 
criminology by merely divulging information. Although I performed my duty not to divulge 
the information, it was painful to abide by this obligation. On Maltese social media, posts 
were being uploaded branding individuals as traitors if they did not disclose information in 
their possession that could expose wrongdoing (for example, by failing to reveal information 
confirming allegations made in the Maltese press concerning the Pilatus affair). The attitude 
among my friends was encapsulated in the phrase “the only thing necessary for evil to 
succeed is for good men to do nothing”. Was I a traitor? Was I allowing evil to succeed? 
Dwelling on these thoughts was disturbing. Liebling (2001:47), following Becker (1967), 
argues that “it is impossible to be neutral” – one must choose a side. By not divulging the 
information, I felt that I was on the wrong side. Remaining neutral and standing aside at 
times was difficult. 
 
4.2 Quantitative phase 
The quantitative phase had three ultimate objectives:  
(i) to develop regulatory legitimacy scales that measure the legitimacy of the MFSA. This 
was done by drawing on the concepts derived inductively from the AI interviews and by 
administering a survey to MFSA-licensed operators;   
(ii) to explore whether it is perceived legitimacy or perceived deterrence that has the greatest 
impact on attitudes to compliance; and  
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(iii) to examine whether obligation to obey mediates the relationship between perceived 
legitimacy and attitudes to compliance.  
 These goals were addressed by administering a survey to Maltese financial services 
operators and through exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, correlation 
analysis and regression.  
 
4.2.1 Survey development 
Perceived legitimacy 
The purpose of this stage was to operationalize the BLDs derived inductively from the 
qualitative stage by developing a pool of items that tapped into the preceding theoretical 
dimensions (Worthington and Whittaker, 2006).  Given that the unit of analysis was operators 
and not individuals within the operator (although the survey was administered to individuals 
within the operator), most statements were framed around “the operator”. Exceptions arose 
when the statement was capturing a very personal aspect such as trust. Many statements were 
developed to measure the underlying concepts. The first draft comprised a pool of 235 items. 
In subsequent drafts, each statement was examined in depth. This exercise served several 
purposes. First, it helped to determine whether each statement was clear. As a result, I revised 
and omitted vague questions. Second, it helped to reduce and condense the dimensions. 
Third, repeated items were identified and eliminated. Fourth, this process helped to clarify 
the underlying concepts. Statements that were previously included under one dimension were 
shifted to other dimensions where they made more theoretical sense. This process was 
iterative in that I went back and forth, inspecting the data, the items and the dimensions 
already established in the legitimacy literature in criminology (see Liebling, 2004, 2011; 
Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013). Through this process, which was carried out 30 
times over a five-month period between March and July 2018, I developed 12 dimensions 
comprising 80 statements (see Table 2 below). There were also five stand-alone items, 
measuring leadership, resources, conscience, shared values and trust in the operators (see 
Appendix 4 for the items or statements contained under each dimension including the stand-
alone items).  Forty-three questions were positively worded; I coded these items on a Likert-
scale ranging from “1” (strongly disagree) to “5” (strongly agree). Forty-two questions were 
negatively worded. For these items, coding was reversed. I coded each negatively worded 
item on a Likert-scale ranging from “5” (strongly disagree) to “1” (strongly agree). 
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Statements were positively and negatively worded to reduce acquiescence bias (Liebling et 
al., 2012). A higher score reflected a more positive opinion. 
 
Obligation to obey 
The questions measuring obligation to obey were adapted from Trinker, Jackson and Tyler 
(2018) (see Appendix 4 for a list of the items measuring obligation to obey). Four items were 
positively worded; I coded these items on a Likert-scale ranging from “1” (strongly disagree) 
to “5” (strongly agree). Four items were negatively worded. For these items coding was 
reversed. I coded each negatively worded item on a Likert-scale ranging from “5” (strongly 
disagree) to “1” (strongly agree). 
 
Deterrence factors 
Perceptions of the risk of apprehension were assessed by a single item adapted from Murphy, 
Bradford and Jackson (2016). This question had a Likert-type response set: 1-not likely at all 
to 4-very likely. Perceptions of the severity of punishment were assessed by a single item 
adapted from Grasmick and Bursik (1990). This question had a Likert-type response set: 1-no 
problem at all to 5-a very big problem (see Appendix 4 for these items).  
 
Attitudes to compliance 
I originally intended to explore the relationship between the perceived legitimacy of the 
MFSA, compliance with MFSA regulations, rules and directives and cooperation with the 
MFSA. Accordingly, I had planned for the survey to contain self-report measures on 
compliance and cooperation. However, due to the events described in the “Research Context” 
section that continued to shroud the Maltese financial services sector under a dark cloud (see 
Chapter 3), I perceived that operators would be reluctant to answer the statements requiring 
self-reporting on compliance with MFSA rules and on cooperation with the MFSA. I 
therefore decided to focus on attitudes to compliance and cooperation by drawing on 
Braithwaite’s (2009, 2013) motivational postures. Braithwaite (2017:33) considered 
motivational postures to “refer to the signal or messages” that individuals send to authorities 
about the degree of control that such authorities exert over them and to reflect a “sets of 
beliefs and attitudes that sum up how individuals feel about and wish to position themselves 
in relation to authority; they communicate social distance”. Braithwaite (2009, 2013) 
distinguished between five motivational postures: commitment, capitulation, resistance, 
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disengagement and game-playing.35 While the postures of commitment and capitulation 
reflect positive and accommodative attitudes towards a regulatory authority, the postures of 
resistance, disengagement and game-playing reflect defiant attitudes (Braithwaite, 2002). The 
accommodative posture of commitment transmits an attitude that the regulatory objectives 
are sound and ought to be valued and supported by regulatees. Capitulation, the second 
accommodative posture, conveys an accepting attitude towards a regulatory authority along 
with an attitude that the authority ought to be supported because it is probably the right 
regulatory authority. The defiant posture of resistance expresses an attitude that the regulator 
should correct problems of its own making and honour its contract with regulatees. 
Disengagement goes a step further and displays a posture of anomie: regulatees lose their 
connection to the values of the regulatory system and continue operating without heeding the 
expectations of the regulator. The final defiant posture, game playing, demonstrates an 
attitude that signals adherence to the letter of the law rather than its spirit. While the postures 
of commitment and capitulation are more likely to lead to compliance with the law and 
cooperation with regulatory authorities, the defiant postures of resistance, disengagement and 
game playing are more likely to have the opposite effect (Braithwaite, 2009). The 
motivational postures of commitment, capitulation, resistance and disengagement were 
empirically derived via a factor analysis that sought to test Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) 
typology of motivational compliance, while that of game playing was added as a result of 
further research (Braithwaite, et al., 2007).  
The questions measuring the postures of commitment, capitulation, resistance, 
disengagement, and game-playing were adapted from Braithwaite (2013) (Appendix 4 
contains a list of these statements).  
Four statements measured commitment. Two items were positively worded; I coded 
these items on a Likert-scale ranging from “1” (strongly disagree) to “5” (strongly agree). 
Two items were negatively worded; for these items coding was reversed. I coded each 
negatively worded item on a Likert-scale ranging from “5” (strongly disagree) to “1” 
(strongly agree).  
Two items measured capitulation, resistance and disengagement. All of these items 
were positively worded and were coded on a five-point Likert-scale ranging from “1” 
 
35 Braithwaite’s motivational postures of commitment, capitulation and game playing correspond to McBarnet’s 
(2001) committed compliance, capitulative compliance and creative compliance.  
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(strongly disagree) to “5” (strongly agree). Agreement with these questions signalled 
increased capitulation, resistance and disengagement.  
Four items measured game playing. These items were also positively worded and 
were coded on a five-point Likert-scale ranging from “1” (strongly disagree) to “5” (strongly 
agree). Likewise, agreement with these statements indicated higher degrees of game playing. 
More will be said about how these scales were utilized in Chapter 7 in the “Analysis” section 
below.  
I inputted these items into the online survey software Qualtrics and each item was 
coded using Qualtrics. When inputting the items into this software, I began with a positively 
worded item followed by a negatively worded item and so forth. I did this to force each 
participant to think about each statement. Appendix 5 contains the final version of the survey 
administered to Maltese financial services participants.  
The Regulatory Legitimacy Survey was divided into five sections as follows: 
(i) Part 1 contained 8 questions and asked participants for some demographic 
information, such as the type of institution they were involved in, their role in the    
institution, the number of times sanctioned and the size of the company.  
(ii) Part 2 contained 85 questions that asked participants about the extent to which 
their expectations from the MFSA were being met.  
(iii) Part 3 contained 22 questions that asked participants about their attitudes to 
compliance and cooperation and feelings of obligation to obey.  
(iv) Part 4 contained 2 questions that asked participants about their perceptions of risk 
of apprehension and risk of severity of punishment.  
(v) Part 5 contained an open-ended question that asked participants for additional 
comments.  
Table 2 – Legitimacy dimensions in survey  
Dimension Number of Items 
Competence 8 
Empathetic understanding  10 
Access and approachability 4 
Impartiality 5 
Legal certainty 6 
Lawfulness 4 
Effectiveness 10 
Procedural fairness: the 
quality of decision-making 
11 
Procedural fairness: the 
quality of treatment  
7 
Distributive fairness 6 
Responsiveness 7 
Trust in regulator and staff 2 
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4.2.2 Pre-testing the survey 
The intention of the pilot phase was to check whether there were any difficulties in 
administering the survey through an online platform, to determine whether respondents had 
any problems with understanding the statements, to see if the survey was too long and to 
establish how long it took respondents to answers the survey, and to try to incorporate 
respondents’ suggestions in order to improve the questionnaire. In order to achieve these 
goals, I piloted the survey among a small sample of regulatees (n=26). A majority of these 
participants (n=18) were selected using availability sampling methods from the list of 
interviews conducted in the qualitative stage. I selected the rest (n=8) by drawing a random 
sample from the MFSA’s financial services register. A referral source contacted 12 
participants on my behalf before I invited them via email to participate in an online survey, 
which they could access through an anonymous link. I spoke to five participants before 
sending them the anonymous link to the questionnaire. I sent the remaining nine a cold email 
containing the anonymous link. Qualtrics indicated that 22 individuals accessed the 
anonymous link, of whom six did not complete the survey. Two participants emailed me to 
say that they were no longer working with the institution, 1 appeared to have run out of time, 
while another informed me via email that the survey was too long to complete. In total, of the 
26 individuals approached, 16 individuals responded, representing a response rate of 62 
percent. Of the 16 individuals who responded to the survey, 12 were individuals who had 
been contacted by the referral source or by me before inviting them to participate in the 
online study through an anonymous link. This prima facie indicates that individuals were 
more likely to complete the survey if a person known to them had contacted them prior to 
inviting them to participate.  
 
4.2.3 Administering the survey and sampling procedures 
All of the operators licensed by the MFSA who appeared on the regulator’s FSR were 
inputted into an Excel sheet according to type of licence. The population list was cleaned by 
excluding the following: (i) cells created in terms of regulation 22 of the Securitisation Cell 
Companies Regulations (because it was not possible to find any individual representing those 
cells); (ii) companies that passport their rights into Malta (because they are mainly regulated 
by their home member states); and (iii) companies whose licences were suspended, revoked, 
cancelled or voluntarily surrendered (because they were no longer operational). The total 
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population of operators licensed by the MFSA after cleansing was 1,258. Of these, 278 had 
multiple licences. These were retained, because where the same operator holds multiple 
licences, different individuals would deal with the separate MFSA units responsible for those 
licences and the same operator would therefore have different experiences.  
A random sample of 600 operators was selected for the survey and these were sent an 
anonymous link to the survey on the Qualtrics platform via email (Appendix 5 contains a 
copy of the email sent to participants). From a legal perspective, it is the board of directors 
acting as a whole that is entrusted to speak for the company. However, it would have been 
impossible to obtain a response from every single member of the board of directors. The 
decision was therefore taken to approach one individual per operator who has been delegated 
powers from the board of directors (so it can be said that he or she is an agent of the 
company) and who is in direct and regular contact with the MFSA. These were individuals 
who occupy key supervisory and managerial roles, namely chairmen, chief executive officers 
(CEOs) or managing directors, chief financial officers (CFOs), chief operations officers 
(COOs) and chief compliance officers (CCOs). I then went through every company in the 
sample list in order to identify individuals with key supervisory and managerial roles and 
their respective email addresses. I identified these individuals and obtained their contact 
details through a combination of sources: the FSR on the MFSA’s website, the Registry of 
Companies website maintained by the MFSA, the operator’s website, Finance Malta’s 
website, LinkedIn and referees. In the case of some operators, particularly those in the 
“funds” industry, I realized that the contact person listed on the FSR was the same contact 
person of another operator. In such cases, I sought to find a different key spokesperson within 
the operator and his/her contact details to invite him/her to participate in the online survey 
using the range of sources mentioned above. Individuals were contacted either directly by 
referees via email (on some occasions with me in copy), by myself via email following an 
introduction made by referees or directly by myself without an introduction in those instances 
when I was unable to obtain an introduction (see Appendix 5 for a copy of the email inviting 
operators to participate in the survey). These latter participants were contacted either by 
email or through LinkedIn. In 154 cases it was not possible to identify key spokespersons and 
obtain their contact details. In those cases, I sent an invitation through the operator’s website 
(where the operator had a website) or selected another operator from the sample list.  
I also contacted the Malta Banker’s Association, the Institute of Financial Services 
Practitioners (IFSP) and Finance Malta (FM), as these organizations maintain databases of 
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operators licensed by the MFSA. Contact with these financial services associations was made 
through Caius. Following correspondence (via telephone calls, emails and meetings) with 
these organizations, they distributed the survey on my behalf to all of their members. The 
only organisation with which I experienced some difficulty was FM. In emails leading up to 
the meeting with the Chairman of FM, concerns were raised about the risk of falling foul of 
the GDPR regulations,36 a concern that appears to have been heightened by the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal which erupted around the same period of time (Rosenberg, Confessore and 
Cadwalladr, 2018). During the meeting, the Chairman of FM reiterated the point that he 
would need to check whether it was possible for him to distribute the survey on my behalf. 
After a two-week period, FM acceded to my request and distributed the survey to all of its 
members. There were some operators on databases maintained by these organizations that 
also appeared on the random sample list. I did not exclude these operators for a number of 
reasons. First, sending another email would serve as a reminder. Second, if an individual had 
already responded to the survey, the same individual would not be able to respond to the 
online survey again because the software was set to prevent ballot stuffing, that is, preventing 
the same respondent from answering the survey multiple times.   
The databases maintained by the IFSP and FM additionally contained lists of legal, 
accounting and auditing firms. Although the MFSA does not license these firms, I included 
them in the study for a number of reasons. First, professional advisors from legal, accounting 
and audit firms are often engaged when licensed operators encounter problems with the 
MFSA. Second, operators often go to meetings with the MFSA accompanied by their 
professional advisors. Third, prospective licensees often engage professional advisors to 
assist in the licensing process. Professional advisors often become involved in lengthy 
discussions with MFSA and continue to provide professional advice once a licence has been 
issued.  Fourth, many lawyers and accountants also serve as directors on, and act as external 
compliance officers for licensed operators. Finally, many financial services lawyers and 
accountants work in firms that are licensed to provide trust and trustee services and may also 
themselves be registered with the MFSA to provide corporate services.  
Furthermore, I sent 587 follow-up emails to participants. A total of 285 participants 
accessed the online survey via the anonymous link. After eliminating those who did not 
consent (4), those who simply clicked on the link but did not continue (26) and those whose 
survey was substantially incomplete (29), I obtained a total sample of 226 operators divided 
 
36 These regulations. came into force on 25 May 2018 (GDPR FAQs, n.d.). 
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as follows: 19 (8.4%) credit institutions; 13 (5.8%) financial institutions; 39 (17.3%) 
insurance undertakings; 32 (14.2%) investment services undertakings; 17 (7.5%) funds; 15 
(6.6%) trustees; 55 (24.3%) corporate service providers; 17 (7.5%) law firms; 9 (4%) firms 
providing accounting, auditing and tax services; 2 (0.9%) insurance brokers; 4 (1.8%) 
insurance managers; 1 (.4%) insurance agent; and 3 (1.3%) miscellaneous/others.  This 
represents a response rate of 37.6%. I believe the response rate to be lower because the 
databases maintained by FM and IFSP contained licensed operators not included in the 
random sample as well as legal, accounting and auditing firms some of which may not have 
been licensed by the MFSA and so were not on the sample list.  
 
4.2.4 Statistical analysis   
Statistical analysis was conducted in Chapters 6 and 7. The software SPSS 25 and SPSS 
AMOS 25 were employed to analyse the data. The objective of Chapter 6 was to develop 
regulatory legitimacy scales that measure the perceptions of MFSA legitimacy from the 
perspective one of its main audiences – operators. After cleaning the dataset (with missing 
data coded as “999”, I conducted a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) on the 85 items 
tapping into the BDLs of, or what-mattered to, Maltese financial services operators. This 
revealed a five-factor solution composed of the following dimensions: rule of law, 
effectiveness, competence, distributive fairness and responsiveness. I then conducted a 
reliability analysis by calculating Cronbach’s alpha followed by a Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) on the five-factor model. I based the evaluation of the model on four 
goodness-of-fit criteria: the minimum discrepancy, divided by its degrees of freedom 
(CMIN/DF); Comparative Fit Index (CFI); the root square error of approximation (RMSEA); 
and standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR). 
Although I had developed a set of theoretical constructs reflecting the operators’ 
BLDs and could have directly proceeded to a CFA, the decision was taken to conduct an 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) prior to performing a CFA because this procedure is 
recommended when developing new scales (Worthington and Whittaker, 2006). I then 
calculated the composite reliability, the convergent validity and discriminant validity for each 
construct. Reliability was assessed by calculating the Composite Reliability (CR); convergent 
validity was assessed by examining the factor loadings and the Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE); and discriminant validity was assessed by computing the Maximum Shared Variance 
(MSV), the Average Shared Variance (ASV), the square root of the AVE and by examining 
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the inter-construct correlations. As can be seen in Chapter 6, the CFA goodness-of-fit 
statistics for the five-factor model yielded a poor fit and the between-construct correlations 
for rule of law and effectiveness, for rule of law and competence, and for competence and 
effectiveness were quite high, demonstrating that the items measuring these constructs were 
actually measuring the same underlying construct. In order to resolve this issue of 
discriminant validity two models were created and examined using CFA analysis. The first 
new model was a four-factor model that combined the dimensions of rule of law and 
effectiveness into a new dimension referred to as the rule of law 1. The other dimensions 
remained the same. Therefore, the four-factor model consisted of the following dimensions: 
rule of law, competence, distributive fairness and responsiveness. The second new model was 
a three-factor model that combined the dimensions of the rule of law, effectiveness and 
competence into a new dimension referred to as the rule of law 2. The other dimensions 
remained unchanged. Therefore, the three-factor model consisted of the following 
dimensions: rule of law, distributive fairness and responsiveness. As can be seen in Chapter 
6, the CFA fit for the three-factor model was better than the four-factor and the five-factor 
models. Moreover, the results pertaining to the convergent and discriminant validity of the 
dimensions in the three-factor model yielded more valid measures than those related to the 
dimensions of the four-factor model. 
 Turning to the statistical analysis in Chapter 7, the main objectives of this Chapter 
were to: (a) explore whether it is perceptions of legitimacy (measured in terms of the three-
dimensional model) or perceptions of deterrence that have the greatest impact on the 
motivational postures of commitment, capitulation, disengagement, resistance and game 
playing; and (b) to explore whether perceptions of obligation to obey mediated the 
relationship between perceptions of legitimacy and Braithwaite’s motivational postures. 
These questions were addressed using bivariate correlation analysis and ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. Based on other studies when running these regression models, I 
also controlled for firm size and number of times sanctioned (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; 
Murphy, 2005). As can be seen in Chapter 7, I only focused on the outcome measure of 
positive attitudes to compliance. In this section I wish to discuss how I arrived at this decision 
and well as describe in brief the statistical procedures used to address the foregoing 
questions.  
The first step was to test the reliability of the motivational postures scales and the 
obligation to obey scale (see Appendix 6). Reliability was assessed by examining the 
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correlation coefficient known as Cronbach’s alpha. Consistent with Liebling’s (2004) 
research, I employed Cohen and Holliday’s (1982) rule of thumb for interpreting this 
correlation: 0.19 and below = very low; 0.20 to 0.39 = low; 0.40 to 0.69 = acceptable; 0.70 to 
0.89 = high; and 0.90 to 1 = very high. As can be seen in Table 1 in Appendix 6, the highest 
alpha was displayed by the game-playing scale (a = 0.654), followed by commitment (a = 
0.582) and resistance (0.484). The alpha for these scales was in the acceptable range, with 
resistance falling on the lower threshold and game playing approaching the higher threshold. 
As can be seen in Table 1 in Appendix 6, the scales of capitulation (a = -0.052) and 
disengagement (a = -0.283) displayed negative alphas. Coding for these items was double-
checked and found to be correct. Owing to the negative alphas displayed by these scales and 
consistent with Braithwaite (2009), the capitulation items were combined with the items 
measuring commitment to form a commitment/capitulation scale, while the items measuring 
disengagement were combined with those measuring resistance to form a 
resistance/disengagement scale. As can be seen in Table 2 in Appendix 6, the combined 
commitment/capitulation scale yielded an alpha of 0.381 and the combined 
resistance/disengagement scale yielded an alpha of 0.023. The item from the 
commitment/capitulation scale (I comply with the applicable regulations even though I feel 
no moral obligation to do so) was omitted and the alpha increased to 0.635 which was on the 
higher threshold of acceptability. The item from the resistance/disengagement scale (if the 
MFSA gets tough with the operator, the operator can become uncooperative with the MFSA) 
was deleted and the alpha improved to 0.418. The resistance/disengagement scale was on the 
lower threshold of acceptability and was therefore excluded from the remainder of the 
analysis. The commitment/capitulation scale was renamed as “positive attitudes to 
compliance” as it reflects postures of accommodation towards the MFSA. More will be said 
about the reliability of the positive attitudes to compliance scale when discussing the 
limitations of the regression results at the end of Chapter 7.  
Turning to the obligation to obey scale, as can be seen in Table 3 in Appendix 6, this 
measure displayed a high level of reliability even though it was on the low threshold.  
 At this stage of the analysis, the aim was to explore: (a) whether it is perceptions of 
legitimacy (rule of law, distributive fairness and responsiveness) or perceptions of deterrence 
that have the greatest impact on positive attitudes to compliance and game-playing; and (b) 
whether perceptions of obligation to obey mediated the relationship between perceptions of 
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legitimacy and positives attitudes to compliance and game-playing. The data-analytical 
strategy comprised two steps. I first conducted a bivariate analysis between all key variables. 
This step was necessary to check for multicollinearity between the legitimacy scales prior to 
using a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to further explore the relationship 
between the legitimacy scales, deterrence, the positive attitudes to compliance and game-
playing, and to examine the influence on legitimacy independent of or mediated by obligation 
to obey the MFSA. In order to explore the second question using OLS three conditions had to 
be satisfied (MacKinnon, Krull and Lockwood, 2000). First, obligation to obey needed to be 
related to the outcome measures. Second, obligation to obey had to be related to the 
legitimacy measures. Third, the legitimacy measures needed to be correlated with the 
outcome measures. In order to confirm the mediation analysis, a Sobel test was conducted. 
I now wish to comment on the relationship between legitimacy and the outcome measures as 
this affects the statistical analysis reported in Chapter 7. As can be seen in Table 4 in 
Appendix 6, the legitimacy measures displayed very weak and insignificant correlations with 
the game playing scale. Given the very weak and non-significant correlations, this variable of 
game-playing will not be considered in the OLS regression analyses examining the 
relationship between legitimacy, deterrence and attitudes to compliance nor when examining 
the mediating impact of obligation to obey (Appendix 7 contains a list of all measures along 
with their means and standard deviations). The mediating effect of obligation to obey was 
also addressed using the Sobel test. A post-hoc power analysis was also conducted 
G*Power3.1 in order to calculate the power (or type II errors) for the multiple regression 
models. 
The next three Chapters present the findings of the qualitative and quantitative stages 
of the research: 
 
1. Chapter 5 presents the findings of the qualitative phase of the research and provides a 
theoretical grounding to developing a regulatory legitimacy survey. 
2. Chapter 6 builds on Chapter 5 by using the results obtained from the interviews to 
construct and distribute a survey to licensed operators. In Chapter 6 the survey data 
were analysed using exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses to develop a three-
dimensional model of MFSA legitimacy. This model was subjected to reliability and 
validity tests in preparation for exploring its relationship with order.  
3. Chapter 7 builds on Chapter 6 and explores whether it is the perceived legitimacy of 
the MFSA (conceptualized and measured as a three-factor model) or perceived 
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deterrence that has the greatest impact on attitudes to compliance. This Chapter also 
explores whether obligation to obey mediates the relationship between perceived 
MFSA legitimacy and attitudes to compliance.  
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5 
 
Reconceptualizing and Measuring Legitimacy: Providing a Theoretical 
Grounding to Developing a Survey on Legitimacy  
 
 
 
 
5.0 Preliminary 
This Chapter presents the findings of the qualitative phase of the research and 
provides a theoretical grounding to developing a regulatory legitimacy survey. This research 
adopted the social scientific approach proposed by Tankebe (2014) in the policing context 
and utilized by Liebling (2004) to develop the Measuring Quality of Prison Life survey, 
which prisoners regarded as a measure of a prison’s “internal legitimacy”. This social 
scientific approach involved a mixed-methods research design that incorporated an inductive 
and a deductive stage. This Chapter only focuses on the inductive stage (see Chapter 6 for the 
deductive stage of the research). The inductive stage involved interviews with MFSA-
licensed operators. The objective of this stage was to identify: (i) what legitimacy means to 
Maltese regulatees, (ii) what operators expect from the MFSA, (iii) what the BLDs of 
operators within the Maltese regulatory context are or, in Liebling’s (2004) language, what 
matters to operators licensed by the MFSA and why. In this Chapter, the themes derived from 
the qualitative stage are discussed in relation to existing frameworks to conceptualising 
legitimacy. The concepts or themes elicited inductively from the qualitative stage, then 
formed the basis of the questionnaire that was administered during the deductive stage of the 
research.  
 
5.1 Research findings  
 
The moral justification for having the MFSA is that someone has to regulate all these 
people who are providing financial services in Malta; and it’s a strong enough 
justification, as far as I’m concerned. Of course, that comes at a price, because if you 
are the appointed regulator you need to be seen as carrying out that role in a manner 
which is, first and foremost, transparent. Secondly, impartial. Thirdly, effectively, and 
in all sincerity. (Participant Cassio) 
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I believe the legitimacy of the regulator is predicated on and conferred by sound 
policies that are developed, implemented and applied with integrity, independence 
and competence. OK, so the policies have to be sound and they have to firstly be 
developed and then they have to be implemented and then they have to be applied 
with integrity and competence. And independence is to me a by-product of integrity; 
if you are not independent then your integrity is in some way compromised. 
(Participant Othello) 
 
The above quotations from the interviews capture many of the dominant themes that 
resounded throughout the research: impartiality, transparency, competence, lawfulness, and 
effectiveness. In general, these themes or concepts reflecting the BLDs of regulatees (or what 
mattered to participants) resonated not only with the Bottoms-Tankebe (2012, 2017) four-
dimensional conceptualization of legitimacy (lawfulness, procedural justice, distributive 
justice and effectiveness) but also with other themes found in (i) the legal literature (legal 
certainty (Bingham, 2010)); (ii) the prisons literature (leadership and maintaining boundaries 
(Liebling, 2011; Liebling, et al., 2012b)); and (iii) the psychology literature (empathy 
(Barrett-Lennard, 2015)). The theme of trust (trust in the regulator by regulatees and trust in 
the regulatees by the regulator), which cuts across disciplines such as police (Tyler and Huo, 
2002) and prisons literature (Liebling, 2004), emerged as a significant expectation. As can be 
seen in Table 3 below and for conceptual clarity, I divided the major themes or concepts into 
four overarching conceptual categories: (i) lawfulness (comprising the themes of adhering to 
the objectives of the law, acting with powers and legal certainty); (ii) procedural justice 
(encompassing the broad themes of procedural justice in the quality of decision-making and 
quality of treatment as well as the concepts of good and right relationships and trust); (iii) 
distributive fairness; and (iv) effectiveness (embracing the dimensions of competence, 
performance of functions, spirit and the heart of the law, empathy, resources, and leadership).  
 
Table 3. Themes derived inductively from the interviews 
 
Theme or concept  Theoretical basis 
 
Lawfulness dimensions 
Adhering to the objectives of the MFSA Act 
Acting intra vires 
Legal certainty 
Beetham (1991) 
Coicaud (2002) 
Bingham (2010) 
Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, 2017) 
 
Procedural Justice dimensions 
Procedural justice: quality of decision-making Leventhal (1980) 
Tyler (1990) 
Tyler and Lind (1992) 
Procedural justice: quality of treatment Leventhal (1980) 
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Tyler (1990) 
Tyler and Lind (1992) 
Access and approachability*  Tankebe (2014) 
Jackson et al. (2012) 
Guidance/helpfulness* Jackson et al. (2012) 
Independence/impartiality** Sunshine and Tyler (2003) 
Voice** Leventhal (1980) 
Tyler and Lind (1992) 
Paternoster et al. (1997) 
Good and right relationships** Liebling (2011) 
Liebling et al. (2012b) 
Trust (in regulator and operator) Liebling (2004) 
Tyler and Huo (2002) 
Distributive fairness dimensions Bottoms and Tankebe (2017) 
  
  
Effectiveness dimensions  
Competence Sunshine and Tyler (2003) 
Performance of functions Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, 2017) 
Spirit and the heart of the law (substance over form) McBarnet (2001) 
Responsiveness  Sunshine and Tyler (2003) 
Resources  
Empathy Barrett-Lennard (2015) 
Leadership Liebling et al. (2012b)  
*These themes or concepts fall under the broader theme of procedural fairness in the quality of treatment. 
** These themes or concepts fall under the broader theme of procedural fairness in the quality of decision-
making. 
 
 
5.1.1 Lawfulness 
Three dimensions of lawfulness emerged from the data: (i) pursuing the objectives of the 
MFSA; (ii) acting intra vires or not acting ultra vires; and (iii) legal certainty or 
predictability.  
 For Beetham (1991) and Coicaud (2002), power is legitimate if it is acquired in 
accordance with the law and it is exercised in accordance with the law. Bottoms and Tankebe 
(2012, 2017) drew on these authors to hypothesize that lawfulness (power exercised in 
accordance with the rule of law) is one of the BLDs that the public makes of police forces. 
This criterion is similar to Bingham’s (2010:60) fourth principle of the rule of law: “ministers 
and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers conferred on them in good faith, 
fairly and for the purpose for which they were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such 
powers and not unreasonably”. Consistent with the above literature, Maltese financial 
services participants expected the MFSA and its staff first to exercise their powers for the 
purposes for which they were given and second to act intra vires. 
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Advancing the objectives of the MFSA and acting intra vires 
Concerning the expectation that the MFSA ought to exercise its powers to fulfil its purposes, 
Tybalt, a partner at a Maltese law firm specialising in providing legal advice to banks and 
investment services entities, was of the view that regulation should be there to identify 
manipulators and fraudsters: 
  
Regulation should be there to make sure that you can identify a wolf in sheep’s 
clothing and somebody who is taking the mickey out of you.  
 
He continued to explain that the MFSA must use its powers for those purposes: 
  
Now coming back to the powers of the MFSA. To the extent that the powers of the 
MFSA are used for these purposes then I am fine. The minute those powers are used 
to go beyond that is where I have the problem. 
  
Furthermore, Kent, a lawyer working in the funds industry, stated that the MFSA ought to 
justify its powers: 
 
By exercising its powers only if and when and to the extent necessary to achieve the 
goals for which those powers were vested in the first place … investor protection first 
and foremost, but even promotion of competition, and even [the] reputation of Malta 
etcetera. 
 
Similarly, Prospero, the managing director of a trusts and trustee company, emphasized that 
the MFSA must not neglect its obligation towards consumers: 
 
[The MFSA's] primary duty is towards the public not towards the service providers, 
not towards the industry; the growth of industry numbers should not be important. 
 
In addition, Laurence, a director and a compliance officer, linked the exercise of powers in 
accordance with the law with trustworthiness (another BLD that is discussed in further detail 
below):  
 
They would be trustworthy if they exercise their powers for the right purpose. Again 
we go back to protection for investors [and] to protection of the reputation of Malta. 
 
 
Beyond furthering the objectives of the MFSA (protecting consumers against abuse and 
protecting the reputation of Malta), participants also wanted the MFSA to act intra vires – 
that is acting within their powers and not abusing of those powers. For example, Rosaline a 
compliance officer of a large insurance entity, argued that the sector has a “duty towards the 
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regulator” to treat clients fairly but “at the same time, the regulator has a duty to not breach 
regulations.” Similarly, what mattered to Portia, a lawyer working in the funds sector, is that 
the MFSA abides by the law when making decisions: 
 
Anyway, to cut a long story short, the MFSA, after a year of keeping [applicants for a 
licence] in limbo, issued a directive telling them that they are postponing the decision 
as to whether to grant them the licence or not … which the law does not allow [the 
MFSA] to do. 
 
Portia reinforced this point when I asked her what the MFSA should have done differently: 
 
Well, the MFSA should have taken a decision. It didn’t. It did something that the law 
doesn’t grant, in my opinion: the right to postpone a decision. Because the directive 
says the regulator has to decide within six months. 
 
Macduff, a compliance officer in the funds sector, echoed Dicey’s (2013) first principle of 
the rule of law (lack of arbitrariness) by articulating the expectation that the MFSA ought not 
to abuse its power by capriciously creating new rules without a legal basis: 
 
[Insofar as] abuse of powers within the MFSA … they sometimes create rules or 
demands out of nothing … yes, in terms of the MFSA Act they are given wide 
powers, but it doesn’t give them the power to harass, it doesn’t given them the power 
to sort of create a new rule which is not even contemplated by … the directives, by 
legislation and impose that [rule] arbitrarily through an email. If there is a legal basis 
for it … OK … but to tell someone that in order to do this you have to do that and it is 
not in the rules, it is not in the rule book, it is not in the law, then quite frankly how 
come you are applying that to me and not to other people? How do I know you are not 
applying it to everyone? 
 
For this participant, the BLD of acting intra vires also extended to acting in good faith.  
The scenarios that follow do not cross the line into outright criminality or malfeasance 
but can be considered as “misfeasance” or bad faith (McCarthy, 1984; Souryal, 2015). 
Macduff recounted a negative experience in which an MFSA official asked him “in a very 
improper manner … to sign a declaration” that he “had breached MFSA rules” and, when he 
refused, the MFSA official said, “if you don’t sign it you will embarrass us”. He gave another 
example of the MFSA acting in bad faith, describing a situation in which the MFSA’s 
Supervisory Council prevented the MFSA’s Authorisation Unit from issuing a licence of a 
new sub-fund until they had submitted financial statements. Although Macduff 
acknowledged that it was an effective way of engendering compliance, he questioned the 
MFSA’s tactic. While not calling it “blackmail”, he believed it to be “a bit unsavoury.”  
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For Prospero, the duty to act in good faith also extended to not acting like Muir’s 
(1979) “avoider,” and not exhibiting wilful blindness or “nonfeasance” (McCarthy, 1984; 
Souryal, 2015): 
 
Bad faith in the case of a regulator doesn’t mean that the regulator tells you “yes, yes, 
keep on breaking the rules.” That would be flagrant. But what if many times the 
regulator does what is called Nelsonian blindness? 
 
As previously mentioned, an example of the MFSA acting ultra vires, and thereby abusing its 
power, was by arbitrarily creating new rules. This leads to another BLD: that of legal 
certainty, to which I now turn. 
 
Legal certainty  
Bingham’s (2010:37) third principle of the rule of law is that “the law must be accessible and 
so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable”. Participants articulated this principle as 
one of the BLDs they expected from the MFSA.  
 Macduff argued that arbitrarily creating rules “is putting Malta in a bad light … it’s is 
counterproductive. There has to be number one legal certainty”. Kent also expressed an 
expectation of lack of arbitrariness in rule creation: “[the MFSA] cannot come up with a rule 
whenever it decides and tells me if there is a loss of an asset then the service provider is 
strictly liable for that loss.” Similarly, what mattered to Mercutio, a former director of a large 
credit institution, was regulatory predictability: 
 
The last thing a regulator should do is spring surprises. So there should also be a 
latitude, particularly when you have complex systems which are in a rapid state of 
transition, that one also takes a human perspective towards the ability of an 
organisation to evolve. And so timeframes should be realistic, no springing of 
surprises and no changing of goalposts because that really breaks the backbone of an 
organisation. 
 
A lack of legal certainty was additionally expressed in cases where the MFSA issued 
unwritten policies. What mattered to participants is that the MFSA should issue its policies in 
a written format as this contributes to legal certainty. As Portia remarked: 
 
Another negative thing of the MFSA is that, unfortunately, … every so often they 
come up with an unwritten policy, and, for us, that’s really not on. Because if you feel 
strongly about it, chuck it in the SLCs [Standard Licensing Conditions], but don’t tell 
me there’s another policy that, for example, the compliance officers have to be local. 
And we have many clients with compliance officers who are not local and then one 
day [the MFSA] wakes up and you know what? We submit a document to be 
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amended for a silly thing and they say, “Ah, but the compliance officer here is not 
local”. No, you approved him. “Well, now we want it to be local, so we’re not going 
to approve your amendment, unless you change the compliance officer”. Wow! I hate 
the uncertainty. Tell me a compliance officer has to be a 40-year-old black woman, I 
don’t care, but at least I know if it’s in the SLCs.   
 
Another participant, Juliet, also questioned whether it is legal to have unwritten policies, 
linking with the previous theme of lawfulness: “They need to see whether those unwritten 
policies are actually lawful.” Kent, unlike Portia and Juliet, did not seem to be bothered by 
unwritten policies, provided that if they were to be changed, the industry must be notified and 
ideally given a justification, because otherwise uncertainty might result when tendering 
advice: 
 
Over the years we built a relationship, and this is not just one-to-one but regulator-to-
industry. Most MFSA policies are not even written. But industry tends to become, 
after a certain number of years, comfortable in knowing what MFSA policies are. 
[The MFSA] shouldn’t ever abuse of the fact that [the policies] were unwritten to 
change them overnight without pre-advice, because there is a legitimate expectation 
[amongst] practitioners that what they are doing, what they are advising clients, is in 
compliance with MFSA policies. So if you are going to change that policy, and if you 
want me to continue to trust you, do tell me about the change in policies and at least 
ideally provide me with a justification for that change in policy; but even without 
justification at least give me due notice. 
 
The BLD of legal certainty was additionally expressed through a need for legal clarity. As 
Laertes, a partner at an accountancy firm, stated: “You should set the rules very clearly”. 
Resonating with Laertes’ expectations were Vincentio’s demands that “the intention should 
be well articulated so that the words of the law cannot be ambiguous so as to lead to more 
than one conclusion” and that therefore the MFSA must make “sure that the rules are as clear 
as possible to ensure that practitioners, when advising clients, know what is expected of 
them”. 
For many participants, it was fundamental not only that the substantive rules be clear 
and unambiguous but also that the MFSA communicate those rules clearly and transparently 
to enable operators to know what to expect. Otherwise, legal uncertainty could result. For 
example, Tybalt observed that: 
 
Another problem we have with the MFSA [is that] there are rules, but the MFSA has 
its own internal policies of how it applies them; but those policies are not available to 
practitioners so you go the MFSA with something … ‘Sorry chum we have a policy 
not to accept this … it is not in the rules but it is a policy’. I think the regulator should 
be more transparent. Where the regulator has made policy decisions, those policies 
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should be in the public domain. People should know what is expected of them. You 
cannot hold me to a benchmark unless you tell me what that benchmark is. You 
cannot tell me go running and I don’t know where the race ends, whether it is 100 
metres, 200 or 300 or 400. I have to know. Am I running a 400-metre race or am I 
running a 10,000-metre race? 
 
Edgar expressed this BLD for the regulator to be more transparent in communicating its 
intention by comparing the MFSA to other foreign regulators: “if you look at the FSA 
[Financial Services Authority] in the UK, or the Irish Authority, they are much more 
forthcoming with giving perimeter guidance and communicating with the industry what they 
expect in certain things”. He continued to explain that it is important for the MFSA to 
communicate its priorities to the industry and to the industry’s professional advisors so they 
know how to tackle problems. Edgar therefore emphasised, “at the cost of being over-
simplistic”, that there “should be more clarity on what they are seeking to achieve in the 
course of the day-to-day regulation and [the MFSA should] communicate that effectively 
industry-wide”. Benvolio, like Edgar, began by mentioning that the UK Financial Conduct 
Authority [FCA] goes out of its way to guide the industry to the extent that “the amount of 
guidance which they issue to the industry is enormous”, admitting that “it’s probably a little 
bit too much”. Benvolio compared this “level of guidance” to a “form of intrusion”, yet 
argued that it is not “intrusion in a negative way, [it] is setting the scene, and setting a very 
robust, solid ground” of what the regulator expects from the operator. He then gave the 
MFSA a score of “one out of ten” on how it goes about communicating its expectations to the 
industry. Similarly, Rosaline asserted that “from a compliance point of view, it’s very 
important that for certain areas I know exactly what the regulator expects”. Equally, for 
Malvolio, a partner at an auditing firm, one of the most negative things was receiving unclear 
communication from the regulator. This respondent deemed clear guidance necessary 
because “if the guidance is unclear it is very difficult to advise the client as to which way to 
go”. In a similar vein, Montague expected the MFSA to provide advance notice to the 
industry of what to expect, because this would reduce “frustration” among operators and 
improve the relationship between them and the regulator: 
 
If [operators] have advance notification, are really clear where things are going and 
what demands are being made of them in the future … short term, medium term, long 
term … then there can be more understanding and I think that would really help. 
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5.1.2 Procedural justice 
Tyler’s research (Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Lind, 1992) showed that relational concerns have a 
significant impact on judgments of procedural fairness. Empirical research in policing has 
demonstrated that judgments of procedural fairness encompass two interrelated elements: (i) 
the quality of decision-making, incorporating the concepts of openness (transparency), giving 
reasons for decisions, neutrality, impartiality, equal treatment, consistency, opportunities for 
representation (audi alteram partem) or voice, and honesty; and (ii) the quality of treatment, 
comprising the concepts of respect, courtesy, approachability and helpfulness (Jackson et al. 
2012; Paternoster, et al., 1997; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990, 2003; Tyler and Lind, 
1992). While in Tyler’s research and in the research it has inspired, procedural justice has 
been conceptualized as an antecedent to legitimacy, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012; see also 
Tankebe, 2013) included procedural fairness as a component of legitimacy. Another 
relational concern – trust – has been conceptualized by Tyler and Lind (1992) as one of the 
three antecedents to procedural fairness, the other two being the quality of decision-making 
and the quality of treatment. However, Tyler and Blader (2000) perceived trust as an aspect 
of the quality of treatment. Research conducted in prisons by Liebling (2004; see also 
Liebling et al., 2012a) also revealed similar relational concerns – of respect, courtesy, 
impartiality and trust – that are consistent with Tyler’s research. As Liebling et al. (2012b:83) 
observed, these relational concerns lie at the “heart of the prisons work”. 
As can be seen in Table 1 above, Maltese financial services participants also expected 
relational aspects embodied in the quality of decision-making and the quality of treatment 
and trust to underscore relationships, resonating with the above research. I will begin with 
examples of procedural fairness, as many of these are in turn linked to the theme of trust 
described below.  
 
Quality of decision-making 
 
Transparency and openness in decision-making 
For many Maltese financial services participants, transparency and openness were 
fundamental to having a right relationship with the MFSA. For example, Kent expected the 
MFSA to “keep a good open relationship” with operators. Similarly, Edgar expected the 
MFSA to be “more transparent” with regulatees. Indeed, he explained that openness is 
essential for a “healthy relationship” between human beings. For this participant, 
transparency was necessary to enable the MFSA to carry out its regulatory function 
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effectively, a theme that is discussed in detail below: “So if the authority expects to regulate 
effectively, it should be open with the regulated entities”.   
For Kent and Edgar, the demand for the MFSA to act transparently and openly was 
mutual: the operator must also be open with the MFSA. Kent stated that it was obvious that 
there “must be a very open relationship in both senses” while Edgar remarked that “regulated 
entities, by the same token, should be open with the authority”. Other participants echoed this 
expectation that transparency be mutual. For example, Gertrude, a director of an insurance 
management company, emphasised that she “would never ever” allow the MFSA to discover 
“something from a set of management accounts which we would not have informed them 
about first”. She continued to explain that being open and transparent with the regulator 
“reflects the manner in which the MFSA treats us”. Similarly, for Othello, a former chairman 
of a large bank, it was “critical” that “an open line of communication and explanation and 
openness and transparency” be the foundation of a good relationship between the MFSA and 
operators. He stressed that the regulated should not view the regulator as an enemy, but as 
sharing a common purpose, and that having “an open dialogue and a good working 
relationship” with the regulator was crucial. Resonating with Othello’s comment, Romeo 
reasoned that it was vital for the MFSA and operators to “live together in an open and 
transparent manner to ensure that we achieve our goals”.  
 For some participants, the BLD of transparency or openness was tied with the themes 
of respect and trust, both discussed separately below. Concerning transparency and respect, 
Albany, a former CEO of a small credit institution, insisted that “a good relationship is one 
based on mutual respect and utmost transparency.” Othello agreed, arguing that mutual 
respect and transparency are ingredients to a good relationship. Moreover, Romeo 
emphasised that “any relationship between individuals must be based on trust and 
transparency”, while for Edgar, transparency was a precursor to trust:  
 
An effective regulator has to be open and transparent, and forthcoming with 
information and when they become cagey and opaque, there is going to be a lack of 
trust instinctively. 
 
This sub-section demonstrates that what mattered to Maltese financial services operators was 
that the MFSA acts transparently and openly. However, what does it really mean to act 
transparently and openly? Transparency involves giving reasons for decisions. It is clear, and 
consistent with Tyler (1990), that what mattered to these participants was the way the MFSA 
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arrives at its decision (that is, by giving reasons) rather than the contents of the decision 
itself. 
Romeo described in detail a negative situation that had been ongoing for over 10 
years during which the MFSA was refusing to admit shares for listing on the Maltese stock 
exchange. What irked Romeo more than the refusal to admit the shares to listing was that the 
MFSA did not give the operator a “plausible justification” or a “reason” for the refusal. Even 
when Romeo “challenged” the regulator as to why the MFSA refused to allow the listing of 
the shares, the MFSA provided a number of excuses (such as “that is the advice we got from 
the EU”) without offering an actual reason. Accordingly, what mattered to Romeo was that 
the “regulator has to be transparent enough to say ‘Listen, we have come to this conclusion 
because of this, this and that’ … allowing us to challenge them, allowing us to come up with 
our own arguments”. Analogously, what mattered to Edgar was that the MFSA should act 
transparently by giving reasons for its decisions:  
 
Like every other agency, it should exercise [its powers] in terms of the principles of 
natural justice, being clear about the reasons for which it is exercising the power, 
communicating publicly why it has exercised that power, and what the implications 
are with the licensees, on the industry, or whatever it is. To summarise, I would say 
transparency, for sure; I’m a very big fan of transparency in the way that powers are 
exercised.  
 
Similarly, what mattered to Gloucester, the head of an organisation representing the interests 
of licence-holders, was not that the MFSA “didn’t accede to [the] request”, but rather that the 
operator knows why the MFSA refused to acquiesce. Consequently, Gloucester maintained 
that “in a good working relationship, like any other relationship, whether between a husband 
and a wife [or between] a bank [and] a borrower, you need openness and not secrecy”. 
Accordingly, Cassio compared an excellent relationship between the MFSA and an operator 
with a “parent having a good relationship with his or her children, or an employer having a 
good relationship with his or her employees”. Cassio, akin to the respondents above, 
contended that rather than “imposing things and running roughshod over [regulated] entities”, 
the MFSA can “encourage a healthier relationship” by “openness … in the need to provide 
the requested information”.  
Cassio, like Edgar, also expected the MFSA to justify its authority by acting 
transparently by explaining why it had exercised its powers in a particular way. Cassio 
explained that in the absence of self-regulation, the moral justification for having the MFSA 
is the necessity of having a body that regulates all those who offer financial services in Malta. 
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He cautioned that having a regulatory authority with a vast array of powers “comes at a price, 
because, if you are appointed regulator you need to be seen to be carrying out that role in a 
manner that is first and foremost transparent, [and also] impartially and effectively”, themes 
discussed in greater detail below. Cassio continued to reason that transparency is “important” 
because the MFSA, in claiming that it exercises its authority in a legitimate manner, “should 
have no difficulty whatsoever in exercising that authority in a manner that is fully 
transparent, open to all, so that if there are any doubts as to the exercise of that authority, then 
they can be aired, they can be challenged, they can be defended”. For Cassio, impartiality 
flowed from transparency:  
 
I need to show, as the regulator, that the way I treat [Operator X] is the same way that 
I treat [Operator Y] because if is open to discussion, or if there are doubts about that, 
then, again, I am not fulfilling my given authority. 
 
 Although Cordelia, a lawyer advising credit institutions, argued that the “MFSA is not 
obliged” to provide reasons for its decisions, like Cassio she reasoned that in order for the 
MFSA to justify its authority it was crucial that it do so in order to enhance its transparency. 
She also agreed with Cassio that “the [MFSA] should explain so that the sector can see it as 
impartial … and respect [its] authority”. Cassio’s and Cordelia’s comments resonated with 
Tyler’s (2003:298) argument that “authorities benefit from openness and explanation because 
it provides them with an opportunity to communicate evidence that they are neutral.” Before 
discussing the theme of impartiality as it is linked to transparency, it is essential to delve into 
another theme that is connected with openness: that of honesty and integrity.  
 
Honesty and integrity 
In the context of trust, O’Neill (2002:70) argued that transparency “certainly destroys 
secrecy” but does not limit deception. Indeed, an individual can be transparent by providing 
all of the necessary information and giving reasons for decisions, but this information may be 
false and the reasons may be disingenuous. Acting honestly is therefore of paramount 
importance. Honesty has been conceptualized in various ways: as an element of trust, as an 
element of the quality of decision-making, and as a component of the quality of treatment. 
While measuring the dimension of staff-prisoner relationships, defined as “trusting, fair and 
supportive interactions between staff and prisoners”, Liebling et al. (2012a:367) included an 
item that incorporated both honesty and integrity. Similarly, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) also 
included an item measuring honesty when operationalizing the concept of trust as a sub-
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dimension of legitimacy. However, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) in different studies also 
included an item (“the police provide honest explanations for their actions”) when measuring 
both the quality of decision-making and the quality of treatment. I believe that this item 
should have been included under the quality of decision-making rather than the quality of 
treatment as it pertains more to the concept of transparency, that is, giving reasons for 
decisions. This is why I am discussing the concept of honesty under the quality of decision-
making. 
 Consistent with the above research, Maltese financial services participants expected 
the regulator to act honestly and in a manner that displayed integrity. For example, Benvolio 
recounted a negative experience with the MFSA that involved a prospective licence-holder 
retracting an application “because all the things that [the MFSA] had told [them] wouldn’t be 
an issue, became issues, and they were not willing then to stick to their word”. What 
Benvolio expected was for the MFSA “to stick to what they had said at the time without 
beating around the bush”. Essentially, what mattered to Benvolio was that the MFSA “give it 
to him the way it is”. As Kent also observed, it is essential that there be “a very open and 
honest relationship … one where you don’t need and shouldn’t assume all the time that it will 
be a ‘no’”. Similarly, what mattered to Octavius was that the MFSA be “upfront with the 
industry” and say something along the lines of “Listen, guys, don’t get that work [to Malta] 
because we don’t want it”. More emphatically, Malvolio stated that “transparency is key, and 
then the honesty to say it as it is”. Moreover, Cornwall simply stated, “they have to be clean, 
honest and transparent”. Mercutio’s perspective accorded with that of Cornwall, arguing that 
he expected the MFSA to value “cleanliness” when carrying out its functions. In this sense, 
an overlap exists between the theme of lawfulness and honesty. This overlap was particularly 
evident when Caesar recounted an experience in which the MFSA asked him to breach the 
bank’s know-your-client policy. He angrily asked, “Why? Is that honesty?” 
The requirement to act honestly was linked with the theme of integrity as was evident 
when Prospero explained what he expected from the MFSA: 
 
Its organs, [that is] the chairman, board of governors and the supervisory board 
[should be] composed of people of integrity, having a spine. I am not saying that the 
people on the executive board are dishonest but … you not only want a person who is 
not dishonest but [you need someone who] when, there is need, [is prepared] to … 
stand up and be counted even if it makes [him] unpopular … it is difficult work … not 
only not being dishonest but being honest to the point that you can make a stand on a 
point of principle. 
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For Iago, the expectation of acting with integrity was tied to acting in an unbiased manner, 
that is, impartially: “integrity to take decisions on the basis of what is good and bad not on 
what one wishes”. Moreover, for Othello, the authority of the MFSA would be justified if, 
among other things, policies are “developed, implemented and applied with integrity”. 
  
Representation and voice  
The respondents not only expected the MFSA to act transparently, openly and with integrity, 
but also that it allow sufficient “opportunities to take part in the decision-making process” 
(Paternoster, et al., 1997:167). This principle of natural justice – audi alteram partem – was 
clearly articulated by Tybalt: 
 
The one thing that really bothers me at the MFSA is how they run investigations, how 
they take it to the Supervisory Council, how you are not allowed [to put forward your 
arguments] … if at least one were permitted to make representations directly to the 
Supervisory Council and it is then up to it to decide, I am not going to dispute that but 
at least allow the regulated entity to have a voice to be able to address the people who 
have the ability to sanction it. You should not rely on the executives within the MFSA 
itself to make my case. No, if they make their case, allow me to make my case and not 
somebody else who is part of the same system that is going to sanction me. I think 
that the way they do it is illegitimate. I think it runs counter to one of the fundamental 
principles of a fair hearing and I have said this so many times and I’m waiting for the 
first opportunity to contest it constitutionally. 
 
Other participants expressed similar expectations. For instance, Bassanio, a compliance 
officer at a large credit institution, expected the regulator to “hear the bank’s views and the 
bank’s position before issuing certain statements in the media”. Gratiano, the MLRO of a 
large bank, also echoed Bassanio’s call for “representation” (Leventhal, 1980):  
 
I think what we expect is that … they don’t arrive at conclusions and put that down on 
black and white or communicate that with other regulators prior to discussing it with 
the bank. Why? Because we might have not described the position clearly or they may 
not have understood the position, so there might have been a misinterpretation or 
misinformation because when you are discussing something you might lose a word 
and that word is the focus of everything. So I believe that prior to issuing any reports 
or decisions, they should be done in draft form and discussed with the subject person 
to see that everything is in order, that what has been said is actually recorded. 
 
Similarly, Banquo, the CEO of a small credit institution, expected the “MFSA, as our host 
regulator, [to] have listened to us first and foremost and understood what was going on and 
asked us to explain our position and not to merely accept what somebody else was saying”.  
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 The interviewees not only desired adequate opportunities to present their submissions, 
consistent with the Tylerian model of regulation and expressed in the “maxim denoting basic 
fairness and a canon of natural justice”, that of audi alteram partem (Gray, 2006a:32). They 
also demanded that the MFSA gives the industry a voice – a broader concept than an operator 
simply being able to state its argument in a case – through a “dialogic approach” (Bottoms 
and Tankebe, 2012) with the industry. What mattered to participants was that the MFSA 
ought to seek to engage in a conversation with the industry and with individual operators, 
thereby giving the industry and individual operators a voice and confirming their status 
(Tyler, 1990) within the Maltese financial services sector. The following quotations 
demonstrate this point:  
 
I would expect them to have much more dialogue with the industry. They’re not out 
there at all. (Benvolio) 
 
[The MFSA should] have an open table with all the operators within the market; and 
where there are … issues that possibly could be discussed, and a solution within the 
realms of the law could be found with all the operators, then adopt it. (Brutus) 
 
They have to talk to the industry. If you remain in your shell, thinking only about 
regulation and going to meetings with other regulators abroad and always listening to 
regulation and regulation, and regulation, there’s no way you’re going to understand 
the industry. (Angelo) 
 
 
Independence and impartiality  
The Maltese financial services participants expected the MFSA to (i) have acquired its 
powers independently and (ii) exercise its powers impartially. Both independence and 
impartiality are, like representation, BLDs that are necessary for the right to a fair trial, 
embodied in Bingham’s (2010) seventh principle of the rule of law. The BLD of impartiality 
is also a sub-component of procedural justice in the quality of decision-making and is 
generally referred to as the “neutrality of decision-making” (Bradford, et al., 2015; Jonathan-
Zamir, Mastrofski, and Moyal, 2015; Murphy and Tyler, 2017).37 I will begin with 
independence.  
 What mattered to participants was that the MFSA be completely politically 
independent. Macduff questioned how the government appointed the chairman: 
 
37 Strictly speaking a difference exists between the neutrality and the impartiality of decision-makers. Whereas a 
neutral decision-maker is uninterested or bored, an impartial decision-maker is objective and not influenced by 
personal feelings or considerations (Collins Dictionary, 1998; Chambers English Dictionary, 2016). In this 
research, it was clear that participants expected the regulator to be impartial rather than neutral.  
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You have the Chairman appointed by the Prime Minister. Seriously? The board of 
governors appointed by the Prime Minister. Why? Why? Why the Prime Minister? 
You can’t [have this]. It’s obvious what is going to happen. The MFSA becomes an 
extension of the government of the day. How is that right? How is that prudent? 
 
Macduff’s expectation of political independence was echoed by other participants. For 
instance, Banquo perceived the MFSA as lacking independence because the MFSA’s board is 
“appointed by government”. He argued that “being a director should be a position that is 
permanent, not because you are placed there because you are the Minister’s friend”. 
Likewise, Cassio expects more “independence than there is today”. For Cassio, like Macduff 
and Banquo, the fact that appointments “are made directly by the Prime Minister” with the 
“leader of the opposition being informed” is “definitely” not enough to guarantee 
independence from the state. Consistent with these respondents, Demetrius expected the 
MFSA “to be as independent as possible”. Indeed, he made the same argument: “Given our 
situation where the appointments and senior appointments are made by politicians, it is very 
difficult to have a truly independent MFSA”. 
Similarly, Regan, a partner at an auditing firm, cautioned that “we should not allow 
politicians to put people on the board of the MFSA, depending upon who was their massive 
canvasser in the run-up to the [general] elections”.  
 What mattered to participants was not only that the MFSA be independent of 
government but also that the MFSA act impartially, that is, that the MFSA ought to act 
without fear or favour by resisting political pressure, by avoiding conflicts of interest, by 
avoiding conflicting roles, and by treating operators equally. 
  Tybalt deemed the MFSA’s sanctioning process to be “a major flaw in the way the 
MFSA works” because it lacks impartiality. He described the procedure employed by the 
MFSA to impose sanctions against operators. In this regulatory process, the employees at the 
MFSA who investigate an operator are the same persons who decide whether the operator 
infringed the relevant regulations, and when the operator is sanctioned these figures also 
enforce the decision. Accordingly, for Tybalt, the fact that the MFSA acts as “judge” and 
“executioner” shows that the system “is flawed and needs to be addressed”. In addition, for 
Tybalt it was crucial that the MFSA operate without fear or favour (and hence impartially) by 
taking decisions in line with the law, rather than seeking to assuage public opinion and public 
pressure: 
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I think it was a bad experience because notwithstanding the technical opinions, the 
evidence, and the significant effort we put into explaining technical issues, they still 
got it wrong and the niggling feeling about it is that they got it wrong because of 
reasons that fall outside the parameters of applying the regulation. It is because they 
wanted to allay public concern, it is because the sympathy will always shift towards 
the small investor. …There was one particular crusader who said that he was the 
crusader of the small investors. [He] was putting the MFSA under huge pressure, and 
the MFSA, in my view, succumbed to that pressure. 
 
It is also essential that the MFSA act impartially by resisting political interference. As 
Othello eloquently argued, “the regulator must be prepared and enabled to do the right thing 
without fear or favour and therefore it needs to be independent and if, as is often the case, 
there is political interference then I think that affects its independence”. Echoing Othello’s 
demand, Mercutio insisted that it was crucial that the MFSA avoid being hijacked by 
“political or individual undertones”. Moreover, for Rosaline, opposing interference was 
necessary for the MFSA to be able to carry out its functions effectively:  
 
I don’t think the MFSA is not independent, but I do not think that as a sector you can 
say that there is enough comfort, 100% comfort, that the MFSA can take, or 
individuals within the MFSA can take, decisions without any interference at all. And 
not just that. One of [the MFSA’s] functions is also to advise. It is important that it 
can give that advice, and that it can exercise that function without hindrance. 
 
 Respondents also expressed an expectation that the MFSA acts impartially in terms of 
avoiding conflicts of interest. For Prospero, it was essential that the regulator does not 
promote financial services because any such promotion jarred with its supervisory function: 
 
I think the MFSA continuously loses sight of its primary objective; as a matter of fact 
one of the criticisms that Sven Giegold [a Member of the European Parliament] made 
of the MFSA is that the Chairman, is [also] the Deputy Chairman of Finance Malta 
[whose function is that of] promotion. A regulator shouldn’t be a salesman. 
 
 Although Demetrius was uncertain whether the MFSA continues to engage in a 
promotion function, his reasoning supported the demand made by Prospero: 
 
There was a time when the MFSA also had the role of ‘selling’ the financial services 
industry abroad. In theory, it made sense; in practice it is not quite right. [There 
needs] to be some clear demarcation between being the regulator and being the 
promoter of financial services in Malta. How you bridge that is always going to be a 
bit of an awkward situation because the promoter needs to be aware of what the 
legislation is because he is going to be asked questions when he is promoting [the 
sector]. But at the same time the regulator cannot be seen to be promoting an industry 
that it is regulating and so it is a catch-22 type of situation. 
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Aside from acting impartially by avoiding conflicting functions, operators also expected the 
MFSA to act impartially by treating operators equally. As Tyler and Lind (1992:141) argued, 
“[w]hen considering whether an authority is displaying neutrality, people focus on whether 
the third party creates a ‘level playing field’ by engaging in even-handed treatment of all 
involved”. Many of the Maltese financial services participants employed the same “level 
playing field” language as Tyler and Lind. In particular, the respondents felt that the MFSA 
must ensure that the rules are the same for everyone and that the MFSA avoids engaging in 
preferential treatment. I will begin with the equal treatment portrayed in the expectation that 
rules are applied equally, a BLD consistent with Bingham’s (2010:55) fifth principle of the 
rule of law: “the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective 
differences justify differentiation”.  
What mattered to Romeo was that the MFSA should ensure that all licence holders 
comply with the law, a reflection of the theme of effectiveness discussed below. However, 
Romeo perceived, in Orwellian terms, that at times “the law is not equal for everyone”. He 
expected the MFSA to apply the law equally to ensure “high standards of behaviour from all 
licence holders” and stressed that it should not be “a question of two weights, two measures”. 
Cornwall, like Romeo, expected that the rules to be the same for everyone. In arguing that the 
regulator must make a rule for everyone “from the Prime Minister down”, Romeo’s position 
resonated with Fuller’s dictum  (cited in Lord Denning’s (1977) judgment in Gouriet v Union 
of Post Office Workers): “be you ever so high, the law is above you”.  Resonating with Tyler 
(1990, 2003), some participants articulated the demand of equal treatment in terms of 
fairness. For example, in line with Romeo’s expectation, what mattered to Brabantio was that 
the MFSA apply the rules equally to ensure “a level playing field” and that “everyone is 
treated fairly”.  
Other participants linked fairness with the equal application of rules. For instance, 
Caliban reasoned that because the MFSA expected operators to treat customers fairly then 
the MFSA itself ought to treat operators fairly. Furthermore, to Caliban, fairness meant that 
the MFSA should adopt a non-discriminatory approach to enforcing rules, given that to do 
otherwise would create an “uneven playing field”:  
 
Those companies that are always complying with all the requirements don’t seem to 
be treated any better than those that habitually fail to meet deadlines. 
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Similarly, Kent expected the MFSA to treat his company fairly, perceiving that fairness 
means that the rules are the same for everyone. Consistent with Brabantio and Kent, 
Claudius, a director in a corporate service provider, believed that fairness means that a rule 
should apply to everyone. He explained that rules should not be imposed “arbitrarily” (thus 
resonating with the theme of lawfulness) and that “fair means it applies to all”. Echoing the 
expectations of Romeo and Brabantio, albiet expressed in negative terms, Macbeth equated 
“unfairness” with the regulator “applying different weights and different measures”.  In this 
sense, fairness in the equal application of rules and therefore the broader theme of equal 
treatment is linked with the theme of consistency discussed in the following sub-section. 
Nevertheless, the respondents did not all share the same understanding of “fairness” (Tyler, 
1990). Wherease Tybalt expected the MFSA to be fair in the application of the rules, to him 
fairness did not mean equality. However, others (like Brabantio, Kent and Claudius) 
interpreted fairness as equality. For Tybalt, fairness meant not employing a one-size-fits-all 
approach and instead making evaluations on a case-by-case basis. He cautioned that to apply 
a regulation fairly, the wording of the law must be clear so as not to give rise to more than 
one conclusion (a point connected with the theme of legal certainty discussed above). 
Consequently, for Tybalt, fairness, expressed in the same language as Ginsberg (1965), 
meant that “unequal circumstances deserve to be treated unequally”. 
Another aspect of the quality of decision-making that makes procedures fairer is 
consistency (Leventhal, 1980). Paternoster et al. (1997:168) explained that one aspect of 
consistency is “consistency in treatment over time”, whereby individuals expect to be treated 
in the same way as others. In this sense, the theme of equal treatment can also be considered 
as an example of consistency. The other aspect of consistency identified by Paternoster et al. 
(1997) is where individuals expect the same rules to be applied. This demand also mattered to 
Maltese financial services, as evidenced in the following quotations: 
 
Wherever there is a law … there is also a subtle grey area. There, obviously, you see 
a lack of consistency in interpretation. (Roderigo) 
 
There is definitely inconsistency … there are the rules and the rules need to be 
consistent. (Albany) 
 
The participants also expected the MFSA not to engage in preferential treatment vis-à-vis 
operators, as this would demonstrate unequal treatment and a lack of impartiality. The 
examples cited below concerning preferential treatment can also be considered as cases of 
unequal application of the rules. However, the reason why equal treatment in the form of 
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equal application of rules was considered separately from preferential treatment was that in 
the above examples no reference was made to favouritism. (Regardless, this is not to suggest 
that favouritism could not have been the reason behind the law being applied unequally.)  
Cordelia argued that the MFSA should apply its powers in an equal manner. She 
specifically linked impartiality to preferential treatment by perceiving that the MFSA acts 
impartially as “they don’t discriminate between one entity and other”. Other participants also 
expected the MFSA not to grant preferential treatment to any operators (and by implication 
demanded that the MFSA act impartially), but held a different perception from Cordelia. In 
the examples that follow, preferential treatment was attributed only to the higher levels of 
authority within the MFSA, in particular, the former Chairman of the MFSA (and in this 
sense, the BLD is linked to the next theme of maintaining boundaries).  
Employing the phrase used by Tyler and Lind (1992), Macduff stressed that “there 
has to be an equal playing field for all”. He loathed hearing other operators saying that they 
“called the Profs” (a reference to the former chairman of the MFSA) to obtain preferential 
treatment. He argued that this favouritism can cost the MFSA its reputation:  
 
“What do you mean, ‘call the Profs’ to get something done!? … Are we going to be a 
reputable financial centre or are we going to be another Cyprus?”  
 
Like Macduff, Prospero also expected the MFSA to treat all operators equally by not 
engaging in preferential treatment and he too alleged that the former Chairman of the MFSA 
engaged in unequal treatment:  
 
The MFSA doesn’t treat licensees in the same consistent manner; that is, there are 
certain licensees who are favoured. Now I will say it again that the fault doesn’t lie 
with the staff or the senior staff but the problem lies above, from up top. Staff are then 
instructed to deal promptly with certain people, to close an eye, to just tick the boxes 
and not to investigate the substantive merits of the case. 
 
For Prospero, impartiality, preferential treatment and maintaining boundaries (discussed 
below) were all tied together: 
 
The common thread is one: a lack of an independent, impartial and objective 
treatment of licensees because it was vitiated by contacts; in a few words, if your 
license application in Malta gets held up and it is taking long, just call up Joe 
Bannister, and he arranges things for you; if you don’t talk to him you will remain 
stuck for 3 months, 6 months, 9 months toing and froing, asking you this and asking 
you that. Then one fine day somebody tells you ‘let me speak to this guy’ and all of a 
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sudden you get all the approvals. You can see … the lack of spine, the lack of 
principle, the lack of impartiality. 
 
Prospero’s concerns were also reflected by Oberon, who rationalised that preferential 
treatment and thus a lack of impartiality was due to overfamiliarity with the former Chairman 
of the MFSA: 
 
I mean there are also people who will tell you, ‘I call Joe Bannister’, he gives me an 
appointment quickly, and I go and speak to him, and he arranges everything for me, 
so it has become a bit like that. And then of course the intermediaries or the 
practitioners who also are more important than others, because of their political 
connections, they get even faster tracked. I think a change is needed. 
 
Similarly to the participants mentioned above, Cornwall perceived that some operators are 
favoured over others due to their connections, giving rise to unequal treatment. Cornwall 
therefore expected “a rule for everybody” and “not [to be able to] bend the rule because you 
know the Chairman or because the Chairman is involved”.  
Puck, a small operator, also expected the MFSA to create a level playing field, but in 
contrast to the previous participants, blamed the lack of a level playing field on the clout of 
“powerful companies”: 
 
What I don’t like, but again this is just rumours, is that sometimes they don’t ensure a 
level playing field; so they might process something quicker if you are maybe one of 
the Big Four or something like that. 
 
In this section references were made to the upper echelons of the MFSA exhibiting 
overfamiliarity with certain operators, compromising the Authority’s impartiality. What 
mattered to participants was that the MFSA acts in an unbiased manner by seeking to 
maintain a boundary between itself and the operators (Liebling et al., 2012b).  
 I will expand on this theme and on its link to impartiality below. 
 
Maintaining boundaries – good and right relationships  
In her discussion on staff-prisoner relationships, Liebling (2011:488) drew a distinction 
between “good” and “right” relationships. She explained that whereas good relationships are 
characterised by closeness, informality and a lack of boundaries, right relationships lie 
somewhere between formality and informality. In my study, Donalbain echoed Liebling’s 
distinction between good and right relationships when he lamented that top-ranking MFSA 
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officials mingled too closely with certain operators. He expected the MFSA to maintain an 
appropriate boundary even when in close contact with operators.  
Cassio, like Donalbain, explained that it was important for the MFSA not to socialise 
or fraternise with operators. Unlike Donalbain, he argued that the MFSA should seek to 
emulate the “very strict” boundary that Maltese judges used to erect between themselves and 
the public:  
 
Let me give you an example. In the past, judges had very strict instructions that there 
were only a limited number of social events they could attend. Today, this has been 
thrown out of the window. I really think that anyone who [is] in a position where he 
or she is going to decide [like a] judge … should be very aloof. Even insofar as social 
interaction is concerned, they have to keep that to a bare minimum. So at all events 
that are hosted in Malta, I really think that the MFSA officials should be conspicuous 
by their absence. One does get the impression that sometimes certain officials hobnob 
with certain players in the industry, and not with others. And that, unfortunately, 
sends the wrong message. 
 
This comparison with the boundary that Maltese judges of old used to keep with the public 
was also expressed by Macbeth. He argued that MFSA officials should maintain a strict 
boundary lest their impartiality be compromised and they act like one of Muir’s (1979) 
“reciprocators”: 
 
I expect the MFSA to be at two arms’ length not just one arm’s length from the 
industry that it is regulating. One guy, when he was Chief Justice and when he was a 
judge, wouldn’t even accept a wedding invitation unless it was from a very close 
member of his family; he wouldn’t accept an invitation for any social engagement 
unless it came from government. He wouldn’t engage in social conversations. He had 
a restricted number of friends. He used to [say] ‘Listen, if you ever aspire to be a 
judge you have to be able to sit in judgment over anyone and if your next door 
neighbour has committed a capital offence then you should have absolutely no 
problem sending him to the gallows’ and that stuck in my mind because it is the 
essence of a judge. 
 
The link between impartiality and maintaining boundaries was expounded by other 
participants, too. Malvolio explained that it was crucial for the MFSA to “avoid being overly 
familiar” and it was accordingly critical that the “people working at the MFSA [not to have] 
too close or personal a relationship with any of the operators”. While acknowledging that the 
MFSA had recently ceased the practice of accepting Christmas hampers from operators, he 
explained that it was important to maintain a certain distance because otherwise the 
Authority’s impartiality might be threatened: 
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Because, at the end of the day, the regulator is going to have to take a decision, not in 
the interests of the operator, but in the interests of the wider society. If you become 
too familiar, you run the risk, I suppose, of taking a decision which may be impacted 
by that overfamiliarity. 
 
While acknowledging that it was imperative for the MFSA to maintain an “open line of 
communication” with operators, Puck emphasised that the relationship had to have 
“boundaries.” In line with other participants, he referred to “boundaries” as a relationship that 
“can’t be … familiar to the extent that independence is compromised”.   
Donalbain admitted that ensuring an MFSA that is totally independent and impartial 
is difficult. He attributed this problem to Malta’s small size and to the “friends-of-friends” 
culture (Boissevain, 1974) in the country. Donalbain’s point was reinforced by Macbeth, who 
explained that it was of particular importance that the MFSA be “absolutely independent and 
impartial” because Malta is an island “17 miles by 5 miles” and “if you are well connected, 
you know half the population either by relationships, or by friendships or by going to 
school”. For Macbeth, therefore, the maintenance of boundaries was an essential condition to 
ensure that the MFSA could be regarded as “truly independent”, because “if I come along as 
the chairman of a [large bank] and the guy at the other end of the table has either been to 
school with me or is the cousin of my wife … [the regulator] has to be independent enough 
and away from mainstream society to be able to put [me] out of business or do whatever the 
regulations allow him to do”.  
The BLD of maintaining boundaries was regarded not only as necessary to avoid a 
relationship becoming so overfamiliar that it would compromise the MFSA’s independence 
and impartiality, but also as essential for the MFSA to conduct its functions effectively. This 
BLD is related to impartiality because it could be argued that if the relationship becomes too 
close, the MFSA would not be able to act without fear or favour. For example, Iago explained 
that it was vital that the regulator maintain some distance “because familiarity breeds 
contempt”, which could possibly lead to the regulator “being a bit lax, which is not good”.  
Mercutio echoed Iago’s reasoning, employing the same expression: “as we all know, 
familiarity breeds contempt and then weaknesses start coming in”, leading to the MFSA 
being overcome by external pressures. Consistent with Mercutio and Iago, Tybalt argued that 
because the regulator is there to ensure that operators comply with their legal obligations, it is 
essential that the regulator does not “create huge familiarity between the regulator and the 
regulated”. Likewise, Coriolanus explained that given that the MFSA is a gatekeeper as well 
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as a supervisor, it is essential that it maintains a boundary so that it is not influenced by the 
entities that it allows through its gates (that is, licensed entities). He stressed that:  
 
If people are just able to pick up the phone and tell someone [at the MFSA], ‘Listen, I 
want to change this, and do this and that’, it’s going to be a bit of a problem. 
 
Although operators expected the MFSA to maintain a boundary between itself and the 
industry, with some operators demanding that this become stricter, several participants also 
expected (as was alluded by Donalbain at the beginning of this sub-section and as will be 
made clearer in the next section) the MFSA to be approachable, accessible, helpful and 
respectful, all aspects that Liebling (2011:488) has termed “right relationships”. I now turn to 
examine these other relational themes embraced under the quality of treatment. 
 
Quality of treatment 
 
Approachability and accessibility  
In the policing context, Jackson et al. (2012) conceptualized trust in procedural justice in 
terms of, among other things, the concepts of approachability, friendliness, and helpfulness. 
While measuring treatment by police supervisors, Tankebe (2010a) included an item that 
tapped into approachability. Moreover, in the prisons context, prisoners also expected prison 
staff to be approachable (Liebling, 2011). Resonating with this literature, what mattered to 
the Maltese financial services participants was that MFSA was approachable, friendly and 
amenable to discussion. I will provide some examples of this BLD hereunder.  
 For Brutus, a good working relationship meant that the regulator is “approachable” 
and “amenable to discuss things”. He emphasised that the regulator does not need to lose 
these traits when conducting its function as a regulator. Brutus perceived the MFSA as 
approachable when he sold his business to another operator and he regarded the regulator’s 
handling of the matter as a very positive experience. Similarly, for Gertrude, the 
approachability of the regulator was “the most important thing” and the one aspect that must 
not be lost. Indeed, she emphasised that approachability is “what operators want” and 
necessary to the industry: “you want a regulator that is regulating you, but not one that’s 
making life a misery, not one that’s making it impossible for you to operate”.  
Other participants held contrasting perspectives, yet the expectation remained the 
same: the MFSA should be approachable. For example, Kent recalled what he termed the 
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“Golden Age of the MFSA”, explaining that he favoured this period not because the MFSA 
had allowed operators to run amok, but because it was approachable:  
 
You could pick up the phone … reason things out with them, try to reach a balanced 
situation.  
 
Octavius reasoned that operators do not need a regulator that is relaxed and lenient; on the 
contrary, what is needed is a firm regulator. Nevertheless, he stressed the importance of the 
regulator being approachable, something that “in the past was better”. His justification 
chimed with Gertrude’s in that he explained that it was necessary for the regulator to remain 
approachable because it helps attract business to Malta. He added that although the MFSA 
still sells itself as being approachable and flexible, some operators are changing their views. 
He suggested that he sometimes felt like he was “covering up” for the MFSA by giving the 
impression to clients that the MFSA is approachable and flexible. Echoing the sentiments of 
the previous participants, Edgar perceived that in the earlier days of the MFSA and at the 
start of his own career, the MFSA was more pro-business and more approachable:  
 
They were keen to learn. So our clients flew in and walked [the regulator] through 
their model …  [The regulator] really took it on board, they had the humility to sit 
down and listen to the client. 
 
Donalbain had mixed views. At times he found the MFSA to act in a “cumbersome” manner 
by sending long letters and by getting drawn into lengthy exchanges, while at other times he 
found the MFSA to be approachable: “at other times, it’s very open to sitting down and 
finding a solution” without the need to impose a fine (although in other cases it did so 
anyway). Donalbain explained that the MFSA was open to discussion provided that space 
existed for this purpose. It was therefore the process that mattered to him rather than the final 
outcome (Tyler, 1997). Regan, like Donalbain, echoed the primacy of process over outcome, 
in line with the process-based model of regulation (Tyler and Blader, 2000): 
 
We are used to a different MFSA, a much more receptive MFSA where you would sit 
down and have reasoned arguments. We didn’t necessarily agree, but you could sit 
with somebody intelligent across the table and have a discussion between two 
professionals. And you come out and say, ‘OK, maybe the result wasn’t what I 
wanted, but at least I had a healthy discussion and debate’. 
 
In this sense, the theme of approachability (in terms of readiness to discuss) is linked with the 
theme examined above: representation.  
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 Some participants did not expect the MFSA to be approachable, reflecting the theme 
of maintaining boundaries, discussed above. For example, Demetrius was regularly perturbed 
by the way in which the MFSA is promoted when he attends conferences, specifically as a 
regulator that is “fair, but sort of flexible, easy to get along with”. He contended that a 
regulator should “be approachable and available” yet he perceived that the “elastic band” was 
being stretched to the extent that the boundary between the MFSA and the operators was 
being muddled. Coriolanus, like Demetrius, expected the MFSA to be approachable, but 
tempered this demand. He argued that the regulator must be approachable not to operators 
individually but to the sector as a whole. Rosaline was more emphatic than Coriolanus and 
Demetrius and expected the MFSA to maintain a very strict boundary between itself and the 
operators: 
 
I wasn’t always very keen on this idea of a regulator that is very approachable and 
meets operators etcetera, because a regulator that doesn’t do that is not necessarily not 
good. 
 
When referring to “one of the main advantages of the MFSA” being “approachability”, 
Oberon actually meant accessibility, that is, that MFSA officials are easy to reach by phone 
or email and are not hard to meet: 
 
As I said before, they are approachable enough … it is an advantage that we have in 
Malta … that you grab the phone and talk to them and they give you an appointment, 
and we send them an email, and they reply. 
 
So that’s one good experience. Ultimately, they are approachable. It is a big 
advantage… [that] in Malta the regulator is a phone call away, it is just a short 
meeting, a few days away usually. And I think it is a big advantage and something we 
should pride ourselves in. 
  
It is not clear whether Brabantio, like Oberon, confused the notion of approachability (that is, 
whether the MFSA is welcoming and easy to talk to) with the notion of accessibility (that is, 
whether the MFSA is able to be reached). Brabantio argued that “theoretically we have a 
regulator that is approachable”. He acknowledged that he was unsure of the extent to which 
foreign regulators are approachable, but nevertheless claimed that the MFSA’s 
approachability is something that Malta sells to attract investors: 
 
I may have a client who would want meetings with the regulator, and I can pick up 
the phone, I can send them an email, I can set the meeting, and I meet with the 
supervisory unit. I meet with the authorisation unit, and I have the top people over, 
people who I know. 
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Although Brabantio initially referred to the notion of accessibility, he then alluded to the 
theme of approachability by stating that “we can have very meaningful, cordial discussions to 
discuss issues of relevance or of importance to the client”. Regardless of whether he was 
conflating the notions of approachability and accessibility, both were normative demands 
made to the MFSA.  
 Other participants were clear about their expectations of regulatory accessibility in 
terms of whether the MFSA is easy to reach via phone and whether it is uncomplicated to 
meet – even though perceptions differed as to the degree of accessibility. For example, 
Caliban, the CEO of a large insurance company, noted that in the past the MFSA was more 
readily available. Certainly, he observed that recently “everything has become difficult and 
very often you don’t get a reply or don’t get one … quickly enough”. In contrast, for 
Gertrude, a positive aspect of the MFSA was its accessibility:  
 
They will take a phone call; they will respond to your phone calls. Not everything has 
to be in writing. Obviously when you’re looking for certain things then you might 
have a phone call first, and then they say ‘now follow it with an email’, which 
definitely you’re always going to do because you need to have an email chain. But 
they’re very open to having discussions on the phone. 
 
Bassanio perceived that the accessibility of the MFSA was essential for a good or right 
relationship to exist between the MFSA and the operator: 
 
In my view accessibility is key. We have the advantage that the regulator is very 
accessible and we can call, we can meet them, within very short notice.” 
 
He explained that a good relationship must be established through a “dialogic approach” 
(Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012) between the regulator and the operator, the foundation of 
which is the accessibility of the MFSA: 
 
In my view a good relationship is established by having a two-way communication 
process while implementing regulation. The bank and the industry have the 
opportunity to provide feedback on what the regulator is proposing to implement and 
also in other matters. So if we have an issue … it is important that we can call, discuss 
over the phone, and have a frank discussion. In my view that is what constitutes a 
good relationship. 
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Helpfulness and guidance   
Procedural fairness has been conceptualized in the policing context as incorporating the 
notion of trustworthy motives, that is, exhibiting care and concern (Jonathan-Zamir, et al., 
2015: Mazerolle, et al, 2013). Liebling (2004) also found that a significant relational matter 
for prisoners was the support offered by prison officers. Participants in the Maltese financial 
services context echoed trustworthy motives and relational concerns. What mattered to 
operators was that the MFSA is helpful and provides informal guidance. In some of the 
examples that follow, the theme of helpfulness coincides with that of responsiveness: that is, 
the extent to which the MFSA is fast-acting, a theme discussed in the following section.  
 For example, Brutus remarked that the MFSA, aside from being approachable when 
he sold his business, was also “very helpful” because he felt that the director of the relevant 
unit at the MFSA understood that the situation required her immediate attention. Brutus’ 
experience was reflected in that of Albany and Angelo. Indeed, the former recounted a “very 
positive experience” in which the bank sought to form a fund management company. This 
was positive both because the MFSA was responsive (fast) and because the MFSA “gave 
certain inputs which were very helpful”. For Angelo, his “best experience” with the MFSA 
took place when the operator was facing regulatory issues with its foreign subsidiary. In his 
view, the MFSA was “fantastic” because it was “helping” the operator and was responsive by 
providing prompt feedback. He added that even though the operator was going through a 
“very very very difficult time”, with its reputation at stake, it nevertheless “found the full 
support of the regulator, which was actually not only telling [the operator] what to do” but 
was helping the operator to do so.  
Cornwall claimed that it was important that the MFSA act as a “mentor” to those 
operators who engage in what McBarnet (2001) has referred to as “committed compliance”. 
Acting as a guide for operators who engage in committed compliance proved crucial for this 
participant because “the regulator should be a sort of friend where you go and seek advice, 
rather than imposing more and more and more regulation.” He argued that it was important 
for the MFSA to help operators engaging in committed compliance, because by doing so 
further compliance would be promoted, a form of positive reinforcement:  
 
Operators feel they are doing something good, they realise what they are doing is OK, 
and they feel encouraged to continue doing it. 
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For Cornwall, it was essential that the regulator does not act like a policeman, but as a friend. 
If the regulator is seen as a friend by the operator, the operator is more likely to comply to 
avoid feelings of shame (Braithwaite, 1989): 
 
Once he is a friend you don’t want to disappoint him; so what you are doing right you 
continue doing right and improve it. 
 
In line with Cornwall, Polonius deemed it crucial that the MFSA engage in “proactive” 
policing by helping the operator to “implement the rules”, rather than “reactive” policing 
(Reiss, 1971) by waiting for the operator to breach regulations.  
Closely related to helping the operator (including by aiding the operator to comply) 
was the provision of informal guidance. Echoing Cornwall’s and Polonius’ expectations, 
Oberon considered it important that the MFSA act as a “lighthouse” by letting operators 
know what was expected of them (thus connecting with the theme of legal certainty discussed 
above). Oberon compared the MFSA to a football team playing defence. Rather than playing 
this reactive role, the regulator should perform a guidance function. Gloucester argued that 
because of the “tsunami of regulation” (a reference to the “depth” of regulation; Crewe, 
2011) the industry looks to the MFSA “for clarification and guidance.” Despite recognising 
that the MFSA is not a “legal firm”, Puck nevertheless expected a degree of “support, 
especially in getting the technicalities right”, although he acknowledged that his expectations 
from the MFSA cannot be “too high in that respect”. Some participants therefore believed 
that one of the functions of the MFSA is to perform a guidance role. I will return to the tasks 
of the MFSA when discussing the broad conceptual theme of effectiveness.  
 
Respect 
Liebling (2004) has additionally identified respect as a dominant relational concern that 
mattered to prisoners. In the Maltese financial services context, operators similarly expected 
a relationship to be founded on “mutual respect”, as the following examples show: 
  
A good relationship is one based on mutual respect. (Albany) 
  
I think mutual respect is critical. (Othello) 
 
A good relationship comes when there is mutual respect and mutual understanding. 
(Polonius)  
 
I think it needs to be an arm’s length objective relationship with mutual respect. 
(Laertes)  
128 	
 
There has to be mutual respect like in anything. (Macbeth) 
 
I think what would constitute a good relationship is if there is respect between the two 
of us. (Octavius) 
 
Although the participants generally believed that a good relationship is founded on mutual 
respect, for some participants such respect has to be earned and not demanded. The principle 
was said to apply both ways: for the operator to be respected by the regulator and the 
regulator to be respected by the operator, certain conditions had to be fulfilled. For the 
regulator to be “respected” (or for the regulator’s authority to be acknowledged as rightful) 
by the operator, the regulator must be inter alia competent, helpful, understanding and not 
overbearing. While the theme of helpfulness has already been discussed, the BLDs of 
competence, understanding and regulatory craft (a lack of authoritarianism) will be addressed 
in the ensuing sections. I wish to focus on what it means for the regulator to treat the operator 
with respect (rather than what it means for the operator to respect the regulator), because the 
latter is a question of what renders a regulator legitimate in the eyes of its audience (Liebling 
et al., 2012b). 
Albany explained that the operator has to work for the regulator’s respect by 
demonstrating consistency in its compliance with the rules, by being honest and by not 
engaging in deception. He suggested that the reputation that operators build over time 
through the aforementioned behaviour will earn the regulator’s respect.  
For Octavius, being treated with respect means that the MFSA adopts one of the 
tenets of a fair trial: the “presumption of innocence”. He explained that one of the negative 
qualities of the MFSA is the “lack of respect, lack of professional respect” by adopting a 
regulatory or supervisory approach of “trying to find an error”. He claimed that when he 
corresponded with the MFSA, “they kind of make you feel like a criminal” and provided an 
example of a meeting he had after the operator had engaged a new compliance officer. The 
meeting was a “courtesy meeting” aimed at keeping the regulator informed. During the 
meeting, Octavius felt that he was being “interrogated”. Consequently, he perceived and 
concluded that the MFSA had reversed the onus of proof: 
 
It’s as if, well, you are in criminology, and you say ‘innocent until proven guilty’. 
And I think the regulator is switching it around: guilty until proven innocent. 
 
Respect also means that the MFSA must acknowledge that the operator needs to has a 
business to run. Polonius explained that for him respect means that the regulator understands 
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(or at least tries to understand) what the operator is trying to do and enables it to pursue its 
business as long as it does so in accordance with the law. This is conditional on the operator 
justifying why it undertakes certain actions.  
 Demetrius’ understanding of the concept of respect was similar to that of Polonius. 
Indeed, he explained that respect means that the regulator has to “recognise that the operator 
has a business to run and is part of an economic environment and has to be aware that 
whatever it does can affect that operation”. Similarly, for Montague, respect means that the 
regulator must understand the economic function played by operators. Such an understanding 
of the operators’ role is crucial because these figures are helping Malta to grow economically. 
Macbeth’s understanding of the concept of respect was also consistent with that of Polonius, 
Demetrius and Montague, associating the concept with the regulator acknowledging the bank 
exists in an economic envelope and is involved in an industry that has its own rules and 
methods … and the regulator has to accept that the bank needs the space to operate within the 
parameters of the law”. 
 
Trust  
Trust is one of the primary relational dimensions and is essential for cooperation (Sztompka, 
1999). Tyler and Kramer (1996:3) observed that “the importance of trust in social, economic, 
political, legal, and organizational relations has been increasingly recognised.” As Lewick 
and Benedict Bunker (1996) argued, trust is the sine qua non element for successful business, 
professional, and employment relationships. Resonating with the aforementioned literature, 
what mattered to Maltese financial services participants was a relationship with the MFSA 
that is built on trust. Specifically, they wanted to trust the MFSA and also expected the 
MFSA to trust the operator. The following examples illustrate this BLD: 
 
I think the best relationship that an operator can have with his regulator is where there 
is a relationship of trust. (Benvolio) 
 
You need a relationship between the regulated entity and the regulator to be a 
relationship based on trust. (Caesar)  
 
I think there has to be a relationship of trust between the MFSA as a regulator and the 
entities that are being regulated. (Romeo)  
 
MM: What in your opinion constitutes a good and right relationship between the 
MFSA and the operator?  
 
R: I think its trust. (Cordelia) 
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Having established that trust is crucial for a good or right relationship to exist between the 
MFSA and the operators, it is essential to understand why trust in the regulator by the 
operator and vice versa is deemed necessary. Resonating with the extant trust literature, the 
present study finds that one reason why trust is a primary relational concern is because it can 
be deemed a robust social oil that reduces relational friction and smoothens social 
interactions (Dasgupta, 1998; Sztompka, 1999). For instance, Albany explained that if the 
MFSA were trusted by the operator, the operator would be more forthcoming with any 
specific issues it may have and would be more likely to seek the MFSA’s assistance. 
Similarly, and as explained by Benvolio, if operators distrust the MFSA, cooperation 
declines: 
 
The impact on the operator is that there is a culture of distrust with the MFSA. The 
culture of being open and transparent with your regulator, forget it, it doesn’t happen. 
 
Polonius contended that if individuals within an operator are trusted by the regulator, a 
smoother relationship would be engendered: 
 
The insurance directorate knew what they were doing, all right. I mean there was a 
substantial measure of trust in us because they know us … because they knew how we 
operate, and at the end of the day when we sold the company it was quite a smooth 
transaction from the MFSA point of view. And in order to make it even smoother we, 
to assure both the client and even the MFSA, decided to remain directors at the new 
company … so we gave it that added trust, that added continuity, so even though the 
owners are new, two people are going to remain there from the people that were 
previously there when it was moving smoothly. 
 
In contrast, a loss of trust strains social relations. Macbeth explained that a loss of trust 
(brought about by a lack of impartiality) resulted in him taking a very cautious approach 
when interacting with the MFSA and in “capitulative compliance” (McBarnet, 2001): 
 
You have to interact in the same way that you interact with a dangerous dog … at 
arm’s length, trying not to upset him and trying to keep him happy. You accept 
decisions … they are going to fine us €10,000 which for the bank reputation-wise is 
not the best thing that could have happened but at the end of the day it is neither here 
nor there; but let [the MFSA] chalk one [up … by fining] the bank”. 
 
Limerick and Cunnington (1993:96) remarked that “[t]rust does not come naturally. It has to 
be carefully structured and managed”. In this regard, Sztompka (1999:69-70) argued that “as 
far as trust is a relationship with others, granting trust is based on the estimate of their 
trustworthiness”. Consistent with these observations, participants do not endow blind trust to 
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the regulator. Therefore, what makes a regulator trustworthy in the eyes of operators? 
Participants referred to several factors that would enhance their trust in the regulator: (i) 
independence/impartiality (11 operators); (ii) honesty/integrity (11 operators); (iii) 
transparency/openness (9 operators); (iv) competence (6 operators); (v) effectiveness (2 
operators); (vi) fairness (4 operators); (vii) reputation (4 operators); (viii) confidentiality (2 
operators); (ix) lawfulness (3 operators); (x) consistency (2 operators); (xi) helpfulness (1 
operators); and (xii) dialogue/consultation (2 operators). These findings mirrored Sztompka’s 
(1999) reputational basis of trustworthiness and Onora O’Neill’s (2002) concept of intelligent 
trust.  
 Sztompka (1999:55) argued that “trust is relative”. This means that trust must be 
about something. I trust individual A to do B. Extending Sztompka’s observations, O’Neill 
(2014) contended that trust is discriminatory in that well-placed trust requires placing trust in 
some people for specific purposes. The following examples encapsulate these points: 
 
 Now by trust, what do you mean? Do I trust them to do what exactly? (Tybalt) 
 
Trust, in a sense, is where you’re looking at good faith of the people. I don’t have any 
issue there. Do I have trust that they’re going to – in its current state – carry out their 
role in the way I would want them to do? No, not in its current state. (Juliet) 
 
 MM:  Do you trust the MFSA? 
Kent:  Yes, my spontaneous answer is yes. Now obviously I am tempted to 
ask you a question. In what sense do I trust the MFSA?  
 
MM:  Do you trust the MFSA? 
Octavius:  In what context?”  
 
MM:  And do you trust the MFSA?  
 
Brabantio: Do I trust the MFSA? That’s a difficult one. ‘Trust’ is a big word. I 
mean what should I be trusting them with? 
 
Liebling (2004:240) observed that trust is an “asymmetric concept, in the sense that trust may 
be built in one way, and slowly, yet destroyed in another, and in an instant.” Consistent with 
this comment, Maltese financial services participants remarked that trust was constructed 
over time. For instance, Vincentio specifically noted that “trust is something which is 
generated over time … not just something which is there”. Similarly, Macduff observed that 
“it is the behaviour of the MFSA on a daily basis that establishes trust.” Octavius also 
explained that trust in the MFSA is something which develops over the years.  Indeed, 
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consistent with the trust literature, he likened trust to a relationship that grows over time: “so 
a relationship, like in anything, takes to time build.”  
Resonating with the above literature, trust can be destroyed in a flash. Regan, 
similarly to Octavius, but in a different context (MFSA trust in the operator), contended that 
trust is a relational matter that is built over time and can take years to regain once it is lost: 
 
I mean, this is all a relationship. When they look at you in the eye and trust you, that 
wouldn’t happen because you’ve just walked into the room for the first time, but it’s 
because you’ve grown up with them and they know you. If that trust gets eroded just 
because you raise your voice, or you say what you shouldn’t say, then it’s very 
difficult. It unravels very quickly. And then to build this up again, it’s going to take 
quite a lot of time. 
 
Banquo argued that the MFSA’s trust in the operators is something that develops over time 
through interactions with key executives who have displayed qualities of procedural fairness: 
“respect, collaboration and transparency”. He maintained that naturally, it is the new 
operators who struggle to build trust, while emphasising that “it takes years to gain and you 
can lose it very quickly”. 
 Sztompka (1999) explored the “targets of trust”. In the present research, Maltese 
financial services participants also identified those they trusted, distinguishing between trust 
in the MFSA as a whole, trust in certain levels of the MFSA and trust in certain individuals at 
the MFSA. For example, Brutus trusted certain persons in the specific unit of the MFSA with 
which he regularly works, but not the higher levels of the MFSA (a reference to the Chairman 
and the Supervisory Council). Resonating with Brutus, Cornwall emphasised the importance 
of trust in the higher levels of the MFSA: “they need to have a Chairman … who, as I said, is 
trustworthy.”  Coriolanus, like Brutus, trusted certain individuals within the MFSA. Other 
participants, such as Laurence and Demetrius, also placed their trust in the MFSA as a whole 
while doubting the trustworthiness of certain individuals within it.  
 
5.1.3 Distributive fairness 
The concept of distributive fairness was considered by Tyler (1997) and other researchers 
(see Sunshine and Tyler, 2003) as an instrumental antecedent variable affecting their 
conceptualization of legitimacy. In contrast, Bottoms and Tankebe (2017) hypothesised that 
police distributive justice (fairness in the allocation of resources and outcomes) is one of the 
BLDs that the public makes of police forces and is one of the components of legitimacy. This 
research supported Bottoms and Tankebe’s hypothesis by finding that considerations of 
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distributive fairness were one of the primary BLDs that operators expected from the 
regulator. Specifically, operators both large and small demanded that the regulator (which in 
the case of large banks in the Eurozone is the European Central Bank (ECB)) acts in a 
proportionately fair manner by not measuring everyone with the same ruler. That is, the 
operators expected the regulator not to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation and 
supervision. Moreover, the operators also expected the regulator to take a balanced approach 
to regulation and supervision by not being overbearing.  
 
Proportional fairness – the lack of a one-size-fits-all approach 
The operators that qualified as large and significant banks expected the ECB to act in a 
proportionately fair manner by not treating (regulating and supervising) large banks in Malta 
in the same way as they treated other major banks in Europe because, such treatment, among 
other things, puts a strain on them. This could be inferred from the following quotations: 
 
You cannot have Deutsche Bank and [a large Maltese bank] measured with the same 
scale because it has 100,000 people and I have 1000 people; and he has more 
resources than I have; so how can I catch up with him? (Caesar) 
 
The ECB tend to use a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach so it will be regulating the biggest 
banks in Europe, Deutsche Bank, for example, or Santander, in the same way that it 
regulates [a large bank in Malta]. They expect the same principles ...  to be adopted by 
all the banks.  Obviously, the economy in which Santander, BNP Paribas and these 
big [European] banks work is quite different ...  a big bank in Malta is overall a small 
bank, with much less resources. (Lysander) 
 
I think the biggest problem … is the lack of proportionality. You have [a large 
Maltese bank] and Deutsche Bank. The returns which Deutsche Bank sends are the 
same returns [a large Maltese bank] sends. Obviously Deutsche Bank has economies 
of scale that we don’t, so there is very little proportionality. That is something that the 
JST [and] the ECB have not accepted to date. (Theseus)  
 
[The principle of proportionality] is catered for theoretically in the regulations. In 
practice though, you find that there is no proportionality. Whether you are Deutsche 
Bank or a little bank in Malta the same regulations apply, the same massive reporting 
requirements. Before, it used to be a much simpler world; there was much more room 
for discussion and manoeuvre with the MFSA. Now I think it is fair to say that not 
due to any particular fault of their own, [the MFSA is] struggling to keep up and to 
understand and to issue and transpose regulations. Local flavour has disappeared 
because now the ECB rules and [the MFSA has] to apply the ECB laws. (Gloucester) 
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To Mercutio, employing an EU-driven one-size-fits-all approach robbed the banks of serving 
the economic interests of a democratically elected Maltese government (Beetham and Lord, 
1998):  
 
One-size-fits-all would be bad because ultimately … banks should also be serving the 
aspirations of a country that is expressed democratically through the government that 
the country elects. The economic agenda of Malta should be driven in our Parliament 
and shouldn’t be driven by bureaucrats pulling the strings of the banking sector. 
 
The lawyer respondents, some of whom advise large banks, expected the MFSA not to apply 
a one-size-fits-all approach. Similarly to Caesar, Lysander, Theseus and Lysander, Tybalt 
perceived a lack of proportionality in the treatment of large banks in Malta compared with 
large banks in Europe: 
 
One of the biggest criticisms I always put to the EU in terms of banking regulation, [is 
that you cannot] have a one-size-fits-all regulation [whereby] you treat [a large bank 
in Malta] and Deutsche Bank in exactly the same way. They are two different 
animals. It is like saying that an elephant and an ant have to have the same features in 
the way they walk, in the way they eat. It just can’t be. 
 
Large banks were also aware of the dangers that a one-size-fits-all approach brings to small 
banks. For instance, Mercutio explained that it is not possible to measure small banks using 
the same scale as large banks because the former would face significant strain: 
 
The danger … when we deal with the EU is a one-size-fits-all approach. They have to 
very careful not to use the same yardsticks with smaller banks as with larger banks 
because it might just kill the backbone of smaller banks. And I think smaller banks 
have a role to play and they are important, too. 
 
Mercutio’s argument was mirrored by Caesar who observed how a lack of proportionality in 
regulation and supervision exerts considerable pressure on large banks in Malta, but even 
greater pressure on smaller banks:  
 
Even if [small banks in Malta] don’t fall under the supervision of the ECB, the MFSA 
which is responsible for [smaller banks] applies the [same] rules … but if you apply 
the same rules you are going to destroy them because they don’t have the reporting 
capabilities that [a large bank has]. 
 
Small and medium-sized banks also expected the MFSA not to adopt a one-size-fits-all 
approach to regulation and supervision. For example, Escalus explained that it was important 
135 	
for the MFSA to be “proportionate and fair” with smaller banks because they cannot cope 
with the amount of regulation:  
 
I think the effect and impact of regulation must be measured with the scale and 
complexities of the business you are regulating. If we are a 27-staff bank with a 
balance sheet of €175 million and an equity of €26 million, you can’t regulate us the 
way you do the Bank of Valletta. 
 
Escalus continued to explain that a one-size-fits-all approach may lead to smaller banks 
“withdrawing” (Merton, 1938) from the sector: 
 
Regulation is costly ... I believe that banks will start distancing themselves from 
business because to get a slice of that business means that you have to spend it on 
compliance with regulation. 
  
Turning to insurance operators, both large and smaller regulatees in this sector reflected the 
demands made by large and small banks. For example, Caliban, the CEO of a large insurance 
company, likened the implementation of the EU Solvency II Regulation to a “nightmare”. 
This was because he deemed it a regime that ought to have been based on the principles of 
proportionality, yet what applied to very large insurance companies in Europe applied to 
large operators in Malta. Caliban’s perceptions were echoed by Polonius, a small insurance 
broker:  
 
We are small in Malta. I see Malta as a special case, but you have this one-size-fits-all 
approach. We are in this blessed EU, directives are issued, loads of directives. 
Regulations that are received by England, Spain or France are received in Malta too. 
We are bound as much as they are, but they have regiments of regulators, or 
regulators with regiments of people with experience. We started 10 or 15 years ago, 
they started 50 years ago, but we have the same obligations and responsibilities that 
they have … I am saying that I am small and so maybe the responsibilities should be 
slightly less in the sense that they should be proportional with my size; I am saying I 
don’t have enough people … and I can’t do it. 
 
Other operators from different sectors, namely investments services and funds, trustees and 
CSPs (all small and medium-sized operators) also expected the MFSA not to employ a one-
fits-all-approach to regulation and supervision. For example, Macduff, a compliance officer 
working in investment services, expected some form of proportionality in the way the MFSA 
supervises operators. He acknowledged that there naturally ought to be rules that apply to all 
operators regardless of their size, but drew a distinction between “the law in the books” and 
the “law in practice” (Liebling, 2011:488) by stressing that “there has to some 
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proportionality” that should be reflected not only in the legislation but also in the way the 
regulator supervises operators:  
 
Yes, you need certain functionaries, but is there need for an internal auditor in a firm 
of four people or five people or six or ten? No. They allow for a derogation … but it 
is quite hard to get a derogation. Do you need a risk manager, a dedicated full-time 
risk manager? Do you need a full-time chief information security officer? Sometimes 
there has to be some flexibility. What they don’t understand is that everything costs 
money.  
 
Resonating with Macduff’s reasoning was Lucio, another compliance officer working in the 
investment services and funds, trustee and CSP sectors. He explained that while investment 
services and funds are subject to different regimes with different requirements and may have 
certain exemptions, this was not the case for trustees and CSPs, resulting in unfairness: 
 
“One of the things I don’t particularly like is that, particularly for CSPs [and] trustees, 
there is one regulatory framework for everyone, irrespective of whether you employ 
50 people or 5. One of the biggest challenges for CSPs and smaller trustees … is the 
compliance costs being so big, so challenging, that it is very, very difficult to keep on 
operating because there is one regime [that applies to all operators].”  
 
Although Lucio believed that there were certain exemptions in investment services that could 
lend some form of proportionality, his opinion was not shared by Kent. This respondent 
perceived that although there was an attempt to recognise proportionality in the AIFMD 
Directive this was not the case in practice. In effect, Kent was drawing a distinction between 
Liebling’s (2011:488) “the law in the books” and the “law in practice”.  
 Rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation and to supervision, 
some participants expected the MFSA to use its discretion when implementing EU 
Directives. For instance, Othello noted that the Directives afforded the MFSA a degree of 
latitude when transposing the Directives into Maltese law, but perceived that they were 
simply “being cut and pasted and applied wholesale to the local market without thought.” 
Caesar remarked that even though the MFSA’s hands were tied because of the EU, he was of 
the view that the MFSA needed to utilize its discretion as much as possible. Similarly, Brutus 
maintained that EU Directives pertaining to insurance were drafted in a “very strict” manner. 
He argued that although the “MFSA probably has some form of [discretion] … and could be 
a bit lax and not apply the maximum threshold”, it generally applies “the maximum 
thresholds.” Malvolio attributed this lack of exercise of discretion by the MFSA as a strategy 
on its part to try to appease EU supranational regulators:  
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In Malta we have the habit of taking any EU Directive to its fullest extreme, so even 
if the EU Directive gives you latitude, Malta likes to be told we are good boys and we 
are very compliant, so we go the whole hog. 
 
 
Proportional fairness – A balanced approach to supervision  
Operators did not want a “nanny regulator”, that is, one that acts like an “enforcer” (Muir, 
1979:294) or adopts an overbearing or authoritarian parenting style (Baumrind, 1991a) by 
rigidly implementing the law. To use Crewe’s (2011:510) language, operators did not want to 
be supervised in a manner that displayed “weight” or “tightness”. A number of reasons were 
proffered by respondents to justify their views. For instance, Macbeth expected the MFSA to 
act like “aircraft travelling at a 1000ft”, supervising the operator at a distance and intervening 
only if it breached the rules. He stressed that when undertaking its supervisory role, the 
MFSA must not be “oppressive”, as otherwise the operator would be “strangled”:  
 
The bank must have the space to do what it has to do so long as it is moving by the 
rules. The police are not chasing you all the time although they are there to police 
what happens. But we don’t have policemen behind the door; they expect us to 
behave like normal human beings, within the law like anybody else. The regulator, 
like the police, [should] get involved when the exception happens. 
 
Reflecting Macbeth’s expectation, Kent argued that the MFSA should “do away with the bad 
service providers” and in doing so ought to give “the good guys” a “breath of fresh air” to 
operate. Similarly, Puck expected the MFSA to “let us work” while performing “its 
supervisory role” in a minimalist way. For Caliban, it was important for the MFSA not to be 
excessively “intrusive” as this “instils a fear in them”, resulting in corporate decisions being 
delayed at the board level. Polonius deemed it critical that the MFSA not solely rely on a 
coercive approach (Muir, 1979) or on over-lawfulness because this will result in non-
compliance (May and Winter, 1999; McBarnet, 2001; but see May and Wood, 2003 for a 
different perspective): 
 
The worst situation is when they throw the book at you and tell you ‘That is how you 
must do it; that’s it: shut your mouth.’ Even if it is the most just command, you will 
have to rebel. 
 
 
The expectation that the regulator should not act in an overbearing manner also extended to 
the regulator not interfering in the business of the operator as otherwise the former would be 
assuming conflicting roles. Othello described a situation in which the regulatory side of the 
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ECB was “overcorrecting” and acting in an overbearing manner by intervening in the way 
banks are run, specifically by sitting in on board meetings. He angrily stressed that “that is 
not the role of the regulator”; rather, the function of the regulator was to “set the regulations” 
and to ensure that those were “fairly and properly applied”. According to Othello, if the 
regulator conflates these roles “it will make for a very difficult relationship”. He 
acknowledged the “carnage caused by the financial crisis” and understood why the regulatory 
response stimulated the pendulum to shift from an attitude towards deregulation to an attitude 
characterised by “overreaction.” In contrast, Othello insisted that having a “draconian regime 
in place” would not work. A similar situation was described by Regan in relation to the 
MFSA, explaining that the MFSA has taken on the role of acting as “the guarantor for the 
general public” to ensure that the consumer receives the best deal possible. She attributed this 
overzealous regulatory approach to undue deference to the EU as well as to criticisms 
levelled at the MFSA over regulatory failures: 
  
What has happened over these last few years, is sometimes they throw the book at 
you and say, ‘But you don’t know what pressure we’re having from the EU,’ which is 
true. I mean, this is a [post-crisis] phenomenon they’ve had to deal with, and it’s not 
nice to have somebody coming and looking at what you’ve done and tick you off if 
you haven’t done things the right way. But I find that that is too much of a blanket 
approach to everything, and then sometimes it has instilled in them a fear, where they 
refuse to consider anything else.  
 
They are scared that something will come back to haunt them. So their reaction is to 
overprotect, to practically tell [operators] every step of the way what they should be 
doing, sometimes misguidedly. 
  
Rather than adopting an overbearing and authoritarian style to regulation and supervision, 
participants expected the regulator to adopt a balanced approach akin to Aristotle’s “golden 
mean”. The following quotations illustrated the expectation of achieving an equilibrium 
between too much and too little supervision:  
 
You need, to a certain extent, compliance. But now compliance is taken to an 
extreme. Everything needs to be in balance when it is neither one extreme nor 
another. I think Aristotle said in medio stat virtus. (Cornwall)  
 
A middle route must be found to reconcile, to find a balance, between the two ends of 
the spectrum. Either be with the operator all the time and you will be overbearing and 
strangle the operator (and therefore the arrangement doesn’t work because you are 
always breathing down the operator’s neck and the operator gets annoyed) or you 
leave the operator alone and hope nothing happens, that is the other extreme. 
(Polonius) 
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There needs to be a balance between regulation [and] being practical and ... business-
oriented. You aren’t going to be business-minded because after all, you’re an 
authority … because supervision can be very burdensome. It can in itself defeat the 
whole scope, because if you going to be ... too burdensome, the operations become 
too expensive ... the fees of various banks and financial institutions … will go up 
making their products not feasible, and ... credit institutions will start either closing or 
limiting their business ... or clients would not be interested in the services that you 
provide because they are too expensive. Of course, the public needs to be protected, 
so there needs to be the right regulation, but it needs to be done only as much as is 
required. (Cordelia) 
 
Othello attributed the regulator’s “overbearing” and “authoritarian” supervisory stance to a 
lack of competence and experience (BLDs related to the broad theme of effectiveness which 
will be addressed in the following section). Several references were thus made to the MFSA’s 
functions, especially its role as a supervisor. The following section will address the BLD of 
performance of functions. 
 
 
5.1.4 Effectiveness 
The themes to be considered in this section (performance of functions, competence, and 
responsiveness) have conventionally been regarded as instrumental notions (Sunshine and 
Tyler, 2003). In this research, however, Maltese financial services participants viewed these 
themes as normative demands or expectations.  
 
Performance of functions 
Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, 2017) hypothesised that the effectiveness of the police in 
performing their functions is one of the BLDs that the general public makes of police forces. 
This research supports the Bottoms-Tankebe hypothesis by finding that participants expected 
the MFSA to perform its functions effectively. The MFSA has numerous functions, which 
can be categorised into three broad groups: (i) authorisation or licensing; (ii) supervision; and 
(iii) enforcement. Some participants did not expressly state that they expected the MFSA to 
perform those functions effectively. However, drawing on MacIntyre’s (2013:69) “functional 
concepts”, where participants considered one of the regulator’s roles or functions to be that of 
“supervising operators”, it would follow that a regulator who did not adequately supervise 
operators should be regarded as not performing its function effectively.  
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 Participants did expect the MFSA to perform its role as a gatekeeper effectively by 
ensuring that the right entities and individuals were licensed to carry out financial services in 
Malta:  
 
I think a regulator, as the name implies, needs to regulate; so it needs to have a very 
good feel of what is happening out there, because it is one of the most important 
sieves in our infrastructure. It is the gatekeeper par excellence. (Benvolio) 
 
The first [function] is to authorise any new applications. (Donalbain)  
 
They have, first, an authorisation function. It’s scrutiny of any regulated business to 
see whether or not that business is compliant with regulatory requirements and is also 
fit and proper for the purpose. (Coriolanus)  
 
As Coriolanus and other participants explained: “then there’s a supervisory side, which is the 
side where basically they’re looking into the ongoing compliance of any licensed entity”. 
Operators expected the MFSA to perform its supervisory role and ensure that all operators 
complied with the relevant regulations: 
 
I think the MFSA should ensure that there are high standards of behaviour from all 
licence holders. (Romeo)  
 
They are mostly involved, as their name indicates, in the regulatory aspect, in the 
substantive aspect. They need to ensure, if we are talking about the business of 
insurance, the same for banking and the same for investments, that operators are 
operating correctly. (Polonius) 
 
Participants explained that to ensure that all operators comply, the MFSA ought to conduct 
regular inspections or compliance visits:  
 
I feel the MFSA … needs to be reorganised and focus on … on-site inspections; I 
think they need more of those. (Regan) 
 
In terms of oversight for thematic reviews, the MFSA does carry out these reviews, 
but ideally they would be carried out more frequently. (Bassanio) 
 
Respondents also expected the MFSA to exercise its powers more proactively:  
 
[The MFSA’s powers] should be applied proactively and not wait for reports to come. 
[The MFSA should] monitor more by starting off inspections. (Cordelia) 
 
They are too passive, they are too passive. It needs to reach a level where they’re 
forced to do something. (Juliet) 
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Moreover, they perceived that wherever wrongdoing is discovered, it must be swiftly acted 
upon, shifting the certainty and celerity of punishment from instrumental to normative 
considerations:  
 
If people have defaulted, action has to be taken promptly … I mean … if there is a 
problem today it has to be dealt with today. It is useless putting the problems under 
the carpet; they will remain there. I think … there is a public interest involved. 
(Romeo) 
 
If you have an issue, that issue needs to be looked at – you look at it now, and you 
have all the regulatory powers in the world to do it. I mean, the law gives you the 
rights to go in and take control. [The MFSA] has an indemnity in the law that unless 
there is bad faith [it’s] not liable, so there’s nothing to be scared of there. But it’s very 
important for market operators to know that there is a proper regulator. (Juliet) 
 
Participants not only expected the MFSA to be responsive in the sense of fast enforcement, 
but they also wanted the MFSA to act quickly and efficiently when exercising its other 
functions, in particular in licensing and conducting investigations as well as when responding 
to operators’ concerns and needs. While responsiveness can be regarded as an instrumental 
concern, the normative aspect of responsiveness was highlighted when participants explained 
that the functions of the MFSA (licensing, supervision and enforcement) must be exercised 
quickly and efficiently to protect the interests of consumers, to protect the reputation of 
Malta, to safeguard the country’s economic interests and stability and to protect the operator. 
Variations existed in the participants’ ranking of these objectives. For example, whereas 
Regan considered the protection of consumers more important than the reputation of Malta, 
Rosaline ranked these two interests equally. Other participants such as Demetrius argued that 
“the lowest common denominator” of the above goals was the protection of consumers, while 
for Prospero the primary and only objective of the MFSA was to protect the general public: 
 
The regulator is there not to give services primarily to the service provider but to 
protect the best interests of the general public. That is the regulator’s function.  
 
Competence 
To perform its functions effectively in the interests of inter alios consumers, participants 
expected the MFSA to be staffed with competent individuals. Competence was 
multidimensional and consisted of the following five characteristics: 
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i. Experienced staff – Participants expected the MFSA to be staffed by members who 
had industry experience to discharge their functions. For instance, Polonius was of the 
view that MFSA staff lacked the necessary experience in the financial services sector 
to effectively perform their role: 
 
The problem in the regulator is that there are people who are trying to regulate 
persons who are in the industry when these people who are regulating don’t 
have the exposure. They aren’t doing it on purpose, they don’t have the 
experience, they haven’t gotten their hands dirty enough. 
 
It was insufficient for the regulator to be staffed with experienced personnel; it should 
also be staffed with specialized personnel. This requirement arose due to the 
complexity of regulation, a point clearly captured by Brutus:  
 
The Maltese regulator, unfortunately, was faced with having to implement 
these directives and regulations without obviously having the necessary 
experience; which leads me to my second point about the need to have the 
necessary staff to handle [complex matters]. 
 
ii. Staff with specialized or expert knowledge – Given that the financial services sector 
in Malta has proliferated over the last 20 years and that an inherently complex 
regulatory regime has become increasingly Kafkaesque, participants expected MFSA 
staff to be experts or specialists in their respective fields. The following statements 
capture this theme: 
 
We have an issue here in Malta at the moment – that a knowledge gap is being 
created … we have come from zero to 80 in the last 20 years; the next leap 
requires a higher level of sophistication and a different set of skills.  [Today] 
the level of sophistication is not there. (Tybalt) 
 
There is a big problem in terms of numbers. The financial services market in 
Malta has grown exponentially, in terms of new market players, in terms of 
resources, in terms of capital, in terms of employment. …  During these 15 to 
20 years I’ve seen exponential growth. The MFSA has grown, but I’d say not 
to proportion, so the MFSA has continually been trying to catch up with the 
market. Unfortunately, for the MFSA the legislation is getting very, very 
complicated. (Donalbain) 
 
iii. Spirit and the heart of the laws – Participants expected the MFSA, in the conduct of 
its licensing and supervisory functions, not to adopt a tick-the-box approach by 
focusing on the insignificant issues and the letter of the law but instead to take a 
substance-over-form approach. This BLD was clear from the following quotations: 
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A criticism on my part is that the MFSA has built up a lot of tick-the-box 
items which need to be covered in order to issue a licence and sometimes that 
might not be enough in order to make a proper analysis as to whether a 
potential trustee deserves to get a licence. (Vincentio)  
 
There needs to be a complete overhaul in the way they supervise the financial 
sector. There has to be a shift from this tick-the-box approach completely. 
(Macduff) 
 
iv. Empathetic understanding – It was not enough that the MFSA be staffed by 
competent individuals with the necessary experience and regulatory expertise to 
undertake their roles in a manner that displays adherence to the heart of the law; it 
was also important that the MFSA be able to perform its functions in a way that 
reflects empathetic understanding (Barrett-Lennard, 2015). This BLD was deemed 
vital at the micro level as well as the macro level. At the micro-level, the interviewees 
expected the MFSA to understand the business of the operator and its business needs. 
For example, Tybalt explained that to supervise operators effectively the MFSA 
needed to understand the business of the operator and its business needs. Similarly, 
when conducting compliance visits, Benvolio explained that the MFSA should “focus 
much more on the business” and “give much more importance to the business plan of 
the operator”. At the macro level, what mattered to operators was that the regulator 
understood the industry. For example, for Laurence a lack of understanding of the 
industry resulted in decisions being taken on the basis of the letter of the law:  
I think that the main difficulty is that they do not understand the industry 
enough, and this is leading to ... decisions that are taken on the basis of 
formalistic concepts rather than knowledge of how things really work. 
 
Similarly, Escalus explained that to adequately supervise operators the regulator 
needs to understand the specific industry in which the operator is involved:  
 
I expect that they would understand more, that they would truly understand the 
financial markets that they are regulating. If they are regulating [our bank] 
which is a bank specialised in commodity trade finance, they should have 
somebody as a point of reference there. 
 
Moreover, and also at the macro level, participants expected the regulator to 
understand the economy of Malta:  
Now it all depends on … the regulator understanding initially the business, but 
it also has to understand … what type of business [we as a country] want to 
accept, what type of jurisdictions we are going to do business with. (Gratiano) 
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I believe they need to understand the general picture by looking at the 
economy in which the bank is operating. (Lysander) 
 
v. Trained staff to carry out their functions – For the MFSA team to be able to carry out 
its functions, its members need to have received the appropriate training. For instance, 
Benvolio explained that if MFSA staff are not trained to exercise their discretionary 
authority to differentiate between compliant operators and non-compliant ones, a one-
size-fits-all approach to supervision can result: 
 
“They are finding it extremely hard to distinguish between what is right and 
what is wrong and to apply their values to the way in which they take their 
decisions … everyone is treated in the same way, but not everyone is the 
same”. 
 
Resources 
Aside from the substantive aspect of competent staff, participants expected the MFSA to be 
sufficiently staffed and resourced. Manpower was regarded as essential for the Authority to 
perform its functions. For instance, Romeo considered a lack of effective supervision “to be a 
problem associated with human resources”. Similarly, Macduff perceived that the MFSA 
cannot effectively regulate certain businesses because it lacks the manpower and expertise. 
Resonating with Macduff’s view, Juliet deemed effective supervision vital to preventing 
wrongdoing that can result in huge victim losses. To her, the lack of effective supervision 
was due to staffing issues, in particular, a lack of specialised and experienced MFSA 
inspectors. On the relational side, Caliban associated a lack of professionalism displayed by 
the MFSA (by cancelling a meeting at short notice) with insufficient human resources, while 
to Gertrude an MFSA priority should be to “staff up”. 
 
Leadership 
Previous studies have demonstrated that for organisations to be effective, their leadership 
must provide a clear sense of direction or strategic vision (Bryman, 2007). Consistent with 
this literature, in order for the MFSA to be effective in performing its functions, the 
participants expected the MFSA to have a chairman and top management that lead and give it 
the necessary direction: 
 
I don’t think there’s leadership. The MFSA, along the years, has lost its leadership. 
(Benvolio) 
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It needs someone who gives it direction and proper direction and gives it lots of 
credibility. (Brutus)  
 
I don’t think any long-term decisions are currently being taken and it is in a state of 
lull. There is severe fatigue, no direction from the top. I think until there is new 
leadership, this is going to be the situation. (Macduff) 
 
Participants also expected the chairman and other top management to be changed from time 
to time, while retaining security of tenure as a mechanism to ensure independence and 
impartiality. A change in leadership mattered for one main reason: as Brutus, Mercutio, 
Donalbain, Puck and Oberon explained, a change in leadership is necessary to prevent the 
cultivation of “tyranny” or a state akin to a “fiefdom”. By substituting the chairman and other 
top management from time to time, the regulator would get a breath of fresh air.  
 In addition, what mattered to participants was that the leadership of the MFSA (the 
chairman and top management) leads by example. For Macduff, Donalbain and Prospero this 
meant that the chairman should exhibit the characteristics of impartiality and lawfulness 
described above.  
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6 
 
Legitimacy of Financial Regulators: Scale Development and 
Validation 
 
6.0 Preliminary 
This Chapter builds on the deductive stage by using the results obtained from the 
interviews to construct and distribute a survey to licensed operators. In this Chapter, which 
focuses on the inductive stage, the survey data were analysed using exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses to develop a three-dimensional model of MFSA legitimacy. 
This model was subjected to reliability and validity tests in preparation for exploring its 
relationship with order.  
 
6.1 PCA 
I conducted a PCA with varimax rotation in order to identify an optimal factor structure 
(Field, Miles and Field 2014). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 
0.893, confirming the appropriateness of the data for a PCA (see Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 
1999). The analysis revealed a five-factor solution (see Table 4) that explained 59.34 percent 
of the variance in the items. MFSA licensees sampled in Malta perceived legitimacy to be 
composed of five dimensions, comprising 34 items. Fifty-one items were omitted from the 
analysis because they cross-loaded onto other items or had a factor loading below 0.45. I 
employed Comrey and Lee’s (1992) cut-off points: 0.32 = poor, 0.45 = fair, 0.55 = good, 
0.63 = very good and 0.71 = excellent. According to this rule of thumb, a threshold of 0.45 is 
considered fair and therefore factors which were below 0.45 were omitted.  
Factor 1 comprised items that measure three sub-dimensions: (i) lawfulness (Q19, 
Q16, Q30, Q9) (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012);38 (ii) trust (Q25, Q12) (Tyler and Huo, 2002); 
and (iii) procedural fairness in the quality of decision-making (Q23, Q56, Q28) and quality of 
treatment (Q10, Q37, Q65) (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003).39 It should be observed that one item 
under lawfulness (“when the MFSA deals with operators it always acts according to law”) 
 
38 One item (Q9) was adapted from Tankebe (2013). 
39 One item (Q23) was adapted from Tankebe (2013). 
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was similar to an item included by Sunshine and Tyler (2003) and by Tankebe (2009b, 2010) 
when measuring procedural fairness and by Tankebe (2008, 2009a) when measuring trust as 
a sub-dimension of legitimacy.40 I decided to retain this item under this factor because 
conceptually it fits better under the theoretical construct of lawfulness. The item “MFSA 
decisions are usually fair” was similar to an item included by Tankebe (2013) in his 
distributive justice scale, but it could also be considered as a general question for measuring 
procedural fairness (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). Factor 1 combined the sub-dimensions of 
lawfulness, institutional trust and procedural fairness and therefore reflected the dimension of 
the rule of law (Bingham, 2010). Most of the items in Factor 2 reflected the dimension of 
effectiveness or performance of functions (see Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013). 
One item that loaded onto Factor 2 (“the MFSA is too close to some operators”) can measure 
the concept of “Good relationships” established by Liebling (2011) or can be an indicator of 
the concept of impartiality, an aspect of the quality of decision-making (Sunshine and Tyler, 
2003). Another item that loaded onto Factor 2 (“the MFSA’s decision-process is open and 
transparent”) could represent transparency, another aspect of the quality of decision-making 
(Tyler, 2003). I decided to retain these items under Factor 2 because they could also be 
indicators of effectiveness. Acting impartially and transparently could influence 
effectiveness. The items in Factor 3 measured the dimension of competence. It should be 
noted that one of the items under competence (“MFSA staff know how to carry out their roles 
well”) was similar to an item included by Tankebe (2008, 2009a, 2009b) when measuring 
effectiveness (“overall the police are doing a good job in my neighbourhood”). A conceptual 
distinction exists between competence and effectiveness: staff may know how to carry out 
their roles well, but still prove ineffective. The distinction may be hard to empirically 
disentangle, because for a regulator to be effective, it must be staffed by competent 
(experienced, knowledgeable and skilful) individuals. However, it is also possible for 
regulatory effectiveness to be affected by factors other than competence. For instance, 
political interference could affect the regulator’s effectiveness without necessarily 
influencing the competence of staff. It could be argued, however, that the ability of staff to 
resist political interference is an aspect of competence. Reviewing the items that loaded onto 
Factor 4, it is arguable that these items measured distributive justice as they mostly concerned 
the fairness of outcomes that operators receive from the regulator (Tankebe, 2013). 
Reviewing the items which loaded onto Factor 5, it was clear that these statements measured 
 
40 Tankebe (2010b) included a similar item under the sub-scale of trustworthiness when measuring confidence in 
the police. 
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the concept of responsiveness. It should be noted that one item under responsiveness (“The 
MFSA acts in a timely manner”) was similar to that included by Sunshine and Tyler (2003) 
and by Tankebe (2008, 2009a, 2009b) when measuring effectiveness. 
To summarise, the five hypothesized scales of MFSA audience legitimacy were the 
rule of law (comprising the sub-dimensions of lawfulness, trust, and procedural fairness), 
effectiveness, competence, distributive fairness and responsiveness. Although EFA 
techniques are useful in identifying the survey’s theoretical factor structure, it is necessary to 
employ a CFA analysis to provide further evidence of an instrument’s construct validity 
(Besnoy et al., 2016). Before subjecting these dimensions to a CFA, I conducted a reliability 
analysis on each dimension (see Table 5). In this study, reliability was assessed by examining 
the correlation coefficient known as Cronbach’s alpha. Consistent with Liebling’s (2004) 
research, I employed Cohen and Holliday’s (1982) rule of thumb for interpreting this 
correlation: 0.19 and below = very low; 0.20 to 0.39 = low; 0.40 to 0.69 = acceptable; 0.70 to 
0.89 = high; and 0.90 to 1 = very high. From Table 4, it is clear that while the dimensions of 
the rule of law, effectiveness, competence and distributive fairness demonstrated high levels 
of internal consistency, the dimension of responsiveness displayed only an acceptable level of 
reliability. 
Table 4. Principal components analysis of items in questionnaire  
Item  Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Rule of Law        
In dealing with 
operators, the 
MFSA exercises its 
powers in good 
faith (Q19) 
 0.758     
I find the attitude of 
MFSA staff to be 
hostile (Q10) * 
 0.743     
The MFSA and its 
staff act as if they 
are above the law 
(Q16)* 
 0.721     
The MFSA 
sometimes abuses 
its powers (Q30) * 
 0.708     
MFSA decisions are 
usually fair (Q23) 
 0.692     
I trust the MFSA 
(Q25) 
 0.691     
The MFSA treats 
operators fairly 
(Q37) 
 0.680     
I find it hard to trust 
MFSA staff (Q12) * 
 0.672     
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The MFSA does not 
apply the law fairly 
(Q56)* 
 0.626     
When the MFSA 
deals with operators 
it always acts 
according to law 
(Q9) 
 0.609     
Things only go your 
way if you know 
the right people at 
the MFSA (Q28) * 
 0.536     
Staff at the MFSA 
are willing to 
support the operator 
(Q65) 
 0.535     
Effectiveness        
The MFSA is doing 
a good job 
investigating 
regulatory 
violations (Q61) 
  0.731    
The MFSA does not 
respond quickly 
enough to breaches 
committed by 
operators (Q44) * 
  0.717    
The MFSA ensures 
high standards of 
conduct from 
operators (Q69) 
  0.655    
The MFSA is doing 
a good job 
supervising 
operators (Q63) 
  0.654    
The MFSA is doing 
a good job 
protecting Malta’s 
reputation as a 
financial services 
centre (Q73) 
  0.636    
The MFSA is too 
close to some 
operators (Q64)* 
  0.600    
The MFSA’s 
decision-making 
process is open and 
transparent (Q11)  
  0.521    
The MFSA ensures 
that the right 
entities/people are 
licensed (Q57) 
  0.520    
Competence        
Staff at the MFSA 
appear properly 
trained for their 
roles (Q85) 
   0.793   
MFSA staff have 
the technical 
(specialized) 
   0.772   
150 	
knowledge to 
discharge their 
functions (Q39) 
Staff at the MFSA 
have the necessary 
regulatory 
experience to 
discharge their 
functions (Q1) 
   0.713   
MFSA staff know 
how to carry out 
their roles well 
(Q29) 
   0.674   
Staff at the MFSA 
are not well versed 
in the relevant 
regulations (Q70) * 
   0.602   
Staff at the MFSA 
understand how the 
law applies in 
practice (Q17) 
   0.573   
The regulator 
understands the 
economic landscape 
in which the 
operator operates 
(Q43) 
   0.452   
Distributive 
Fairness  
      
The regulator 
adopts a one-size-
fits-all approach to 
regulation (Q34) * 
    0.851  
The regulator 
adopts a one-size-
fits-all approach to 
supervision (Q52) * 
    0.784  
The MFSA is too 
rigid in the way it 
applies the law 
(Q40) * 
    0.689  
The MFSA adopts a 
tick-the-box 
approach when 
carrying out its 
functions (Q48) * 
    0.669  
Responsiveness        
The MFSA does not 
seem to have 
enough staff to 
attend to operators 
(Q14) * 
     0.775 
The licensing 
process is too slow 
(Q22) * 
     0.774 
The MFSA acts in a 
timely manner 
(Q13)  
     0.632 
       
Variance  19.397 12.857 11.834 8.754 6.494 
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Explained 
       
NOTE: N = 226 Only factor loadings >.45 are displayed 
* Items marked with an Asterix were reverse coded 
 
 
 
Table 5. Reliability analysis of the five dimensions 
 
Dimension/Factor  Cronbach’s Alpha (a) 
Rule of Law  .924 
Effectiveness  .852 
Competence  .876 
Distributive Fairness  .825 
Responsiveness  .694 
 
6.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Using AMOS SPSS 25 software, a CFA was conducted on the five-factor model to test the 
hypothesis that the five scales of MFSA audience legitimacy are the rule of law, 
effectiveness, competence, distributive fairness, and responsiveness. I based the evaluation of 
the model on four goodness-of-fit criteria: the minimum discrepancy, divided by its degrees 
of freedom (CMIN/DF); Comparative Fit Index (CFI); the root square error of approximation 
(RMSEA); and standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR). According to Arbuckle 
(1997), the CMIN/DF is the most appropriate goodness-of-fit index. Although a lack of 
agreement exists among academics as to what constitutes an appropriate ratio (Hooper, 
Coughlan and Mullen, 2008), with various cut-offs ranging from two to five being suggested 
(Loo and Thorpe, 2000), the ratio ought to range between one and three but should be closer 
to one for a good-fitting model (Van Berkel and Schmidt, 2000). As Schermelleh-Engel, 
Moosbrugger and Müller (2003) suggest, the CMIN/DF ratio should be as small as possible 
for a good fitting model. Bentler’s CFI, in contrast to the chi-square likelihood ratio, adjusts 
for sample size (Hooper et al., 2008). Its values range from 0.00 to 1.00, and while a value 
close to 0.90 was conventionally an indicator of a good-fitting model (Bentler, 1992), Hu and 
Bentler (1999:24) suggest a more stringent cut-off point to a score closer to 0.95. Despite this 
more stringent cut-off point, CFI values between 0.90 and 0.95 indicate an acceptable or 
reasonable fit while values below .90 demonstrate a poor fit (Bentler, 1990; Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). The RMSEA reveals how well the model fits the population covariance matrix 
(Byrne, 1998). For Brown and Cudeck (1993), RMSEA values below 0.05 indicate a good or 
close fit, values between 0.05 and 0.08 an acceptable fit, values between 0.08 and 0.10 a 
mediocre fit and values above 0.10 are unacceptable. Hu and Bentler (1999) are more 
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restrictive and suggest a cut-off point close to 0.06 for a good-fitting model. MacCullum and 
Austin (1999) advise researchers to employ the RMSEA because of two advantages: first, 
unlike the Chi-Square it is sensitive to model misspecification; second, it provides a 
confidence interval that estimates the precision of the model fit unavailable in other models. 
The SRMR is the square root of the difference between the residual of the sample covariance 
matrix and the hypothesized covariance model (Hooper et al., 2008). Similar to the CFI, its 
values range from 0.00 to 1.00 (Hooper et al., 2008). Researchers have suggested different 
cut-off points for the SRMR (see, for instance, Bagozzi, 2010; Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; 
Bagozzi and Yi, 2012; Byrne 1998; Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2000; Hu and Bentler, 
1999), however a value of below 0.08 suggests a good fit. In this paper I rely on Hu and 
Bentler’s (1999; see also Hooper et al., 2008) combinational rules for the CFI, SRMR and 
RMSEA: (i) a cut-off value close to 0.95 for CFI and a cut-off value of not more than 0.09 
for the SRMR; and (ii) a cut-off value close to 0.06 or lower for the RSMEA and a cut-off of 
value of not more than 0.09 for the SRMR. Given that SPSS AMOS 25 software only 
computes the SRMR with no missing data and because the data set contained missing data, 
cases with missing data were omitted in order to compute the SRMR.  
The CFA model is presented in Figure 1 and the results are contained in Table 6. The 
CMIN/DF ratios of 1.718 and 1.584 suggested an acceptable-fitting model. However, 
employing the first combinational rule showed mixed results. While the CFI value of 0.898 
suggested a poor fit, the CFI value of 0.900 suggests a borderline fit with the SRMR value of 
0.0698 suggesting an acceptable fit. However, using the second combinational rule indicated 
an acceptable fit to the data. Specifically, the SRMR of 0.0698 and an RSMEA values of 
0.056 and 0.057 indicated that the hypothesized model was an acceptable fit of the data. In 
sum, using the second combinational rules presented an acceptable fit to the data in contrast 
to using the first combinational rules. 
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Table 6 – Five-factor goodness-of-fit statistics  
 BLD 5 Factor 
Model 
CMIN/DF – 
missing data 
(226) 
1.718 
CMIN/DF – no 
missing data 
(181) 
1.584 
CFI – missing 
data (226) 
0.898 
CFI – no 
missing data 
(181) 
0.900 
RMSEA – 
missing data  
(226) 
0.056 
RMSEA – no 
missing data 
(181) 
0.057 
SRMR (181) 0.0698 
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Figure 1. BLD Five-Factor Model 
 
 
 NOTES: N = 226 
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After evaluating the fit of the CFA model, I assessed the reliability and the convergent 
and discriminant validity of each dimension. Reliability reflects the degree to which the 
measure is consistently measuring that construct. Convergent validity refers to the internal 
consistency of a construct and measures the strength of the association between the items that 
are predicted to form a single latent construct (Brown, 2015). Discriminant validity concerns 
the relationship between different latent constructs (Brown, 2015). Reliability was assessed 
by calculating the Composite Reliability (CR); convergent validity was assessed by 
examining the factor loadings and the Average Variance Extracted (AVE); and discriminant 
validity was assessed by computing the Maximum Shared Variance (MSV), the Average 
Shared Variance (ASV), the square root of the AVE and by examining the inter-construct 
correlations.   Hair et al. (2010, 2011, 2014; see also Fornell and Larker, 1981) suggest 
employing the following thresholds: (i) a value of above 0.7 to gauge CR; (ii) a value above 
0.5 to measure AVE; (iii) the MSV must be less than the AVE; (iv) the square root of the 
AVE must be greater than the inter-construct correlations; and (v) ASV must be less than the 
AVE. In addition, between-construct correlations ought to be small enough that it can be 
implied that the constructs are distinct and not part of some larger construct (Gau and Pratt, 
2008; Kline 2005 cited in Gau, 2011). These results are presented in Table 7.  
Table 7. Five-factor model reliability, convergent and discriminant validity statistics  
 CR AVE MSV ASV Rule 
of 
law 
Effectiveness Competence Distributive 
Fairness 
Responsiveness 
Rule of law 0.95 0.5 0.53 0.38 0.71     
Effectiveness 0.88 0.41 0.53 0.35 0.73 0.64    
Competence 0.91 0.51 0.34 0.48 0.69 0.65 0.71   
Distributive 
Fairness 
0.84 0.54 0.29 0.28 0.54* 0.42 0.46 0.73  
Responsiveness 0.73 0.43 0.28 0.22 0.44 0.53 0.52 0.38 0.66 
 
NOTE: the square root of the AVE is displayed on the diagonal in bold and the inter-construct correlations are presented in 
italics  
N = 226 
* SPSS Amos sometimes does not round up the figures when displaying the model. In this case rounding up was done 
manually. 
 As shown in Table 7, the CR was above 0.70 for all dimensions indicating good 
reliability. The AVE was above the threshold for the rule of law, competence and distributive 
fairness dimensions, demonstrating good convergent validity but below the threshold for 
effectiveness and responsiveness. Malhotra and Dash (2011) however argue that if the CR is 
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above 0.70, it can be concluded that the convergent validity of the scale is acceptable. All 
factor loadings were above 0.4, and most factor loadings were above 0.6 thus indicating good 
convergent validity except for Q65 (0.53) under the rule of law, Q57 as well as Q64 under 
effectiveness (0.59/0.58), Q70 under competence (0.51) and Q14 under responsiveness 
(0.55). The results pertaining to the discriminant validity, similarly to those of convergent 
validity, were equally mixed. The MSV was well below the AVE for competence, 
distributive fairness and responsiveness indicating good discriminant validity. The MSV was 
above the AVE for effectiveness and slightly above the AVE for the rule of law. The square 
root of the AVE (i) for the rule law was greater than all inter-construct correlations apart 
from the correlation between the rule of law and effectiveness; (ii) for effectiveness was 
greater than all inter-construct correlations apart from the correlations between rule of law 
and effectiveness, rule of law and competence and effectiveness and competence; (iii) for 
competence was greater than all inter-construct correlation except for the correlations 
between rule of law and effectiveness; (iv) for distributive fairness was greater than all inter-
construct correlations but was equal to the correlations between rule of law and effectiveness; 
and (v) for responsiveness was almost equal to the correlation between effectiveness and 
competence and greater than all inter-construct correlations except for the correlation 
between rule of law and effectiveness and rule of law and competence. The ASV for all 
scales was lower than the AVE, thus demonstrating good discriminant validity for all 
dimensions. This was not the case when examining the inter-construct correlations. While the 
between-construct correlations for rule of law and effectiveness, for rule of law and 
competence, and for competence and effectiveness were quite high (over 0.6) thus indicating 
poor discriminant validity between these construct, the between-construct correlations for 
rule of law and distributive fairness, rule of law and responsiveness, effectiveness and 
distributive fairness, effectiveness and responsiveness, competence and distributive fairness, 
competence and responsiveness and distributive fairness and responsiveness were quite low 
(below 0.6) thus indicating good discriminant validity between these constructs. Given that 
the between-construct correlations for rule of law and effectiveness, for rule of law and 
competence, and for competence and effectiveness were all quite high, with the strongest 
correlations between reported for rule of law and effectiveness and for rule of law and 
competence, it is possible that the items measuring these constructs were actually measuring 
the same underlying construct. In order to resolve this issue of discriminant validity which 
could lead to issues of multicollinearity when examining the relationship between perceptions 
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of MFSA audience legitimacy and compliance and cooperation two revised models were 
constructed and tested using CFA. The first was a four-factor model comprising: (i) the 
combined dimensions of rule of law and effectiveness (referred to as new rule of law 1), (ii) 
competence; (iii) distributive fairness; and (iv) responsiveness. The second was a three-factor 
model comprising: (i) the combined dimensions of rule of law, effectiveness and competence 
(new rule of law 2); (ii) distributive fairness, and (iii) responsiveness. Owing to the study’s 
small sample, when reporting the results of these CFA models, only factor loadings above 0.6 
were retained (Comrey and Lee, 1982; Garson, 2010). Figures 2 and 3 display the four-factor 
and three factor-models, respectively. Table 8 contains a comparison of the items contained 
in each model and Table 9 contains the CFA results pertaining to the four-factor and three-
factor models.  
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Figure 2: BLD Four-Factor Model  
 
 
 
NOTES: N = 226 
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Figure 3: BLD Three-Factor Model  
 
 
NOTES: N = 226 
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Table 8. Comparison of items in five-factor, four-factor and three-factor models 
Item BLD Five Factor 
Model 
BLD Four Factor 
Model 
BLD Three Factor 
Model 
Rule of Law     
In dealing with 
operators, the 
MFSA exercises its 
powers in good 
faith (Q19) 
X X X 
I find the attitude 
of MFSA staff to 
be hostile (Q10)  
X X X 
The MFSA and its 
staff act as if they 
are above the law 
(Q16) 
X X X 
The MFSA 
sometimes abuses 
its powers (Q30)  
X X X 
MFSA decisions 
are usually fair 
(Q23) 
X X X 
I trust the MFSA 
(Q25) 
X X X 
The MFSA treats 
operators fairly 
(Q37) 
X X X 
I find it hard to 
trust MFSA staff 
(Q12)  
X X X 
The MFSA does 
not apply the law 
fairly (Q56) 
X X X 
When the MFSA 
deals with 
operators it always 
acts according to 
law (Q9) 
X X X 
Things only go 
your way if you 
know the right 
people at the 
MFSA (Q28)  
X X X 
Staff at the MFSA 
are willing to 
support the 
operator (Q65) 
X   
Effectiveness     
The MFSA is 
doing a good job 
investigating 
regulatory 
violations (Q61) 
X   
The MFSA does 
not respond 
quickly enough to 
breaches 
committed by 
X   
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operators (Q44)  
The MFSA ensures 
high standards of 
conduct from 
operators (Q69) 
X   
The MFSA is 
doing a good job 
supervising 
operators (Q63) 
X   
The MFSA is 
doing a good job 
protecting Malta’s 
reputation as a 
financial services 
centre (Q73) 
X   
The MFSA is too 
close to some 
operators (Q64) 
X   
The MFSA’s 
decision-making 
process is open and 
transparent (Q11)  
X   
The MFSA ensures 
that the right 
entities/people are 
licensed (Q57) 
X   
Competence     
Staff at the MFSA 
appear properly 
trained for their 
roles (Q85) 
X X  
MFSA staff have 
the technical 
(specialized) 
knowledge to 
discharge their 
functions (Q39) 
X X  
Staff at the MFSA 
have the necessary 
regulatory 
experience to 
discharge their 
functions (Q1) 
X X  
MFSA staff know 
how to carry out 
their roles well 
(Q29) 
X X X 
Staff at the MFSA 
are not well versed 
in the relevant 
regulations (Q70)  
X   
Staff at the MFSA 
understand how the 
law applies in 
practice (Q17) 
X X X 
The regulator 
understands the 
economic 
landscape in which 
the operator 
X X  
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operates (Q43) 
Distributive 
Fairness  
   
The regulator 
adopts a one-size-
fits-all approach to 
regulation (Q34)  
X X X 
The regulator 
adopts a one-size-
fits-all approach to 
supervision (Q52)  
X X X 
The MFSA is too 
rigid in the way it 
applies the law 
(Q40) * 
X X X 
The MFSA adopts 
a tick-the-box 
approach when 
carrying out its 
functions (Q48)  
X X X 
Responsiveness     
The MFSA does 
not seem to have 
enough staff to 
attend to operators 
(Q14)  
X   
The licensing 
process is too slow 
(Q22)  
X X X 
The MFSA acts in 
a timely manner 
(Q13)  
X X X 
 Table 8 shows that in the four-factor and three-factor models, the items pertaining to 
effectiveness were omitted, as were most of the items in the competence dimension due to 
their factor loadings being below 0.6. Although the rule of law dimension in the four-factor 
and three-factor models omits items related to effectiveness, in the discussion to follow and 
for the purposes of clarity, the factor combining rule of law and effectiveness and the factors 
combining rule of law, effectiveness and competence dimensions will be referred to as the 
rule of law. In Table 8, one item from the responsiveness dimension (Q14) was omitted due 
to its factor loading being below 0.4. Another item (Q22) had a factor loading below 0.6 but 
above 0.5 and was not deleted because factors should have a minimum of two items in order 
to perform a CFA (Byrne, 1998).  
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Table 9. Goodness-of-fit statistics for BLD five-factor, four-factor and three-factor 
models  
 BLD 5 Factor 
Model  
BLD 4 Factor 
Model  
BLD 3 Factor 
Model  
CMIN/DF – 
missing data 
(226) 
1.718 1.771 1.741 
CMIN/DF – no 
missing data 
(181) 
1.584 1.703 1.785 
CFI – missing 
data (226) 
0.898 0.934 0.945 
CFI – no 
missing data 
(181) 
0.900 0.927 0.931 
RMSEA – 
missing data  
(226) 
0.056 0.059 0.057 
RMSEA – no 
missing data 
(181) 
0.057 0.063 0.066 
SRMR (181) 0.0698 0.0659 0.0570 
 
Examining the goodness-of-fit statistics for the four-factor model in Table 9 it is clear 
that the CMIN/DF ratios of 1.771 and 1.703 suggest an acceptable-fitting model even though 
these values were higher than the five-factor model. In contrast to the five-factor model, 
employing the first combinational rule demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data. The CFI 
values of 0.934 and 0.927 and the SRMR value of 0.0659 suggest an acceptable fit. Using the 
second combinational rule also indicates an acceptable fit to the data. Specifically, the SRMR 
of 0.0698 and an RSMEA values of 0.059 and 0.053 indicate that the hypothesized four-
factor model is an acceptable fit of the data. In sum, using both the first and second 
combinational rules presents an acceptable fit to the data for the four-factor model in contrast 
to the five-factor model.  
Turning to the goodness-of-fit measures for the three-factor model in Table 9 it is 
evident that the CMIN/DF values of 1.741 and 1.785 suggest an acceptable-fitting model 
even though these values are higher than both the five-factor and the four-factor models. 
Using the first combinational rule yields a more acceptable fit than the four-factor model.  
The CFI values of 0.945 and 0.931 suggest a more acceptable fit because these values are 
near to 0.95 in contrast to the five-factor and four-factor models. The SRMR of 0.0570 also 
demonstrates a more reasonable fit than both the five-factor and the four-factor models.  
Using the second combinational rule in the three-factor model additionally indicates a more 
acceptable fit to the data than the five-factor and four-factor models. Specifically, the SRMR 
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of 0.0570 and RSMEA values of 0.057 and 0.066 indicate that the hypothesized three-model 
has a more acceptable fit of the data than the five-factor and four-factor models. Essentially, 
the three-factor model yields a better fit than the five-factor and the four-factor models.  
Prior to examining the reliability and validity measures for the four-factor and three- 
factor models, it should be observed that Hu and Bentler’s cut-off criteria are not golden 
standards or absolute guidelines and can prove unduly restrictive (Iacobucci, 2010; Marsh 
and Wen, 2004). In this regard, Gau (2013:44-45) has suggested the use of a multipronged 
strategy: “if the CFI is 0.90 and the other measures indicate good fit, then the model may 
have merit; on the other hand, if the CFI is 0.90 and the other measures are outside their 
ranges for acceptable fit, then the model should be considered poor”. Given that in this 
research the four-dimensional and three-dimensional models have an “acceptable or 
reasonable” CFIs of 0.945 and 0.934 and demonstrated a good fit in terms of the other 
criteria, it can be concluded that both the four-dimensional three-dimensional model may 
have “merit” (Gau, 2013:44). However, as Lai and Green (2016:233) argue, “we do not know 
how a model’s ‘good fit’ is reflected in any of these indices” and so “for a model that has 
‘bad’ CFI, does it mean the model is ‘good’ (or ‘bad’) if its SRMR [or other indexes are] 
‘good’ (or ‘bad’) too?” To answer this question, it is crucial to turn to theory (Iacobucci, 
2010) because as Hooper et al. (2008:57) observe “[b]y allowing model fit to drive the 
research process it moves away from the original, theory-testing purpose of structural 
equation modeling”. This will be addressed in the following section.  
I now turn to assess the reliability and the convergent and discriminant validity of 
each dimension for the four-factor and three-factor models. These are presented in Tables 10 
and 11 below.  
Table 10. Four-factor model reliability, convergent and discriminant validity statistics  
 CR AVE MSV ASV Rule of law 1 Competence 
Distributive 
fairness Responsiveness 
Rule of law 1 0.94 0.52 0.49 0.34 0.72    
Competence 0.93 0.55 0.49 0.32 0.7 0.74   
Distributive 
Fairness 0.84 0.54 0.28 0.22 0.53 0.46 0.73  
Responsiveness 0.7 0.51 0.27 0.23 0.51 0.52 0.4 0.71 
         
NOTE: the square root of the AVE is displayed on the diagonal in bold and the inter-construct correlations are presented 
in italics  
N = 226 
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Table 11. Three-factor model reliability, convergent and discriminant validity statistics 
 CR AVE MSV ASV Rule of law 2 
Distributive 
fairness Responsiveness 
Rule of law 2 0.95 0.5 0.29 0.27 0.71   
Distributive 
fairness 0.84 0.54 0.29 0.22 0.54 0.73  
Responsiveness 0.72 0.54 0.24 0.19 0.50 0.37 0.73 
        
NOTE: the square root of the AVE is displayed on the diagonal in bold and the inter-construct correlations are presented 
in italics  
N = 226 
 
Beginning with Table 10, it is clear that all constructs apart from responsiveness 
present a CR above 0.7. The AVE for all dimensions is above 0.5 thus demonstrating good 
convergent validity. The MSV is also lower than the AVE for all constructs, the square root 
of the AVE is greater than all inter-construct correlations and the ASV was lower than the 
AVE for all constructs, thus demonstrating good discriminant validity. However, the 
correlation between the rule of law 1 and competence is quite high, indicating that these two 
constructs may be measuring the same underlying construct.  
 Turning to Table 11, all constructs display a CR above 0.7 demonstrating good 
reliability. The AVE for rule of law 2 is equal to 0.5 demonstrating borderline convergent 
validity. As previously noted, Malhotra and Dash (2011) argue that if the CR is above 0.70, it 
can be concluded that the convergent validity of the scale is acceptable, which is the case for 
rule of law 2. Moreover, the AVE for rule of law 2 is 0.51 when calculated with no missing 
data. The AVE is above the threshold for distributive fairness and responsiveness and thus 
exhibits good convergent validity for these constructs. The MSV is also lower than the AVE 
for all constructs, the square root of the AVE is greater than all inter-construct correlations 
and the ASV is lower than the AVE for all constructs, demonstrating good discriminant 
validity for the three-factor model constructs, a finding similar to the results pertaining to the 
constructs in the four-factor model. However, in contrast to the four-factor model the 
between-construct correlations are all approximately 0.5 or below thus indicating good 
discriminant validity.  
 From the above it can be reasonably concluded that three-factor model displays a 
better fit to the data than the five-factor and four-factor models and that its constructs yield 
more valid measures than those in the five-factor and three-factor models. 
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7 
 
 
 
The Roles of Legitimacy and Deterrence  
in explaining Compliance with Regulations  
 
7.0  Preliminary 
Legitimacy matters because if a legal authority such as the MFSA is acknowledged as 
rightful by its audiences (for example, operators or regulatees), then such legitimacy provides 
moral grounds for cooperation with authorities and compliance with the law (Beetham, 
1991). As previously noted in Chapter 2, the few studies that have compared the effects of 
legitimacy and deterrence on behaviour in organisational, workplace, regulatory and taxation 
contexts have generally found a stronger association between legitimacy (which as noted has 
been conceptualized and measured mostly as an obligation to obey) and rule-following 
behaviour than between deterrence factors and rule-following behaviour. This association is 
tempered by confusing obligation to obey with legitimacy and by determining the dimensions 
that constitute legitimacy in advance. This Chapter aims to address these gaps in the Maltese 
regulatory context by examining the effect of newly developed legitimacy scales and 
deterrence factors on positive compliance attitudes.  
In Chapters 2 and 3 above, I explained that Bottoms-Tankebe’s (2012) model 
conceptualized legitimacy as separate from obligation to obey and that Tankebe (2013) found 
that obligation to obey mediates the relationship between legitimacy and cooperation. Similar 
results were reported by Tankebe et al. (2016). This Chapter also aimed to explore whether 
the new legitimacy scales are conceptually separate from obligation to obey and whether 
obligation to obey mediates the relationship between the new regulatory legitimacy measures 
and positive attitudes to compliance.  
To summarise, the aims of this Chapter were as follows: 
i. to examine whether legitimacy dimensions or deterrence variables have the 
greater effect on positive attitudes to compliance; and   
ii. to explore whether the influence on legitimacy is independent of or mediated by 
obligation to obey the MFSA.  
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Prior to presenting the findings I wish to briefly describe the measures used in this 
Chapter. 
 
7.1 Measures 
Legitimacy scales 
These scales were developed through inductive (interviews) and deductive processes (EFA 
and CFA techniques). In developing these items, attention was paid to participant’s words as 
well as to concepts already established in the literature, in particular those in the Bottoms-
Tankebe (2012/2017) model. Perceptions of the MFSA acting in accordance with the rule of 
law (comprising the sub-scales of lawfulness, procedural fairness and trust) were assessed 
employing a 13-item scale. The items were then combined to create a rule of law index (α = 
0.928; mean = 3.49; SD = 0.613). Perceptions of MFSA distributive fairness were assessed 
using a four-item scale. The items were then combined to create a distributive fairness index 
(α = 0.825; mean = 2.51; SD = 0.764). Perceptions of MFSA responsiveness were assessed 
using a two-item scale. The statements were then combined to create a responsiveness index 
(α = 0.637; mean = 2.18; SD = 0.826). All legitimacy items were subsequently combined into 
a composite legitimacy scale (α = 0.923; mean = 3.15; SD = 0.559). 
 
Deterrence 
Perceptions of the risk of apprehension were assessed by a single item adapted from Murphy, 
Bradford and Jackson (2016). This question had a Likert-type response set: 1-not likely at all 
to 4-very likely. Perceptions of the severity of punishment were assessed by a single item 
adapted from Grasmick and Bursik (1990). This question had a Likert-type response set: 1-no 
problem at all to 5-a very big problem. These items were not combined in a scale.  
 
Obligation to obey 
Obligation to obey was measured using an eight-item scale adapted from Trinker, Jackson, 
and Tyler (2018). The statements were then combined to create an obligation to obey index 
(α = 0.728; mean = 3.66; SD = 0.510). 
 
Positive attitudes to compliance 
Positive attitudes to compliance were measured using a five-item scale adapted from 
Braithwaite’s (2009, 2013) commitment and capitulations scales. These responses were then 
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combined to create a positive attitudes to compliance index (α = 0.635; mean = 4.11; SD = 
0.457).  
 
(Appendix 7 contains a list of all of these items along with their means and standard 
deviations). 
 
A short note on reliability 
Reliability was assessed by examining the correlation coefficient known as Cronbach’s alpha. 
Consistent with Liebling’s (2004) research, I employed Cohen and Holliday’s (1982) rule of 
thumb for interpreting this correlation: 0.19 and below = very low; 0.20 to 0.39 = low; 0.40 
to 0.69 = acceptable; 0.70 to 0.89 = high; and 0.90 to 1 = very high. From the above it is clear 
(i) that the combined legitimacy scale and the dimension of the rule of law displayed a very 
high-level of reliability; (ii) the dimensions of distributive fairness and obligation 
demonstrated high levels of internal consistency; and (iii) the dimensions of responsiveness 
and positive attitudes to compliance displayed an acceptable level of reliability.  
 
Control variables 
Two control variables were included in this study based on other studies (Paternoster and 
Simpson, 1996; Murphy 2005). Firm size has been hypothesised to be related to offending 
(Simpson, Garner and Gibbs, 2007; Simpson and Piquero, 2002). The size of an operator was 
a dummy variable coded in the direction of small- and medium-sized companies. The number 
of times sanctioned was divided into two categories: never sanctioned and sanctioned. Since 
186 operators were never sanctioned and only 31 were sanctioned, those who were 
sanctioned were omitted from the analysis. 
7.2 Findings 
7.2.1 Bivariate correlations  
Table 12 presents the findings of bivariate correlations between the legitimacy scales, the 
obligation to obey scale, the deterrence variables and the positive attitudes to compliance 
index. The correlations between the legitimacy variables are below 0.5 and present no 
multicollinearity problems (Dormann et al., 2013). The strongest significant correlates of 
positive attitudes to compliance were the dimensions of obligation to obey (r = 0.438, p< 
0.01) and the rule of law (r = 0.387, p< 0.01). The deterrence variables and responsiveness 
displayed weak and insignificant correlations on operators’ positive attitudes to compliance. 
Obligation to obey was also positively and significantly related to the rule of law and 
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distributive justice scale, but weakly and insignificantly correlated with responsiveness. 
Given that obligation to obey was related to positive attitudes to compliance and to the 
legitimacy measures and given that the legitimacy measures (apart from responsiveness) were 
correlated with positive attitudes to compliance, the necessary empirical conditions for 
exploring whether the influence of legitimacy is independent of or mediated by obligation to 
obey the MFSA were satisfied. 
 
Table 12. Bivariate correlations between key research variables  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Legitimacy 
scale 
1        
2.Likelihood of 
apprehension 
.182** 1       
3. Perception of 
sanction severity  
.004 .411** 1      
4. Rule of law  .949** .189** -.003 1     
5.Distributive 
fairness 
.703** .043 .048 .480** 1    
6.Responsiveness .554** .186** -.046 .397** .341** 1   
7. Obligation to 
obey 
.237** .079 .039 .221** .184** .119 1  
8. Positive 
attitudes to 
compliance 
.340** .010 .089 .387** .186** -.007 .438** 1 
 
N = 223-226; *p< 0.05, **p<0.01 
 
7.2.2 OLS regressions 
The results of the OLS regression are presented in Tables 13 and 14. Table 13 contains 
models 1 and 2. Whereas model 1 explores the relationship between the composite legitimacy 
scale, deterrence variables and operators’ positive attitudes to compliance, model 2 explores 
the relationship between the rule of law, distributive fairness, responsiveness, deterrence and 
positive attitudes to compliance. Model 1 reveals a positive significant association between 
legitimacy and positive attitudes to compliance (β = 0.359; p <0.001). That is, the more 
operators perceived the MFSA to be legitimate, the more willing they were to display 
positive attitudes to compliance with MFSA rules and directives. Model 1 additionally 
demonstrates a positive significant association between perceptions of the severity of 
punishment and attitudes to compliance, although the effect was only significant at the 0.05 
level (β = 0.141; p <0.05). Perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension had no significant 
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effect on intentions to comply. Reviewing the regression coefficients for the separate 
legitimacy scales in model 2, the data indicated that operators’ perceptions of the MFSA 
acting in accordance with the rule of law was the component of legitimacy that had the 
largest and most significant effect on operators’ positive attitudes to compliance (β = 0.448; p 
<0.001), while the component of responsiveness had an inverse relationship with positive 
attitudes to compliance (β = -0.180; p <0.05). Unlike the results in model 1, perceptions of 
the severity of punishment did not have a significant effect on attitudes to compliance yet 
similar to model 1 perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension had no effect. Essentially, 
legitimacy factors were stronger predictors of intentions to comply than were deterrence 
factors. A post-hoc power analysis for model 1 showed that, with medium effect size of (f2 = 
0.14) and alpha at 0.05, the sample of 221 yields a power of 0.996. A post-hoc power 
analysis for model 2 also demonstrated that with a medium effect size of (f2 = 0.21) and alpha 
at 0.05, the sample of 220 yields a power of .999. This suggests that the sample sizes of 221 
and 220 were sufficient to avoid Type I and II errors. 
Table 14 which contains models 3 and 4, presents the results of the OLS regression 
incorporating the variable of obligation to obey. Model 3 explores the impact of obligation to 
obey and the composite measure of legitimacy. A comparison of models 1 and 3 shows that 
the insertion of obligation to obey resulted in a significant increase in the value of the 
adjusted R-squared: from 13% to 27%. Comparing models 2 and 4, it can also be seen that 
the insertion of obligation to obey resulted in a significant increase in the value of the 
adjusted R-squared: from 17% to 31% complementing the previous finding. Two points are 
of merit here. As Tankebe (2013:123) has observed, this increase suggests that obligation to 
obey contains a large number of “non-legitimacy issues”, apart from deterrence factors. 
Given that the former R-squared value included both deterrence and legitimacy factors and 
that the value of r square increased with the insertion of obligation to obey, it is arguable that 
obligation to obey incorporates other normative and instrumental issues. These results also 
support the contention that legitimacy and obligation are separate issues, supporting research 
conducted by Tankebe (2013) and Tankebe et al. (2016). Comparing models 1 and 3 as well 
models 2 and 4 it is clear that obligation to obey slightly attenuates the effect of the aggregate 
legitimacy scale and the component of the rule of law on positive attitudes to compliance, 
suggesting a mediation effect. A Sobel test was conducted using the aggregate legitimacy 
scale and showed that obligation to obey mediates the relationship between legitimacy and 
positive attitudes to compliance (2.90; p < 0.05).  The effects of legitimacy and of obligation 
171 	
to obey on positive attitudes to compliance remain even when considering deterrence factors. 
The implications of these findings will be discussed further below. A post-hoc power analysis 
for model 3 showed that, with a strong effect size of (f2 = 0.36) and alpha at 0.05, the sample 
of 221 yields a power of 1. A post-hoc power analysis for model 4 also indicated that, with a 
strong effect size of (f2 = 0.45) and alpha at 0.05, the sample of 220 yields a power of 1. This 
also suggests the sample sizes of 221 and 220 were sufficient to avoid Type I and II errors. 
The regression coefficients in model 3 show that the strongest predictor for positive 
attitudes to compliance is obligation to obey followed by the composite legitimacy scale. In 
this model while the likelihood of apprehension had no significant effect on positive attitudes 
to compliance, the severity of punishment displayed a positive and significant effect on 
positive attitudes to compliance. Slight differences are evident in model 4. In contrast to 
model 3, the strongest predictor of positive attitudes to compliance was rule of law followed 
by obligation to obey. Responsiveness still displayed a negative and significant effect on 
positive attitudes to compliance. In contrast to model 3, severity of punishment no longer 
remains a significant predictor of positive attitudes to compliance yet similar to model 3 the 
certainty of apprehension was not a significant predictor of positive attitudes to compliance. 
The component of the rule of law was a stronger predictor of positive attitudes to compliance 
than were deterrence variables.  
 On examining all of the Tables, it is noteworthy that none of the control variables 
exerted a significant effect on operators’ positive attitudes to compliance.  
 
Table 13. Legitimacy, deterrence and positive attitudes to compliance  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 β (SE) Tolerance VIF β (SE) Tolerance VIF 
Size of 
operator 
        
Small/ Medium -.100 (.096) .987 1.013 -.119 (.094) .979 1.021 
Number of 
Times 
sanctioned 
        
Never -.012 (.077) .981 1.020 -.033 (.075) .973 1.028 
Legitimacy 
scale 
.359*** (.053) .942 1.061 - - - - 
Rule of law - - - - .448*** (.057) .647 1.545 
Distributive 
fairness 
- - - - .044 (.043) .710 1.409 
Responsiveness - - - - -.180* (.039) .768 1.301 
Obligation to 
obey 
- - - - - - - - 
Certainty of -107 (.050) .788 1.268 -.088 (.050) .749 1.335 
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apprehension 
Severity of 
punishment 
.141* (.045) .821 1.218 .127 (.044) .797 1.255 
F Test 7.266***    7.492***    
Adjusted R2 .125    .172    
N 221    220 
 
   
*p < .05, ** p < .0, *** p < .001 
 
Table 14. Legitimacy, deterrence, obligation to obey and positive attitudes to 
compliance 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 β (SE) Tolerance VIF β (SE) Tolerance VIF 
Size of 
operator 
        
Small/ Medium -.075 (.088) .983 1.017 -.095 (.086) .975 1.025 
Number of 
Times 
sanctioned 
        
Never -.008 (.071) .981 1.020 -.029 (.069) .973 1.028 
Legitimacy 
scale 
.274*** (.049) .899 1.113 - - - - 
Rule of law - - - - .386*** (.052) .636 1.572 
Distributive 
fairness 
- - - - .006 (.040) .704 1.420 
Responsiveness - - - - -.176** (.036) .768 1.301 
Obligation to 
obey 
.386*** (.053) .940 1.064 .382*** (.052) .938 1.067 
Certainty of 
apprehension 
-.122 (.046) .787 1.270 -.110 (.046) .747 1.339 
Severity of 
punishment 
.130* (.041) .820 1.219 .121 (.041) .797 1.255 
F Test 14.199***    13.285***    
Adjusted R2 .265    .310    
N 221    220    
         
*p < .05, ** p < .0, *** p < .001 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This dissertation began by arguing that empirical studies in criminology adopt a normative 
approach to conceptualizing and measuring legitimacy by determining a priori the BLDs of 
the audiences under study and by adapting scales from other studies in order to measure 
legitimacy. By drawing on Williams (2005) and Bottoms and Tankebe (2012; see also 
Beetham, 1991), I argued that adopting a normative approach to measuring legitimacy can 
lead to validity error and distort the relationship between legitimacy and rule-following (or 
rule-breaking) behaviour both because what justifies authority or power in a particular 
context reflects a range of variables that cannot be adequately captured by adopting or 
adapting scales from previous studies as well as because legitimacy dialogues can differ 
according to the particular context. In order to address this gap in the literature, I adopted the 
social scientific approach utilized by Liebling (2004) to develop the Measuring Quality of 
Prison Life survey and proposed by Tankebe (2014) in the policing context, to measure the 
legitimacy of the MFSA as perceived by one of its main audiences – licensed operators.  This 
social scientific approach involved a mixed-methods design that incorporated an inductive 
and a deductive stage. The inductive stage involved interviews with MFSA licenced 
operators licensed and sought to identify what legitimacy means to Maltese operators (that is, 
what operators expect from the MFSA, what their BLDs are, or in Liebling’s (2004) 
language, what matters to operators licensed by the MFSA and why). The deductive stage 
entailed the development and administration of a regulatory legitimacy survey informed by 
the interviews.  
 Chapter 5 of this dissertation presented the results of the qualitative stage of the 
research. The interviews with Maltese financial services participants revealed four broad 
themes or expectations (each with sub-themes or expectations): (a) lawfulness – furthering 
the objectives of the MFSA, acting intra vires and legal certainty; (b) procedural fairness – 
quality of decision-making, quality of treatment, maintaining boundaries and trust; (c) 
distributive fairness – a lack of a one-size fits all approach and balanced supervision; and (d) 
effectiveness dimensions – competence, performance, substance over form, responsiveness, 
resources, empathy and leadership. These themes resonated with concepts already established 
174 	
in the criminological, legal, organisational and regulatory literature and provided an inductive 
theoretical grounding for developing a regulatory legitimacy survey.  I now wish to provide 
some general comments on the overall themes identified in Chapter 5 and some specific 
remarks pertaining to them. I will begin with the general comments.  
 To summarise, the themes or expectations derived inductively from the interviews 
conducted with Maltese financial services participants resonated with: (i) the hypothesised 
BLDs identified by Bottoms and Tankebe (2017) (lawfulness, procedural justice, distributive 
justice and effectiveness); (ii) Liebling’s (2004) findings that “what mattered” to prisoners 
were expectations of respect and trust; (iii) the concept of good and right relationships 
(maintaining boundaries) also identified by Liebling (2011; see also Liebling et al., 2012b); 
and (iv) Bingham’s principles of the rule of law (legal certainty and exercising powers intra 
vires). Bingham’s other tenets of the rule of law – equality before the law and a right to a fair 
trial, encompassing the natural law maxims of audi alteram partem (adequate representation) 
and nemo judex in causa propria (independence and impartiality) – were also reflected in the 
data. Bingham’s principles are congruent with Tyler’s quality of decision-making arm of 
procedural justice and even with Beetham’s concept of lawfulness (Tankebe, 2013). 
Ultimately, significant overlap exists between the Bottoms-Tankebe four-component model 
of legitimacy, Liebling’s concepts mirroring the quality of prison life and Bingham’s 
principles of the rule of law.  
Muir’s (1979) types – avoiders, reciprocators and enforcers – also explicitly emerged 
as regulatory styles which participants expected the MFSA not to adopt. Rather than 
expecting the MFSA to display under-enforcement or passiveness, over-familiarity and over-
enforcement or zealousness, participants expected the regulator to maintain a boundary with 
the industry to avoid the possibility of regulatory capture affecting its independence and 
ability to act impartially and to enable it to exercise its authority within reasonable limits and 
proportionately, while displaying the qualities of empathy, respect and communication. 
Consequently, what mattered to participants was that the MFSA adopts the style of Muir’s 
fourth type of policeman: the professional. Muir’s typology reflects several aspects of the 
Bottoms-Tankebe framework. The avoider is the antithesis of effectiveness; the enforcer is 
the upper threshold of distributive justice and of lawfulness; the reciprocator mirrors a lack of 
impartiality (an aspect of the quality of decision-making) as well as some elements of 
(un)lawfulness; and the professional reflects all aspects of the Bottoms-Tankebe framework.  
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 The themes that emerged from this study were also consistent with Baldwin’s 
“legitimacy claims” and with the dimensions established in organizational legitimacy. 
Baldwin (1996:90)  approached legitimacy from the standpoint of the power-holder when 
arguing that a regulator may seek to secure “legitimation” by invoking the following five 
claims: (i) the legislative claim, by which the regulator claims legitimacy on the basis of 
delegated power from a parliament that is democratically elected; (ii) the accountability 
claim, by which the regulator secures legitimacy through measures of accountability; (iii) the 
due process claim, by which the regulator claims legitimacy on the basis of using fair 
procedures; (iv) the expertise claim, by which the regulator claims legitimacy on the grounds 
that it is staffed by experts who are making expert judgements and are acting in the public 
interest; and (v) the efficiency claim, by which the regulator claims legitimacy on the grounds 
that it is performing its functions effectively and efficiently. The legislative claim is similar to 
the expectation of lawfulness; the due process and accountability claims resonate with the 
expectation of procedural fairness; the expertise claim is analogous with the expectation of 
competence; and the efficiency claim equates with the expectation of the performance of 
functions and responsiveness.  
The expectation of lawfulness is similar to the concept of regulative legitimacy in the 
organizational legitimacy literature that stresses conformity with laws (Deephouse and 
Carter, 2005; Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway, 2006; Scott, 1995). The BLDs of procedural 
fairness and the performance of functions are strikingly similar to Suchman’s (1995) 
concepts of procedural legitimacy and consequential legitimacy, respectively.  
Examining the four overarching themes of legality, relationships, distributive justice, 
and effectiveness, it is clear that they must be seen, as Bottoms and Tankebe (2017:85) have 
observed, “as potentially operating in interaction with one another”. For instance, if the 
MFSA acts lawfully by exercising its powers in accordance with the law to further the 
objectives of the MFSA, it will be performing its functions effectively. Bottoms and Tankebe 
(2017) also observed that tensions or conflicts can arise between themes. Given that the 
regulator wears different hats – that of a guide or shepherd and that of a policeman – conflicts 
may emerge between the themes explored in this research. By adhering to the expectations of 
trustworthy motives (giving guidance and providing help and support), it could for example 
be argued that the regulator is neglecting its other role of supervising operators adequately, 
instead displaying overfamiliarity and not acting impartially. Alternatively, by acting in an 
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overbearing manner, the regulator may engage in over-lawfulness and demonstrate a lack of 
trust in operators.  
 A final general comment relates to AI, the style in which the interviews were 
conducted. Although questions were posed that tapped into both positive and negative 
experiences, it became increasingly evident that the participants expressed their expectations 
in negative terms, even when asked about their positive experiences. This accords with 
Lucas’ (1980) comment in relation to justice that individuals focus on instances of injustice 
rather than justice.    
Having provided some general comments about the expectations of financial services 
participants, I now turn to offer some specific comments on these expectations. As previously 
noted, criminologists working on legitimacy disagree on whether effectiveness, competence 
and responsiveness are instrumental or normative (see, generally, Sunshine and Tyler, 2003 
vs. Bottoms and Tankebe 2017, 2020). This depends on whether researchers employ 
quantitative or qualitative methods. While those that are quantitative (for instance most 
studies following Sunshine and Tyler, 2003) tend to regard effectiveness considerations as 
instrumental, those that are qualitative (for instance Liebling, 2004) tend of regard them as 
normative. Similar to findings reported by Kearns et al (2019), these factors emerged in the 
current research as normative considerations. Kearns, Ashooh and Lowrey-Kinberg (2019) 
conducted an exploratory study in the U.S. to understand how the public conceptualises 
police legitimacy by asking participants to define legitimacy. To address this question Kearns 
et. al (2019) asked a sample of 1,900 U.S. residents the open-ended question: “when thinking 
about the police, what does ‘legitimacy’ mean to you?”. Overall the results showed, that 
participants mostly defined police legitimacy in terms of following the law (37%), followed 
by honesty (19%), fairness (11%), right to govern (11%), effectiveness (9%), moral 
behaviour (9%) and providing protection (5%). The categories identified by Kearns et. al 
correspond closely with the BLDs that emerged in this study. The dimensions of lawfulness, 
procedural fairness, trust and competence correspond with the categories of following the 
law, fairness, honesty and effectiveness/providing protection. The dimension of distributive 
fairness corresponds to the category of fairness and the dimension of responsiveness 
corresponds to the dimensions of effectiveness and providing protection. Maltese financial 
services participants, similar to those in Kearns et al’s research, expressed instrumental 
considerations in normative terms – that is, the licenced operators interviewed considered it 
right and proper for the regulator to perform its functions effectively and efficiently with 
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competent staff. The reverse was also true of other themes. For instance, the normative theme 
of legal certainty became an instrumental consideration. Participants required legal certainty 
in order to conduct their business and advise clients. In a sense, dimensions can take on both 
a normative and an instrumental character. This may be due to the fact that financial services 
is a profit-geared industry. Operators are there to make money for their shareholders and to 
provide a service for their clients, objectives that may also conflict with one another.  
 The expectation of maintaining boundaries to avoid overfamiliarity highlights a 
societal feature of Malta that has been documented by Boissevain (1974). In his study on 
Malta, Boissevain (1974:232) concluded that Maltese people are continually competing for 
valued scarce goods and resources (important goals) and forge a network of “friends-of-
friends” to obtain them. In the Maltese financial services context, it was clear that a network 
exists in which certain financial services operators build contacts with individuals at all levels 
of the MFSA (in particular the Chairman) and used them to realise their corporate goals, such 
as obtaining a licence to provide financial services faster than others. This is why many of the 
participants expected MFSA officials to act impartially and independently.  
 Majone (1996) argued that independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), as non-
majoritarian institutions (public bodies that are not directly accountable to the public or to 
elected officials), suffer from an inherent democratic legitimacy deficit. According to Majone 
(1998), this is because democratically elected governments may delegate policy-making 
powers to IRAs but not their own legitimacy. He proposes that this legitimacy deficit can be 
addressed not by reducing the independence of IRAs, but by adhering to procedural and 
substantive legitimacy principles. Procedural legitimacy involves improving accountability 
and transparency by giving reasons for decisions and by ensuring public participation and 
avenues for judicial review, and is therefore similar to some aspects of Tyler’s quality of 
decision-making. This research provides partial support to Majone’s thesis through the 
finding that participants expected the MFSA to adhere to procedural legitimacy. However, 
and in contrast to Majone’s argument, they also emphasised the independence of the MFSA 
from the government. This was due to the political climate and culture in Malta, which 
engenders a perception that the MFSA is captured by the government.  
 Two themes, transparency and respect, were mutual expectations. This may be 
understood through the lens of Honneth’s (2005) struggle for recognition thesis. Anderson41 
has succinctly summarised Honneth’s argument as follows: it is only through a continual 
 
41 Anderson is the translator of Honneth’s (2005) The Struggle for Recognition - The Moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts. Anderson provides the summary in the introduction to Honneth’s work. 
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struggle of mutual recognition of love, legal relations and solidarity that an individual is able 
to acquire the pre-requisites for identity-formation: self-confidence, self-respect, and self-
esteem. Using Honneth’s thesis as a lens, the MFSA can be understood as being constantly 
engaged in a struggle for mutual recognition: operators continually expect to be treated with 
respect and utmost transparency by the regulator, demands that can only be met where 
participants reciprocate these expectations.  
The purpose of this discussion has not been to validate normative theoretical 
frameworks by recourse to the empirical but rather to provide a solid theoretical grounding to 
develop questions or statements that can be utilized to measure operators’ perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the financial regulator. This study has demonstrated for the first time that using 
a grounded approach to conceptualizing and measuring regulatory legitimacy yields 
dimensions similar to those already established in criminological, organisational and 
regulatory literature. This suggests that future studies seeking to conceptualize and measure 
legitimacy in other regulatory contexts (for instance in the UK) should consider employing a 
similar empirical, bottom-up approach. This would represent an important step in enhancing 
regulatory legitimacy. However, does this mean that all expectations or BLDs must be 
accepted by a regulator, including the MFSA? Is legitimacy only about pleasing regulatees? 
(Sparks and Bottoms, 1995).   
To complete the discussion on legitimacy, it is necessary to bridge the gap between 
the empirical and the normative (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Three points are of relevance 
here. First, given that the BLDs distilled from this research (lawfulness, procedural justice, 
trust, distributive justice and effectiveness) are similar to established legitimacy theoretical 
frameworks and to concepts that have been empirically established in the policing and 
prisons literature, a move towards a certain degree of universality of themes is evident. This 
confirms Beetham’s (1991:22) observation that there is “an underlying structure of 
legitimacy common to all societies, however much its content will vary from one to the 
other”. Second, the BLDs of lawfulness, legal certainty and procedural justice (reflected in 
Bingham’s principles of the rule of law) provide a universal normative touch to the BLDs 
inductively identified through the interviews. Third, although Williams’ BLD does provide a 
“partial normative break” (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2017:68) because Williams insists that the 
BLD “requires a legitimation to be given to every subject”, it is, as Bottoms and Tankebe 
(2017:69) have observed, “in Hinsch’s terms, empirical”. Bottoms and Tankebe (2017:69) 
proposed that for the BLD “to be fully adequate it requires some objective normative 
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buttressing,” and this comes in the form of Sen’s (2009) impartial spectator strategy. Sen’s 
concept of the impartial spectator extends Smith’s (1976) own concept of the impartial 
spectator by drawing on Rawls’s (1972) “veil of ignorance”. The difference between Rawls’s 
“veil of ignorance” and Sen’s impartial spectator is that while in terms of the former concept 
individuals who make judgements will eventually become part of that society, in terms of the 
latter, judgements are allowed to be made by individuals who are extraneous to that society 
(Bottoms and Tankebe, 2017).  
In employing Sen’s impartial spectator approach, I suggest that not all themes pass a 
normative test. Specifically, I am referring to the themes of approachability and accessibility. 
It appeared to me that these expectations are in a liminal position to the theme of maintaining 
boundaries. In the case of some participants, it was evident that the MFSA is so approachable 
and accessible that their relationship transcends the regulator-regulatee divide to the extent 
that it seems to be one based on friendship. Here I wish to refer to a degree of hypocrisy or 
duplicity on the part of such participants, casting doubt on the authenticity of their demands 
and consequently their intentions. For example, Oberon explained that on requesting a 
meeting with MFSA officials, he was allowed to visit at short notice. Yet he acknowledged 
that while he does not seek favour, he has forged close relationships with these members of 
staff. In another part of the interview, however, he lamented that there are individuals who 
obtain appointments quickly owing to their political connections (in particular, 
overfamiliarity with the Chairman) and that this should change. The contradiction is that 
although he attempts to avoid these situations, he is nonetheless one of those individuals who 
profits from setting up meetings at short notice because of his friendships, while 
simultaneously insisting that he wants the MFSA to maintain a boundary. Similarly, Cordelia 
regarded the MFSA as impartial in the sense that it does not discriminate between one entity 
and another, while at the same time conceding that she has what other participants described 
as a “hotline” to the top officials. This may point to the ontological nature of the duality of 
man. Nevertheless, this contradiction might be explained by way of nuance: although these 
participants had connections with high-level individuals (specifically the directors of the 
various units within the MFSA), they frowned upon those who used their connections to 
access the highest level of the MFSA, that is, the Chairman.  
In Chapter 6, which reported the results of the quantitative stage of the research, the 
themes obtained inductively from the interview stage were operationalized and a survey was 
distributed to a random sample of licensed operators and practitioners in the Maltese financial 
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services sector.  This Chapter identified a multi-dimensional legitimacy scale, comprising 
five sub-scales using EFA analysis. It has specifically focussed on the legitimacy of the 
MFSA from the perspective of operators. The first sub-scale, the rule of law, measured 
perceptions of MFSA lawfulness, procedural fairness and trust among operators. The second 
sub-scale, effectiveness, measured the extent to which operators perceived the MFSA to be 
effectively performing its functions. The third sub-scale, competence, measured the extent to 
which operators perceived the MFSA to have the skills, knowledge, experience and training 
to discharge their functions. The fourth sub-scale, distributive fairness, measured the extent to 
which operators perceived the MFSA to use a one-size-fits-all approach and to act in an 
overbearing manner. The fifth sub-scale, responsiveness, measured the extent to which 
operators perceived the MFSA to be fast-acting.   
Using CFA analysis, Chapter 6 has shown mixed results: the five-factor legitimacy 
model suffered from a poor fit using Hu and Bentler’s first combinational rule but from an 
acceptable fit using the second combinational rule. The convergent and discriminant validity 
results were equally mixed. Significantly, the correlations between rule of law, effectiveness 
and competence were quite high. Two CFA models – a four-factor model and a three-factor 
model – were then tested. The four-factor model combined the rule of law dimension with the 
effectiveness dimension and the three-factor model combined the rule of law of dimension 
with the effectiveness and competence dimensions. In running these models, items with 
factor loadings below 0.6 were omitted (except for one item Q22 under the responsiveness 
dimension), resulting in all of the items measuring the concept of effectiveness and all but 
two of the items measuring the concept of competence being removed from the models. 
Although the four-factor model yielded a better fit than the five-factor model and 
demonstrated better convergent and discriminant validity than the five-factor model, 
correlations between the rule of law dimension and competence remained rather high. In 
comparison to the five-factor and four-factor models, the three-factor model (comprising the 
dimensions of rule of law, distributive fairness and responsiveness) yielded a more acceptable 
fit to the data and displayed better convergent and discriminant validity. This raises the issue 
of whether the three-dimensional scale is a valid reflection of the BLDs of MFSA licensed 
operators. That is whether the three-dimensional scale is internally valid. Despite the non-
random sample of interviewees which were utilized to provide an inductive theoretical 
grounding to the survey and the small sample size in the exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses, it is still possible to conclude that the BLDs of rule of law (comprising the 
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components of lawfulness, procedural fairness, trust and competence), distributive fairness 
and responsiveness are valid measures of MFSA regulatory legitimacy. This is not only 
because of the inductive grounding of the survey items, of the acceptable goodness-of-fit 
measures, and of the results pertaining to convergent and discriminant validity, but also 
because independent sources provided a level of verification that the three-dimensional scale 
reflects the BLDs of MFSA licensed operators. During the course of the research, an article 
was published in the Sunday Times of Malta (25 March 2018) entitled “When Banking 
Supervision Fails”. While this article specifically regarded the banking sector, many of the 
points made applied to other sectors within the Maltese financial services industry. The 
article argued that the MFSA’s supervision of Pilatus Bank failed because the Authority did 
not conduct its duties according to law, adopted a tick-the-box function to licensing, lacked 
impartiality and failed to act in a timely manner when the bank was faced with allegations of 
money laundering – all themes reflected in the three-dimensional model. Recommendations 
by the IMF (Country Report No 16/69) to increase the MFSA’s independence, timeliness and 
competence provides further support to the validity of the three-dimensional measure. The 
IMF report explicitly mentioned that the MFSA needs to be adequately resourced to be able 
to perform its functions effectively. A more recent report by MoneyVal (2019) echoed the 
recommendations made by the IMF by advising that Maltese supervisory authorities 
(specifically the MFSA and the FIAU) be adequately resourced with competent staff to 
effectively perform their functions. In Chapter 6 the items specifically measuring the 
recommendations of adequate resources and effectiveness were omitted from the models 
because the items demonstrated low factor loadings. Nonetheless, the recommendation of 
effectiveness in performing the MFSA’s functions can be subsumed in the sub-scales of 
competence and lawfulness as the items which measure these concepts can also tap into the 
concept of effectiveness. Moreover, informal conversations with Maltese financial services 
practitioners continue to reveal similar expectations: that the MFSA must act according to 
law, within its powers and in a timely and proportional manner while being staffed by 
competent individuals.  
Having discussed issues pertaining to internal validity I turn to the issue of external 
validity. Are the expectations of the rule of law (comprising lawfulness, trust, procedural 
fairness and competence), distributive fairness and responsiveness generalisable to other 
audiences? A few points are worth noting here. First, the main aim of this study was to 
measure the legitimacy of the MFSA from the perspective of licenced operators and not from 
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the perspective of other audiences such as the general public. Second, as both Beetham 
(2013) and Worden and McLean (2017) have observed, different audiences have different 
claims, expectations or demands. That is, audiences are heterogenous and not homogenous. 
Consequently, by focusing on licenced operators as my study has done, we can only draw 
conclusions about that audience. Yet, it is expected the findings might hold some validity 
among similar audiences elsewhere.  Whether they can be generalised to other audiences 
such as the general public can only be answered through similar research with a sample of the 
public. One recent empirical study conducted by Kearns et al (2019) (see above), however, 
does shed some light on the generalisability of the three dimensional BLD model identified in 
this research. Since Kearns et. al (2019) employed an open-ended question with no prompting 
it is arguable that the three-dimensional model reflects the BLDs of ordinary citizens and its 
thus generalisable to other contexts. However, Kearns et al. (2019) also found various 
between-race and within-race differences in people’s definitions of legitimacy. This suggests 
that different audiences have different expectations or demands. Future research should test 
the extent to which the three-dimensional model is generalizable outside the Maltese 
financial services context. 
In summary, through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis conducted in 
Chapter 6 a three-dimensional model was deduced from the data comprising the components 
of: (a) rule of law, measuring perceptions of MFSA lawfulness, procedural justice, trust and 
competence; (b) distributive fairness; and (c) responsiveness. 
Before providing some specific comments in regard to these dimensions, I wish to 
highlight why I named the latent construct “the rule of law” even though it included items 
related to competence, specifically MFSA staff know how to carry out their roles well (Q29) 
and staff at the MFSA understand how the law applies in practice (Q17). As previously 
noted, lawfulness, procedural fairness and trust are all aspects of the rule of law (Bingham, 
2010). Bingham explicitly considered lawfulness his fourth principle of the rule of law which 
included elements of fairness and trust. He did not, however, consider competence as an 
element of the rule of the law. Drawing on MacIntyre’s (2013:69) “functional concepts”, I 
argue that competence is an element of the rule of law. MacIntyre (2013:69) contended that a 
watch has the function of telling the time and therefore “the concept of a watch cannot be 
defined independently of the concept of a good watch”. Participants’ expectation that the 
MFSA acts intra vires (that is, within its powers) carries with it the obligation to advance the 
objectives of the MFSA Act; and it is only possible to exercise powers for the purposes for 
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which they are conferred if the individuals exercising those powers had the skill, knowledge 
and expertise to exercise those powers. In this regard, it can also be argued that the items 
measuring competence could also be considered as tapping into the concept of effectiveness 
(Tankebe, 2013). Moreover, competence may also be an aspect of the rule of law through 
procedural fairness. Paternoster et al. (1997) cited Leventhal’s (1976, 1980) six branches of 
procedural fairness, one of which being the accuracy of procedures. Paternoster et al. 
(1997:168) defined accuracy of procedures in terms of the “ability of authorities to make 
competent, high quality decisions”. This involved using valid and reliable evidence when 
deciding cases. Although Paternoster et al. (1997) did not make reference to the knowledge 
or skill of legal authorities it is implicit that an authority cannot deliver high quality decisions 
without possessing the knowledge or skill to do so. Given that competence may be an 
element of procedural fairness, which is in turn clearly a component of the rule of law, it 
follows that competence can be regarded as an element of the rule of law.  
Lawfulness 
The finding that lawfulness is a dimension of Maltese regulatory legitimacy supports 
Beetham’s (1991) broad hypothesis that legality is a constitutive criterion of audience 
legitimacy across all contexts and is consistent with research finding that lawfulness is a key 
construct that explains police legitimacy (Tankebe, 2013; Tankebe, Reisig and Wang 2016). 
Consistent with Beetham (1991) and, by extension, the Bottoms-Tankebe conceptualization 
and measurement of legitimacy, Maltese financial services participants expected the MFSA 
to exercise their powers in accordance with the law. This aspect of lawfulness is similar to the 
dimension of “regulative legitimacy” in organisational legitimacy which stresses conformity 
with the law (Scott, 1995). The expectation of acting in accordance with the law is also 
congruent with an aspect of Bingham’s (2010) fourth principle of the rule of law, requiring 
public officials to exercise their powers intra vires as opposed to ultra vires. MFSA-licensed 
operators not only expected the MFSA to act in accordance with the law but to exercise their 
powers in a way that demonstrates good faith, an aspect of lawfulness also embodied in 
Bingham’s (2010) fourth principle of the rule of law.  
Procedural justice 
Resonating with Bottoms-Tankebe’s (2012) four-component model of police 
legitimacy, procedural justice also emerged as a significant construct explaining the 
legitimacy of the MFSA as perceived by operators. Participants expected the MFSA to act 
fairly, to give fair decisions, to be impartial, and to be courteous, concepts embodied in 
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Tyler’s (2003; see also Sunshine and Tyler, 2003) quality of decision-making and quality of 
treatment, two elements that form the construct of procedural fairness. The concept of 
procedural justice echoes Suchman’s concept of procedural legitimacy in organisational 
legitimacy as well as Baldwin’s (1995) due process claim. The finding that the concepts of 
procedural justice and lawfulness loaded together on the same construct – that of the rule of 
law – corresponded with Tankebe’s (2013) observation that elements of Tyler’s procedural 
fairness are incorporated within Beetham’s (1991) argument that power-holders must 
exercise their powers in accordance with the law. The results that lawfulness and procedural 
fairness loaded together also chimed with Bingham’s (2010) fourth principle of the rule of 
law emphasising that public authorities must exercise their powers fairly. To support this 
argument, Bingham (2010:62) cited Lord Steyn’s observation that “the rule of law enforces 
minimum standards of fairness, both substantive and procedural”. 
Trust 
In line with previous studies in police (Tyler and Huo, 2002) and prisons (Liebling, 
2004) literature, institutional trust emerged as a significant element of MFSA legitimacy. The 
finding that lawfulness and trust loaded together on the same construct complemented 
arguments made by Bingham (2010) when discussing the requirement that public officers 
exercise their powers intra vires. Bingham (2010) cited the reasoning of the House of Lords 
in R v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, ex p. Chetnik Developments Ltd ([1988] AC 
858, 872) in which the court quoted Wade (1982:357): “[s]tatutory power conferred for 
public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely - that is to say, it can validly 
be used only in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to 
have intended”. The finding that procedural justice and trust loaded together on the same 
construct was also congruent with a comment made by Tyler (2003) in relation to motive-
based trust. Indeed, Tyler (2003:299) maintained that trust and procedural justice are 
intrinsically connected, because when individuals trust authorities, they perceive the 
procedures they use to be fairer, increasing their trust in them. Empirical research conducted 
by Johnson et al. (2014) has reinforced Tyler’s argument that trust and procedural justice are 
intertwined through the finding that the quality of decision-making and quality of treatment 
overlapped heavily with institutional trust. However, such findings conflict with Kaina 
(2008) and Barbalet (2009) who argued that legitimacy and trust are conceptually distinct and 
that conflating the two obfuscates a proper account of trust, and therefore trust should not be 
regarded as a component of legitimacy but as a separate element. Examining the definitions 
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of trust and legitimacy can shed some light on why trust and procedural justice are 
conceptually distinct but empirically similar. Kaina cited Easton’s (1979:258) definition of 
legitimacy who explained that legitimacy results when people perceive that authorities are 
“conforming with [their] own moral principles, [their] own sense of what is right and 
proper”. Johnson et al. (2014:966) referred to Miller and Listhaug (1990:358) who defined 
trust as evaluations that authorities act “in accordance with normative expectations held by 
the public”. In this research the BLDs of trust and of procedural justice were normative 
expectations, in that operators want to trust the MFSA and want the MFSA to treat them in a 
procedurally fair manner. It can be argued that to the extent that the MFSA is trusted by 
operators and that operators feel they are treated in accordance with the precepts of 
procedural fairness (that is, whether the MFSA is conforming to what operators believe to be 
right and proper) then trust and procedural fairness are empirically similar and are 
components of legitimacy.  
Competence 
Participants also expected the MFSA to be competent, specifically that it be staffed by 
knowledgeable and skilled individuals. The finding that competence is a dimension of MFSA 
audience legitimacy resonates with Wrong’s (1995:57) comment that in hierarchical 
relationships, the relationship between competent authority and legitimate authority may 
become blurred, as well as with Baldwin’s (1996) argument that regulators claim 
“legitimacy” by invoking an expertise rationale. In criminology, although competence is not 
explicitly considered as a component of legitimacy, it is are still reflected in some studies. 
Paternoster et al. (1997) define the accuracy of a procedure as the ability of decision-makers 
to deliver technically competent decisions. However, Levi, Sacks, and Tyler (2009) viewed 
administrative competence as one of the antecedents to trustworthiness, which in turn was 
treated as an antecedent to legitimacy (measured in terms of an obligation to obey). In their 
study, competence had two distinct attributes: honesty and the capacity to enforce the tax 
law.  Some researchers use the terms “competence” and “effectiveness” or “performance” 
interchangeably. For example, while discussing the component of effectiveness in the context 
of shared values, Tankebe (2013:112) has argued that audiences require legal authorities to 
be “competent (or effective) in their tasks”. Similarly, when discussing their findings relating 
to police performance in fighting crime, Tyler, Fagan and Geller (2014:775) remarked that 
“perceptions of general police competence in fighting crime shaped perceived legitimacy”. 
This is plausible because competent individuals enhance a legal authority’s effectiveness.   
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Distributive fairness 
Consistent with the Bottoms-Tankebe (2017) conceptualization of legitimacy 
(implicit in Bottoms and Tankebe (2012)), Maltese financial services participants also 
expected to be treated in a manner that displays distributive fairness. The concept of 
distributive fairness relates to the fair distribution or allocation of positive and negative 
resources or outcomes across different social and demographic groups (Schminke, Ambrose 
and Cropanzano, 2000; Tankebe 2019b; Tyler and Fagan, 2008). In this research the concept 
of distributive fairness incorporated the notions of not measuring everyone with the same 
ruler and of proportional fairness (Adams, 1965; Roberson and Colquitt, 2005). Maltese 
financial services participants expected the MFSA to adopt Aristotle’s “golden mean” when 
exercising its regulatory and supervisory functions by adopting a balanced approach to 
regulation and to supervision, that is, they expected the MFSA not to adopt a one-size-fits-all 
approach to regulation and supervision. In addition, operators did not want a “nanny 
regulator”: one that acts like an “enforcer” (Muir, 1979) or adopts an overbearing or 
authoritarian parenting style (Baumrind, 1991b) in implementing the law rigidly. 
Alternatively, to use the language of Crewe (2011:510), operators did not want to be 
supervised in a manner exhibiting “weight” or “tightness”. Rather they expected the MFSA 
to act like Muir’s “professional” who looks at the substance and spirit of compliance. This 
BLD is also an expectation of financial services operators in other EU jurisdictions 
(Kyriakou, 2018). 
Responsiveness 
Participants expected the MFSA to act quickly and efficiently. The finding that 
responsiveness is a component of regulatory legitimacy is congruent with Baldwin’s (1996) 
proposition that regulators seeks to gain “legitimacy” by invoking an efficiency rationale. In 
criminology, responsiveness in the sense of acting promptly is frequently incorporated as an 
item when measuring police effectiveness or performance (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; 
Tankebe, 2013, 2008, 2009a, 2009b). This makes sense as the faster a legal authority 
responds to or addresses an audience’s concerns, the more effective a power-holder will be. 
The concept of responsiveness in this study stands in contrast to: (i) Mastrofski’s (1999:2) 
expectation of the police being a “responsive service” and to Van Craen and Skogan’s (2015) 
conceptualization of police un-responsiveness which are associated with notions of 
trustworthy motives (showing care and concern) (Jonathan-Zamir, Mastrofski and Moyal, 
2015), giving reasons for decisions and providing citizens with voice and representation; as 
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well as (ii) Kane’s (2005:475) concept of police responsiveness, defined in terms of “over- 
and under-policing”, which resonates more with the expectation of distributive fairness. 
Having described the three dimensions of MFSA regulatory legitimacy as perceived 
by operators, I wish to briefly focus on evidence of a relationship between these dimensions 
and behaviour in organisational, workplace, regulatory and taxation contexts. Beginning with 
the sub-dimensions of lawfulness and procedural fairness, Feldman and Tyler (2012) found 
that when employees perceived procedural fairness to emanate from a legally mandated voice 
in performance procedures, this interaction effect resulted in increased compliance with 
workplace rules. In the taxation context, Murphy et al. (2009) found that perceived 
legitimacy of the law (operationalized in terms of moral values) influenced the motivational 
posture of commitment and self-reported compliance behaviour. In that study, Murphy et al. 
(2009) also found that perceptions of procedural fairness were associated with self-reported 
compliance behaviour, a finding that complements the results of earlier studies (Hartner et 
al., 2008; Murphy, 2005; Verboon and Goslinga, 2009). Recent studies have also 
demonstrated the association between procedural justice and tax-compliance. For instance, 
Murphy et al. (2016) found that procedural fairness impacts on tax compliance behaviour 
through the mediating variable of “legitimacy” (operationalized in terms of an obligation to 
obey). Moreover, Faisal et al. (2017) demonstrated that perceptions of procedural justice 
increased tax compliance. In that study procedural justice was associated with increases in 
perceptions of trust and trust was found to affect tax compliance, findings congruent with to 
those of Murphy (2004). In the context of police organisations, Haas et al. (2015) showed 
that organisational procedural justice and trust were positively associated with police officer 
compliance with organisational rules, a finding complementing studies in the taxation 
environment. Tyler (1997) compared perceptions of leader competence and perceptions of 
leader integrity (trust) on willingness to voluntarily accept decisions, discovering that while 
both competence and trust had a significant effect on the willingness to voluntarily accept 
decisions, the effect of trust was stronger than that of competence.   
Some previously cited studies (see Hartner et al., 2008, Verboon and Goslinga, 2009) have 
demonstrated that procedural justice and trust had a stronger effect on compliant behaviours 
than distributive fairness. I now wish to focus on some studies that identified a relationship 
between distributive fairness and behaviour. In the organisational context, Kumar, Bakhski 
and Rani (2009) have shown that distributive fairness and procedural fairness both had a 
significant effect on organisational commitment, with the stronger effect being demonstrated 
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by distributive fairness. Consistent with the foregoing study, Ybema, van der Meer and 
Leijten (2016) found that distributive justice of appreciation and procedural justice were 
associated with lower productivity loss and with lower sickness absence (with the former 
exerting a slightly stronger effect). However, no effect was found for distributive fairness of 
salary on lower productively loss and sickness absence. Moreover, in the taxation context 
(and complementing the findings in organisational contexts), Hartner et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that perceptions of distributive fairness of EU transfer payments were linked 
with increases in both collective EU tax compliance and individual tax compliance. Turning 
to the final dimension of responsiveness, as previously noted, many studies have included 
elements of responsiveness (speed, promptness or timeliness) when measuring effectiveness 
and therefore it is not possible to disentangle speed from effectiveness in order to examine 
the effect of responsiveness on compliance. Drawing on the deterrence and rational choice 
theory, it can be argued that perceptions of MFSA promptness in exercising its functions may 
be associated with increased compliance and cooperation. However, a dearth of evidence 
exists regarding the effects on celerity of punishment (at least in criminology) and where 
evidence is found it is “modest at best” (Pratt and Turanovic, 2018:197).   
Chapter 7 has sought to address the limited amount of research in the regulatory 
legitimacy literature by investigating whether legitimacy or deterrence factors are the most 
significant predictors of positive attitudes to compliance. It has done so by exploring the 
relationship between three newly developed legitimacy scales (rule of law, distributive 
fairness and responsiveness) that measure the BLDs that Maltese financial services operators 
make of the MFSA, deterrence variables and positive attitudes to compliance. This Chapter 
has also attempted to determine whether the influence of legitimacy is independent of 
obligation to obey the MFSA. Several important findings emerged from the analysis.  
 First, the data revealed that the composite measure of legitimacy and the dimension of 
the rule of law were stronger predictors of positive attitudes to compliance with MFSA rules 
and directives than were perceptions of deterrence, except in model 3, where obligation to 
obey had a stronger influence than the composite measure, possibly due to the low scores of 
distributive fairness and responsiveness. This suggests that operators are not only be “rational 
actors who weigh the benefits of non-compliance against the probability and costs of 
punishment” (Simpson, 2002:94) but are also “norm-users” (MacCormick, 2007:20). 
Tankebe (2014:238) commented that MacCormick’s observation about norm-users “has 
decisive consequences for police organisations because it suggests that while direct orders 
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from the officers will likely be obeyed due to fear of punishment, [compliance] … will more 
readily be offered to police organisations whose authority has the moral assent of citizens”. It 
is submitted that Tankebe’s comment applies equally to financial regulators. It remains to be 
seen whether operators’ positive attitudes to compliance translate into actual compliance with 
MFSA rules and cooperation with MFSA in accordance with Braithwaite’s (2009, 2013) 
theory on social distancing as well as with empirical research (Braithwaite et al., 1994, 
Murphy et al., 2009). Future research ought to explore this relationship.  
 Second, the data showed that responsiveness had a negative influence on operators’ 
attitudes towards deference, that is, when operators perceived the MFSA to be more 
responsive (fast-acting and efficient), they were less likely to display positive attitudes 
towards compliance. This finding is counterintuitive and I wish to suggest some reasons that 
may explain it by alluding to research examining the timing of punishment in behavioural 
literature, while bearing in mind both that the current study did not specifically measure the 
speed of punishment (and instead merely whether the MFSA is fast-acting in general), as well 
as the fact that in the studies to which I now refer, the sample consisted of children rather 
than adults. Indeed, studies among children have generally shown that punishment is more 
effective in achieving the desired behaviour when it is presented immediately rather than 
when it is delayed (Abramowitz and O’Leary, 1990; Arvey and Ivancevich, 1980; Walkers, 
Parke and Cane, 1965). However, this paper was a perceptual-based study. It might be argued 
that if perceptions that the MFSA is fast-acting increase, then what is being witnessed is an 
avoidance response, that is, participants expressing a desire not to comply, especially if they 
have never been punished, as was true with the vast majority of the participants in this study 
(Skinner, 1971).  
 Although legitimacy measures (namely the rule of law and the composite legitimacy 
scale) displayed stronger and more statistically significant effects on positive attitudes to 
compliance than did the deterrence variables, the latter factors were not irrelevant. While in 
all models the likelihood of apprehension has no effect on positive intentions to comply, 
chiming with Tyler and Blader’s (2005) first study, in the models with the composite 
legitimacy scale, perceptions of the severity of punishment were associated with an increase 
in positive attitudes to compliance, a finding which contrasts with Tyler and Blader’s (2005) 
second study. In general, the poor effects of risk of apprehension on positive attitudes to 
compliance conflicted with prior studies in the policing legitimacy literature that have found 
that risk of sanction increases compliance (Hough et al., 2013; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; 
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Tyler and Jackson, 2014). Although attitudes to comply are not actions in the sense of 
behaviour and even though attitudes do not necessarily lead to compliant actions on the part 
of regulatees, it is arguable that these findings contradict the trend of empirical research in 
policing deterrence research which shows that it is the perceived certainty of apprehension 
rather than the perceived severity of punishment that has the stronger association with 
reduced offending (Paternoster, 2010; Apel and Nagin, 2011; Durlauf and Nagin, 2011; 
Nagin, 2013a; Nagin, 2013b; Nagin, Solow and Lum, 2015). I wish to offer some reasons 
why, in the Maltese sample, perceptions of the severity of punishment increased deferential 
attitudes towards the regulator, whereas perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension 
reduced them. Participants might have been answering the statement about the perceived 
severity of punishment by thinking about perceived informal sanctions such as shame. As 
Williams and Hawkins (1989) have argued, formal sanctions may be required to trigger 
informal sanction mechanisms. In terms of the MFSA Act, where the MFSA imposes a 
sanction or penalty on an operator, it is obliged to publish on its website the administrative 
measure it imposed as well as the operator’s name. Shame is a potent weapon of informal 
social control, especially for financial services operators that rely on the trust and confidence 
of their customers for their survival (Braithwaite, 1993; Jaffer, Morris and Vines, 2014). This 
is particularly true in a small country like Malta where news, especially bad news, travels like 
wildfire.  In the light of these points, it is arguable that operators’ deferential attitudes to the 
MFSA increase as perceptions of the severity of punishment rise. Empirical research provides 
some support to this argument by showing that perceived informal sanctions have a greater 
impact on compliance than do perceptions of formal sanctions (Elis and Simpson, 1995; Fisse 
and Braithwaite, 1983; Hollinger and Clarke, 1982; Makkai and Braithwaite, 1994). Future 
research should distinguish between different types of perceived informal sanctions, while 
recognising that shaming can be both disintegrative and re-integrative (Murphy and Harris, 
2007) and that perceptions of certainty of punishment can affect perceptions of informal 
sanctions (Welch et al., 2005). Why do perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension reduce 
deferential attitudes towards the MFSA? Operators are staffed by human beings who are 
likely to suffer from what Simon (1990) has described to as bounded rationality. Therefore, if 
there is a probability that an operator will be apprehended (which does not necessarily carry 
the consequences described above) even though it may eventually be punished (which does 
carry the consequences described above), then it is possible that the operator will try its 
utmost to avoid punishment, translating into attitudes of defiance. Another reason could be 
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that an operator who perceives an increased likelihood of being caught, may develop an 
attitude of animosity towards authority, resulting in defiance. In a similar way, if you are 
more likely to be caught by the police, it is more likely that you will express a desire of 
dislike towards the police and adopt a defiant stance. A final reason could be that because 
participants’ attitudes to comply were already high, perceptions of the likelihood of 
apprehension had a defiance rather than a deterrent effect, consistent with Mohdali, Isa and 
Yusoff’s (2014) study on tax compliance. Future research should address: (a) the impact that 
bounded rationality has on attitudes of defiance; (b) the extent to which perceptions of the 
likelihood of being caught affect defiance; and (c) the interaction between positive attitudes 
to compliance and perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension on behaviour.  
 Third, the data demonstrated that the composite legitimacy scale mediated the 
relationship between legitimacy and positive attitudes to compliance and that obligation to 
obey contained a large number of non-legitimacy issues, aside from deterrence factors. The 
data also showed that deterrence factors did not affect the influence of legitimacy and 
obligation to obey on operators’ positive attitudes to compliance. Taken together these 
findings suggest that other factors may influence obligation to obey and positive attitudes to 
compliance. Drawing on theoretical and empirical literature that has hypothesized and 
identified a relationship between personal morality, low self-control, a desire for control and 
corporate or white-collar offending (see Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender and Klein, 2006; 
Bottoms, 2019; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Nagin and Paternoster, 1994; Paternoster and 
Simpson, 1996; Piquero, 2012; Piquero, Schoepfer and Langton, 2010; Schoepfer, Piquero 
and Langton, 2014; Simpson, 2002; Simpson and Piquero, 2002) I posit that issues of 
personal morality, low self-control and a desire for control are factors that may affect an 
operator’s feelings of obligation to obey, attitudes to comply and self-reported compliance. In 
the light of the above, I also suggest that future research in legitimacy and compliance (as 
well as cooperative actions) in the regulatory sphere should be incorporated in Wikström’s 
Situational Action Theory (SAT) framework (Wikström et al., 2013).  
 Having discussed this study’s main findings and conclusions I now turn to its 
limitations. I will begin with Chapter 5 which presented the findings derived from the 
interviews. This qualitative stage of the research suffers from a number of limitations that 
may limit the significance of the conclusions drawn from the data. I wish to highlight two 
limitations, one pertaining to sampling and the other to the conduct of the interviews.  
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The original intention was to draw a random sample of operators from the MFSA’s 
Financial Services Register (FSR), which contains a list of all operators licensed by the 
MFSA. Although a “relatively rare” occurrence and a subject of considerable controversy in 
qualitative studies, random sampling would enable generalizations to be made from the 
sample to the populations of interest (Marshall, 1996; Morse, 1999; Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 
2007:242; Polit and Beck, 2010). However, I had to abandon this plan in the initial stages of 
the qualitative phase following the money laundering and corruption allegations published by 
Daphne Caruana Galizia (DCG) concerning Pilatus Bank, a bank licensed by the MFSA. On 
1 May 2017, the Maltese Prime Minister called a general election in response to the 
allegations published by DCG in April 2017. At that stage, I felt that the situation had 
reached a tipping point. The Pilatus Bank affair (roping in the MFSA) was exponentially 
politicized with Maltese tribal politics emerging in full swing (Cini, 2002). The media 
coverage on Pilatus Bank, and by implication the MFSA, was frenzied. I deemed it would be 
nearly impossible to access participants unless they were known at a personal and/or 
professional level by Caius and/or by myself. Owing to these developments, I considered it 
prudent to delay the interview stage until a month after the general election and to use non-
probability sampling methods instead. The reasons underlying this change in strategy were as 
follows. I believed that if I were to continue the interviews during the period before and 
immediately after the election, the Pilatus Bank affair would overshadow the objective of the 
interviews. I suspected that my respondents would simply interpret the questions related to 
the MFSA in the light of the Pilatus Bank scandal. In addition, unlike Desmond (2004), who 
found that temporal closeness to politically sensitive events facilitated access, I felt that it 
would have proved more difficult to access participants both in the period before and after the 
election. Towards the end of June 2017 (around three weeks after the general election), I 
considered whether to commence random sampling. However, two further events occurred 
that again placed the MFSA under the spotlight, solidifying my decision to use non-
probability sampling methods: (i) on 14 June 2017, DCG reported that the Chairman of the 
MFSA and the Chairman of Pilatus Bank were travelling together on a flight to Malta from 
Frankfurt; and (ii) on 22 June 2017, DCG stated that inspectors from the Banking 
Supervision Unit had refused to conduct an on-site inspection of Pilatus Bank. Had random 
sampling been employed, I would have been more confident in generalizing the themes to the 
whole of the financial services industry. 
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The second limitation is related to the conduct of the interviews. A number of 
participants displayed dominance by providing long answers, by not answering the questions 
posed to them and by taking charge of the interviews, rendering the collection of the 
necessary data a cumbersome process. Rather than interrupting these interviewees to try and 
steer them back on course, I adopted a deferential attitude in the form of Goffman’s (1959) 
avoidance and presentational rituals along with a doxastic interview style (Brinkmann, 2007), 
thus allowing the interviewees to talk while I listened carefully, as Mayo (1949) suggested, 
before re-asking the relevant question again in a polite manner, as Thomas (1993) advised. In 
three cases, I also organised another meeting. These rituals of deference (Goffman, 1959) 
were employed for four interconnected reasons. First, the interviewees who displayed such a 
level of dominance were all at least 20 years my senior, and in Malta an expectation exists 
that young individuals respect their elders by allowing them to speak freely, without 
interruption. Second, these interviewees were, in Hunter’s terms (1993:50), “knowledgeable 
informants” and I fulfilled the role of a student by listening in accordance with the maxim a 
bove majori discit arare minor (a young ox learns to plough from an older one) (Gray, 
2006a:21). Admittedly, I had thought of informing the respondents at the beginning of the 
interviews that “I am interested in everything you have to say, and I wish to go over all of the 
questions so please be concise and brief in your responses” in order to establish some level of 
dominance and to prevent the interviewees from giving long responses. When I mentioned 
this to Caius, the primary referral source, he explained that if the participant is giving you his 
or her time, it would be rude to ask them to be concise. Third, interrupting the interviewees 
would have been regarded as impolite behaviour, jeopardising our rapport. Fourth, such 
behaviour on my part would have caused the referral source as well as myself reputational 
damage. Malta is a small country and news of disrepute travels fast. This would have 
impeded my chances of collecting further data.  
 The results and conclusions of Chapter 6 are subject to a number of limitations. The 
first limitation is related to scale development. When developing dimensions and 
constructing scales, researchers have often consulted experts and stakeholders (Liebling, 
2004), as guidelines on scale development tend to advocate a review of the pool of items by 
experts in the field (Cabrera-Nguyen, 2010; Worthington and Whittaker, 2006). Although I 
piloted the survey among a small sample of operators, I did not discuss the questionnaire 
items with them. This exercise might have helped to clarify and amend the initial concepts 
and reduce the number of items. The second limitation relates to representativeness of the 
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sample of 226 operators. Representativeness is important to establish because this affects the 
internal validity of the legitimacy measures discussed above. It must be acknowledged that it 
is difficult to determine the sample’s representativeness. This is for several reasons. First, and 
as noted in section 4.2.3 above, the population list from which the sample was drawn 
excludes certain operators, namely those licensed in terms of the Securitisation Act and those 
who passport their rights into Malta. Second, the population list was from which the sample 
was drawn would have changed during data collection. The third set of limitations pertains to 
the CFA analysis. One, the quantitative stage of the research had a low response rate and thus 
a small sample size (n= 226 with missing cases and n=181 with no missing cases). The CFA 
literature recommends a range of thresholds for the minimum sample size to obtain factor 
solutions that closely correspond to population factors (MacCallum et al., 1999). Although 
this research satisfied Kline’s (1979) and Gorsuch’s (1983) recommended minimum sample 
of 100 as well as Guildford’s (1954) proposed 200 (which according to Comrey and Lee 
(1992) is fair), the sample size fell below Cattell’s (1978) suggestion of 250 and Comey and 
Lee’s (1992) recommendation for 500 or more. Research conducted by MacCallum et al. 
(1999) has shown that these rules of thumb lack validity. Two, and flowing from the first 
limitation, Nunnally (1967) has suggested a minimum of 10 cases per variable. I conducted 
the five-factor CFA analysis on 34 variables, necessitating a sample size of 340. The sample 
size used in the five-factor analysis fell short of this threshold. The four-factor CFA analysis 
used 23 variables and the three-factor CFA analysis used 19 variables, requiring sample sizes 
of 230 and 190, respectively. While the three-factor model satisfied the sample size 
requirements, the four-factor model fell short of this threshold by four participants. Future 
research should test these models with larger sample sizes and compare the differences while 
keeping in mind that Wolf et al. (2013) have suggested that a one-size-fits-all approach does 
not necessarily work and that the models with more indicators per factor require fewer cases. 
Three, I conducted the CFA analysis on the EFA data set, but research suggests that in order 
to confirm the results of an EFA through a CFA, a separate sample should be used.  
The results and conclusions of Chapter 7 are not without shortcomings. First, the 
cross-sectional research design precludes causal conclusions being made between legitimacy, 
deterrence factors, obligation to obey and attitudes to compliance. Future research should 
therefore employ longitudinal designs to examine whether changes in legitimacy and 
deterrence affect obligation to obey and attitudes to compliance over time. It may well be the 
case, as hypothesized by Braithwaite and Reinhart (2013), that perceived deterrence leads to 
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different motivational postures or alternatively that motivational postures precede perceptions 
of legitimacy. Second, this study did not take into account threshold or tipping point effects 
of the independent variables in this study (Liebling and Ludlow, 2017). High or low 
thresholds of the legitimacy scales could have different effects on positive attitudes to 
compliance.  For instance, it could be the case that no effect was witnessed for distributive 
fairness despite the mean score being quite low (2.51) because it did not pass a certain 
threshold. Third, the scale measuring intentions to comply was adapted from Braithwaite 
(2009, 2013). In this sense, the outcome measures in this study suffer from the same 
methodological limitation identified in the literature review section in relation to existing 
conceptualizations and measurements of legitimacy, identifying a priori the dimensions of 
compliance. Future research should be conducted to explore what occurs when operators’ 
BLDs are met or remain unfulfilled. Fourth, and as previously noted, attitudes to compliance 
do not necessarily translate into actual compliance; rather, they reflect an attitude or a posture 
to compliance that may or may not lead to actual behaviour (Braithwaite, 2009, 2017). Future 
research should take into account Braithwaite’s motivational postures and self-reported 
measures while acknowledging that there are different forms of compliance and that these 
may vary according to context (McBarnet, 2001). The fifth limitation pertains to sampling. In 
this research, I sought to approach one individual per operator who had authority from the 
board of directors (so it can be said that such individual was representing the company) and 
who was in direct and regular contact with the MFSA. The sample consisted of individuals 
who occupied key supervisory and managerial roles: directors (n = 55), chief executive 
officers or managing directors (n = 35), compliance officers and money laundering reporting 
officers (n = 36), chairmen (n = 7), chief operations officers (n = 5),  chief financial officers 
(n = 2), company secretaries (n = 2) and chief investment officers (n = 1). The sample also 
consisted of partners, managing partners and senior associates of firms offering legal, 
auditing or accounting services (n = 50), associates of such firms (n = 2), lawyers (n = 12), 
professional service advisors (n = 11) and sole practitioners (n = 4).42 As can be seen, most of 
the sample consisted of individuals who occupied high positions in financial services 
organisations and not individuals at lower levels. Although this study did not measure self-
reported acts of compliance or cooperation (which future research should do), but attitudes of 
deference instead, it is worth noting that corporate offending or breaches of financial services 
regulation can range from simply failing to submit a document to the MFSA on time to 
 
42 This number does not add up to 226 because some participants did not complete the “role section” in the 
survey.  
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complex fraud. These acts of omission or commission may be performed by individuals at all 
levels of a financial services organisation, whether acting as a lone wolf or in collusion with 
other employees. In view of the social information processing theory (Salancik and Preffer, 
1978) and the social learning theory (Bandura and Walters, 1977), it may be hypothesized 
that the attitudes of higher-level management can be assimilated and adopted by mid-level 
and lower-level employees (who are regularly responsible for the firm’s regulatory 
compliance). Given these hypothetical scenarios, future research should sample more than 
one participant from each organisation and from different levels of the organisation in 
question. Six, the regression analysis only focused on impact of meso-level perceptions of 
regulatory legitimacy (operators) on positive attitudes to compliance and did not examine the 
effect of macro-level variables on positive attitudes to compliance. Regulatees operate in a 
regulatory and political environment which encompasses other actors such as the state.  
Research has also shown that variations in levels of state legitimacy are associated with 
variations in crime rates (Eisner and Nivette, 2013). Changes in political legitimacy are 
therefore crucial to consider especially given the political and regulatory context (see Chapter 
3) within which this research took place.  Future research ought to examine the connection 
between this state legitimacy and attitudes to compliance.  The final limitation relates to 
reliability. As shown in section 7.1. above, while the combined legitimacy scale and the 
dimension of the rule of law displayed a very high-level of reliability with the dimensions of 
distributive fairness and obligation demonstrating high levels of internal consistency; the 
dimensions of responsiveness and positive attitudes to compliance displayed an acceptable 
level of reliability. This could indicate that the responsiveness and the positive attitude to 
compliance scales were not consistently measuring the same concept. Future research should 
seek to use a larger sample size to mitigate this limitation.  
 Taking into account these limitations, it would premature for the MFSA to adopt 
these measures to explore the relationship between legitimacy, deterrence and obligation to 
obey and positive attitudes to compliance. Nonetheless, it is still essential that the MFSA act 
in accordance with the rule of law as measured in this study, as otherwise a ripple effect 
could follow in the years to come. A strong Maltese financial services sector is a sine qua 
non for a well-functioning economy. The foundation for a robust financial services sector in 
turn rests on an MFSA that functions in accordance with the rule of law. If the MFSA fails to 
abide by the rule of law, by failing to act lawfully and impartially, by being untrustworthy 
and by employing incompetent individuals, Malta risks becoming a haven for financial crime. 
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This could have a number of consequences all of which would affect the Maltese economy. 
Financial crime could lead to bank closures (as evidenced in the case of Pilatus bank and 
Satabank) and blacklisting by international organisations such as MoneyVal. This would 
significantly damage Malta’s reputation as a financial centre, in turn further attracting 
operators with a criminal intent to exploit the Maltese financial services sector and dissuading 
honest operators from functioning in Malta. Since Malta is an EU member state and Maltese 
licensed operators can passport to other EU jurisdictions, any negative effect on Malta’s 
economy and reputation could also spill over to other EU states. It is therefore necessary for 
the MFSA to weaponize the rule of law in order to robustly combat financial crime.  
 In the remaining paragraphs I wish to suggest three areas for future research which 
would address the some of the limitations of this research not tackled above.  
 The first area of future research lies in scale development. In order to improve the 
legitimacy scales, focus groups or workshops ought to be conducted with financial services 
participants to refine the regulatory legitimacy survey. The legitimacy survey should be 
distributed not just to one individual occupying a top-level management position within each 
organisation but also to other members of top, middle and lower level management as these 
individuals also interact with the MFSA and are essential cogs in the machinery required for 
the financial organisation to operate. A wider distribution would also increase the response 
rate. In respect of the outcome measures, I adopted a normative approach to measuring 
operators’ motivational postures. Although the qualitative stage of the research had questions 
that asked about what occurs when the MFSA fails to meet its expectations, not enough data 
was available to develop themes that could be utilized to develop survey items that measure 
legitimacy outcomes. Future research should specifically address this limitation.  
This research only explored the legitimacy of the MFSA as perceived by operators. 
Similar research should be conducted with other audiences, such as the general public and 
EU supranational regulators. In addition, there are other regulators that are important actors 
within the Maltese financial services industry – primarily the EU supranational regulators and 
the local FIAU. The same research design ought to be employed to discover what operators 
expect from the EU supranational regulators and the FIAU. Conducting such research would 
set the stage for an EU-wide regulatory legitimacy survey.  
 The second area of future research lies in employing a framework to understanding 
the rule-following (or rule-breaking behaviour) of licensed operators, incorporating 
legitimacy and deterrence factors. As noted in Chapter 7, obligation to obey contained a large 
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amount of non-legitimacy issues and that paper did not include measures of well-known 
correlates of behaviour, such as self-control and personal morality. One such framework is 
Paternoster and Simpson’s (1993) rational choice model of corporate crime. The main issue 
with this model is that it is premised on the rational-choice theory, yet as demonstrated in the 
third paper, legitimacy considerations are important factors that impact attitudes to 
compliance. I believe that Wikström’s SAT can, with some refinements, provide a framework 
within which to examine how legitimacy affects behaviour. Wikström’s SAT (Wikström et 
al, 2013) sees crime as a moral action that is the outcome of a perception-choice process that 
is initiated and guided by the causal interaction between an individual’s crime propensity (an 
individual’s personal morality and self-control) and a particular criminogenic setting. If 
individuals do not regard rule-breaking as an alternate route to a particular temptation or 
provocation, no rule-breaking will result. However, if rule-breaking is seen as an alternative, 
the SAT hypothesises two different routes: one in which the actor habitually perceives crime 
as an action and therefore habitually acts in that manner; the other in which the actor sees a 
number of different alternatives and engages in a process of rational deliberation which is in 
turn affected by controls such as the ability to exercise self-control, personal morality and 
perceptions of deterrence. Two recent studies applied the precepts of SAT to explain white-
collar offending. Jordanoska (2018:1445) through semi-structured interviews with white-
collar prisoners concluded that “its constructs can be fruitfully deployed in explaining white-
collar crime” but “only to a moderate extent”. Another study showed more promising results. 
Craig (2019) using a convenience sample of criminology students found that individuals with 
a high level of morality and with a low level of self-control displayed reduced intentions to 
offend and increased intentions to offend respectively. Craig’s study also showed that 
morality moderates the effect of low self-control on white-collar offending. None of these 
studies included legitimacy variables. Perceptions of legitimacy are relevant at different 
stages of the SAT: (i) the temptation/provocation stage; (ii) the moral filter stage; and (iii) the 
control stage. Future research should incorporate measures of legitimacy at these three stages 
while extending the SAT to incorporate not only rule-breaking behaviour but also rule-
following behaviour.  
 The third area of future research lies in understanding the origin of operators’ 
perceptions of MFSA legitimacy. Preliminary evidence from the qualitative stage of the 
research shows that operators’ expectations of the MFSA are largely consistent with what 
Boulding (1967:299) referred to as “internal legitimacy”. More interviews should be 
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conducted to examine how operators self-justify their authority and how this relates to 
operators’ perceptions of regulatory legitimacy.  
 Despite this dissertation’s methodological limitations, this study hopefully sets the 
stage for future legitimacy research in Malta as well as in the EU.  
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Appendix 1. Conceptualizations of Legitimacy in Criminology 
 
Table 1. Studies adopting the Tylerian conceptualization of Legitimacy 
Author(s) Sample Context Legitimacy 
scale 
dimensions  
Number 
of items 
in scale 
Treatment of 
legitimacy  
Deterrence 
variables 
Main 
Findings 
Tyler (1990) n = 1,575 
Chicago 
residents 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Support 
 Independent 
variable 
affecting 
compliance 
with the law. 
Mediating 
variable 
between the 
independent 
variables of 
inter alia 
procedural 
justice, 
distributive 
justice and the 
dependent 
variables of 
compliance 
and 
cooperation 
Yes Legitimacy 
had a 
significant 
impact on 
compliance.  
 
Procedural 
justice was 
significantly 
related to 
legitimacy 
which in turn 
was found to 
affect 
compliance 
with the law.  
 
Deterrence did 
not have a 
significant 
impact on 
compliance. 
Tyler and 
Rasinski 
(1991) 
n = 636 U.S. 
residents 
Courts Obligation to 
obey 
5 Mediating 
variable 
affecting 
intention to 
break the law  
No Legitimacy 
was found to 
mediate the 
relationship 
between the 
public’s 
perceptions of 
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fairness of the 
decision-
making 
procedures of 
the Supreme 
Court and 
decisions of 
whether to 
breach the 
law. 
Tyler and Huo 
(2002)  
n = 1,656 
Oakland and 
Los Angeles 
residents 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Cynicism about 
the law 
Institutional 
trust 
Feelings about 
authorities 
3 
3 
 
6 
1 
Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
independent 
variable 
affecting 
behaviour and 
as a 
dependent 
variable affect 
by inter alia 
quality of 
decision- 
making and 
the quality of 
treatment 
(aspect of 
procedural 
fairness).    
No Legitimacy 
had a positive 
and significant 
impact on 
compliance 
and help-
seeking 
behaviour.  
 
Legitimacy 
was impact by 
the process-
based 
variables of 
the quality of 
decision-
making and 
the quality of 
treatment.  
Sunshine and 
Tyler (2003) 
n = 1,653 
New York 
City 
residents in 
study 1 
 
 
 
 
Police 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obligation to 
obey the law 
Institutional 
trust  
Affective 
feelings towards 
the police 
 
 
4 
 
9 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
Legitimacy 
was treated as 
a mediating 
variable 
between inter 
alia the 
independents 
variables of 
procedural 
Yes – 
likelihood of 
being caught a 
punished 
measured with 
3 items 
In study 1 
legitimacy had 
a significant 
impact on 
compliance, 
cooperation 
and 
empowerment 
with 
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n = 1,653 
New York 
City 
residents in 
study 1 
 
 
Police Obligation to 
obey the law 
Institutional 
trust  
Affective 
feelings towards 
the police 
 
9 
 
10 
fairness, 
distributive 
fairness and 
effectiveness 
and the 
outcome 
variables of 
compliance 
with of 
cooperation 
with police, 
and 
empowering 
police.  
procedural 
fairness 
exerting the 
most 
significant 
effect on 
legitimacy. 
Distributive 
fairness had 
no effect on 
legitimacy. 
 
Both 
legitimacy and 
deterrence had 
a significant 
effect on 
compliance 
with 
legitimacy 
exerting a 
slightly 
stronger 
effect.  
 
In the second 
study 
legitimacy 
also had a 
significant 
effect on 
compliance, 
cooperation 
and 
empowerment. 
Legitimacy 
was mostly 
predicted by 
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perceptions of 
procedural 
fairness and to 
a lesser degree 
by perceptions 
of distributive 
fairness.  
 
Both 
legitimacy and 
deterrence 
exerted a 
significant 
effect on 
compliance 
with 
legitimacy 
exerting a 
stronger 
effect.  
Tyler and 
Wakslak 
(2004) 
n = 586 
young 
residents 
from New 
York City 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n = 1,653 
New York 
City 
residents 
Police 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Police 
Obligation to 
obey 
Institutional 
trust 
Honesty 
Effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obligation to 
obey 
Trust/confidence 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
8 
Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
dependent 
variables 
affected by 
inter alia 
procedural 
fairness, 
distributive 
fairness, 
sanction risk 
trust.  
No Procedural 
justice 
considerations 
had the 
strongest 
impact on 
legitimacy for 
both non-
white and 
white 
respondents 
with the 
exception of 
trust. 
 
 
The quality of 
treatment was 
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the strongest 
driver of 
legitimacy for 
both white and 
non-white 
participants. 
While the 
quality of 
decision-
making had a 
stronger 
impact on 
legitimacy for 
non-white 
respondents 
than white 
respondents,  
trust had an 
equally strong 
impact.  
Tyler, 
Callahan and 
Frost (2007)  
n = 419 
composed 
of 209 city 
and federal 
law 
enforcement 
officers and 
210 soldiers 
Police/Army Obligation to 
obey 
12 Legitimacy is 
treated both 
as a 
dependent 
variable 
influenced by 
inter alia  
procedural 
fairness and 
distributive 
fairness and 
as a 
independent 
variable 
affecting 
behaviour 
No In the law 
enforcement 
context 
legitimacy 
positively 
predicted 
following 
organizational 
rules, 
deference to 
rules but not 
following 
organizational 
rules. In the 
military 
context, 
legitimacy 
predicted all 
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forms of rule-
following 
behaviour. 
Procedural 
justice and not 
distributive 
fairness was 
the main 
driver of 
legitimacy in 
both police 
and armed 
forces 
contexts.  
Tyler and 
Fagan (2008) 
n = 830 
New York 
City 
residents 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Trust/confidence 
Identification 
with the police 
10 
7 
9 
Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
independent 
variable 
affecting 
cooperation 
with the 
police and 
helping the 
community as 
a dependent 
variable 
affected by 
inter alia 
procedural 
fairness 
Yes – 
sanctioning 
risk 
Legitimacy 
had a 
significant 
influence on 
cooperation 
with the police 
and helping 
the 
community. 
Procedural 
fairness were 
stronger 
predictors of 
legitimacy 
than 
distributive 
justice 
considerations. 
 
In wave 1 
neither 
legitimacy nor 
risk had any 
significant 
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effect on 
helping the 
police; but 
legitimacy had 
a statistically 
significant 
effect on 
helping the 
community 
with risk 
having no 
effect.  
 
In wave 2 in 
contrast to 
wave 1, 
legitimacy had 
a statistically 
significant 
effect on 
helping the 
police and like 
wave 1, risk 
had no effect.  
In relation to 
helping the 
community 
both 
legitimacy and 
risk had strong 
effects with 
risk being 
more 
significant.  
Murphy, 
Hinds and 
Fleming 
(2008) 
n = 2,611 
Australian 
residents 
(cross-
Police  Effectiveness, 
confidence, and 
respect 
4 Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
independent 
variable 
No  In the cross-
sectional study 
legitimacy and 
distributive 
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sectional) 
 
n = 102 
suburban 
Australian 
residents 
(panel) 
affecting 
cooperation 
with the 
police and as 
dependent 
variables 
affected by 
inter alia 
procedural 
justice, 
distributive 
justice and 
police 
performance  
fairness were 
both found to 
exert 
significant 
positive effect 
on cooperation 
with 
legitimacy 
displaying the 
stronger 
effect. In 
contact, police 
performance 
reduced 
cooperation 
with the 
police.  
 
In the cross-
sectional 
study, 
procedural 
fairness, 
distributive 
fairness and 
police 
performance 
were all 
significant 
predictors of 
legitimacy 
with 
procedural 
justice 
exerting the 
strongest 
effect.  
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In the panel 
study, while 
legitimacy was 
found to 
predict 
cooperation 
with the 
police, police 
performance 
and 
distributive 
justice were 
unable to 
predict 
changes in 
cooperative 
behaviours.  
 
In the panel 
study, both 
procedural 
justice and 
distributive 
fairness were 
found to both 
positively 
predict 
cooperation 
with police 
performance 
having no 
effect.  
 
 
Reisig and 
Lloyd (2009) 
n = 289 
Jamaican 
high school 
students  
Police Obligation to 
obey 
3 Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
independent 
variable 
No Procedural 
justice and not 
distributive 
justice was the 
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affecting 
cooperation 
and as a 
dependent 
variable 
affected by 
inter alia 
procedural 
fairness and 
distributive 
fairness 
strongest 
predictor of 
legitimacy. 
Legitimacy 
and 
distributive 
fairness had 
no significant 
influence on 
cooperation 
with the police 
with 
perceptions of 
procedural 
fairness 
exerting 
having a 
significant 
effect.   
Tankebe 
(2009a) 
n = 374 
residents in 
Accra, 
Ghana 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Trust 
 
7 
 
6 
Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
independent 
variable 
affecting 
cooperation 
with the 
police 
Yes – 
Perceived risk 
of being 
arrested and 
punished for 
breaking the 
law measured 
with two 
items. 
Only the sub-
scale of trust 
predicted 
cooperation 
with the 
police. 
Elliott, 
Thomas and 
Ogloff (2011) 
n = 110 
people who 
had reported 
a crime in 
Australia 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Trust 
19 Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
outcome of 
procedural 
fairness  
No Procedural 
justice 
significantly 
predicted 
legitimacy.  
Huq, Tyler 
and 
Schulhofer 
(2011) 
n = 1,653 
New York 
City 
residents 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
6 Legitimacy is 
treated, as an 
dependent 
variable 
predicted by 
No Procedural 
justice 
significantly 
predicted 
legitimacy. 
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procedural 
fairness, as an 
predictor of 
cooperation 
with the 
police and 
alerting the 
police and as 
a mediating 
variable 
between 
procedural 
fairness and 
behaviour.  
Legitimacy 
also had a 
significant 
impact on 
cooperation 
with the police 
and 
willingness to 
alert the 
police. In 
additional, 
procedural 
justice 
predicted 
cooperation 
with the police 
and alerting 
the police 
through the 
mediating 
variable of 
legitimacy.  
Reisig, 
Tankebe and 
Mesko (2012) 
n = 683 high 
school 
students in 
Maribor and 
Ljubjana, 
Slovenia 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Trust 
2 
2 
Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
outcome of 
inter alia 
procedural 
justice and 
effectiveness 
and as a 
predictor of 
cooperation. 
No Procedural 
justice was the 
more 
significant 
predictor of 
legitimacy and 
while 
legitimacy 
predicted 
cooperation 
this effect was 
invariant when 
the 
cooperation 
measure was 
disaggregated. 
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Further when 
the legitimacy 
scale was 
disaggregated 
only the sub-
component of 
trust had a 
significant 
effect on 
cooperation 
with the 
police.  
Reisig, 
Tankebe and 
Mesko (2014) 
n = 683 
young 
adults in 
Slovenia 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Trust 
2 
2 
Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
outcome of 
among other 
variables 
procedural 
justice and 
effectiveness 
and as a  
predictor of 
compliance. 
 Procedural 
fairness was 
the more 
significant 
predictor of 
legitimacy. 
Legitimacy 
also predicted 
compliance 
with the law  
Muratbegović, 
Vujović, & 
Fazlić (2014) 
n = 583 
students  
from the 
Faculty of 
Law and 
Faculty of 
Criminal 
Justice, 
Criminology 
and Security 
Studies at 
the 
University 
of Sarajevo, 
Bosnia and 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Trust 
2 
2 
Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
outcome of 
procedural 
justice and 
predictor of 
self-reported 
compliance 
and 
cooperation. 
Yes – 
perceived risk 
of getting 
caught and 
punishment 
measured with 
6 questions 
Legitimacy 
demonstrated 
a strong 
positive 
correlation 
with 
compliance 
but not with 
cooperation. 
Procedural 
justice was 
also positively 
and strongly 
correlated with 
legitimacy. 
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Herzegovina Procedural 
justice also 
exhibited a 
stronger 
correlation 
with the trust 
component of 
legitimacy that 
the component 
of obligation 
to obey.  
 
Deterrence, 
similar to 
legitimacy 
strongly 
associated 
with 
compliance 
but not with 
cooperation. 
Pryce (2014) n = 304 
Ghanaian 
immigrants 
Police Obligation to 
obey  
Trust 
 
Police 
legitimacy 
4 
4 
 
4 
Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
dependent 
variable 
impacted by 
inter alia 
procedural 
justice and 
effectiveness 
and as an 
predictor of 
cooperation 
No Effectiveness 
was the more 
significant 
predictor of 
legitimacy and 
of 
cooperation.  
Trinkner and 
Cohn (2014) 
n = 322 
New 
Hampshire 
students in 
11th grade 
Police, 
parents and 
Teachers 
Obligation to 
obey  
Trust 
10  Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
mediating 
variable 
between 
No Legitimacy 
was found to 
mediate the 
relationship 
between 
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procedural 
justice 
considerations 
and rule-
violating 
behaviour. 
procedural 
fairness and 
rule violations 
Bradford 
(2014) 
n = 1,017 
young males 
who 
identified as 
a minority 
group in 
London 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
 Legitimacy is 
treated as 
mediating 
variable 
between 
procedural 
justice and 
intentions to 
cooperate 
with police 
No Among the 
UK group 
legitimacy 
fully mediated 
the 
relationship 
between 
perceptions of 
procedural 
fairness and 
intentions to 
cooperate.  
Hertogh 
(2015) 
n = 1,182 
traffic 
offenders in 
the 
Netherlands 
Traffic 
offences 
Obligation to 
obey  
Support  
Law legitimacy 
 
6 
 
4 
10 
Legitimacy 
variables are 
treated as 
predictors of 
compliance 
with traffic 
laws (self-
reported and 
observed 
compliance). 
Yes – 
perceived 
likelihood of 
getting caught 
and punished 
measured with 
5 items 
Legitimacy 
variables all 
predicted self-
reported 
compliance 
with traffic 
laws with law 
legitimacy 
being the most 
significant 
predictor. The 
sub-
component of 
obligation to 
obey had a 
significant 
impact on 
observed 
compliance for 
those who had 
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received 3 or 4 
tickets and 5 
or 6 tickets but 
not for those 
who received 
7 or more 
tickets. The 
sub-
dimensions of 
support and 
law legitimacy 
has no effects 
on observed 
compliance.  
 
Deterrence 
had no impact 
on the 
outcome 
measures in 
this study 
Pryce (2016) n = 304 
Ghanaian 
residents in 
Alexandria, 
Virginia 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Trust 
4 
3 
Legitimacy is 
treated an 
independent 
variable 
affecting 
satisfaction 
with the 
police 
No Legitimacy of 
Ghana police 
reduced 
perceptions of 
satisfaction 
with US 
police.  
Czapska, 
Radomska 
and Wojcik 
(2016) 
n = 506 
students in 
Poland 
Police Trust  
Obligation to 
obey  
2 
2 
Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
dependent 
variable 
impacted by 
procedural 
justice and as 
an predictor 
of 
No Procedural 
justice was the 
most 
significant 
predictor of 
legitimacy but 
legitimacy is 
not predict 
cooperation.  
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cooperation  
White, 
Mulvey and 
Dario (2016)  
N = 2,262 
arrestees in 
Maricopa 
county 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
2 Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
dependent 
variable and 
as an one of 
the 
independent 
variables 
affecting 
cooperation 
with the 
police along 
with 
procedural 
fairness and 
as a mediator 
between 
procedural 
fairness and 
cooperation.  
No Procedural 
justice was the 
most 
significant 
predictor of 
police 
legitimacy.  
Both 
Legitimacy 
and procedural 
justice both 
predicted 
cooperation 
with 
procedural 
justice being 
the more 
significant 
predictor. 
Legitimacy 
also mediated 
the 
relationship 
between 
procedural 
fairness and 
cooperation.  
Akinlabi 
(2017) 
n = 305 
students in 
Nigeria 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Trust 
Legal cynicism 
Not 
possible 
to 
determine 
Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
outcome of 
inter alia 
procedural 
justice.  
 Procedural 
justice 
significantly 
predicted 
legitimacy 
although other 
variables were 
more 
significant 
(moral 
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neutralization 
and political 
cynicism) 
Sun, Wu, Hu, 
and Farmer 
(2017) 
 
n = 1,000 
residents in 
a Chinese 
city 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
4 Legitimacy is 
treated as 
mediating 
variable 
between 
procedural 
fairness, 
distributive 
fairness and 
effectiveness 
and 
cooperation 
with the 
police  
No Legitimacy 
was a better 
mediator for 
distributive 
fairness and 
effectiveness 
than 
procedural 
fairness.  
 
Table 2. Studies adopting the Jackson et al., (2011; 2012) conceptualizations of Legitimacy 
 
Author(s) Sample Context Legitimacy 
scale 
dimensions  
Number of 
items in 
scale 
Treatment of 
legitimacy 
Deterrence 
variables 
Main 
Findings 
Jackson et 
al., (2011) 
  Obligation to 
obey 
Moral alignment 
Legality 
 
    
Jackson, 
Bradford, 
Hough, 
Myhill, 
Quinton and 
Tyler (2012) 
n = 937 
adults in 
England and 
Wales 
Police Moral alignment 
Obligation to 
obey the police 
3 
3 
Several 
pathways were 
hypothesized 
including trust 
in police 
procedural 
justice and 
trust in police 
effectiveness 
as predictors 
Yes – 
perceived risk 
of sanction 
Trust in 
procedural 
fairness did 
not predict 
obligation to 
obey the 
police but 
predicted 
moral 
alignment. 
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of legitimacy 
and legitimacy 
scales as 
predictors of 
offending 
behaviour.  
Trust in 
procedural 
fairness 
predicted both 
obligation to 
obey and 
moral 
alignment 
with the 
stronger effect  
being seen for 
trust in 
procedural 
fairness. 
While 
obligation to 
obey the did 
not predict 
offending 
behaviour, 
moral 
alignment 
reduced 
offending 
behaviour. 
Perceived risk 
of sanction 
did not have a 
statistically 
significant 
effect on 
reducing 
offending 
behaviour  
Hough et al.,  
(2013) 
n = 52,041 
interview 
from the 
European 
 Obligation to 
obey 
Moral alignment 
Legality 
 Several 
pathways were 
hypothesized 
including trust 
Yes – 
perceived risk 
of sanction 
Trust in 
procedural 
fairness, trust 
in 
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Social Survey in procedural 
justice, trust in 
distributive 
fairness and 
trust in 
effectiveness 
as predictors 
of legitimacy 
and legitimacy 
scales as 
predictors of 
offending 
behaviour.  
effectiveness 
and trust in 
distributive 
fairness were 
all significant 
predictors of 
obligation to 
obey and 
moral 
alignment and 
legality, albeit 
with varying 
levels of 
significance. 
Legality, 
deterrence,  
and moral 
alignment 
demonstrated 
significant 
and negative 
effects on 
offending 
behaviour 
with 
obligation to 
obey showing 
no significant 
effect.  
Jackson, 
Huq, 
Bradford and 
Tyler (2013) 
n = 1,017 
London 
residents 
Police Obligation to 
obey  
Moral alignment 
Legality 
4 Legitimacy is 
treated an 
independent 
variable that 
affects views 
about violence 
and as a 
dependent 
variable 
No Legitimacy 
mediated the 
association 
between 
perceptions of 
procedural 
justice and 
views about 
violence.  
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impacted by 
procedural 
justice 
considerations 
Tyler and 
Jackson 
(2014) 
 Police  
Courts 
Obligation to 
obey the law  
Obligation to 
obey the police 
Obligation to 
obey the courts  
Trust in the law 
Trust in the 
police 
Trust in the 
courts 
Normative 
alignment with 
the law 
Normative 
alignment with 
the police 
Normative 
alignment with 
the courts 
9 
 
4 
 
4 
 
3 
5 
6 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
2 
 
 
Legitimacy is 
treated an 
independent 
variable that 
affects 
compliance, 
cooperation 
with legal 
authorities and 
community 
engagement 
and as a 
dependent 
variable 
impacted by 
inter alia 
procedural 
justice 
considerations 
and 
effectiveness.  
No Legitimacy 
had a 
significant 
and positive 
impact on 
compliance 
(both minor 
crimes and 
major crimes). 
Legitimacy 
also reduced 
the likelihood 
of engaging in 
self-defense 
acting and 
increased 
cooperation 
with the 
police. The 
sub-
dimension 
 of obligation 
to obey 
significantly 
predicted both 
compliance 
and 
cooperation 
with the 
stronger effect 
being 
demonstrated 
for 
compliance 
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yet obligation 
to obey had 
no significant 
impact on 
engagement. 
The sub-
dimension of 
trust also did 
not have a 
significant on 
engagement 
but showed a 
positive and 
significant 
impact both 
on compliance 
and 
cooperation 
with a 
stronger effect 
being 
demonstrated 
for 
cooperation. 
And the sub-
dimension of 
normative 
alignment, 
while 
predicting 
both 
cooperation 
and 
engagement 
did not predict 
compliance.  
 
Fairness in the 
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quality of 
decision 
making was a 
significant 
predictor of 
the sub-scale 
of trust did 
not predict 
obligation to 
obey, 
normative 
alignment or 
the composite 
legitimacy 
measure. 
However, the 
quality of 
treatment was 
a significant 
predictor of 
the composite 
mesure and of 
all three sub-
scales. And 
effectivenesss, 
predicted the 
composite 
measure and 
the sub-scales 
of obligation 
to obey and 
normative 
alignment but 
not trust.  
Tyler, Fagan 
and Geller 
(2014)  
n = 1,261 
New York 
City residents  
Police Trust/confidence 
Obligation to 
obey 
Moral alignment  
34 Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
outcome of 
procedural 
No Procedural 
fairness 
significantly 
predicted 
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 justice and 
predictor of 
cooperation. 
legitimacy 
which in turn 
predicted 
cooperation. 
Reisig and 
Bain (2016) 
n = 502 
university 
students 
attending 
Arizona State 
University 
University 
Students 
Normative 
Alignment 
Obligation to 
obey 
Trust 
3 
 
6 
5 
Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
predictor of 
compliance 
with university 
rules 
No Legitimacy 
sub-scales and 
as an 
aggregate 
scale 
predicted 
compliance 
with rules 
against 
cheating but 
not rules 
against 
plagiarism 
Bradford, 
Hohl, 
Jackson and 
MacQueen 
(2015) 
n = 816 
drivers in 
Scotland 
Police Obligation to 
obey 
Moral alignment 
6 Legitimacy is 
regarded as a 
outcome of 
inter alia 
procedural 
justice and as 
predictor of 
compliance 
No Procedural 
fairness was a 
significant 
predictor of 
legitimacy but 
legitimacy did 
not predict 
compliance.  
Van Damme 
and Pauwels 
(2016) 
n = 1659 
students 
university or 
college 
students in 
Ghent  
Police Legitimacy of 
the police -  
Moral 
Alignment 
Obligation to 
obey 
 
Legitimacy of 
the law – 
obligation to 
obey the law 
 
 
4 
 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
Legitimacy of 
the police is 
treated as an 
outcome of 
procedural 
fairness and 
effectiveness, 
in turn 
affecting the 
legitimacy of 
the law which 
in turn may 
affect 
No Perceived 
procedural 
justice and 
effectiveness 
both predicted 
moral 
alignment 
with 
procedural 
justice 
exerting a 
stronger 
effect. 
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compliance 
with the law.  
Procedural 
fairness 
exhibited a 
slightly 
stronger effect 
that effective 
on obligation 
to obey. Both 
moral 
alignment and 
oblation to 
obey the 
police 
demonstrated  
positive and 
significant 
effect on the 
obligation to 
obey the law 
with a 
stronger effect 
shown for 
normative 
alignment. 
Perceived 
legitimacy of 
the law in turn 
had a 
significant 
impact on 
cooperation.  
Akinlabi and 
Murphy 
(2018) 
n = 600 
individuals 
from south 
west Nigeria  
Police Normative 
alignment 
Obligation to 
police 
 Legitimacy is 
treated both as 
a independent 
variable 
affecting self-
reported 
compliance 
No Legitimacy 
did not predict 
self-reported 
compliance 
with the law 
and 
procedural 
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with the law 
and as 
outcome of 
inter alia 
procedural 
justice  
justice did not 
predict 
legitimacy.  
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Table 3. Studies adopting the Bottoms and Tankebe (2012;2017) conceptualization of Legitimacy 
 
Author(s) Sample Context Legitimacy 
scale 
dimensions  
Number of 
items in 
scale 
Treatment of 
legitimacy – 
independent 
or mediating 
variable 
Deterrence 
variables 
Main 
Findings 
Bottoms and 
Tankebe 
(2012, 2017) 
N/A Police Lawfulness 
Procedural 
Fairness 
Distributive 
Fairness 
Effectiveness 
N/A Legitimacy is 
treated an 
independent 
variable 
affecting 
compliance 
and 
cooperation. 
  
Tankebe 
(2013) 
n = 5,120 
London 
residents 
Police Lawfulness 
Procedural 
Fairness 
Distributive 
Fairness 
Effectiveness 
2 
5 
2 
 
7 
Legitimacy 
variables are 
treated as 
independent 
predictors of 
cooperation 
with the police 
No Tankebe 
found that: 
(i) 
legitimacy 
(as an 
aggregated 
scale) was a 
significant 
predictor of 
cooperation 
with the 
police; (ii) 
procedural 
justice and  
distributive 
justice were 
significant 
predictors of 
cooperation 
with the 
police; (iii) 
similar to 
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Murphy and 
Cherney 
(2012), 
lawfulness 
was an 
important 
predictor of 
cooperation 
with the 
police; (iv) 
perceived 
police 
effectiveness 
reduced 
cooperation 
with the 
police; and 
(iv) 
obligation to 
obey 
mediated the 
relationship 
between the 
aggregated 
legitimacy 
scale and the 
individual 
components 
of 
legitimacy. 
Tankebe, 
Reisig and 
Wang (2016) 
n = 516 
students at a 
university in 
the U.S. 
n = 428 
students at a 
university in 
Ghana 
Police Lawfulness 
Procedural 
Fairness 
Distributive 
Fairness 
Effectiveness 
 Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
independent 
variable 
affecting 
compliance 
and 
cooperation  
No Regarding 
the outcome 
of 
cooperation 
with the 
police, 
Tankebe et 
al.’s (2016) 
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study was 
largely 
consistent 
with the 
results 
obtained 
from the 
London data 
in that 
legitimacy 
(as an 
aggregated 
scale) 
predicted 
cooperation 
with the 
police and 
that 
obligation to 
obey 
mediated the 
relationship 
between 
legitimacy 
and 
cooperation. 
Concerning 
the outcome 
of 
compliance 
with the law, 
the findings 
from the 
U.S. sample 
were also 
similar to the 
results 
obtained in 
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the London 
data. The 
Ghana data 
showed that 
while 
legitimacy 
was 
significantly 
related to 
compliance 
with the law, 
obligation to 
obey did not 
mediate the 
relationship 
between 
legitimacy 
and 
compliance.  
 
Liu and Liu 
(2018) 
n = 711 high 
school 
students in 
China 
Police Procedural 
fairness 
Effectiveness 
Shared values 
(lawfulness)  
Distributive 
fairness 
3 
1 
1 
1 
Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
predictor of 
compliance  
No Only 
distributive 
fairness was 
a strong 
predictor of 
compliance.  
Tankebe 
(2019a) 
n = 530 
young adults 
at a Ghanaian 
University 
Police Police 
unlawfulness 
Procedural 
fairness 
Effectiveness 
3 
 
5 
4 
Legitimacy 
variables 
treated as 
predictor of 
cooperative 
intentions 
Yes – 
certainty and 
severity of 
punishment 
measured 
with 6 and 4 
items 
respectively  
Experiences 
of police 
unlawfulness 
and 
perceptions 
of certainty 
of 
punishment 
showed 
significant 
and negative 
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effects on 
cooperative 
intentions.  
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Table 4. Studies measuring legitimacy in workplace, taxation and organizational contexts 
 
Author(s) Sample Context Legitimacy 
scale 
dimensions  
Number 
of items in 
scale 
Treatment of 
legitimacy 
Main findings  
Tyler (1997) Workplace  Sample 1 N 
= 409 
managers in 
California  
 
 
 
 
 
Sample 2 N 
= 305 
employees at 
a public 
sector 
organisations 
in Northern 
California  
Obligation to 
obey 
Willingness to 
accept 
authority 
Favourability 
of evaluations 
 
Obligation to 
obey 
Willingness to 
accept 
authority 
Favourability 
of evaluations 
3 
 
2 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
5 
 
4 
 
 
3 
Dependent 
variables 
affected by 
inter alia 
relational or 
instrumental 
concerns   
Legitimacy 
was predicted 
by relational 
judgments but 
not by 
instrumental 
concerns.  
 
 
Legitimacy 
was predicted 
by both 
relational and 
instrumental 
concerns but 
with the 
greater impact 
accorded to 
relational 
concerns.  
Kuperan and 
Sutinen 
(1998) 
N = 318 
Malaysian 
fishermen  
Regulatory Outcomes of 
regulation 
Aspects of 
regulatory 
procedures 
6 
 
6 
Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
independent 
variable 
affecting 
compliance 
with fisheries 
regulations 
When groups 
felt the 
outcomes of 
regulation 
favoured one 
group over the 
other this 
reduced 
legitimacy 
perceptions 
among the 
disadvantaged 
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group leading 
to reduced 
compliance.  
 
Regulatory 
violators who 
perceived that 
enforcement of 
regulatory 
violations was 
adequate were 
more likely to 
non-comply. 
Tyler and 
Blader 
(2000) 
Workplace n = 404 
employees 
Obligation to 
obey 
6 Legitimacy is 
treated as 
independent 
variable 
affecting 
compliance, 
in-role 
behaviour, 
deference and 
extra-role 
behaviour  
Legitimacy 
predicted 
deference and 
compliance 
with equal 
levels of 
significance 
but with 
stronger 
impact shown 
for deference. 
Legitimacy 
had no 
significant 
impact on  
Murphy and 
Sakurai 
(2001)* 
Taxation  n = 2,040 
Australian 
taxpayers 
Obligation to 
obey 
Willingness to 
accept 
authority 
Favourability 
of evaluations 
 
Not 
possible to 
determine 
Independent 
variables 
affecting 
aggressive tax 
planning  
Legitimacy 
had no effect 
on aggressive 
tax effect on 
aggressive tax  
Murphy and 
Byng 
n = 6000 
Australian 
Taxation Favourability 
of evaluations 
 Variable 
capturing 
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(2002)* taxpayers Obligation to 
obey 
views about 
tax office 
Wenzel and 
Jobling 
(2005)*  
n = 965 
Australian 
residents 
 
n = 4000 
Australian 
citizens 
Taxation 
 
 
 
Taxation 
Obligation to 
obey 
 
 
Perceived 
fairness 
Favourability 
towards 
authority 
Trust 
7 
 
 
 
9 
Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
dependent 
variable. 
In study 1 
respondents 
who identified 
less strongly 
with the 
inclusive 
category 
(Australians) 
perceived the 
tax authority to 
be more 
legitimate the 
when it 
exercised 
effective 
power over the 
outgroup.  
In study 2 
respondents 
who identified 
less strongly 
with the 
inclusive 
category 
(Australians) 
perceived the 
tax authority to 
be more 
legitimate the 
when it 
appeared 
lenient 
towards the 
ingroup.  
However, 
respondents 
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who identified 
strongly with 
the inclusive 
category 
perceived the 
tax authority to 
be more 
legitimate the 
when it used 
its powers 
consistently 
vis-à-vis both 
groups.  
 
Murphy 
(2005)* 
Study 1(cross-
sectional)  n = 
2,292 
Australian tax 
scheme 
investors 
 
 
 
Study 2 
(longitudinal) 
n = 659 
Australian tax 
scheme 
investors 
 
Taxation Favourability 
of evaluations 
Obligation to 
obey 
 
 
 
 
Favourability 
of evaluations 
Obligation to 
obey 
Unclear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unclear 
Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
mediating 
variable 
between inter 
alia 
perceptions of 
procedural 
fairness and 
outcome 
favourability 
and the 
behavioural 
and attitudinal 
outcomes 
Study 1 
Legitimacy 
was predicted 
by both 
procedural 
justice and 
outcome 
favourability 
with the 
former 
exerting the 
stronger effect. 
Procedural 
justice also 
significantly 
predicted 
obligation to 
obey but no 
effect was 
found for 
outcome 
favourability. 
Legitimacy 
and obligation 
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to obey in turn 
reduced 
resistance 
towards the tax 
authority and 
while 
obligation to 
obey reduced 
tax evasion 
behaviour no 
effect was 
found for 
legitimacy.  
 
In study 2, 
procedural 
justice 
predicted both 
legitimacy and 
obligation to 
obey. While 
outcome 
favourability 
predicted 
legitimacy it 
did not predict 
obligation to 
obey. And 
procedural 
fairness was 
the stronger 
predictor of 
legitimacy and 
obligation to 
obey. 
Legitimacy 
and obligation 
to obey had 
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significant 
effects on 
reducing 
resistance 
towards the tax 
authority with 
the more 
significant 
effect reported 
for legitimacy 
but neither 
legitimacy nor 
obligation to 
obey  
significantly 
predicted tax 
evasion . 
Tyler and 
Blader 
(2005)** 
n =540 
employees of a 
large financial 
services 
company in 
the U.S. 
 
n = 4,430 
employees 
from a range 
of 
organisations 
Workplace 
 
 
 
 
Workplace 
 
Obligation to 
obey 
 
 
 
Obligation to 
obey 
8 
 
 
 
 
6 
Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
antecedent of 
compliance 
with 
organisational 
policies, 
deference to 
organisational 
policies and 
rule-breaking.   
Legitimacy 
had a 
significant 
effect on 
compliance 
with 
organisational 
policies, 
deference to 
such policies 
and a rule-
breaking. 
Murphy, 
Tyler and 
Curtis 
(2009) 
n = 652 
Australian 
taxpayers 
 
 
Taxation 
 
 
 
Legitimacy of 
the law - 
moral values 
3 Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
moderating 
variable 
between 
procedural 
fairness and 
self-reported 
compliance 
Legitimacy 
moderated the 
effect between 
perceptions of 
procedural 
fairness and 
tax -
compliance 
Legitimacy 
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behaviour and 
as a 
independent 
variable 
affecting the 
motivational 
posture of 
commitment 
was also a 
significant 
predictor of 
commitment 
with the tax 
authority.  
Levi, Sacks 
and Tyler 
(2009) 
N = 23,909 
African 
taxpayers  
Taxation Obligation to 
obey 
3 Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
outcome of 
trustworthiness 
(performance 
and 
competence)  
and procedural 
justice. 
Elements of 
procedural 
justice and 
trustworthiness 
predicted 
willingness to 
obey tax 
authorities  
Vainio 
(2011)* 
N = 460 
Finnish Forest 
owners  
Regulatory Obligation to 
obey  
Trust 
4 
4 
Legitimacy 
was treated as 
an outcome of 
procedural 
justice and 
uncertainty 
and as a 
predictor of 
satisfaction 
with decisions. 
Procedural 
justice 
predicted 
legitimacy 
which in turn 
predicted 
satisfaction of 
decisions.  
Ntayi et al., 
(2012) 
N = 110 public 
procurement 
disposing 
entities 
Regulatory 
Regulatory Obligation to 
obey 
Trust 
8 total Legitimacy is 
treated in 
many ways but 
primarily as an 
outcome 
procedural 
justice and as a 
predictor 
regulatory 
compliance 
Procedural 
justice 
significantly 
predicted 
regulatory 
legitimacy and 
legitimacy 
significant 
predicted 
regulatory 
compliance 
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Feldman and 
Tyler (2012) 
N = 599 Israeli 
employees 
Workplace Obligation to 
obey 
5 Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
outcome of 
inter alia 
procedural 
justice 
considerations. 
Procedural 
justice did not 
predict 
legitimacy.  
Van Der 
Toorn et al., 
(2014)*** 
N = 1,530 U.S. 
employees 
Workplace Obligation to 
obey 
3 Legitimacy is 
treated as an 
outcome of 
inter alia 
procedural 
justice 
Procedural 
justice was 
found to 
significantly 
predict 
legitimacy.  
Murphy, 
Bradford 
and Jackson 
(2016)**** 
n = 359 tax 
offenders 
Taxation Obligation to 
obey 
Respect 
4 Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
mediating 
variable 
affecting the 
relationship 
between 
procedural 
fairness and 
tax compliance 
Legitimacy 
was found to 
mediate the 
mediate the 
relationship 
between 
procedural 
fairness and 
tax compliance 
Gobena and 
Van Dijke 
(2016)***** 
N = 231 small 
and large 
businesses 
N = 231 
small and 
large 
businesses 
Performance 
of functions 
5 Legitimate 
power is 
treated as a 
moderator  
between when 
examining the 
relationship 
between 
procedural 
fairness, trust 
and voluntary 
tax compliance  
Legitimate 
power 
moderated the 
relationship  
between 
procedural 
fairness and 
voluntary tax 
compliance 
because of the 
mediating 
variable of 
cognition 
based trust. 
Also the 
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relationship 
between 
cognition 
based trust and 
tax compliance 
was moderated 
by legitimate 
power.  
Rorie, 
Simpson, 
Cohen and 
Vanderbergh 
(2018) 
Offending 
scenarios N = 
879 
professionals 
and managers 
knowledgeable 
about 
environmental 
regulation  
 
Beyond 
compliance 
scenarios N = 
586 
professionals 
and managers 
knowledgeable 
about 
environmental 
regulation 
Regulatory 
 
Adequacy of 
law 
Obligation to 
obey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obligation to 
obey 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Legitimacy is 
treated as a 
predictor of 
corporate 
intentions to 
offend 
Legitimacy 
had little 
effected on 
offending 
scenarios and 
no effect on 
beyond-
compliance 
scenarios.  
 
Participants 
who felt that 
they should 
comply with a 
law even if 
went against 
their personal 
morality then 
they were less 
likely to ignore 
a compliance 
order but this 
had no effect 
on discharge 
of toxins or 
mislabelling 
waste. Those 
who felt that 
they should 
comply with 
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the law so long 
as the law go 
against their 
personal 
morality were 
also less likely 
to disobey a 
compliance 
order but this 
item had no 
effect on other 
forms of 
offending. The 
statement 
measuring the 
extent to 
which an 
individual 
should act as 
others do had 
no effect on 
offending 
intentions 
NOTE 
*Items 
adapted 
from Tyler 
(1997) 
**Items 
adapted 
from Tyler 
and Blader 
(2000) 
***Items 
adapted 
from Tyler 
(2006) 
****Items 
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adapted 
from Tyler 
(1990) 
*****Items 
adapted 
from 
Kastlunger 
Lozza, 
Kirchler, 
and 
Schabmann 
(2013)  
 
 
 
273 	
 
Appendix 2. Qualitative Stage – Interview Schedule, Note to Participants, Participant 
Information Sheet and Informed Consent Form 
 
Appreciative Inquiry Interview Schedule (Researcher Version)  
 
1. To begin, can you tell me what attracted you to the financial services industry? What 
do you value about the industry and why?  
 
2. Have you ever thought about leaving the financial services industry? Why? What has 
invigorated you to stay in this industry?  
 
3. Can you tell me a bit about your role/function in the organization? What are your 
duties? What do you do on a day-to-day basis?  
 
4. Can you explain the functions/roles of [a director/chief compliance officer/chief 
financial officer/chief operations officer/chief executive officer?] How far have these 
functions/roles changed over the years?  
 
5. How do you convince yourself that the powers granted to you as [a director/chief 
compliance officer/chief financial officer/chief operations officer/chief executive officer] are 
morally right? How you do self-justify the powers granted to you as [a director/chief 
compliance officer/chief financial officer/chief operations officer/chief executive officer]? 
 
6. What in your opinion makes a good [a director/chief compliance officer/chief 
financial officer/chief operations officer/chief executive officer?] 
 
7. Are there instances when you doubted whether your role as [a director/chief 
compliance officer/chief financial officer/chief operations officer/chief executive officer] is at 
all necessary? What are those instances? What has invigorated you to continue in your role? 
 
8. What do you understand the roles/functions of the MFSA to be? How well/effective is 
the MFSA performing these roles/functions? What are the reasons for this 
effectiveness/ineffectiveness? How can the MFSA play these roles/functions effectively?  
 
9. Why do you believe it is right or proper for the regulator to have the powers that is 
has? What in your view makes the powers of the regulator right or proper? What in your view 
justifies the powers of the regulator?  
 
10. What powers should the regulator have? How should those powers be applied?  
 
11. How do you or your colleagues perceive the MFSA? To what extent has your 
perception of the MFSA changed over the years? 
 
12. What are some of the things you expect from the MFSA? Why are these things 
important? How well is the MFSA meeting these expectations? 
 
13. What in your opinion makes a good regulator?  
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14. What sort of interactions have you had with the MFSA? What were your feelings 
about how the MFSA treated you? What positive/negative qualities did staff display? What 
could have been done differently? How has this experience affected your perceptions towards 
the MFSA? How has this experience shaped future interactions with the MFSA? How 
common is this experience? Have your colleagues had similar experiences?  
 
 
15. Can you tell me about an experience you had with the MFSA that was particularly 
good? What happened? Who was involved? What made it a good experience? How had this 
experience affected your perceptions/attitudes towards the MFSA? How has this experience 
shaped the way you deal with the MFSA? How has this experience affected the way you 
interact with the MFSA? How common is this experience? Have your colleagues had similar 
experiences?  
 
 
16. Can you tell about an experience you had with the MFSA that did not go well? What 
happened? Who was involved? Why did it not go well? How did you feel about this 
experience? How has this incident affect your perceptions/attitudes towards the MFSA? How 
has this experience shaped the way you deal with the MFSA? How common is this 
experience? Have your colleagues had similar experiences? 
 
 
17. What do you think constitutes a good (or right) relationship between companies and 
the MFSA?  
 
18. How important is it for the MFSA to have a good (or right) relationship with 
companies?  
 
19. Are there certain things that you believe the MFSA should avoid altogether when 
dealing with companies such as yours? Why is it important for the MFSA to avoid such 
things? 
 
20. Do you trust the regulator? Why? What makes a regulator trustworthy or 
untrustworthy?  
 
21. Does the regulator trust companies such as yours? Why?  
 
22. To what extent do you share the same values as the company?  
 
23. To what extent do you and companies like yours share similar values about the 
financial services industry?  
 
24. To what extent do you and companies like yours share similar values about the 
MFSA?  
 
25. To what extent do you think that the MFSA acts in a manner that is consistent with 
your notions and the company’s notions of what is right or wrong? To what extent do you 
perceive that the MFSA shares the same values as you and the company?  
 
275 	
26. If you were in a position to advise the MFSA on how to build good relationships with 
regulated entities what would be your suggestions/issues you would prioritize?  
 
27. Is there something else you wish to discuss about the MFSA that we haven’t talked 
about?  
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Email sent to participant inviting them to participate in interview 
 
Dear [insert name of participant]  
 
I trust that you are doing well. 
 
I believe [insert name of referral source] spoke to you regarding my PhD project. It would be 
great if we could meet up so I could ask you some questions for the interview stage of the 
PhD project. This would be of tremendous aid. I am very flexible for timing over the next 
two weeks. 
 
In connection with the proposed meeting I attach herewith the following three documents: (i) 
a brief explanation of the PhD project; (ii) a participant information sheet and informed 
consent form; and (iii) an interview schedule. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
Matthew Muscat 
Ph.D. Student 
Institute of Criminology – Cambridge 
+356 79046914 
+44 7711187546 
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Brief explanation about Ph.D. research  
 
Dear [insert name of participant],  
 
I am reading for a Ph.D. in Criminology at Cambridge University’s Institute of Criminology. 
I had previously graduated with an LL.D. from the University of Malta, an LL.M. from the 
University of London, an M.C.J. from Boston University and an M.Phil. in Criminological 
Research from Cambridge University. 
 
In order to complete the Ph.D. at the Institute of Criminology, I am required to submit a 
dissertation on a subject pertinent to the study of criminology. The working title for this 
dissertation is “Basic Legitimation Demands in the Maltese Financial Services Sector”. This 
dissertation seeks to address the following four research questions: (i) what is the nature of 
regulatees’ experiences with the Malta Financial Services Authority (the MFSA)?; (ii) what 
do regulatees expect from the MFSA?; (iii) how do regulatees respond to a failure to meet 
those expectations?; and (iv) what is the relationship between the perceived legitimacy of the 
MFSA and the behavioural outcomes of compliance and cooperation?  The first three 
research questions will be addressed through an inductive approach by conducting 
interviews. The fourth research question will be addressed via a deductive approach that 
entails the development and administration of a regulatory legitimacy survey informed by 
interviews.  
 
 At this stage of the research I am concerned with addressing the first three research 
questions. For the purposes of aiding the researcher to address these questions you are being 
invited to take part in an interview. This is voluntary. 
 
Attached are the following two documents: 
 
1. A participant information sheet; and  
 
2. An informed consent sheet.  
 
Please read the attached documents and do not hesitate to ask the researcher for any help. 
 
Many thanks, 
 
 
_______________ 
Matthew Muscat 
Ph.D. Student 
Institute of Criminology – Cambridge 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Ph.D. Title  
 
Basic Legitimation Demands in the Maltese Financial Services Sector  
 
Purpose of Interview 
 
This interview seeks to: (i) explore the nature of your experiences with the MFSA; (ii) 
identify your expectations of the MFSA; and (iii) to explore how your experiences with the 
MFSA shape future interactions with the regulator. The interview findings will be aggregated 
with those of other participants and will be employed to develop a regulatory legitimacy 
survey that seeks to measure the legitimacy of the MFSA as perceived by licensed financial 
market participants and to examine the relationship between the perceived legitimacy of the 
MFSA and the behavioural outcomes of compliance and cooperation.  
 
Participation 
 
Your participation is completely voluntary, and you are free to withdraw your participation 
at any time without giving any reason. There are no direct foreseeable benefits to you in 
participating, nor are there any foreseeable harms.  
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
 
All information you provide will be anonymous. None of the information that you provide 
can be linked to you and it is for this reason that I will not ask questions about your name, 
age, gender, residential address, marital status or educational attainment. This is to make it 
impossible for anyone to identify you in my Ph.D. dissertation. In addition, the records of this 
study will be kept private and confidential. Although it would be extremely valuable to 
audio-record interview, you are free to decline. However, any audio-recording will be 
destroyed after it has been transcribed. The transcripts will be stored securely and 
anonymously on a computer that is password protected. Access to the data will be restricted 
to the researcher and to his supervisor.  
In the light of the great efforts to protect your privacy, please provide honest and complete 
answers to the interview questions. 
 
Additional issues 
 
The interview should last around 90 minutes. If you would like to have anything explained 
please do not hesitate to ask the researcher. Any questions relating to the research study or 
your participation in the interview will be answered by Matthew Muscat (+ 356 79046914; 
mm2056@cam.ac.uk; 200 Main Street, St. Julians, Malta STJ 1019) 
 
Thank you very much for your assistance and participation. 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Please complete this form by checking the boxes 
 
Ph.D. Title – Basic Legitimation Demands in the Maltese Financial Services Sector 
    
Name of Researcher: ….. 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet  
and have had an opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to  
withdraw at any time. 
      
 
3. I understand that I will participate in an interview, which will be 
 recorded and subsequently transcribed.  
 
 
4. I understand that the interview transcript may be looked at by the  
researcher’s supervisor (Dr. Justice Tankebe), where it is relevant to my  
taking part in the research. 
 
 
5. I understand that in the researcher’s Ph.D. dissertation no real names or  
other identifying information about me or others will be used.  
 
   
 
6. I agree to take part in this interview.       
 
       
 
________________  __________________ _________________ 
Name of Participant          Date   Signature  
 
 
 
 
______________  _________________  _________________ 
Researcher          Date   Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
280 	
 
Appendix 3. List of Interviewees 
Interviewee Dominant  Role in 
Financial  
Services 
Sector 
Venue Date 
contacted 
by referee 
Date 
contacted 
by MM 
Date 
interviewe
e 
responded 
Intervie
w Date 
Length of 
recorded 
interview 
(hours/mi
nutes/seco
nds)* 
Pilot         
1. Brutus Yes Former 
managing 
director – 
Insurance  
Board 
room in 
office 
4 April 2017 4 April 
2017 via 
telephone 
 5 April 
2017 
47:36 
2. Kent No Lawyer – 
Funds  
Office 4 April 2017 4 April 
2017 via 
telephone 
 7 April 
2017 
1:22:44 
3. Albany Yes Former 
CEO – 
Banking  
House 
of 
intervie
wee 
4 April 2017 4 April 
2017 via 
telephone 
 11 
April 
2017 
1:44:39 
4. Romeo Yes Complianc
e officer – 
investment 
services  
Board 
room in 
office 
5 April 2017 6 April 
2017 via 
telephone 
 11 
April 
2017 
58:15 
5. Othello 
 
Yes Former –
Chairman 
Banking  
House 
of 
intervie
wee 
6 April 2017 6 April 
2017 via 
telephone 
7 April 
2017 
11 
April 
2017 
1:00:16 
6. Antony 
 
Yes Former 
Chairman 
– Banking 
Office 4 April 2017 5 April 
2017 via 
telephone 
5 April 
2017 
13 
April 
2017 
52:59 
7. Caesar Yes Former 
CEO –
Banking  
Office 6 April 2017 6 April 
2017  
8 April 
2017 
18 
April 
2017 
26 
April 
2017 
49:15 
 
24:23 
8. Mercutio Yes Former 
non-
executive 
director –
Banking  
Office 17 April 
2017 
18 April 
2017 
18 April 
2017 
26 
April 
2017 
1:11:18 
9. Tybalt  Yes Partner at 
law 
firm/direct
or – 
investment 
services 
Office 3 May 2017 3 May 
2017 
3 May 
2017 
11 May 
2017 
1:00:02 
 
10. 
Vincentio  
Yes Partner at 
law 
firm/direct
or - Trusts 
Board 
room in 
office  
8 May 2017 8 May 
2017  
11 May 
2017 
18 May 
2017 
1:15:42 
Substantive         
11. Macbeth  Yes Chairman 
– Banking 
Board 
room in 
office 
House 
of 
intervie
30 June 
2017 
3 July 
2017 
 
25 July 
2017 via 
telephone  
3 July 
2017 
 
 
5 July 
2017 
 
1 
August 
2017 
1:18:18 
 
37:28 
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wee 
12. Banquo Yes CEO – 
Banking  
Office 30 June 
2017 
3 July 
2017 
3 July 
2017 
6 July 
2017 
1:02:45 
13. Polonius  Yes Director – 
Insurance 
House 
of 
intervie
wee 
4 July 2017 4 July 
2017 
4 July 
2017 
6 July 
2017 
1:38:00 
14. Lysander Yes Lawyer – 
Banking  
Office 30 June 
2017 
3 July 
2017 
4 July 
2017 
7 July 
2017 
58:14 
15. Prospero Yes Managing 
Director – 
Trusts 
House 
of 
intervie
wee 
7 July 2017 7 July 
2017 
12 July 
2017 
17 July 
2017 
 
7 July 
2017 
12 July 
2017 
 
17 July 
2017 
9 July 
2017 
30 July 
2017 
 
 
1:34:43 
1:09:00 
16. Angelo 
 
Yes Company 
Secretary - 
Insurance 
Office 3 July 2017 3 July 
2017 
3 July 
2017 
10 July 
2017 
1:00:02 
17. Theseus  
 
No CEO – 
Banking 
Office 30 June 
2017 
3 July 
2017 
3 July 
2017 
11 July 
2017 
50:23 
18. Oberon 
 
Yes CEO – 
Banking  
Office  30 June 
2017 
3 July 
2017 
5 July 
2017 
12 July 
2017 
1:09:26 
19. Laurence 
 
Yes Lawyer/Di
rector/Co
mpliance 
officer –
Investmen
t services 
and Funds 
Office 4 July 2017 7 July 
2017 
7 July 
2017 
13 July 
2017 
1:24:57 
20. 
Gloucester 
Yes Chairman 
–Banking 
Board 
room in 
office 
10 July 2017 10 July 
2017 
10 July 
2017 
14 July 
2017 
53:06 
21. Puck 
 
No Director – 
Corporate 
Service 
Provider 
House 
of 
intervie
wee 
 14 July 
2017 
14 July 
2017 
14 July 
2017 
24:52 
22. Caliban 
 
No CEO – 
Insurance 
Office 3 July 2017 3 July 
2017 
6 July 
2017 
17 July 
2017 
46:50 
23. 
Demetrius 
 
Yes Director – 
Insurance  
Board 
room in 
office 
3 July 2017 3 July 
2017 
3 July 
2017 
12 July 
2017 
18 July 
2017 
51:21 
24. Gertrude 
 
Yes Director – 
Insurance  
Office 4 July 2017 7 July 
2017 
7 July 
2017 
18 July 
2017 
26:06 
25. Edgar 
 
No Director – 
Corporate 
Service 
Provider 
Office 13 July 2017 13 July 
2017 
15 July 
2017 
19 July 
2017 
30:50 
26. Claudius  
 
Yes Director – 
Corporate 
Service 
Provider 
Office 4 July 2017 7 July 
2017 
7 July 
2017 
19 July 
2017 
1:43:54 
27. Cassio 
 
No Director – 
Corporate 
Service 
Provider 
Board 
room in 
office 
13 July 2017 13 July 
2017 
14 July 
2017 
20 July 
2017 
1:01:23 
28. Escalus 
 
Yes CEO – 
Banking  
Board 
room in 
10 July 2017 10 July 
2017 
10 July 
2017 
20 July 
2017 
39:48 
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office 
29. Octavius  
 
No Director – 
Trusts 
Office 13 July 2017 13 July 
2017 
13 July 
2017 
21 July 
2017 
1:06:59 
30. Malvolio Yes Partner – 
accounting 
and 
auditing 
firm 
Board 
room in 
office 
18 July 2017 18 July 
2017 
19 July 
2017 
24 July 
2017 
26:03 
31. Benvolio 
 
Yes Partner at 
law 
firm/direct
or – 
investment 
services 
and funds 
Board 
room in 
office 
13 July 2017 14 July 
2017 
17 July 
2017 
24 July 
2017 
9 
August 
2017 
54:42 
57:08 
32. Portia  
 
No Partner at 
law firm – 
investment 
services 
and funds 
Office 21 July 2017 21 July 
2017 
21 July 
2017 
25 July 
2017 
37:16 
33. 
Montague 
No CEO – 
accounting 
and 
auditing 
firm 
Board 
room in 
office 
18 July 2017 19 July 
2017 
19 July 
2017 
26 July 
2017 
47:04 
34. Reagan 
 
Yes Partner – 
accounting 
and 
auditing 
firm 
Board 
room in 
office 
10 July 2017 10 July 
2017 
10 July 
2017 
26 July 
2017 
56:44 
35. +36. 
Bassanio 
and Gratiano 
 
No Complianc
e Officer 
and 
Money 
Launderin
g 
Reporting 
Office – 
Banking  
Board 
room in 
office 
30 June 
2017 
3 July 
2017 
4 July 
2017 
28 July 
2017 
44:14 
37. Macduff No Complianc
e Officer – 
Investmen
t services 
and Funds 
House 
of 
intervie
wer 
 12 July 
2017 
13 July 
2017 
29 July 
2017 
1:21:58 
38. Cornwall 
 
Yes Director – 
Investmen
t services 
and Funds 
Office 21 July 2017 21 July 
2017 
22 July 
2017 
2 
August 
2017 
54:38 
39. 
Brabantio 
No Director – 
Insurance 
Board 
room in 
office 
19 July 2017 21 July 
2017 
21 July 
2017 
2 
August 
2017 
40:41 
40. Lucio 
 
Yes Complianc
e Officer – 
Investmen
t services 
and Funds 
Board 
room in 
office 
25 July 2017 25 July 
2017 
25 July 
2017 
3 
August 
2017 
1:12:29 
41. Laertes No Partner – 
accounting 
and 
Board 
room in 
office 
18 July 2017 19 July 
2017 
31 July 
2017 
4 
August 
2017 
33:16 
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auditing 
firm 
42. 
Donalbain 
 
No Partner in 
law 
firm/direct
or – 
insurance  
Office 26 July 2017 26 July 
2017 
Responded 
via 
telephone 
on 26 July 
2017 
4 
August 
2017 
55:54 
43. Messala No Director – 
Corporate 
Service 
Provider 
Board 
room in 
office 
14 July 2017 17 July 
2017 
31 August 
2017 
4 
August 
2017 
28:56 
44. Cordelia No Lawyer – 
Banking 
Board 
room in 
office 
2 August 
2017 
7 August 
2017 
7 August 
2017 
9 
August 
2017 
23:07 
45. Iago 
 
No Lawyer – 
Banking 
Board 
room in 
office 
2 August 
2017 
7 August 
2017 
7 August 
2017 
9 
August 
2017 
32:41 
46. Rosaline Yes Complianc
e office – 
insurance  
Board 
room in 
office 
20 July 2017 21 July 
2017 
31 July 
2017 
11 
August 
2017 
1:10:18 
47. 
Coriolanus 
No Partner at 
law firm – 
banking  
Office 27 July 2017 27 July 
2017 
27 July 
2017 
11 
August 
2017 
29:09 
48. Lear 
 
Yes CEO – 
insurance 
House 
of 
intervie
wer 
5 April 2017 5 April 
2017 via 
telephone 
 14 
August 
2017 
1:54:55 
49. Juliet No Partner at 
law 
firm/direct
or – 
banking 
Office 25 July 2017 25 July 
2017 
7 August 
2017 
21 
August 
2017 
45:07 
* NOTE: Meetings with participants actually lasted longer that the recorded times. This was for several reasons. First, 
the recorder was only turned on when I obtained in the interviewee’s consent. Prior to this I engaged in general 
conversation with interviewees (exchanging pleasantries, talking about the weather, talking about the financial services 
sector, mentioning common connections and explaining the background to the Ph.D. and what the research seeks to 
achieve). Second and in two cases, participants asked me to switch off the recorder to tell me confidential information. 
Three, after the interview was concluded, I spoke for a short while with participants about my plans for the future 
including the next stage of the research.  
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Appendix 4. Legitimacy dimensions, obligation to obey, motivational postures and 
deterrence questions. 
 
Lawfulness: the extent to which operators perceive that the MFSA acts according to 
law.  
 
Item no. Item Coding 
30. The MFSA sometimes abuses its powers RC 
9. When the MFSA deals with operators it always acts according to law*   
19. In dealing with operators, the MFSA exercises its powers in good faith   
16. The MFSA and its staff act as if they are above the law  RC 
 * Adapted from Tankebe (2013)  
 
Legal certainty: the extent to which operators perceive that MFSA are clear. This 
includes whether the MFSA has unwritten rules and arbitrarily creates rules. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
74. Rules published by the MFSA are not always clear RC 
80. The MFSA has a lot of unwritten rules and policies RC 
82. The MFSA arbitrarily creates rules and policies RC 
7. The MFSA clearly explains what it expects from operators  
33. The MFSA is transparent and open about its rules and policies  
6. The MFSA does not provide clear guidance to guide operators RC 
 
Quality of decision-making: the extent to which operators perceive that the MFSA in its 
decision-making process gives reasons for decisions, is transparent, honest, consistent, 
and fair. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
11. The MFSA’s decision-making process is open and transparent  
32. There is a lot of inconsistency in the actions of the MFSA* RC 
71. The MFSA clearly explains its reasons when giving decisions   
21. Staff at the MFSA are honest**  
42. The MFSA does not treat all operators equally* RC 
56. The MFSA does not apply the law fairly RC 
53. The MFSA uses rules and procedures that are fair to everyone*  
62. The MFSA does not provide opportunities for unfair decision to be 
corrected*  
RC 
75. The operator is allowed sufficient opportunity to explain its position 
before the MFSA takes a decision*  
 
27. An ongoing dialogue exists between the MFSA and operators  
46. The MFSA does not regularly consult the industry RC 
 * Items adapted from Sunshine and Tyler (2003) 
** Item adapted from Liebling, Hulley and Crewe (2012) 
 
 
Quality of treatment: the extent to which operators perceive the MFSA to treat them 
fairly and with respect. This also includes the extent to which operators perceive the 
MFSA to be helpful. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
37. The MFSA treats operators fairly   
45. The MFSA and its staff treat operators with respect*   
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20. The MFSA does not keep an open mind when dealing with operators RC 
10. I find the attitude of MFSA staff to be hostile RC 
59. The MFSA helps operators when they have regulatory issues*   
65. Staff at the MFSA are willing to support the operator  
51. I feel that the MFSA gives operators appropriate guidance  
 * Items adapted from Sunshine and Tyler (2003)  
 
Impartiality: the extent to which operators perceive that the MFSA acts impartially and 
maintains a correct distance from the industry. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
4. The MFSA is controlled by politicians RC 
41. The MFSA acts without fear or favour  
28. Things only go your way if you know the right people at the MFSA RC 
64. The MFSA is too close to some operators RC 
54. There is too much informality in the relationship between the MFSA 
and operators  
RC 
 
Access and Approachability: the extent to which the MFSA is able to be reach and easy 
to talk to. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
31. The MFSA is accessible (able to be reached)  
5. The MFSA is approachable (is welcoming and easy to talk to)  
78. It is difficult to get a meeting with officials at the MFSA RC 
66. It is difficult to reach the appropriate officials by when needed RC 
 
Trust: the extent to which operators trust the MFSA. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
25. I trust the MFSA  
12. I find it hard to trust MFSA staff RC 
 
Distributive fairness: the extent to which operators perceive the MFSA to use a one-
size-fits-all approach and to be overbearing. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
34. The regulator adopts a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation RC 
52. The regulator adopts a one-size-fits-all approach to supervision  RC 
23. MFSA decisions are usually fair*   
58. The MFSA is too heavy-handed in enforcing decisions  RC 
36. The MFSA imposes too many rules and regulations on operators RC 
40. The MFSA is too rigid in the way it applies the law RC 
 *Adapted from Tankebe, 2013  
 
Effectiveness in performing their functions: the extent to which operators perceive the 
MFSA to be carrying out its roles. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
35. The MFSA has sufficient powers to carry out its functions effectively  
61. The MFSA is doing a good job investigating regulatory violations  
8. The MFSA tries to tell operators how to run its business RC 
57. The MFSA ensures that the right entities/people are authorised    
18. The MFSA does not conduct enough surprise inspections and RC 
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compliance visits  
63. The MFSA is doing a good job supervising operators   
69. The MFSA ensures high standards of conduct from operators  
50. The MFSA is not doing enough to protect consumers RC 
73. The regulator is doing a good job protecting Malta’s reputation as a 
financial services centre 
 
77. The MFSA is doing a good job at regulating the industry  
 
Competence: the extent to which operators perceive the MFSA to be staffed by 
individuals who have the skill, knowledge, experience and training to be able to carry 
out its functions. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
29. MFSA staff know how to carry out their roles well   
70. MFSA Staff are not well versed in the relevant regulations RC 
1. Staff at the MFSA have the necessary regulatory experience to 
discharge their functions  
 
76. Staff at the MFSA lack the necessary industry experience to 
discharge their functions  
RC 
39. MFSA staff have the technical (specialized) knowledge to discharge 
their functions 
 
85. Staff at the MFSA appear properly trained for their roles  
48. The MFSA adopts a tick-the-box approach when carrying out its 
functions 
RC 
3. The MFSA prioritizes substance over form  
 
 
 
Empathetic Understanding: the extent to which operators perceive the MFSA staff to 
understand the business of the operator, its needs and the industry. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
2. MFSA staff do not understand the business of the operator  RC 
26. Staff at the MFSA do not understand the business needs of the 
operator 
RC 
43. The regulator understands the economic landscape in which the 
operator operates 
 
81. MFSA staff understand the industry in which the operator works  
49. Generally, the MFSA understands how the operator views things*   
17. Staff at the MFSA understand how the law applies in practice  
55. The regulator understands the challenges faced by the operator  
38. Staff at the MFSA do not care about the impact of their decisions on 
the operator 
RC 
60. The MFSA is not doing enough to understand the choices that 
operators have to make* 
RC 
84. The MFSA does not listen to what operators have to say* RC 
 *Items adapted from Barrett-Lennard (2015)   
 
Responsiveness: the extent to which operators perceive that the MFSA is fast acting, 
efficient and adaptable. 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
68. The MFSA does not take the needs of operators into account when 
implementing EU directives 
RC 
79. The MFSA is flexible enough to find solutions for the operator  
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83. The MFSA adapts to a changing regulatory environment  
13. The MFSA acts in a timely manner  
22. The licensing process is too slow RC 
67. The MFSA provides timely guidance to operators  
44 The MFSA does not respond quickly to breaches committed by 
operators 
RC 
 
Stand-alone items 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
14. The MFSA does not seem to have enough staff to attend to operators RC 
72. The MFSA suffers from a lack of leadership RC 
47. I feel that the MFSA trusts the organization I work with  
24. Operators and the MFSA have different views on what is right or 
wrong 
 
RC 
15. Staff at the MFSA tend to do the right thing  
 
 
Obligation to obey (adapted from Trinkner, Jackson, and Tyler, 2018)  
 
Item no. Item Coding 
89. Operators should support MFSA decisions even when the operator 
disagrees with them 
 
100. The operator should do what the MFSA directs even if the operator 
does not understand or agree with the reasons 
 
102. I do what the MFSA directs even if I don’t like how they treat me  
97. All regulations should be strictly obeyed  
93. Some regulations are made to be broken 
 
 
RC 
87. Sometimes doing the right thing means breaking the applicable 
regulations  
 
RC 
91. There are times when it is ok to ignore the applicable regulations  RC 
105. Sometimes the operator has to bend the law for things to come out 
right. 
 
RC 
 
Motivational postures (items adapted from Braithwaite, 2013) 
 
Commitment: the extent to which operators comply willingly  
 
Item no. Item Coding 
92. Complying with the applicable regulations is the right thing to do  
88. The operator’s policy is to comply with the applicable regulations 
with good will  
 
95. I resent complying with the MFSA’s directives RC 
103. I find myself being less open and transparent with the MFSA RC 
 
Capitulation: the extent to which operators comply but do so unwillingly  
 
Item no. Item Coding 
94. I comply with the applicable regulation even though I feel no moral 
obligation to do so  
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86. No matter how cooperative or uncooperative the MFSA is, operator’s 
policy is always to be cooperative with the MFSA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resistance: the extent to which operators feel a need to take a stand against the MFSA   
 
Item no. Item Coding  
96. As an industry, we need more operators willing to take a 
stand against the MFSA 
  
101. It is important not to let the MFSA push the operator 
around 
  
 
Disengagement: the extent to which operators feel that they are losing their connection 
with the norm and values of the regulatory systems and continue operating without 
paying heed to the MFSA’s demands  
 
Item no. Item Coding 
98. I don’t think there is much the MFSA can do if the operator doesn’t 
want to comply  
 
106. If the MFSA gets tough with the operator, the operator can become 
uncooperative with the MFSA 
 
 
 
Game playing: the extent to which operators find legal ways to beat the system or 
complying with the letter of the law but not its spirit 
 
Item no. Item Coding 
104. I enjoy talking to other industry players about loopholes in the 
applicable regulations  
 
90. I always seek to find the grey area in the applicable regulations   
99. I enjoy the challenge of findings ways round the applicable regulations   
107. I do things to give the appearance of compliance   
 
Deterrence 
  
Item no. Item Coding 
108. If an operator breaches the applicable regulations, what is the likelihood 
that the MFSA will discover the breach?* 
 
109. If the MFSA sanctions an operator for breaching the applicable 
regulations, how big a problem would it be for an operator?** 
 
 *item adapted from Murphy, Bradford and Jackson (2016) 
**item adapted from Grasmick and Bursik (1990) 
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Appendix 5. Quantitative stage – Email sent to Participants and Basic Legitimation 
Demands Survey 
 
Email sent to participants inviting them to participate in survey 
 
Dear [insert name of participant],  
 
I hope this email finds you well.  
 
[I believe [insert name of referee] spoke to you about my research project earlier today]43 
 
I am reading for a Ph.D. at the Institute of Criminology at the University of Cambridge. 
 
The title of my dissertation is “Basic Legitimation Demands in the Maltese Financial 
Services Sector”. The dissertation addresses the following questions: (i) what are operators’ 
experiences with the MFSA?; (ii) what do operators expect from the MFSA?; (iii) how do 
operators respond to a failure to meet those expectations?; and (iv) what is the relationship 
between the legitimacy of the MFSA and operators’ attitudes towards compliance and 
cooperation?   
 
To help me explore these questions, you are kindly being invited to take part in a survey on a 
voluntary basis. Participation in this survey is strictly anonymous and confidential. 
 
To take the survey please click on the link below: 
 
https://cambridge.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_9pfINV6TbOfbn7f 
 
The survey will not take longer than 15 minutes to complete. 
 
No identifying information such as name or email address will be collected. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
Matthew  
 
 
 
43 This phrase was only included in those cases were participants were contacted following an introduction by a 
referral source.  
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Basic Legitimation Demands Survey 
 
 
PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET      
 
Ph.D. Title       
 
Basic Legitimation Demands in the Maltese Financial Services Sector       
 
Purpose of Questionnaire      
 
This questionnaire is designed to measure: (i) the extent to which your expectations of the 
MFSA are being met; and (ii) your attitudes towards compliance and cooperation. Your 
completed questionnaire will be combined with those of other participants and aggregate 
results, not individual responses, will be reported.       
 
Participation      
 
Your participation is VOLUNTARY, and you are free to withdraw your participation at any 
time without giving any reason.      
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality       
 
The questionnaire is ANONYMOUS. All responses will be kept in STRICT CONFIDENCE 
and will never be revealed as coming from you. You will never be identified or associated 
with any of the responses you provide. Your individual responses to the questions in the 
survey will not be given to anyone at all.  The surveys will be stored securely. Access to the 
data will be restricted to the researcher and to his supervisor (Dr. Justice Tankebe).       
 
Structure of Questionnaire      
 
Part One asks for some background information.      
 
Part Two asks whether your expectations are being met.      
 
Part Three asks about your attitudes towards compliance and cooperation. 
 
Part Four asks about your perceptions on the certainty and severity of punishment. 
 
Part Five contains space to add additional comments.      
 
Additional issues      
 
The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. 
 
  
If you would like to have anything explained please do not hesitate to contact the researcher. 
Any questions relating to the research study or to your participation in the survey will be 
answered by Matthew Muscat (+ 44 7711187546; +356 79046914; mm2056@cam.ac.uk).    
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By clicking the button below: 
 
 
(i) I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet. 
 
(ii) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason. 
   
                      
Please note that this survey will be best displayed on a laptop or desktop computer.  Some 
features may be less compatible for use on a mobile device.     
o I consent, begin the study  
o I do not consent, I do not wish to participate  
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PART 1 
 
This section asks for some demographic information 
 
 
Q1 The entity which you work with or for is licensed as a: (please tick the category of entity 
with which you are mainly involved): 
o Credit institution  
o Financial institution  
o Insurance undertaking  
o Investment services undertaking  
o Fund  
o Trustee and Fiduciary  
o Corporate Service Provider   
o Other (please specify) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q2 What is your role, position or title in the licensed entity indicated above? (Please write 
your answer in the space below) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q3 How long has your company or organisation been involved in the financial services 
industry? (Please write your answer in the space below) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q4 Have you ever been employed with the MFSA? (Please select the appropriate response) 
o Yes  
o No  
 
Q5 How would you describe the size of your company? (Please select the appropriate 
response)  
o Small  
o Medium  
o Large  
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Q6 How many times has your company been sanctioned by the MFSA? (Please select the 
appropriate response) 
o Never  
o Once  
o Twice  
o Three or more times  
o Don't know  
 
Q7 If your company has ever been sanctioned, what was the most recent sanction the 
company received? (Please choose one) 
o Administrative fine  
o Reprimand  
o Warning  
o Restriction of license  
o Suspension of license  
o Appointment of competent person  
o Other ________________________________________________ 
 
Q8 In the last 12 months with which unit within the MFSA did you have the most contact 
with? (Please choose one) 
o Authorisation Unit   
o Banking Supervision Unit   
o Securities and Markets Supervision Unit   
o Insurance and Pensions Supervision Unit  
o Conduct Supervision Unit  
o Enforcement Unit  
o Other ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 	
 
PART 2 
 
 This part asks whether your expectations from the MFSA are being satisfied. For each 
statement, please select the response that best describes how you feel.  
 
 
Q1 Staff at the MFSA have the necessary regulatory experience to discharge their functions 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q2 MFSA staff do not understand the business of the operator  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q3 The MFSA prioritizes substance over form 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q4 The MFSA is controlled by politicians 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
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Q5 The MFSA is approachable (i.e., is welcoming and easy to talk to) 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q6 The MFSA does not provide clear guidance to guide operators  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q7 The MFSA clearly explains what it expects from operators 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q8 The MFSA tries to tell the operator how to run its business 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q9 When the MFSA deals with operators it always acts according to law 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
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o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q10 I find the attitude of MFSA staff to be hostile  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q11 The MFSA's decision-making process is open and transparent  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q12 I find it hard to trust MFSA staff 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q13 The MFSA acts in a timely manner 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
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Q14 The MFSA does not seem to have enough staff to attend to operators 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q15 Staff at the MFSA tend to do the right thing 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q16 The MFSA and its staff act as if they are above the law 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q17 Staff at the MFSA understand how the law applies in practice 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q18 The MFSA does not conduct enough surprise inspections and compliance visits 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
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o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
 
 
Q19 In dealing with operators, the MFSA exercises its powers in good faith 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q20 The MFSA does not keep an open mind when dealing with operators 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q21 Staff at the MFSA are honest 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q22 The licensing process is too slow 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
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Q23  MFSA decisions are usually fair 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q24 Operators and the MFSA have different views on what is right or wrong 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q25 I trust the MFSA 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q26 Staff at the MFSA do not understand the business needs of the operator 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q27 An ongoing dialogue exists between the MFSA and operators 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
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o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
Q28 Things only go your way if you know the right people at the MFSA 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q29 MFSA staff know how to carry out their roles well 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q30 The MFSA sometimes abuses its powers 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q31 The MFSA is accessible (i.e., able to be reached) 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q32 There is a lot of inconsistency in the actions of the MFSA 
o Strongly agree  
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o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q33 The MFSA is transparent and open about its rules and policies 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q34 The MFSA adopts a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q35 The MFSA has sufficient powers to carry out its functions effectively  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q36 The MFSA imposes too many rules and regulations on operators 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
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o Strongly disagree  
 
Q37 The MFSA treats operators fairly  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q38 Staff at the MFSA do not care about the impact of their decisions on the operator 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q39 MFSA staff have the technical (specialized) knowledge to discharge their functions  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q40 The MFSA is too rigid in the way it applies the law 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q41 The MFSA acts without fear or favour 
o Strongly agree  
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o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
Q42 The MFSA does not treat all operators equally 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q43 The regulator understands the economic landscape in which the operator operates   
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q44 The MFSA does not respond quickly enough to breaches committed by operators 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q45 The MFSA and its staff treat operators with respect 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
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Q46 The MFSA does not regularly consult the industry  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q47 I feel that the MFSA trusts the organization I work with 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q48 The MFSA adopts a tick-the-box approach when carrying out its functions  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q49 Generally, the MFSA understands how the operator views things 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q50 The MFSA is not doing enough to protect consumers 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
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o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q51 I feel that the MFSA gives operators appropriate guidance 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q52 The MFSA adopts a one-size-fits-all approach to supervision  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q53 The MFSA uses rules and procedures that are fair to everyone 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q54 There is too much informality in the relationship between the MFSA and operators  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
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Q55 The MFSA understands the challenges faced by the operator 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
Q56 The MFSA does not apply the law fairly 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q57 The MFSA ensures that the right entities/people are licensed 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q58 The MFSA is too heavy-handed in enforcing decisions  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q59 The MFSA helps operators when they have regulatory issues 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
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o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q60 The MFSA is not doing enough to understand the choices that operators have to make 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q61 The MFSA is doing a good job investigating regulatory violations 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q62 The MFSA does not provide opportunities for unfair decisions to be corrected 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q63 The MFSA is doing a good job supervising operators 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q64 The MFSA is too close to some operators  
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o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q65 Staff at the MFSA are willing to support the operator 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q66 It is difficult to reach the appropriate officials when needed 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q67 The MFSA provides timely guidance to operators 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q68 The MFSA does not take the needs of operators into account when implementing EU 
directives 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
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o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q69 The MFSA ensures high standards of conduct from operators 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q70 Staff at the MFSA are not well versed in the relevant regulations  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q71 The MFSA clearly explains its reasons when giving decisions 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q72 The MFSA suffers from a lack of leadership 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q73 The MFSA is doing a good job protecting Malta’s reputation as a financial services 
centre 
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o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q74 Rules published by the MFSA are not always clear  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q75 The operator is allowed sufficient opportunity to explain its position before the MFSA 
takes a decision 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q76 Staff at the MFSA lack the necessary industry experience to discharge their functions 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q77 The MFSA is doing a good job at regulating the industry 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
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o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q78 It is difficult to get a meeting with officials at the MFSA 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q79 The MFSA is flexible enough to find solutions for the operator 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q80 The MFSA has a lot of unwritten rules and policies 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q81 MFSA staff understand the industry in which the operator works 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q82 The MFSA arbitrarily creates rules and policies 
312 	
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q83 The MFSA adapts to a changing regulatory environment 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q84 The MFSA does not listen to what operators have to say 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q85 Staff at the MFSA appear properly trained for their roles 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
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PART 3 
 
 This part asks about your attitudes towards compliance and cooperation. For each statement, 
please select the response that best describes how you feel.  
 
 
Q86 No matter how cooperative or uncooperative the MFSA is, the operator's policy is 
always to be cooperative with the MFSA 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
  
Q87 Sometimes doing the right thing means breaking the applicable regulations  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q88 The operator's policy is to comply with the applicable regulations with good will 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q89 Operators should support MFSA decisions even when the operator disagrees with them 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
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o Strongly disagree  
 
Q90 I always seek to find the grey area in the applicable regulations 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q91 There are times when it is ok to ignore the applicable regulations  
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q92 Complying with the applicable regulations is the right thing to do 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q93 Some regulations are made to be broken 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q94 I comply with the applicable regulation even though I feel no moral obligation to do so 
o Strongly agree  
315 	
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q95 I resent complying with the MFSA’s directives 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q96 As an industry, we need more operators willing to take a stand against the MFSA 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q97 All regulations should be strictly obeyed 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q98 I don’t think there is much the MFSA can do if the operator doesn’t want to comply 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
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o Strongly disagree  
 
Q99 I enjoy the challenge of findings ways round the applicable regulations 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q100 The operator should do what the MFSA directs even if the operator does not 
understand or agree with the reasons 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q101 It is important not to let the MFSA push the operator around 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q102 I do what the MFSA directs even if I don’t like how they treat me 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q103 I find myself being less open and transparent with the MFSA 
o Strongly agree  
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o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q104 I enjoy talking to other industry players about loopholes in the applicable regulations 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q105 Sometimes the operator has to bend the law for things to come out right. 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q106 If the MFSA gets tough with the operator, the operator can become uncooperative with 
the MFSA 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree  
 
Q107 I do things to give the appearance of compliance 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree  
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o Strongly disagree  
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PART 4 
 
This part asks about your perceptions concerning the certainty and severity of punishment.  
 
 
Q108 If an operator breaches the applicable regulations, what is the likelihood that the MFSA 
will discover the breach? 
o Very likely  
o Likely  
o Not likely  
o Not likely at all  
 
Q109 If the MFSA sanctions an operator for breaching the applicable regulations, how big a 
problem would it be for an operator? 
o A very big problem  
o A big problem  
o A little problem  
o Hardly any problem  
o No problem at all  
 
PART 5 
 
Q140 In the space below please include any additional comments you wish to make in regard 
to the MFSA  
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q141 Please take a moment or two to check that you have answered all the relevant 
questions. If you are satisfied with your responses click the "Submit Survey" button. 
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Appendix 6. Motivational Postures scales, Obligation to Obey scale and Key 
Correlations 
Table 1. Original Motivational Postures Scales  
 
Table 2. Revised Motivational Postures Scales 
 
Motivational Postures  Cronbach’s Alpha (a) Improved Cronbach’s Alpha (a) 
Commitment/capitulation  0.381 0.635 
Complying with the applicable 
regulations is the right thing to do 
  
The operator's policy is to comply 
with the applicable regulations 
with good will 
  
I resent complying with the 
MFSA’s directives 
  
I find myself being less open and 
transparent with the MFSA  
  
I comply with the applicable 
regulation even though I feel no 
moral obligation to do so (item 
deleted) 
  
No matter how cooperative or 
uncooperative the MFSA is, the 
  
Motivational Postures  Cronbach’s Alpha (a) 
Commitment  0.582 
Complying with the applicable regulations is the 
right thing to do 
 
The operator's policy is to comply with the 
applicable regulations with good will 
 
I resent complying with the MFSA’s directives*  
I find myself being less open and transparent with 
the MFSA* 
 
Capitulation -0.052 
I comply with the applicable regulation even though 
I feel no moral obligation to do so 
 
No matter how cooperative or uncooperative the 
MFSA is, the operator's policy is always to be 
cooperative with the MFSA 
 
Resistance 0.484 
As an industry, we need more operators willing to 
take a stand against the MFSA 
 
It is important not to let the MFSA push the operator 
around 
 
Disengagement  -0.283 
I don’t think there is much the MFSA can do if the 
operator doesn’t want to comply 
 
If the MFSA gets tough with the operator, the 
operator can become uncooperative with the MFSA 
 
Game-Playing  0.654 
I enjoy talking to other industry players about 
loopholes in the applicable regulations 
 
I always seek to find the grey area in the applicable 
regulations 
 
I enjoy the challenge of findings ways round the 
applicable regulations 
 
I do things to give the appearance of compliance  
* Items were reverse coded  
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operator's policy is always to be 
cooperative with the MFSA 
Resistance/disengagement  0.023 0.418 
As an industry, we need more 
operators willing to take a stand 
against the MFSA 
  
It is important not to let the MFSA 
push the operator around 
  
I don’t think there is much the 
MFSA can do if the operator 
doesn’t want to comply 
  
If the MFSA gets tough with the 
operator, the operator can become 
uncooperative with the MFSA 
(item deleted) 
  
 
Table 3. Obligation to Obey Scale  
 
Items Cronbach’s Alpha (a) 0.728 
Operators should support MFSA decisions even when the 
operator disagrees with them 
 
The operator should do what the MFSA directs even if 
the operator does not understand or agree with the 
reasons 
 
I do what the MFSA directs even if I don’t like how they 
treat me 
 
All regulations should be strictly obeyed  
Some regulations are made to be broken*  
Sometimes doing the right thing means breaking the 
applicable regulations* 
 
There are times when it is ok to ignore the applicable 
regulations* 
 
Sometimes the operator has to bend the law for things to 
come out right* 
 
* Items were reverse coded  
 
Table 4. Correlations between key research variables  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Legitimacy 
aggregate 
1         
2. Rule of law 0.949** 1        
3. Distributive 
Fairness 
0.703** 0.480** 1       
4. 
Responsiveness 
0.554** 0.397** 0.341** 1      
5. Likelihood 
of 
apprehension  
0.182** 0.189** 0.043 0.186** 1     
6. Severity of 
punishment 
0.004 -0.003 0.048 -0.046 0.411** 1    
7. Obligation 
to obey 
0.237** 0.221** 0.184** 0.119 0.079 0.039 1   
8. Positive 
attitudes to 
compliance 
0.340** 0.387** 0.186** -0.007 0.010 0.089 0.438** 1  
9. Game-
playing 
-0.102 -0.095 -0.118 0.018 0.037 0.010 -0.401** -0.261** 1 
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Appendix 7. Summary statistics for items  
 
Item Mean** Standard Deviation  
A. Rule of Law (Lawfulness, trust, 
procedural fairness and 
competence)  
  
In dealing with operators, the MFSA 
exercises its powers in good faith 
(Q19) 
3.75 0.784 
I find the attitude of MFSA staff to 
be hostile (Q10) * 
3.73 0.816 
The MFSA and its staff act as if they 
are above the law (Q16)* 
3.56 0.916 
The MFSA sometimes abuses its 
powers (Q30)* 
3.29 0.944 
MFSA decisions are usually fair 
(Q23) (adapted from Tankebe (2013) 
3.51 0.802 
I trust the MFSA (Q25) 3.61 0.837 
The MFSA treats operators fairly 
(Q37) 
3.41 0.776 
I find it hard to trust MFSA staff 
(Q12) * 
3.68 0.833 
The MFSA does not apply the law 
fairly (Q56)* 
3.48 0.821 
When the MFSA deals with 
operators it always acts according to 
law (Q9) 
3.77 0.802 
Things only go your way if you 
know the right people at the MFSA 
(Q28) * 
3.08 0.944 
MFSA staff know how to carry out 
their roles well (Q29) 
3.36 0.733 
Staff at the MFSA understand how 
the law applies in practice (Q17) 
3.17 0.897 
B. Distributive Fairness    
The regulator adopts a one-size-fits-
all approach to regulation (Q34) * 
2.60 0.976 
The regulator adopts a one-size-fits-
all approach to supervision (Q52) * 
2.65 0.934 
The MFSA is too rigid in the way it 
applies the law (Q40) * 
2.56 0.896 
The MFSA adopts a tick-the-box 
approach when carrying out its 
functions (Q48) * 
2.23 0.954 
C. Responsiveness    
The licensing process is too slow 
(Q22) * 
1.97 0.888 
The MFSA acts in a timely manner 2.38 1.024 
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(Q13)  
D. Obligation to Obey (adapted 
from Trinker, Jackson, and Tyler 
(2018)) 
  
Operators should support MFSA 
decisions even when the operator 
disagrees with them (Q89) 
3.29 0.913 
The operator should do what the 
MFSA directs even if the operator 
does not understand or agree with 
the reasons (Q100) 
3.18 0.965 
I do what the MFSA directs even if I 
don’t like how they treat me (Q102) 
3.46 0.905 
All regulations should be strictly 
obeyed (Q97) 
3.83 0.766 
Some regulations are made to be 
broken* (Q93) 
4.22 0.802 
Sometimes doing the right thing 
means breaking the applicable 
regulations* (Q87) 
3.57 0.941 
There are times when it is ok to 
ignore the applicable regulations* 
(Q91) 
4.06 0.724 
Sometimes the operator has to bend 
the law for things to come out right* 
(Q105) 
3.66 0.824 
E. Positives Attitudes to 
Compliance (adapted from 
Braithwaite, 2009; 2013)  
  
Complying with the applicable 
regulations is the right thing to do 
(Q92) 
4.28 0.613 
The operator’s policy is to comply 
with the applicable regulations with 
good will (Q88) 
4.30 0.542 
I resent complying with the MFSA’s 
directives* (Q95) 
3.97 0.846 
I find myself being less open and 
transparent with the MFSA* (Q103) 
3.69 0.906 
No matter how cooperative or 
uncooperative the MFSA is, 
operator’s policy is always to be 
cooperative with the MFSA (Q86) 
4.30 0.566 
F. Deterrence (not summated into 
a scale) 
  
1. If an operator breaches the 
applicable regulations, what is the 
likelihood that the MFSA will 
discover the breach? (adapted from 
Murphy, Bradford and Jackson, 
2.72 0.639 
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2016) 
2. If the MFSA sanctions an operator 
for breaching the applicable 
regulations, how big a problem 
would it be for an operator? (adapted 
from Grasmick and Bursik (1990 
4.13 0.699 
A, B, C, D, and E response set 
ranging from: 1- strongly disagree to 
5 – strongly agree. 
 
F1 response set ranging from: 1-not 
likely at all to 4-very likely 
 
F2 response set ranging from: 1-no 
problem at all to 5-a very big 
problem 
 
* items were reverse coded 
** N = 214 - 225 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
